Now, with the likelihood of unrest and government crackdowns continuing, the possibility of a second U.S. attack remains viable. Iran’s people deserve international support as they endure what may prove to be the most brutal suppression in the history of the Islamic Republic. But the quick pivot to considering military force without serious domestic debate in the United States or clarity about what force is meant to achieve, and whether this is the best way to help the Iranian people, is alarming. The President and other senior officials have offered mixed messages on the purpose of military threats, suggesting goals ranging from the protection of protesters, the possibility of regime change, the promotion of freedom and democracy, striking more favorable diplomatic deals, and the need to reassert U.S. credibility. Such varied aims leave the strategic objectives of a potential strike unclear—and raise the risk that military action becomes a substitute for strategy. Moreover, military tools are unlikely to achieve any of these objectives, and may only make the situation worse. 

 Military Force is Unlikely to Advance U.S. Goals in Iran   

The most urgent rationale for using military force is to protect Iranian civilians. Reports on the death toll from the current unrest vary, but even cautious estimates suggest casualties in the thousands. Even with the government imposing a total internet blackout, the reports that have emerged make it clear the leadership sees the current protests as existential and has chosen to use the full force of the state’s security forces against its people. President Trump has repeatedly threatened Iranian leaders if they use force against the protesters, posting early in the crisis that the United States. is “locked and loaded” and would come to the protesters “rescue” if the killing continued. He later told Iranians to “keep protesting” and that “help is on the way.” 

But military strikes are unlikely to prevent Iran’s security forces from killing civilians. Striking the headquarters of the IRGC or other state institutions responsible for the killing may rattle the leadership. But as Israel’s previous killing of top IRGC officials has demonstrated, it is difficult to dismantle an expansive security apparatus through external military intervention alone. Moreover, previous attacks only led to more repression as paranoia about external intelligence infiltration led to mass arrests and executions. In this respect, military strikes can backfire and lead to even more indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians.

What if the objective is more expansive, aiming to not only protect protesters but to topple the regime itself? Trump’s statements moved in this direction as the protests gained momentum, encouraging the Iranian people to “Make Iran Great Again.” Senator Lindsey Graham and other U.S. officials have even been donning ‘Make Iran Great Again’ hats, branding Iran’s uprising as a MAGA movement. Though initially reluctant to meet former Iranian crown prince Reza Pahlavi, who has been actively encouraging protesters to overthrow the regime, senior White House envoy Steve Witkoff reportedly met Pahlavi last weekend. However, Trump has questioned Pahlavi’s support inside the country, suggesting he might be seeking information about potential alternative leaders should the Islamic Republic fall.

But the use of external military force to topple regimes has a poor track record historically. Without armed opposition forces on the ground, airpower alone has rarely succeeded in ousting governments. Peaceful protesters on the streets are not an army. They are not organized to take on the massive security capabilities of the Iranian state. This is not Syria, where an armed opposition had been organizing for years and exercising autonomy in parts of the country during the civil war before the surprising opportunity to advance to Damascus and overthrow Bashar al-Assad. Without defections and other signs of splintering among Iran’s security forces and leadership, regime collapse is unlikely. So far, such fissures have not emerged, even after the significant military setbacks during the Israeli and American attacks in June.

Another goal often linked to overthrowing the regime is the desire to see Iran transition to democratic governance, which is the aspiration for many Iranians inside and outside the country. Trump’s social media postings at times refer to his support for freedom in Iran, but the actions of his second administration suggest little interest in such objectives. The Venezuela model, that some fear may be in store for Iran, demonstrated that the administration was content with a change of leadership, not a change of the regime or its repressive machinery. Even if democracy, human rights and accountability were higher priorities for this administration, research on foreign military interventions suggests they tend to bring more repression and violence than democracy. There is little reason to believe Iran would prove an exception.

Another argument for military force is that it can advance diplomacy, forcing Iran’s leaders to accept terms they previously refused, such as the permanent suspension of uranium enrichment within the country, which has proven a major sticking point in nuclear negotiations. However, the use of military force in June did not move the Iranians to more accommodating positions. Instead of returning to the negotiating table, Iran’s leaders focused on restoring military capabilities, particularly missile capacity, to deter future attacks and make such attacks more costly for the United States and Israel. And in the aftermath of such unprecedented bloodshed in Iran, the political appetite for a deal in Washington is likely diminished. Military escalation tends to disrupt diplomatic processes, not encourage them, as evidenced when the June attacks derailed the Omani-mediated nuclear talks after five rounds of meetings.  

Finally, what if the objective is a show of force to maintain credibility, allowing Trump to claim he acted on his threats without risking prolonged military engagement. Trump prefers military operations that are decisive and short, and that do not require ground troops that could risk quagmires like Afghanistan and Iraq. But just because military operations may be conceived as limited does not mean that they are without risks. Iran has already threatened to retaliate against U.S. bases in neighboring countries if attacked. There are also secondary impacts, including the prospect that even limited strikes lead to unanticipated escalation, spilling over the borders to neighboring states and destabilizing global oil markets. Such concerns, which are not hypothetical as we saw during the June war, explain why regional states, particularly in the Gulf, lobbied Trump to refrain from an attack. 

A Smarter Way to Stand with Iranians

While it is still unclear what the administration is trying to achieve in Iran, military strikes are unlikely to advance any conceivable U.S. objective. The most immediate priority should be to help the Iranian people, and there are more effective and less dangerous ways to do so than resorting to force. 

One way to support Iranian protesters is to improve their ability to communicate with each other and the outside world during internet shutdowns and ensure that reliable information about the protests is available. Internet censorship circumvention tools like Starlink satellite terminals are already being utilized to send videos and images of the protests out of the country, and SpaceX has allowed for free access during this emergency. But relying only on private sector companies and the discretion of its leadership can be risky, and should not replace funding for governmental and nongovernmental organizations working in the internet freedom area, funding that the Trump administration has cut and is under pressure to restore. Funding for NGOs that help investigate and expose AI manipulated media that can be used by the Iranian government and other external actors to distort the nature of the unrest is also critical to document crimes and allow for accountability in the future. 

Another useful step to help Iranians who may be facing increased dangers within the country would be to reverse the current visa restrictions on Iranians who are seeking asylum in the United States and halt deportation flights of Iranians already in the country. The Trump administration sent two planeloads of Iranians seeking refuge in the United States back to Iran before the current protests, Iranians who were sure to face persecution upon their return. Future deportation flights at this perilous time in Iran would be particularly callous.

Finally, this is a moment for a global response, not unilateral military action. The U.S. government should be activating mechanisms like the United Nations, the Human Rights Council, and trans-Atlantic forums to hold those responsible for the killing to account. This is particularly difficult as the administration has withdrawn the United States from dozens of international organizations that press for accountability and rule of law across the world, not to mention the dismantling of U.S. agencies and nongovernmental organizations focused on supporting civil society and democratic governance. 

Ultimately, if the aim is to help the Iranian people, the best approach is to empower them to do it on their own without the complications and dangers of external military intervention. This is an Iranian uprising, and it is up to the people of Iran to decide their own future.

The post Military Force Will Not Help the People of Iran appeared first on Just Security.

In this collection, experts examine the legal, political, and security dimensions of U.S. policy towards Greenland, including with respect to U.S.-NATO relations, congressional oversight, and broader geopolitical implications.  

• Alberto Mora, How Congress Can Preserve NATO: Using 22 USC 1928f to Protect the Peace in Greenland (Jan. 16, 2026) 
• Frank A. Rose, Trump Is Right About Greenland — Wrong About How to Secure It (Jan. 13, 2026) 
• Michael Schmitt, The North Atlantic Treaty and a U.S. Attack on Denmark (Jan. 13, 2026) 
• Ambassador Daniel Fried, Trump’s New Year Foreign Policy: The Risk that the Bold and the Bad Outweigh the Constructive (Jan. 8, 2026) 

The post Collection: U.S., Greenland, and NATO appeared first on Just Security.

The Maduro capture gives credence to Trump’s own subsequent boast that when he is exercising his commander in chief authority, he is constrained by no law, but only by “his own morality” – whatever that might be. Indeed, Maduro’s capture constituted an act of military aggression and the initiation of an international armed conflict, all in violation of the U.N. Charter’s prohibition against the non-authorized use of force. It also runs against more than 80 years of U.S. post-war diplomacy designed primarily to create and reinforce a rules-based international order geared to the prevention of war. In ordering the capture, Trump also disregarded Congress’s constitutional authority to declare war and the related consultation requirements imposed by the War Powers Act. His statements regarding Greenland constitute clear signals of his determination to continue with his scofflaw behavior.

Unfortunately for Trump’s imperial ambitions – but fortunately for the rule of law, the U.S. national interest, and international stability – Trump’s ability to execute any act of military aggression against Greenland is constrained by an additional statute: 22 U.S.C. 1928f. This statute – which was not applicable to Venezuela because it is not a NATO member — was adopted by Congress pursuant to Section 1250A of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act and was designed to prohibit the president from materially altering the U.S. government’s relationship with NATO and the North Atlantic Treaty (the diplomatic instrument that gave rise to NATO) without prior congressional approval. 

How Section 1928f Applies to the Use of Force against Greenland

In addition to its consultation and notification requirements, the statute – which is titled “Limitation on Withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” – contains two principal provisions: first, as the title implies, a broad prohibition against withdrawal from NATO or taking other analogous steps that would materially damage the U.S. relationship with the organization and, second (and critically), a limitation on the use of appropriated funds such that the president would be precluded from using such funds to implement the actions prohibited by the statute. 

The texts of these two provisions are the following:

§ 1928f. Limitation on withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(a) Opposition of Congress to suspension, termination, denunciation, or withdrawal from North Atlantic Treaty

The President shall not suspend, terminate, denounce, or withdraw the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty, done at Washington, DC, April 4, 1949, except by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided that two-thirds of the Senators present concur, or pursuant to an Act of Congress.

(b) Limitation on the use of funds

No funds authorized or appropriated by any Act may be used to support, directly or indirectly, any decision on the part of any United States Government official to suspend, terminate, denounce, or withdraw the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty, done at Washington, DC, April 4, 1949, except by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided that two-thirds of the Senators present concur, or pursuant to an Act of Congress.

The applicability of this statute stems from Greenland’s status as an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark and Denmark’s status as a member of NATO. As Mike Schmitt has explained, “[i]t is clear that Greenland falls within the geographical coverage of Article 5.” 

While the administration will undoubtedly claim that, because it has no intent to formally “withdraw” from the North Atlantic Treaty, the statute is not applicable to the current situation, this assertion would be false. A U.S. attempt to seize Greenland militarily would constitute an attack on Denmark and, through the operation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, an attack on each of the other 30 NATO members (excluding of course the U.S.). Not only would this attack instantaneously breach, either directly or constructively, each of the four prohibitions in clause (a) of Sec. 1928f (meaning it would invariably constitute or lead to the suspension, termination, denunciation, and withdrawal of the U.S. from the Treaty), it would necessarily also lead to the destruction of the organization in its current form as the U.S. wages war on our former allies. 

Because these consequences are inevitable, any order by President Trump to launch an attack on Greenland necessarily triggers the automatic cutoff of authorized or appropriated funds that would be required to execute the assault. In addition, because the administration has clearly not only engaged in “deliberation” about taking military action against Denmark and NATO, but, indeed, has reportedly already ordered that military planning be initiated, the consultation and notification requirements of Sec.1928f have already been triggered.  

The consultation and notification requirements are:

(c) Notification of Treaty action

(1) Consultation

Prior to the notification described in paragraph (2), the President shall consult with the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives in relation to any initiative to suspend, terminate, denounce, or withdraw the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty.

(2) Notification

The President shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives in writing of any deliberation or decision to suspend, terminate, denounce, or withdraw the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty, as soon as possible but in no event later than 180 days prior to taking such action. [Emphasis added.]

It has not been reported that the Trump administration has yet complied with either of these two statutory requirements. If that is the case, it is already in breach of them.

The Constitutional Dimension

The division of constitutional authorities between Congress and the Executive in foreign affairs, including the authority to withdraw from treaties (on which the Constitution is silent), has historically been a matter of legal dispute between the two political branches. While this is a complex topic and the executive branch has been accorded great deference in the post-ratification management of treaties, with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty there is a strong argument that Congress’ assertion of a measure of legislative control so as to protect the U.S.-NATO relationship should be given preeminence over the administration’s intent to destroy the organization. 

First, Congress has a long history of deep and consistent legislative involvement in the U.S.–NATO relationship generally and with the North Atlantic Treaty specifically. Second, according to the Congressional Research Service in a Jan. 6, 2025, Legal Sidebar, the enactment of Section 1928f “is the first statute in which Congress has prohibited unilateral presidential withdrawal from a treaty.” And third, Congress has coupled its treaty termination prohibition with the Section 1928f(b) limitation of funds provision, thus coupling its unchallengeable constitutional power of the purse with the legislation designed to protect NATO. 

These factors led the CRS to conclude that if the Trump administration were to refuse compliance with the Section, it may well find that its presidential power relative to that of Congress is at “at its lowest ebb” under the Youngstown framework. Thus, if Congress were to seek to challenge Trump’s aggressive designs on Greenland, the invocation of Section 1928f would provide a strong foundation for the challenge.

Moreover, as practitioners and scholars have argued, the North Atlantic Treaty’s status as an advice-and-consent treaty and its subject matter also counsel towards congressional authority to regulate withdrawal, suspension, or denunciation: 

As the North Atlantic Treaty is an Article II treaty adopted with two-thirds approval by the Senate, requiring congressional authorization for withdrawal places limitations on withdrawal that are consistent with the degree of authorization needed to enter the treaty. Such limits are also consistent with the subject matter of the treaty, which relates to the war powers shared between Congress and the president.

The Reaction of Denmark, Greenland, and Other European Countries

The governments of both Denmark and Greenland have repeatedly stated that they oppose the annexation or sale of Greenland to the United States, a stand that is reinforced by a large majority of the public, as evidenced by public opinion polls in both countries. In addition, Denmark has announced that it is bolstering its military presence in Greenland and will consult with European allies to potentially solicit additional military support. Sweden, France, and Germany have already sent troops and the U.K. is considering it. Other EU-member countries, such as Spain and Italy, while not yet committing troops to Greenland have condemned the threatened aggression.

Danish authorities have stated that they would fight back if invaded. 

The Foreign Policy and National Security Dimensions

The repercussions of Trump’s threats against Greenland and Denmark have already been severe inasmuch as they have demonstrated to NATO and all other European nations that the United States cannot be trusted as an ally, partner, or even a good neighbor; and, worse, that the United States actually presents a military threat. 

Should the United States actually seek to accomplish its Greenland landgrab, the consequences would be infinitely worse. With NATO shattered, the European Union – along with the U.K. and Canada – would likely react by summarily: terminating all military and intelligence cooperation; closing its airspace to U.S. flights; terminating all U.S. basing rights in their territories; detaining and disarming all U.S. military personnel and assuming custody of all U.S. military equipment; and interning all U.S. intelligence, diplomatic, and other personnel. 

Beyond those immediate security consequences, economic sanctions would be levied quickly, financial cooperation and European investment in U.S. debt instruments would plummet, and Europe would seek to lessen its dependency on the dollar. Sales of U.S. products or services to Europe would sharply decline, including sales of military weapons, and the U.S. defense industry would shrink. Tourism in both directions would also decrease. There will be global economic repercussions as well. And this would only be the start.

As harmful as these security and economic countermeasures may be to the United States, the negative impact of U.S. aggression may even be worse across the Atlantic. Beyond the damage to Denmark, the most immediate impact will be felt in Ukraine and Europe as a whole. While President Trump insists that U.S. possession of Greenland is imperative for the protection of the U.S. and Europe from encroachments by China and Russia, that claim is bogus. 

In business terms, the value proposition that President Trump seems to be advancing is the following: The United States will acquire Greenland, which although vast, is barren and frozen, for the costs of waging a war of aggression on Denmark and Greenland; destroying NATO; severing our economic, military, and political relationship with the EU, the U.K., and Canada; enduring economic and commercial sanctions; and abandoning the heretofore fruitful collaborative effort to build a rules-based international order. If this is the proposed deal, most Americans will have no trouble concluding that it is a fool’s bargain, particularly from a security standpoint. 

To be clear, the principal beneficiary of Trump’s aggression will be Russia, which will no longer have to contend with NATO’s defensive barrier. What Trump has actually done by threatening Greenland and Denmark is to open up a “second front” to help relieve the pressure on Russia’s military, finances, and society created by Ukraine’s stout defense of its sovereignty and by the growing European support for Ukraine. Trump’s threats to Greenland both complicate Ukraine’s effort to strengthen its supply chains to compensate for the decrease in American support and Europe’s effort to rebuild its own military (in light of the growing U.S. indifference to Europe) and to simultaneously increase its level of support to Ukraine. 

Ironically, Trump’s second front mirrors the second front launched by Roosevelt and Churchill during the Second World War, with the difference being that the Allies launched D-Day to help save democracy while Trump’s assault is designed to advance autocratic objectives that are inimical to America’s national interest but congenial to Russia’s imperial ambitions. If Russia continues to advance, Europe may well be faced with the very difficult choice of allowing Russia to absorb Ukraine or, instead, to integrate Ukraine and its very capable military into Europe and enter into the defensive war against Russia on Ukraine’s side. This could spiral into an even more dangerous global war. If it does, the Trump administration will share a very large portion of the blame.

Conclusion and Recommendation

President Trump’s threats of military aggression towards Greenland and Denmark are madness. If carried through they will betray American values, make the world less safe, shatter NATO, destroy our historic relationship with our European partners, and cause other incalculable damage to the U.S. national interest. Congress should immediately wrestle from the president his power to launch his threatened unprovoked, unauthorized, and pointless war of aggression against NATO. It can do so by depriving him of the financial means to do so by triggering the application of 22 USC 1928f and ensuring that the administration complies with its requirements.

The post How Congress Can Preserve NATO and Greenland: Using 22 USC 1928f to Protect the Peace appeared first on Just Security.

Legal Background: The War Powers Resolution

The War Powers Resolution provides the statutory framework for the unilateral use of military force by a president, such as the ongoing maritime strikes and the U.S. operations in Venezuela. Congress enacted this law over President Richard Nixon’s veto in 1973 to reassert the body’s constitutional prerogatives with respect to war and peace. In essence, Congress sought to forestall any president from taking the country to war without congressional authorization or even without congressional awareness (as had allegedly been the case for aspects of the wars in South-East Asia, such as the incursion into Cambodia). Congress attempted to do this through a framework requiring transparency before forces are in harm’s way, and mechanisms for automatic termination of unilateral presidential uses of force absent specific congressional authorization. 

Reporting: To this end, Section 4(a) of the Resolution establishes reporting requirements to prevent the president from taking the country to war in secret. In the absence of a declaration of war or other statutory authorization, the executive branch is subject to multi-tiered obligations to report to Congress within 48 hours of certain activities by U.S. armed forces. 

First, under subsection 4(a)(1) the Executive must report when U.S. military forces are introduced into “hostilities” or introduced into “situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” Such hostilities reports are the focus of this essay. 

Second, even if U.S. forces are not engaging in hostilities, subsection 4(a)(2) requires the Executive to report the introduction of “combat equipped” forces into a country (the executive branch defines “combat-equipped” as forces equipped with crew-served weapons such as machine guns requiring more than one person to operate and mortars). The goal of this provision is essentially to avoid putting U.S. forces into a position that could lead to imminent hostilities without congressional awareness.

Third, pursuant to subsection 4(a)(3), the president must also report a substantial enlargement of such combat equipped forces in a country where such forces are already present.

Two mechanisms to terminate unilateral deployments into hostilities or imminent hostilities: Notably, under Section 5(b) of the 1973 Resolution, the submission of a report under the first of these scenarios — introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or situations of imminent hostilities — starts a 60-day clock for the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from such situations unless Congress declares war or otherwise enacts specific statutory authorization for the use of force. No further action needs to be taken by Congress for the termination to become effective (though in practice, presidents have found numerous ways to try to circumvent the termination requirement or argue its inapplicability). 

When enacted, the War Powers Resolution provided a mechanism in section 5(c) for Congress to order the removal of U.S. forces from hostilities through a concurrent resolution—that is, a resolution passed by both houses of Congress but not presented to the president for his or her signature or veto. Particularly following the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in INS v. Chadha that ruled unconstitutional the so-called legislative veto, section 5(c) is widely viewed as unconstitutional. Following Chadha, Congress enacted expedited procedures for joint resolutions requiring the removal of U.S. armed forces from hostilities, which does require presentment to the president.

As one of us previously wrote (with Stephen Pomper), one of the consequences of Chadha was to “encourage[] a lingering (and in our view incorrect) impression that other provisions of the War Powers Resolution are constitutionally infirm — an impression that the executive branch has sometimes encouraged.” It is to that issue that we now turn. 

Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution

Although it is sometimes asserted (including recently by Vice President J.D. Vance) that every presidential administration has claimed the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional, that claim is inaccurate. (Charlie Savage recently wrote in the New York Times about the administration’s misleading claims on this front.) 

Although it is true that prior to Chadha, the executive branch regarded the concurrent resolution mechanism for terminating introductions into hostilities as unconstitutional based on the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Presentment Clause (Article I § 7 of the Constitution), that is distinct from claims regarding the constitutionality of the resolution as a whole, or any of its other specific provisions. As the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) noted in 1979, “the only provision that this Administration has suggested presents constitutional problems related to the right of Congress to act by concurrent resolution.” 

Under administrations of both political parties, OLC has repeatedly accepted that other provisions of the resolution are constitutional at least on their face, including the reporting requirements, 60-day clock, and the revised joint resolution mechanism for withdrawing U.S. armed forces from hostilities. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser to the Department of State during the Obama administration, testified with reference to the War Powers Resolution that “[t]he Administration recognizes that Congress has powers to regulate and terminate uses of force.”

What’s more, in practice presidents have endeavored to comply with these requirements. First, all presidents since Ford have submitted the 48-hour reports described above. Second, while presidents have certainly stretched or narrowed their interpretations of the statute’s terms to avoid the termination requirement, they have attempted to make arguments under the law for why it does not constrain their activity in a given case, rather than arguing that the law itself is unconstitutional. 

In our view, the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution is on firm ground. Congress holds the preponderance of the war-making, and war-adjacent, powers in the Constitution. Moreover, Congress has since the founding regulated when and how the United States may use force abroad (from the late 1700s to the frameworks in place today that are the subject of this essay). In sum, both the text and historical and modern practice make the statute’s constitutionality clear. 

Multiple Hostilities (and 60-Day Clocks Running) in Latin America

The first set of hostilities involves the administration’s campaign of lethal strikes against suspected drug ferrying boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific—Operation Southern Spear—in which the administration claims (erroneously) that it is involved in non-international armed conflicts against an unreleased list of 24 criminal gangs and drug cartels but, paradoxically, that it is not in “hostilities’ for WPR purposes (despite submitting a report implying that it was so involved 48 hours after the first Sept. 2 strike, as required by the WPR). These hostilities appear to be ongoing following 35 strikes and over 100 people killed. On Jan. 4, Secretary of State Rubio stated that “we continue to reserve the right to take strikes against drug boats that are bringing drugs towards the United States that are being operated by transnational criminal organizations.”

The other set of hostilities involves the administration’s unlawful use of force against Venezuela—Operation Absolute Resolve—including the seizure of its president and commander in chief, Nicolás Maduro, and his wife, Cilia Flores, in a military raid. That operation took place in the context of an immense military build-up in the region, continued threats of military force, and a naval blockade against U.S. sanctioned oil shipments from the country that remains ongoing. 

Congress has already voted on a series of measures under the War Powers Resolution that would require President Trump to remove U.S. forces from hostilities related to the boat strikes as well as in or against Venezuela. Another such vote is expected this week in the Senate. 

We now turn to explaining the two sets of hostilities, how each is governed by the War Powers Resolution, and what opportunities this creates for Congress. 

The Maritime Strikes Termination Clock

Consistent with section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the White House reported the first maritime strike (which occurred on Sept. 2, 2025) to Congress in a Sept. 4 letter. This report triggered the start of the Resolution’s 60-day clock—which was due to expire on Nov. 3.

But as this deadline approached, the Trump administration shifted its view on whether these strikes constitute “hostilities” under the 1973 law. The head of the OLC reportedly informed a small group of lawmakers that the maritime strikes did not constitute “hostilities” despite having initially reported them under the law. 

An anonymous senior administration official told the Washington Post that the War Powers Resolution doesn’t apply to the maritime strikes because, “even at its broadest … [it] has been understood to apply to placing U.S. service-members in harm’s way.” According to this official, “[t]he operation comprises precise strikes conducted largely by unmanned aerial vehicles launched from naval vessels in international waters at distances too far away for the crews of the targeted vessels to endanger American personnel.” Thus, “the kinetic operations underway do not rise to the level of ‘hostilities,’” according to the administration.

Contrary to the administration’s arguments, the War Powers Resolution’s clock has been ticking since Sept. 4th of last year, and exceeded the 60 day deadline in early November. Based on the text, legislative history, and past executive branch practice, the better view is that airstrikes, even when U.S. armed forces are not exposed to significant risk, are hostilities under the Resolution.

As one of us (Finucane) has previously explained:

There are many flaws with the Trump administration’s reported interpretation of hostilities. As indicated in the legislative history, Congress understood the term “hostilities” to apply broadly, more broadly than “armed conflict.” The Obama administration’s prior attempt to restrictively interpret the term garnered strong bipartisan congressional opposition.

Moreover, the War Powers Resolution was enacted not only against the general backdrop of the Vietnam War, but more specifically President Nixon’s legally contested aerial bombing of Cambodia in 1973 (Operation Freedom Deal) which Congress sought to terminate through funding restrictions. As Representative Zablocki (a key architect of the War Powers Resolution) explained, “[w]hat really helped the war powers legislation was the arrogance of the executive branch in saying ‘We’ll bomb Cambodia as long as we desire, regardless of what Congress says.’” It thus beggars belief that Congress somehow intended the War Powers Resolution not to cover U.S. airstrikes.

Indeed, in October 1973, to prevent a resumption of the Cambodia aerial bombing, Congress enacted (just weeks before the War Powers Resolution itself) a funding restriction barring “the involvement of United States military forces in hostilities in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, unless specifically authorized hereafter by the Congress.” (emphasis added) On November 16th—a week after the War Powers Resolution was enacted over Nixon’s veto—the Defense Appropriations Act of 1974 was signed into law with the exact same prohibition on “hostilities” but effective upon enactment. From this context, it appears clear that Congress meant to capture aerial bombing within the scope of the term “hostilities” and thus the restrictions of the War Powers Resolution. 

Although the Trump administration’s attempt to circumvent the 60-day clock is legally unconvincing, it is hardly the first administration to resort to “creative” lawyering to continue hostilities past the deadline. In recent years, both the Obama administration (in Libya) and the Biden administration (in Yemen) relied on strained interpretations of the War Powers Resolution to continue hostilities notwithstanding the law’s restrictions and the absence of congressional authorization. 

But the Trump administration’s reported theory goes even further than the arguments from past administrations in suggesting that any standoff airstrike by the United States is outside the scope of the War Powers Resolution by claiming that the resolution is inapplicable even when the president believes the strikes are part of an ongoing armed conflict, which purportedly includes hostile actions against the United States (the notion of an armed conflict with cartels and gangs and of hostilities against the United States by such groups are both facts we dispute, but which the administration has consistently claimed). Such an interpretation would allow the United States to wage an air war indefinitely without congressional authorization. 

The Venezuela Hostilities – Operation Absolute Resolve

There is no doubt that Operation Absolute Resolve constitutes “hostilities” within the meaning of the WPR. And while WPR reports to Congress have almost never specifically stated so, this was implied in the report President Trump sent to Congress. In the context of explaining why the president needed congressional authorization to undertake the operation, one of us (Bridgeman) recently outlined (with Brian Egan and Ryan Goodman) the extensive nature of the military engagement:

On Jan. 3, President Donald Trump ordered a military operation that bombed Venezuelan air defenses and other targets in the country, seized Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores from their home, killed approximately 75 or 80 people, caused the injury of around six or seven U.S. service members, and potentially resulted in regime change Venezuela. As described in the War Powers Report subsequently provided to Congress, “the Armed Forces of the US conducted targeted and limited military strikes within the territory of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.” The operation was more extensive than this brief sentence would indicate, distinguishing it from other contested unilateral uses of force that relied on unmanned “over-the-horizon” strikes (Syria in 2017 and 2018) or other types of one-off kinetic strikes (Iran in summer 2025). 

Numerous officials in the Trump administration have publicly acknowledged that this named military operation was inherently risky (calling it “very dangerous” and “audacious”). It involved approximately 200 U.S. personnel on the ground in Caracas. There were, as would be expected in an operation of this nature, fire fights between U.S. forces and opposing forces, involving both Venezuelan and Cuban military forces. What’s more, the operation took place in the context of an extensive military build-up in the region, coupled with threats against Maduro to cede power, as well as an ongoing U.S. naval blockade of Venezuelan oil tankers. (The threats and blockade continue today.)

These facts are also important for the analysis of whether the operations constituted “hostilities” for WPR purposes. Based even on OLC’s exceedingly narrow view (a view contrary to the statute’s legislative history) on what types of military engagements constitute “hostilities” for WPR purposes, all of the hallmarks are present. To focus on the most salient and long-held criterion for the executive branch as to what constitutes hostilities – actual “exchanges of fire” between U.S. and hostile forces – this operation clearly did so. Indeed, the combat resulted in dozens of fatalities amongst Venezuelan and Cuban combatants as well as Venezuelan civilians, and injuries to seven U.S. servicemembers. Reportedly, one of the U.S. helicopters that took hostile fire during the operation almost didn’t make it out of Caracas. 

The U.S. Senate also took the position that the military incursion into Venezuela constituted “hostilities.” On January 8th, the Senate voted 52-47 to advance a joint resolution to block further U.S. military action in Venezuela. That resolution specified in pertinent part that “use of military force by the United States Armed Forces within or against Venezuela constitutes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.” 

The Venezuela Termination Clock

At a minimum, the 60-day clock started running on Sunday Jan. 5th—48 hours after the operation to capture Maduro occurred. (Depending on the facts, there may be an argument that the clock should have started earlier in connection with the drone strike on Venezuela disclosed by President Trump.) 

The Trump administration will most likely argue that there are no ongoing hostilities. Unlike the argument advanced in relation to the strikes on suspected drug trafficking vessels, which rested on the idea that the hostilities were essentially not intense enough insofar as they did not pose risks to U.S. personnel, in the Venezuela context the administration is instead likely to argue that Operation Absolute Resolve was a one-time engagement that ended as soon as US aircraft left Venezuelan airspace, taking all US personnel with them.

There are reasons to contest any such claims. 

The U.S. military incursion into Venezuela, aerial bombardment of the country, attacks on Venezuelan and Cuban forces, and seizure of the commander in chief of Venezuela’s armed forces constitutes an “international armed conflict.” In contrast to the standard for a non-international armed conflict, the standard for an international armed conflict under international law is low. As explained by the International Committee of the Red Cross in its 1952 commentary on the Geneva Conventions, “Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces is an [international] armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war.”

This international armed conflict appears to be ongoing, including the prospect for further hostilities. Rather than proclaim the attack of January 2nd/3rd a “one and done affair,” President Trump has threatened another round of airstrikes, threatened the acting Venezuelan president with a fate “worse” than Maduro, and left open the possibility of U.S. “boots on the ground” in Venezuela. Notably, the War Powers report submitted by the White House to Congress in connection with the raid does not specify that U.S. military operations have concluded, as most reports of limited engagements (such as hostage recoveries, evacuations, rescue missions, and the like) have in the past. Instead, it is silent on the expected duration of the operations, although the president is statutorily required to provide that information. Moreover, U.S. armed forces remain stationed in the region and continue to support the interdiction of sanctioned oil tankers.  [Update: In a statement of administration policy opposing and threatening a veto of the Senate Venezuela resolution, the White House asserted that there were ‘’ongoing national security threats posed by the Maduro-led Cártel de los Soles and other violent drug-trafficking cartels.” This characterization by the administration reinforces the conclusion that “hostilities” remain ongoing.]

For these reasons, the 60-day clock for Operation Absolute Resolve appears to still be ticking.

How Should Congress Respond?

The Senate has now voted to discharge Senator Kaine’s joint resolution from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, teeing up a floor vote on the resolution itself as well as potential amendments. In the House, Congressman McGovern has also introduced a concurrent resolution to remove U.S. armed forces from Venezuela without specific congressional authorization. (As a concurrent resolution would not be presented to the President for signature or veto, the Supreme Court’s decision in Chadha renders it highly unlikely it could be binding even if passed by both houses of Congress.) 

In addition, measures in both the House and Senate have been introduced to exercise Congress’s ultimate war power—the power of the purse—to block funding for U.S. military operations in or against Venezuela. At present, it is unlikely that Congress could muster the votes for these various measures to overcome presidential vetoes even if they passed both houses. 

Longer term, both sets of unauthorized hostilities and the willingness of the White House to disregard the 60-day clock with respect to the boat strikes should serve as a forceful reminder that Congress needs to reassert its constitutional prerogatives and responsibilities over the use of military force. Among other things, such congressional action should entail reforming the 1973 War Powers Resolution to close loopholes in that law and give it more teeth. Such reforms would include defining key terms, shortening the termination deadline for any unauthorized hostilities, enhancing transparency requirements, and, crucially, imposing mandatory funding cutoffs. 

Regardless of the near term prospects for meaningful legislative reform, Congress must also engage in more rigorous oversight. This should include using all of the tools at its disposal (from the nominations process to use of its subpoena power, among others) to demand that the administration answer for its unilateral uses (and abuses) of U.S. armed forces and shine a spotlight for the American people on the gravity of the situation. 

Conclusion

The U.S. Constitution assigns the power to Declare War and related war powers to the Congress for good reasons that remain as relevant today as ever. It is precisely because going to war is one of the most consequential choices a country can make that decisions on resorting to the use of force were intended to be difficult—to be made after public debate and deliberation by the people’s elected representatives. Although the President would have authority as commander in chief to repel sudden attack, other military actions would require the collective decisionmaking of the legislature. The Constitution does not authorize one person taking the country to war based solely on that individual’s policy or personal preferences.

Obviously, presidential administrations of both parties have departed from this constitutional model by using military force without congressional authorization in situations outside of immediate self-defense. But even by the standards of prior executives, the flurry of unilateral military actions by this administration is striking and deeply troubling to members of Congress and the public across ideological lines. Since returning to office, President Trump has overseen military strikes in Yemen (against the Houthis), Iran, the Caribbean, the Pacific, and Venezuela, all without any plausible congressional authorization (Nigeria might be added to that list, depending on the administration’s justification). (This is an addition to military actions in Syria, Iraq, and Somalia notionally pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force.)

The last year of unauthorized, discretionary military interventions and the president’s threats of more to come—including even against a NATO ally—should spur the Article I branch of the U.S. government to reassert its constitutional prerogatives and indeed constitutional responsibilities over the use of force.

The post War Powers, Venezuela, Drug Boats, and Congress appeared first on Just Security.

Originally published Jan. 21, 2025, and frequently updated.

A. Resources

Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions 

B. “What Just Happened” Series

Mark Nevitt, Trump, the National Guard, and the District of Columbia: What You Need to Know (Aug. 18, 2025)

Kathleen Claussen, What Just Happened: The Tariff Litigation Advances (Jun. 4, 2025)

Chiraag Bains, What Just Happened: The Trump Administration’s Dismissal of Voting Rights Lawsuits (May 27, 2025)

Dani Schulkin, Tess Bridgeman and Andrew Miller, What Just Happened: The Trump Administration’s Reorganization of the State Department – and How We Got Here (Apr. 22, 2025)

Stefanie Feldman, What Just Happened: The Trump Administration Repealed Zero Tolerance Policy for Rogue Gun Dealers (Apr. 15, 2025)

Kathleen Claussen, What Just Happened: The Trump Administration’s Latest Moves on Tariffs (Apr. 3, 2025)

Ahilan Arulanantham and Adam Cox, Explainer on First Amendment and Other Legal Issues in Deportation of Pro-Palestinian Student Activist(s) (Mar. 12, 2025)

Brett Holmgren, What Just Happened: Security and Foreign Policy Implications of Pausing Intelligence Sharing with Ukraine (Mar. 6, 2025)

Nicholas Bednar, What Just Happened: Musk-OPM Send Email to Federal Employees Asking for Five Accomplishments (Feb. 22, 2025)

Roderick M. Hills, What Just Happened: Purges at the DOJ and FBI – How Do and Don’t the Civil Service Laws Apply (Feb. 14, 2025)

Alex Finley, What Just Happened: Security Implications of Trump’s Efforts to Trim the CIA Workforce (Feb. 7, 2025)

Jonathan Hafetz and Rebecca Ingber, What Just Happened: At Guantanamo’s Migrant Operation Center (Feb. 6, 2025)

Kathleen Claussen, What Just Happened: New Tariffs on Products from Mexico, Canada, and China (Feb. 5, 2025)

Tess Bridgeman, What May Be About to Happen: Can the President Dissolve USAID by Executive Order? (Feb. 1, 2025)

Brad Brooks-Rubin, What Just Happened: Trump’s Termination of West Bank Settler Sanctions (Jan. 30, 2025)

William Banks, What Just Happened: The Framing of a Migration “Invasion” and the Use of Military Authorities (Jan. 29, 2025)

Ilya Somin, What Just Happened: The “Invasion” Executive Order and Its Dangerous Implications (Jan. 28, 2025)

Tom Ellison, What Just Happened: Trump’s Executive Actions on Environment and Implications for US Climate Security (Jan. 24, 2025)

Ahilan Arulanantham, What Just Happened: Sanctuary Policies and the DOJ Memo’s Empty Threat of Criminal Liability (Jan. 23, 2025)

Andrew Weissmann, What Just Happened: What Trump’s Hobbling Privacy Oversight Board Portends for Exercise of Surveillance Powers (Jan. 22, 2025)

Justin Hendrix, What Just Happened: Trump’s Announcement of the Stargate AI Infrastructure Project (Jan. 22, 2025)

Tom Joscelyn, What Just Happened: Trump’s January 6 Pardons and Assaults on Law Enforcement Officers By The Numbers (Jan. 22, 2025) 

Mark Nevitt, What Just Happened: Unpacking Exec Order on National Emergency at the Southern Border (Jan. 21, 2025)

Tess Bridgeman and Rebecca Hamilton, What Just Happened: With ICC Sanctions (Jan. 21, 2025)

Sue Biniaz, What Just Happened: Withdrawing from Paris and other International Environmental Agreement Actions (Jan. 21, 2025)

C. Analysis and Perspectives

Elizabeth Goitein, Trump v. Illinois: A Narrow Supreme Court Decision with Broad Implications (Jan. 9, 2026)

Harold Hongju Koh, Bruce Swartz, Madeline Babin, Saavni Desai, Samantha Kiernan, Ananya Agustin Malhotra, Pete Nelson, Jake Reagan, Summia Tora and Julian Watrous, A SCOTUS Bench Memo for the Trump Tariff Case: Separation of Powers, Delegation, Emergencies, and Pretext (Nov. 3, 2025)

Kelsey Merrick, The Use of Tariffs to Raise Revenue is a Choice for Congress, not the President (Nov. 3, 2025)

Thomas E. Brzozowski, How Designating Antifa as a Foreign Terrorist Organization Could Threaten Civil Liberties (Oct. 27, 2025)

Cathy Buerger, Repression as Rescue: The Authoritarian Logic of Trump’s Early Executive Orders (Sept. 25, 2025)

Himamauli Das, Rethinking IEEPA Accountability and Oversight (Sept. 18, 2025)

Conner Bender, America’s Missile Shield Raises Legal and Cybersecurity Concerns (Aug. 27, 2025)

Devika Hovell, Raising the Cost of U.S. Coercion Against the ICC (Aug. 26, 2025)

Jordan Ascher, The APA Authorizes “Universal” Stays of Agency Action Under 5 U.S.C. § 705 (Aug. 22, 2025)

Andrew Miller and Kelly L. Razzouk, Save the PMF Program or Risk Losing a Generation of Public Servants (Aug. 1, 2025)

Michael Schiffer, Congress Shrinking from the World: the Constitution’s Article I in the Shadow of Trump 2.0 (July 23, 2025)

Ryan Goodman, Understanding DHS’s and ICE’s New Powers in Comparative Perspective (July 21, 2025)

Samuel Estreicher and Andrew Babbitt, Court of International Trade’s Flawed Ruling in Striking Down Trump’s Tariffs (July 14, 2025)

Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The Trump Administration’s Multi-Front Assault on Federal Research Funding (July 9, 2025)

Bruce Swartz, Will to Resist: What Dartmouth Teaches Harvard About Protecting American Freedom (July 7, 2025)

John Lewis and Jordan Ascher, Pathways to “Universal” Relief after Trump v. CASA (July 3, 2025)

Harold Hongju Koh, Alan Charles Raul and Fred Halbhuber, After CASA: The Administrative Procedure Act Option for Challenging the Birthright Citizenship and Other Illegal Executive Actions (June 30, 2025)

Rebecca Hamilton, The Trump Administration’s Use of State Power: Keeping Track of the Big Picture (updated June 30, 2025)

Ilya Somin, Nondelegation and Major Questions Doctrines Can Constrain Power Grabs by Presidents of Both Parties (June 26, 2025)

Elizabeth Goitein, Federal Troops in Drug Raids Outside of Los Angeles: An Alarming Escalation (June 25, 2025)

Ryan Goodman and Steve Vladeck, The Posse Comitatus Act Meets the President’s “Protective Powers”: What’s Next in Newsom v. Trump  (June 20, 2025)

Adam Grogg and John Lewis, The Legal Defects in the Trump Administration’s Attempts to Deregulate Without Notice and Comment (Jun. 17, 2025)

Rachel Levinson-Waldman and Melanie Geller, How DHS’s New Social Media Vetting Policies Threaten Free Speech (Jun. 17, 2025)

Cathy Buerger, Unequal Before the Law: How Trump’s Death Penalty Order Codifies Dangerous Speech (Jun. 6, 2025)

Suzanne Summerlin, Too Big to Be Lawful: A Federal Court Halts Mass Layoffs Across the Civil Service (Jun. 3, 2025)

Kristin A. Collins, Gerald Neuman and Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Another Reason Trump’s Birthright Citizenship Order is Unlawful (May 15, 2025)

Mark Nevitt, The New “National Defense Area” at the Southern Border: What You Need to Know (Apr. 29, 2025)

Harold Hongju Koh, Fred Halbhuber and Inbar Pe’er, No, the President Cannot Enforce the Law-Firm Deals (Apr. 28, 2025)

Paul M. Barrett, Justice Department Fails to Address Central Point in VOA Case (Apr. 24, 2025)

Ahilan Arulanantham, Deportation to CECOT: The Constitutional Prohibition on Punishment Without Charge or Trial (Apr. 23, 2025)

Aadhithi Padmanabhan, The Fox TV Problem with Deporting International Students (Apr. 21, 2025)

John Mikhail, Birthright Citizenship and DOJ’s Misuse of History in Its Appellate Briefs (Apr. 18, 2025)

Paul M. Barrett, Unpacking the Voice of America Litigation (Apr. 10, 2025)

Harold Hongju Koh, Fred Halbhuber and Inbar Pe’er, No, the President Cannot Issue Bills of Attainder (Apr. 9, 2025)

Francisco Bencosme and Michael Schiffer, America’s Absence in Myanmar’s Early Earthquake Response: A Moral and Strategic Failure (Apr. 4, 2025)

Marty Lederman, Remarkable Things in the Government’s Alien Enemies Act Briefs to the Supreme Court (Apr. 3, 2025)

Stephanie Psaki and Beth Cameron, Dropping U.S. Biodefenses: Why Cuts to Federal Health Agencies Make Americans Less Safe (Apr. 3, 2025)

Edgar Chen and Chris M. Kwok, The Trump Administration’s 14th Amendment Retcon: ‘Wong Kim Ark’ Does Not Limit Birthright Citizenship (Mar. 28, 2025)

Mary B. McCord, Dissecting the Trump Administration’s Strategy for Defying Court Orders (Mar. 25, 2025)

Rebecca Hamilton, The Imperative of Solidarity in Response to Assaults on Legal Services, Universities, and Independent Media (Mar. 24, 2025)

Andrew Weissmann, The New “Blacklists” Work When Law Firms Stay Silent (Mar. 24, 2025)

Katherine Yon Ebright, The Courts Can Stop Abuse of the Alien Enemies Act – The Political Question Doctrine is No Bar (Mar. 20, 2025)

Rebecca Ingber and Scott Roehm, The Trump Administration’s Recent Removals to El Salvador Violate the Prohibition on Transfer to Torture (Mar. 20, 2025)

Mark Pomar, Trump Move to Eliminate VOA, RFE/RL Ignores Lessons of Global Power (Mar. 20, 2025)

Jean Garner, Journalists Who Took Risks for US-Funded Broadcasters Threatened Anew by Trump Shutdown (Mar. 18, 2025)

Ambassador Daniel Fried, The US Government’s Self-Harm in Killing Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Mar. 17, 2025)

Faiza Patel, U.S. AI-Driven “Catch and Revoke” Initiative Threatens First Amendment Rights (Mar. 18, 2025)

Steve Vladeck, 5 Big Questions in the Alien Enemies Act Litigation (Mar. 16, 2025)

Noor Hamadeh and David McKean, Suspension of FCPA Enforcement Is Bad for U.S. and Global Business (Mar. 13, 2025)

Brian O’Neill, The President’s Declassification Power is a Double-Edged Sword (Feb. 28, 2025)

Michael Schiffer and Anka Lee, Trump’s China Tariff Now Treats Hong Kong the Same as the Mainland, a First in US Policy (Feb. 27, 2025)

Bill Frelick, The Racial Twist in Trump’s Cutoff of Refugee Admissions (Feb. 27, 2025)

Daniel Jacobson, The Trump Administration Cannot Use Award Terms and Conditions to Impound Funds (Feb. 24, 2025)

Mark Nevitt, How the Pentagon Personnel Firings Threaten Our Apolitical Military (Feb. 24, 2025)

Brian Finucane, U.S. Military Action in Mexico: Almost Certainly Illegal, Definitely Counterproductive (Feb. 20, 2025)

Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Attempt to Purge Trans Members from the Armed Services (Feb. 19, 2025)

Elizabeth Goitein and Katherine Yon Ebright, Trump’s Doubly Flawed “Invasion” Theory (Feb. 19, 2025)

Seth Binder, Sheridan Cole, and Haydn Welch, The Disastrous Costs of the Foreign Foreign Aid Freeze on US Interests in the Middle East and North Africa (Feb. 14, 2025)

Laura Booth, Can the President Dismantle the Department of Education by Executive Order? (Feb. 14, 2025)

Scott Busby, Freezing Support to Democracy and Human Rights Activists Undermines US Interests (Feb. 13, 2025)

Laura Thornton, Supporting Freedom and a Foreign Aid Freeze are Incompatible – But Perhaps the Point? A Case Study (Feb. 13, 2025)

Donell Harvin, The Need for Course Correction: The Risks of Treating Drug Cartels as Terrorist Threats (Feb. 12, 2025)

Winona Xu, As Sexual Violence Surges in Goma, US Aid Remains Crucial (Feb. 12, 2025)

16 US Human Rights Experts, Current and Former Members of UN Bodies, “The Trump Administration’s Attacks on International Law and Institutions”: Public Statement of American Human Rights Experts, Current and Former Members of UN Bodies (Feb. 10, 2025)

Simon Lomax, Greg Clough, Morgan Bazilian, Restarting US LNG Permitting Brings Geopolitical Benefits and the Potential for Climate Progress (Feb. 10, 2025)

Rebecca Hamilton, Connecting the Dots: Trump’s Tightening Grip on Press Freedom (Feb. 6, 2025)

Rachel Levinson-Waldman, The Dangerous Sweep of Trump’s Plan to Designate Cartels as Terrorist Organizations (Feb. 5, 2025)

Marty Lederman, The Most Indefensible Aspects of DOJ’s Briefs in the Birthright Citizenship Cases (Feb. 4, 2025)

Suzanne Summerlin, Federal Employee Rights: What Probationary Employees Need to Know (Jan. 31, 2025)

Faiza Patel, Trump’s Executive Order on Foreign Terrorists: Implications for the Rights of Non-Citizens (Jan. 31, 2025)

Sara Zdeb, The Real Reason Trump’s Purge of Career DOJ Officials Should Alarm You (Jan. 30, 2025)

Suzanne Summerlin, Beware the “Deferred Resignation” Offer: A Legally Dubious Proposal for Federal Employees (Jan. 29, 2025)

Stuart Gerson, Understanding Trump’s Choice for FBI Leadership in Light of the “Weaponization of the Federal Government” Executive Order (Jan. 29, 2025)

Adam Cox and Trevor Morrison, Trump’s Dictatorial Theory of Presidential Power – What the Executive Orders, in the Aggregate, Tell Us (Jan. 28, 2025)

Ambassador Donald Steinberg, `Elections Have Consequences’: Trump and Rubio’s Foreign Aid Halt Will Hit the World’s Most Vulnerable (Jan. 28, 2025)

Dafna H. Rand, Stopped Security Assistance: From Counter-Narcotics to Combating Human Trafficking Programs (Jan. 28, 2025)

Andrew Weissman, Why has the Trump Justice Department Not Moved to Dismiss the Case Against Trump’s Co-Defendants in the FLA Classified Documents Case? (Jan. 28, 2025)

Michael Schiffer, Stop-Work Order on US Foreign Aid Puts China First and America Last (Jan. 27, 2025)

Ambassador (Ret.) Dennis Jett, Deprofessionalizing the State Department Is a Threat to National Security (Jan. 24, 2025)

Jean Galbraith, The Legal Problem with Trump’s WHO Order: The US Cannot Withdraw Until It Pays Its Dues (Jan. 23, 2025)

Alex Abdo, A Free Speech View on the “Free Speech” Executive Order (Jan. 21, 2025)

Xiangnong (George) Wang, President Trump’s Attempt to “Save” TikTok is a Power-Grab that Subverts Free Speech (Jan. 21, 2025)

“What Just Happened” Podcast Series

David Aaron, Brian Netter and Mark Nevitt, Federalization of DC Law Enforcement, Legal Authorities and Updates (Aug. 20, 2025)

David Aaron, Carrie Cordero and Donell Harvin, Federalization of Law Enforcement in Washington DC (Aug. 14, 2025)

David Aaron and Steven Cash, The Budget Bill and the Future of DHS and ICE (July 18, 2025)

Chiraag Bains, Dani Schulkin and Maya Nir, Dismissal of Voting Rights Lawsuits (June 2, 2025)

Ambassador Daniel Fried, Dafna H. Rand, Michael Schiffer, Michael Hanna, Rachel Goldbrenner and Maya Nir What’s Next for U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Assistance (May 19, 2025)

Ryan Goodman, Tom Joscelyn, Mary B. McCord, Paras Shah and Clara Apt, Politicization and Weaponization of the Justice Department in the Second Trump Administration (Mar. 6, 2025)

David Aaron, Kevin Carroll, Paras Shah and Clara Apt, CIA Officers’ Lawsuit at Intersection of DEI and National Security (Mar. 4, 2025)

David Aaron, Tess Bridgeman and Suzanne Summerlin, Understanding Federal Employee Rights (Feb. 18, 2025)

David Aaron, Tess Bridgeman, Ryan Goodman and Mark Nevitt, Potential U.S. Military Domestic Deployment for Immigration Enforcement (Jan. 28, 2025)

Steve Vladeck, David Aaron, Tess Bridgeman and Ryan Goodman, Trump’s Immigration Executive Orders (Jan. 22, 2025)

IMAGE: President Donald Trump signs executive orders in the Oval Office on January 20, 2025 in Washington, DC. Trump takes office for his second term as the 47th president of the United States. (Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

The post Collection: Just Security’s Coverage of Trump Administration Executive Actions appeared first on Just Security.

In the 1990s, the Department of Defense faced a similar massive backlog of construction and repairs for housing. At the time, the Pentagon estimated that it would take four decades and $20 billion to address on its own. In response, Congress passed legislation authorizing the Military Privatized Housing Initiative, allowing the DOD to enter into decades-long contracts with private developers to develop and manage housing for service members and their families. In return, these developers received rental payments from service members using their Basic Allowance for Housing, ensuring them a stable revenue stream. To further attract private investment, the Pentagon could even provide developers with subsidized loans.

At the time, officials optimistically estimated that private capital could eliminate the housing backlog by 2010 without increasing federal spending and with substantially lower upfront costs. Yet, like many things that sound too good to be true, it was. The Defense Department’s privatization of military housing came at a great cost, with a higher bill for the taxpayer, lower quality for service members and their families, and less accountability across the entire system.

This experience should serve as a cautionary tale as Secretaries Driscoll and Bessent consider further privatizing critical military assets in ways that disproportionately benefit politically-connected private equity firms.

Private Capital Costs More than Public Funding

The typical argument in favor of privatization is that private firms can deliver infrastructure improvements more cheaply and efficiently than the government can through public financing. This belief justified the Defense Department’s transfer of control of almost all military family housing to private developers by 2009.

In the case of privatized military family housing, however, the predicted savings failed to materialize. As early as 1998, the Government Accountability Office questioned the Defense Department’s projections of cost savings. The Congressional Budget Office later concluded that privatizing housing ultimately cost the government more than directly constructing and managing the housing itself. Initial cost models had not accounted for long-term liabilities and indirect expenses, with total government contributions to privatized military housing projects exceeding $28 billion by 2024.

Developers are not charities. As Government Accountability Office noted, “Privatization is essentially a business venture, and like any business, it carries inherent risk.” The question for any of these endeavors is who assumes that risk. In the case of the privatized military family housing, developers often structured a deal whereby they captured the upside regardless of outcome. Many rental contracts include provisions that adjust rent to account for any increases in the housing allowances. To avoid overbuilding, developers sometimes say they will only build if the government financially guarantees the project. But when the government reduces the housing allowances or installation personnel numbers and project revenues drop, developers shift much of this cost burden onto the government and service members. Some developers claim they can no longer afford to maintain the properties and, in some cases, even ask the services to reassume responsibility for infrastructure projects they can no longer sustain.

This is not an empty threat. In 2018 and 2019, through photos and testimony, military families revealed homes plagued by mold, leaks, shoddy repairs, lead paint, and other hazards that compromised health and quality of life. Two years later, Balfour Beatty Communities, a large United Kingdom-based contractor managing more than 40,000 on-base homes, pleaded guilty to one count of major fraud against the United States for falsifying repair records to claim performance bonuses. The company was sentenced to pay over $33.6 million in criminal fines and more than $31.8 million in restitution. In 2022, Hunt Companies, Inc., another major housing developer, refused to admit fault but agreed to a $500,000 settlement with the U.S. government following similar allegations.

While military families suffered, the companies profited handsomely. The year that Balfour Beatty pleaded guilty to major fraud, its Chief Executive Officer reported higher-than-expected returns. In 2018, when stories of true conditions in housing were starting to emerge, Balfour Beatty announced a pre-tax profit increase of ten percent. Other major developers have similarly brought in huge profits while the government assumed risk and housing stock decayed.

The recent proposal to engage private equity firms raises its own unique risks. First, private equity firms operate on very high expected returns to compensate their investors and generate substantial transaction and management fees–targeting an annualized financial return of 20 percent, compared to U.S. Treasuries, which yield 5 percent. The desire to generate high returns may exacerbate the problems seen in housing. Second, these firms invest with the expectation of flipping their investments in a four- to seven-year period. The incentives to make a quick buck are often not aligned with society’s long-term interests. Private equity investment in hospitals, water systems, and parking meters have a far from perfect track record, not to mention the fact that many private equity firms are funded with capital from foreign investors. A data center financed and operated by private equity on a military installation, for instance, would raise immediate concerns about access, dependency, cybersecurity, and cost.

The Deals Both Require and Erode State Capacity

Perhaps the government should have structured a better deal that shifted more risk to the private sector. But effective contract management of complex financial partnerships requires highly skilled negotiators and managers in the government to ensure that the American taxpayer is protected. Even before the recent reductions in its civilian workforce, the Defense Department almost assuredly lacked the in-house skills at the service or installation-level necessary to administer such programs proposed by Secretary Driscoll responsibly.

Paradoxically, these arrangements are also likely to degrade the very capacity their effective management requires. When the military privatized family housing, base housing management offices were downsized, and personnel with operational and contractual expertise were lost to streamlining, budget cuts, and private-sector competition. Over the subsequent decades, inconsistent and inadequate oversight of these projects has been a persistent source of concern across the services. The Navy’s experience is similar. As it privatized shipbuilding, it shed most of its naval architects and engineers, weakening its ability to supervise contractors and contributing to long-term design and cost problems. The Defense Department’s broad outsourcing of information technology functions likewise left it unable to effectively procure, integrate, or even evaluate software and digital systems.

If the Army now turns to private financing and management for data centers, arsenals, depots, and who knows what else, it will again require robust, sustained, and technically literate oversight–yet such partnerships often siphon off or justify the elimination of precisely the personnel needed to perform it. Without deliberate reinvestment in public expertise, the result will be a self-reinforcing decline in institutional capacity, leaving the Army increasingly dependent on, and vulnerable to, the very private partners it seeks to manage.

Public Assets, Once Privatized, are Hard to Recover

Despite fierce public criticism from a Senate investigation and numerous congressional hearings, these contracts remain seemingly impossible to unwind once they are in place. As the Project on Government Oversight has reported, the complex financing structures used in these deals involve third-party lenders and long-term bond obligations that limit the ability of the Defense Department to extricate itself.

The result is an enduring accountability gap. As recently as September 2025, the Department of Defense Inspector General concluded that the military services still provide inadequate oversight of privatized housing maintenance and continue to lack both the guidance and resources necessary to protect service members and their families. Yet, when Balfour Beatty built poor housing, the Defense Department neither amended nor terminated Balfour Beatty’s contracts (in fact, it expanded their footprint), effectively ensuring private rent extraction from public assets in perpetuity.

History offers repeated lessons on the risks of surrendering control of critical assets. Each time the military has ceded authority over essential infrastructure, whether arsenals, depots, or shipyards, it has weakened its ability to produce and maintain what it needs, when it needs it. Private owners, bound by fiduciary duty to investors or shareholders rather than the public interest, operate under an inherently different incentive structure.

Why Monetize the Army?

Increasing funding for infrastructure and modernization is both necessary and proper, and should be a priority for any administration committed to readiness and quality of life for service members and their families. But against this historical backdrop, the logic of Secretary Driscoll’s proposal to court private equity firms is difficult to defend.

The only plausible advantage of turning to private equity for financing is speed of financing. Secretary Driscoll has argued that the Army faces a $150 billion infrastructure requirement over the next decade but has only $15 billion in available funds. But this framing is misleading: the Army’s military construction budget is not an arbitrary or static constraint. For fiscal year 2026, the administration requested approximately $2.1 billion for Army military construction projects. If that level is insufficient, the appropriate remedy is to work through the administration’s budget proposal process and then with Congress to increase appropriations.

The solution is not to bypass Congress’s fiscal powers, undermining the public appropriations process and committing taxpayers to hidden long-term fees and costs. Decisions of this magnitude must occur transparently, through established budgetary channels, and with the explicit consent of Congress.  Especially given the potential conflicts of interest — for instance, Deputy Secretary of Defense Steve Feinberg is co-founder and former chief executive officer of Cerberus Capital Management — it is essential to ensure that the Trump administration is not just treating the army as another piggy bank for billionaire friends. Anything less represents not innovation, but abdication of democratic accountability.

The post Will Trump Allow Private Equity to Gut the Army Too? appeared first on Just Security.

Nevertheless, the discharge petition has survived regardless of which party has controlled the House for more than 90 years. Part of its survival may have to do with the fact that discharge petitions are rarely successful in getting the necessary signatures to trigger a vote – let alone enacting bills into law. But it is enjoying a rare period of success right now and it is not limited to having forced the high-profile passage of the Epstein Files Transparency Act, which required the Trump administration to release all of the investigative files relating to convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein by Dec. 19. In recent years, the discharge petition also brought two other measures into law (the Federal Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2023 and the Social Security Fairness Act of 2023). A fourth discharge petition to nullify a Trump executive order that would strip federal workers of collective bargaining rights successfully brought the measure to the House floor earlier this month. And a fifth discharge petition to allow for consideration of an extension of subsidies for the Affordable Care Act just reached the 218 signature threshold, setting up a vote in the new year.

Shortly after the House passed the Epstein Files Transparency Act by a nearly unanimous vote, Speaker Mike Johnson told reporters that he is considering changing the House Rules to make it harder to use discharge petitions. Perhaps this shouldn’t be surprising. The current congressional leadership is limiting the rights of the minority in historic and unprecedented ways.

For example, it is also taking aim at the “Seven Member Rule,” another tool that the Democrats in Congress have used in an attempt to overcome opposition from the majority to releasing the Epstein files. This rule allows members of the principal oversight committee of either chamber of Congress to obtain information from a resistant executive branch. Seven members of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform or five members of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs is required for its use. In July, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer invoked the Seven Member Rule in an attempt to force disclosure of the Epstein files. The effort was shortly eclipsed by the bipartisan approval of a subpoena in the House Oversight Committee and subsequent legislation to force release of the documents, so it is doubtful that there is any need to push that request to an ultimate outcome. Regardless, the Epstein-related examples show just how important it is to have congressional tools that enable the minority in Congress to voice their concerns.

The Power of the Seven Member Rule

Like the discharge petition, the Seven Member Rule has a long history in Congress. In 1927, the Supreme Court found that Congress “cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information,” and therefore the “constitutional provisions which commit the legislative function to the two houses are intended to include” the power to compel information from the executive branch. The following year, in 1928, Congress established a statutory mechanism for congressional committees to obtain information from the executive branch. Congress amended the provision to its modern form in 1966, and has periodically updated the names of the relevant congressional committees as they have changed over time. The provision is found at 5 U.S.C. § 2954 and provides that, when requested, an executive agency, shall submit “any” information requested of it relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the respective oversight committee.

On its face, the provision is powerful. It is nondiscretionary; an executive agency “shall submit” the requested information. It is broad; an agency must provide “any information requested.” And the jurisdiction requirement is hardly limiting; congressional oversight committees have extremely wide-ranging jurisdiction. Moreover, unlike the discharge petition, the statute does not require any members of the majority congressional caucus to support or join in the request for the request to be effective. With 21 minority members on the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and seven minority members on the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, this provision may be used without the support of any member of the majority party.

It is likely this feature that has led the House majority leadership to change the rules of the House to thwart its use. When the Republicans took over the House in 2023, they adopted a separate order along with the House Rules that addressed the Seven Member Rule. A separate order is a freestanding provision that has the force of the House rules without actually amending the House rules. This separate order provides that the chair of the House oversight committee shall be included as one of the seven members in any request for information invoking the Seven Member Rule. This separate order was again adopted in 2025 at the beginning of the current session. The goal is obvious: converting a statutory authority that can be exercised by members of any political affiliation into an authority that cannot be exercised without the agreement and participation of the House majority.

As a legal matter, it is difficult to see how the House can thwart the federal agency duty that flows from the statutory requirement in 5 U.S.C. § 2954. The House’s separate order does not amend the statute (which was passed by both the House and the Senate and signed by President Calvin Coolidge), and the statute is what should govern an agency’s legal analysis. Undoubtedly though, the separate order is having a chilling effect on the actions of House members by making it a violation of the House Rules for a member to use the Seven Member Rule unless the chair of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform joins in the effort. The Constitution grants the House the ability to “punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour.” Rule XXIII of the House Rules requires members to “adhere to the spirit and the letter of the Rules of the House.” While censure and reprimand are historically reserved for more serious offenses, the separate order technically makes members of Congress vulnerable to disciplinary action in the House for merely using a tool that members have been authorized to use since 1928.

Over the years, House members have invoked the Seven Member Rule repeatedly. In some cases, requests have been routinely complied with. For example, in January 2017, members obtained information from the General Services Administration about the leasing of the Old Post Office building in Washington, D.C., pursuant the Seven Member Rule. The Seven Member Rule was also used to compel the State Department to produce unredacted emails between former Secretary of State Colin Powell and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in September 2017.

In other cases, the executive branch has vigorously fought the Seven Member Rule requests. For example, when the executive branch has refused to provide requested information relating to the census and additional information relating to the Old Post Office building, members of the House have taken the executive branch to court in efforts to force compliance with the Seven Member Rule. These cases have had a mixed record in the courts so far. Two district court rulings have found that the Seven Member Rule can only be enforced by Congress as an institution, not the members who signed the letter. (One case concerned the Medicare Modernization Act, and the other was in regard to additional information sought on the Old Post Office building.) A Court of Appeals decision upheld members’ enforcement authority, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the case raising questions about the durability of that decision.

Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court never reached the merits. The Court of Appeals decision was vacated as moot after a political change in the executive branch resulted in the executive branch producing nearly all the requested records. Additionally, the executive branch has argued that legislative history indicates that the Seven Member Rule should be interpreted as less encompassing than specified by the plain language of the statutory provision. For watchers of today’s Supreme Court, it may seem highly unlikely that legislative history could negate statutory text, but that issue has not been resolved by a court.

Attempts to Thwart the Seven Member Rule

The House majority’s separate order can be traced to actions taken during the first Trump administration when the Acting Administrator of the General Services Administration testified before the House Appropriations Committee that the administration “instituted a new policy that matters of oversight need to be requested by the committee chair.” That general policy of distinguishing between requests from committee chairs and individual members of Congress was not novel in context of the Freedom of Information Act. However, applying that general policy to the Seven Member Rule was new. A 2019 opinion by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel later enshrined the distinction between requests from committee chairs and individual members without acknowledging or factoring in the Seven Member Rule.

The House’s approach is an apparent effort to put a stop to uncomfortable questions being asked of the executive branch. But should a House majority be able to make its members subject to disciplinary action just for exercising their rights as members of Congress? Certainly, the House rules should not be able to prohibit members from introducing certain legislation, speaking out in opposition to other legislation, or even signing a discharge petition. These are all tools, options, and opportunities that we expect members to exercise and are necessary in a democracy. Why would requesting information from the executive branch be considered any differently? Can the House Rules prohibit members of Congress from filing Freedom of Information Act requests or showing up at a federal facility without approval of the majority? Answers to these questions are not readily available, but they point to silly and unproductive policies. Instead of obscuring government operations, congressional leadership could better serve the nation by promoting transparency.

Certainly, all information in the possession of the executive branch is not equally disclosable. Government leases, census data, advice from the Department of Justice to its federal agency clients, and communications between the president and his closest advisers, all have different legal status. But questions of privilege don’t need to be answered to allow for a more systematic implementation of the Seven Member Rule. The executive branch should provide information where it can and raise objections where it must. Congress need not be in the business of preventing a question from ever being asked.

The Seven Member Rule is not a panacea for the ailments of congressional oversight. And the discharge petition is not a solution for congressional leadership that refuses to address pressing issues in the country. But these tools, along with other established policies and practices in Congress, are essential in ensuring that Congress is knowledgeable and responsive to the nation’s challenges. They are a critical part of the checks and balances that help democracy function.

In this time of political polarization, the discharge petition and the Seven Member Rule are two longstanding features of the country’s legislative institutions that allow the minority to have a meaningful, although limited, role in advancing their agenda. Hearing the concerns of the minority party has value and rather than squelching these voices, the U.S. Congress should work to better hear and respond to them.

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Overview as of January 2, 2026: 35 strikes; 115 reported killed; 2 known survivors; 8 missing

INTERNATIONAL REACTION (Russia): On or before December 31 – Russia lists Bella 1 in official database of flagged vessels

• On or before December 31, Russia states that the Bella 1 is now registered as the Marinera, flying the Russian flag and with a home port of Sochi
• Note: See December 20 entry for U.S. Coast Guard pursuit of Bella 1.

THIRTY-FOURTH AND THIRTY-FIFTH STRIKE December 31 – 34th and 35th strikes on two vessels, killing five

On December 31, at the direction of Secretary of Defense Hegseth, Joint Task Force Southern Spear conducted successive strikes on two vessels “operated by Designated Terrorist Organizations” and “transiting along known narco-trafficking routes” in an unnamed body of water. According to a post on X by U.S. Southern Command, the strikes killed three people aboard the first vessel and two people aboard the second vessel, totaling five killed.

THIRTY-FIRST, THIRTY-SECOND, AND THIRTY-THIRD STRIKE December 30 – The 31st, 32nd and 33rd strikes on three vessels, killing at least three

• On December 30, at the direction of Secretary of Defense Hegseth, Joint Task Force Southern Spear conducted successive strikes on three vessels “traveling as a convoy” and operated by “Designated Terrorist Organizations.” Unlike prior strike announcements, the announcement of the strikes noted that the vessels were in “international waters” and “transiting along known narco-trafficking routes” but did not specify the body of water in which the attacks occurred. The announcement also stated that the three vessels had “transferred narcotics between [themselves] prior to the strikes.”

According to a post on X by U.S. Southern Command, the first strike killed three people aboard one vessel, while the occupants of the other vessels jumped overboard before strikes sunk the remaining two vessels. SOUTHCOM thereafter notified the U.S. Coast Guard to activate the Search and Rescue System for the reported eight potential survivors. The U.S. Coast Guard issued a statement that it “is coordinating search and rescue operations with vessels in the area” and that “a Coast Guard C-130 aircraft is en route to provide further search coverage with the ability to drop a survival raft and supplies.”

THIRTIETH STRIKE December 29 – 30th strike on one vessel in the eastern Pacific, killing two

• On December 29, at the direction of Secretary of Defense Hegseth, Joint Task Force Southern Spear conducted a strike on a vessel “operated by Designated Terrorist Organizations” in the eastern Pacific Ocean, killing two people aboard, according to a post on X by U.S. Southern Command. 

INTERNATIONAL REACTION (Russia): December 25 – Russia criticizes U.S. actions to blockade Venezuela

• At a December 25 press conference, in response to a question about U.S. action to blockade Venezuela, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stated, “Today we are witnessing complete lawlessness in the Caribbean Sea, where long-forgotten theft of other people’s property, namely piracy, and banditry, are being revived.” She stated that Russia would “consistently advocate for a de-escalation.”
• The Foreign Ministry spokesperson further stated, “We confirm our support for the efforts of the government of Nicolas Maduro aimed at protecting sovereignty and national interests, and maintaining the stable and secure development of his country.”

On or about December 24 – CIA conducts drone strikes on port facility in Venezuela

• According to sources within the U.S. government, the CIA conducted a drone strike on a port facility within Venezuela likely on December 24, the first known American operation inside Venezuelan territory. The strike reportedly occurred on a dock where U.S. officials believed Tren de Aragua, a designated cartel, was storing narcotics, and did not cause any fatalities.

• Note: In a phone interview on December 26, President Trump first revealed the strikes, stating, “We just knocked out — I don’t know if you read or you saw — they have a big plant or big facility where they send the, you know, where the ships come from … Two nights ago we knocked that out. So we hit them very hard.” He further stated in an interview on December 29 that “there was a major explosion in the dock area, where they load the boats up with drugs.”

INTERNATIONAL REACTION (United Nations): December 24 – UN experts issue statement condemning US naval blockade of Venezuela

• On December 24, four UN experts – Ben Saul, UN special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights; George Katrougalos, independent expert on international order; Surya Deva, UN special rapporteur on right to development; and Gina Romero, special rapporteur on the right to peaceful assembly and association – issued a joint statement condemning the US naval blockade of Venezuela.
• The statement contended that the use of military force to blockade another country is prohibited by the UN Charter. The experts further stated that the blockade constituted an armed attack – which would provide Venezuela a right of self-defense – and “such a serious use of force that it is also expressly recognised as illegal armed aggression.” They called on States to engage in “collective action” to uphold international law.

INTERNATIONAL REACTION (United Nations and Member States): December 23 – UN Security Council holds emergency meeting over U.S. seizure of Venezuelan oil tankers (UN video)

• In an introduction, UN Assistant Secretary General Khaled Khiari reiterated an October 31 statement made by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk that ​​“the airstrikes by the [United States] on boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific — allegedly linked to drug-trafficking — violate international human-rights law.” He called for “prompt, independent and transparent investigations” (full statement).
• Venezuelan ambassador Samuel Moncada stated, “The world knows that, if the scale of armed attacks continues, we will exercise, with all determination, our inalienable right to self-defence.”
• In response, U.S. ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz opened his statement saying, “the United States does not recognize Nicolas Maduro or his cronies as the legitimate government of Venezuela.” He stated that “sanctioned oil tankers operate as the primary economic lifeline for Maduro and his illegitimate regime.” He added, “One has to ask: why have sanctions either bilaterally, unilaterally, or backed by the international community – if they are not enforced? Well, the United States, under President Trump is enforcing them in international waters” (full statement).
• Brazil stated, “The aforementioned military force maintained by the United States off the coast of Venezuela and the recently declared naval blockade are violations of the UN Charter. Therefore, it should cease immediately and unconditionally in favor of the use of political and legal instruments that are broadly available.” 
• Denmark stated that it “underscores the importance of preserving the Caribbean as a ‘Zone of Peace,’” and “strongly urges all parties to strictly adhere to international law” and that “differences must be resolved through peaceful means, diplomacy, and political solutions.” South Korea, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Sierra Leone, and Algeria also emphasized the region’s status of Zone of Peace.
• South Korea also stated, “The need to address transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking, is an issue the international community cannot ignore. At the same time, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, as well as protection of civilians remain core values that the United Nations Charter seeks to uphold.” The South Korean representative also emphasized the need for non-military means to address the issue.
• Russia’s representative stated, “The acts by the US side run counter to all key norms of international law including the UN Convention on Law of the Sea, [previous] Security Council resolutions and the [UN] Charter.”
• China’s representative similarly stated, “We stand against any move that violates the purposes and principles of the UN charter and infringes upon other countries’ sovereignty and security; against the threat or use of force in international relations; against external interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs under any pretext, and against illicit unilateral sanctions and long armed jurisdiction that have no basis in international law or authorization by the Security Council.”
• France stated, “France has been closely monitoring the developments transpiring in the region specifically in the wake of President Donald Trump’s announcements related to Venezuelan airspace and the naval blockade against oil tankers under sanction, which are entering and exiting Venezuela. We call for avoidance of all escalation that may threaten peace and security in the region and beyond. As always, we recall our commitment to respect for international law and in particular the Charter of the United Nations. The principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of States must be upheld. International disputes must always be resolved peacefully in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3 of the charter. We support the Secretary General’s call for restraint and immediate deescalation as well as his offer of good offices. We extend our support as well for the mediation proposals emanating from States in the region who may contribute. President, combating narcotics trafficking needs to be done in accordance with international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and various international conventions on drug control, specifically the United Nations Convention against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances dating 1988, which sets out the relevant framework of action against illicit trafficking at sea.”
• Mexico stated: “The recent escalation of tensions and the deployment of military forces in the south of the Caribbean sea represent actions that put at risk regional stability.” He also spoke against the threat or use of force.
• Chile stated that although her government “does not recognize the legitimacy of the current regime led by Mr. Nicolás Maduro,” Chile rejects any armed activity that could put at risk regional peace and stability. The representative stated, “Chile would like to express its profound concern regarding the deployment of military action in the Caribbean,” referencing the need to comply with international law.
• Sierra Leone stated, “Without prejudging the facts, we emphasize a general point of law. When States respond to transnational challenges, whether illicit trafficking, organized crime or terrorism, those responses must remain consistent with the Charter and other applicable rules of international law, including relevant maritime rules and international human rights law. In that regard, Sierra Leone also recalls that outside a situation of armed conflict, the use of lethal force is subject to strict constraint under international human rights law, including the protection of the right to life. As a general principle, operations of a  law enforcement character should seek wherever feasible to intercept and bring suspects to justice through due process. Reports that suggest loss of life in circumstances that may not meet the strict requirement of necessity and proportionality understandably raises serious legal questions.”
• Greece, Pakistan, and Somalia cautioned against escalation that could spread instability across the region, and called for the peaceful resolution of disputes.
• See also the full statement by the United Kingdom.
• Note: Venezuela requested a meeting of the Security Council on December 17, the day following President Trump’s order of a “blockade” of all sanctioned oil tankers entering and leaving Venezuela.

INTERNATIONAL REACTION (Russia, China): December 22 – Russia and China express concern over U.S. interception of oil tanker off Venezuelan coast

• Following the United States’ interception of the Centuries, a China-bound oil tanker off the coast of Venezuela on December 20, on December 22, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that the interception as well as “unilateral and illegal” sanctions violated international law and asserted that Venezuela had the right to develop relations with other countries.
• On the same day, Russia’s foreign minister issued a joint statement with Venezuela’s foreign minister expressing “deep concern over the escalation of Washington’s actions in the Caribbean Sea, which could have serious consequences for the region and threaten international shipping.” 

December 22 – U.S. deploys aircraft designed to transport special-operations forces, troops and equipment in Caribbean

• On December 22, Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft used to transport special forces and cargo planes arrived in Puerto Rico, within SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility. 
• On the same day, in an interview with reporters, President Trump stated, “We have a massive armada for him [Venezuelan President Maduro]. The biggest we’ve ever had and by the far the biggest we’ve ever had in South America.”

TWENTY-NINTH STRIKE December 22 – 29th strike on a vessel in the eastern Pacific, killing one total

• On December 22, Joint Task Force Southern Spear conducted a strike on “a low-profile vessel operated by Designated Terrorist Organizations” in international waters, killing one person aboard, according to a statement by U.S. Southern Command. 

December 20 – U.S. Coast Guard pursues Venezuela-linked oil tanker in international waters 

• As of December 20, the U.S. Coast Guard was actively pursuing in the Caribbean Sea the Bella 1, an oil tanker en route to pick up oil from Venezuela. U.S. officials said the vessel was not flying a valid flag when the Coast Guard approached it late on Dec. 20. U.S. officials told press the Coast Guard had obtained a judicial seizure warrant and pursued the tanker after it did not submit to being boarded. The tanker reportedly was under U.S. sanctions since last year for transporting Iranian oil. 
• Note-1: This would be the third oil tanker linked to Venezuela intercepted since the start of December, following U.S. operations on Dec. 10 and 20.
• Note-2: See December 31 entry for Russian flagging this vessel.

December 20 – U.S. Coast Guard boards tanker carrying Venezuelan oil in Caribbean Sea

• • On December 20, the U.S. Coast Guard, with support from DOD, stopped and boarded the Centuries, a Panamanian-flagged oil tanker carrying Venezuelan oil in the Caribbean Sea. Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem posted a video of the operation on X, saying the tanker was last docked in Venezuela. The tanker’s cargo reportedly belongs to a China-based oil trader with a history of taking Venezuelan oil to refineries in China.

• Note: A U.S. official told the New York Times that U.S. authorities did not have a seizure warrant to take possession of the vessel, and said that the Coast Guard was trying to ascertain if the tanker’s Panama registration was valid. The tanker was not at the time on the Treasury Department’s sanctions list.

December 19 – Trump nominates new head of SOUTHCOM

• On December 19, the Department of Defense announced that President Trump had nominated Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Francis L. Donovan to head U.S. SOUTHCOM after the previous commander, Adm. Alvin Holsey retired on December 12.

Note: The New York Times reported that, according to current and former U.S. officials, previous commander Adm. Holsey had voiced concerns over boat strikes in past months. However, there was no official reason given for Adm. Holsey’s retirement.

TWENTY-SEVENTH AND TWENTY-EIGHTH STRIKES December 18 – 27th and 28th strikes on two boats in the eastern Pacific, killing five total

• On December 18, Joint Task Force “Southern Spear” conducted two strikes on vessels that it stated were “operated by Designated Terrorist Organizations” in international waters, according to a statement by U.S. Southern Command. The first strike killed three in the first vessel, and the second killed two in the second vessel, totaling five killed. 

TWENTY-SIXTH STRIKE December 17 – 26th strike on one vessel in the eastern Pacific, killing four

• On December 17, Joint Task Force “Southern Spear” conducted a strike on a vessel that it stated was “operated by Designated Terrorist Organizations” in international waters, killing four people aboard, according to a statement by U.S. Southern Command.

December 17 – Proposed war powers resolutions fail to reach the Senate floor

• The first measure (H.Con.Res.61), introduced on Nov. 17 by lead sponsor House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Gregory Meeks (D-NY), failed in a vote of 210-216. The mostly party-lines vote had the support of Reps. Thomas Massie (R-KY) and Don Bacon (R-NE). Pursuant to the War Powers Resolution section 5(c), the legislation would have directed the President to “remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with any presidentially designated terrorist organization in the Western Hemisphere, unless authorized by a declaration of war or a specific congressional authorization for use of military force against such presidentially designated terrorist organization.” 
• The second measure (H.Con.Res.64), introduced on Dec. 1 by lead sponsor Jim McGovern (D-MA), failed in a vote of 211-213. It  had the support of Reps. Thomas Massie (R-KY), Don Bacon (R-NE), and Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA). The legislation would have directed the “removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities within or against Venezuela” in the absence of congressional authorization. 

December 16 – Trump announced a “complete blockade” of U.S. sanctioned oil tankers going to and from Venezuela

• On Dec. 16, Trump said in a post on social media that he ordered a “complete blockade” on all sanctioned oil tankers going to and from Venezuela. He wrote, “Venezuela is completely surrounded by the largest Armada ever assembled in the History of South America. It will only get bigger, and the shock to them will be like nothing they have ever seen before — Until such time as they return to the United States of America all of the Oil, Land, and other Assets that they previously stole from us.”
• Note: On Dec. 10, U.S. forces seized an oil tanker, the Skipper, off the coast of Venezuela, in a law enforcement action aimed at enforcing existing U.S. sanctions on the tanker. (See entry for Dec. 10)

December 16 – Secretaries Rubio and Hegseth give classified bipartisan briefings to House and Senate

On Dec. 16, Secretary of State Rubio and Secretary of Defense Hegseth provided classified briefings to the full House and Senate on the strikes. Hegseth reportedly declined to show members the video of the Sep. 2 operation that included a second strike, killing survivors of the initial strike on the boat, calling it “top-secret,” but planned to show the video to members of House and Senate national security focused committees, given its level of classification. Members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committee were shown the full video on Dec. 17.

TWENTY-THIRD, TWENTY-FOURTH, AND TWENTY-FIFTH STRIKES: December 15 – 23rd, 24th, and 25th strikes on three vessels in the eastern Pacific, killing eight total 

• On December 15, Joint Task Force “Southern Spear” conducted three strikes on vessels “operated by Designated Terrorist Organizations” in international waters, according to a statement by U.S. Southern Command. The first strike killed three in the first vessel, the second killed two in the second vessel, and the third killed three in the third vessel, totaling eight killed. In a social media post accompanying a video, U.S. Southern Command stated, “Intelligence confirmed that the vessels were transiting along known narco-trafficking routes in the Eastern Pacific and were engaged in narco-trafficking.”

December 11 – U.S. announces sanctions on Venezuelan oil industry and members of Maduro’s family

• On Dec. 11, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced new sanctions on “three nephews of Maduro’s wife; a Maduro-affiliated businessman; and six shipping companies operating in Venezuela’s oil sector.” The Treasury statement also identified six already-sanctioned vessels that continue to provide shipping and financial resources to Maduro’s regime and announced stricter sanctions enforcement measures on those vessels.

December 10 – U.S. forces seize oil tanker off the coast of Venezuela

• On Dec. 10, U.S. forces seized an oil tanker off the coast of Venezuela, reportedly following its transfer of about 50,000 barrels of oil to Cuba. Attorney General Pam Bondi posted a video of the operation on social media and stated, “For multiple years, the oil tanker has been sanctioned by the United States due to its involvement in an illicit oil shipping network supporting foreign terrorist organizations.” The Coast Guard seized the vessel pursuant to a warrant issued by a U.S. court on Nov. 26.
• Venezuela’s Communications Minister called the seizure an example of the United States’ “piracy, kidnapping, theft of private property, [and] extrajudicial executions in international waters.”

December 7 – Provision that would restrict Secretary Hegseth’s travel budget unless boat strike evidence is disclosed included in amendments to the annual defense authorization bill 

• A provision was included in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2026 (House Amendment to S.1071), released December 7, to limit Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s travel budget for fiscal year 2026. The funds would be cut to “not more than” 75% until Hegseth releases specified orders behind the strikes and “provides to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate unedited video of strikes conducted against designated terrorist organizations in the area of responsibility of the United States Southern Command.”
• Note: The legislation was signed into law on Dec. 18.

TWENTY-SECOND STRIKE: December 4 – 22nd strike on a vessel in the eastern Pacific, killing four

• On December 4, Joint Task Force “Southern Spear” conducted a strike on a vessel “operated by a Designated Terrorist Organization” in the eastern Pacific Ocean at the direction of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. In a social media post, the Southern Command stated that “the vessel was carrying illicit narcotics and transiting along a known narco-trafficking route in the Eastern Pacific.”

December 3 – Family of Colombian fisherman killed in September 15 strike file complaint with Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

• The family of Colombian fisherman Alejandro Carranza, who was allegedly killed in the Trump administration’s second strike on a vessel on September 15, filed a formal complaint with the Inter-American Commission, requesting the body to investigate and issue a finding that the order from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to bomb the vessel was an extrajudicial killing in violation of Carranza’s human rights.

November 29 – Trump declares Venezuelan airspace closed

• In a social media post, Trump declared the airspace above and surrounding Venezuela “closed in its entirety,” escalating tensions between the U.S. and Venezuela. Caracas responded in an official statement, calling Trump’s comments a “colonialist threat that seeks to undermine the sovereignty of [Venezuela’s] airspace, constituting a new extravagant, illegal, and unjustified aggression against the people of Venezuela.”
• Note: See November 22 entry on three international airlines having cancelled flights to and from Venezuela upon reports of “new phase” of operations.

November 28 – House and Senate begin inquiries into alleged September 2 double-tap strike

• The House and the Senate have reportedly begun separate investigations into the Sept. 2 incident.
• Note: See Just Security’s Unlawful Orders and Killing Shipwrecked Boat Strike Survivors: An Expert Backgrounder for more information and analysis.

November 27 – Trump suggests land strikes in Venezuelan territory would start “soon”

• On a Thanksgiving call to service members, Trump noted that “You probably noticed that people aren’t wanting to be delivering by sea, and we’ll be starting to stop them by land also. The land is easier, but that’s going to start very soon.”

November 24 – 13 Democratic Senators write letter to AG Bondi and Secretary Hegseth requesting the declassification and public release of the DOJ OLC written opinion on the strikes

• The letter was signed by Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Jack Reed (D-RI), Tim Kaine (D-VA), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Mazie K. Hirono (D-HI), Angus King (I-ME), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Gary Peters (D-MI), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Mark Kelly (D-AZ), and Elissa Slotkin (D-MI).
• The letter requested the text of the reported September 5 OLC opinion “concerning the domestic and international legal basis for recent military strikes of certain vessels near South America and the Caribbean, with appropriate redactions necessary to protect military personnel and sensitive intelligence matters.” It further noted: “Few decisions are more consequential for a democracy than the use of lethal force. We therefore believe that the declassification and public release of this important document would enhance transparency in the use of deadly force by our Nation’s military and is necessary to ensure Congress and the American people are fully informed of the legal justification supporting these strikes.”

November 24 – U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine, reportedly visits Puerto Rico and a Navy warship deployed in the Caribbean 

• The stated reason for the trip by General Caine is to thank troops ahead of Thanksgiving, but military officials reported that the general was expected to consult with commanders on preparations related to Operation Southern Spear.

November 22 – U.S. reportedly to launch “new phase” of Venezuelan operations

• According to sources from within the U.S. government speaking on the condition of anonymity, the Trump administration plans on commencing a new phase of Venezuelan operations, involving additional covert operations and a potential plan to overthrow Venezuelan President Maduro.
• Note: On November 21, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) warned major airlines of a “potentially hazardous situation” when flying over Venezuela. Three international airlines have since cancelled flights to and from Venezuela.
• Note: During the previous week, Trump and Maduro reportedly spoke over the phone to discuss a potential face-to-face meeting in the United States, although no meeting was scheduled.

November 20 – U.S. Air Force conducts “bomber attack demo” near Venezuela in “support” of Operation Southern Spear

• In a November 21 post on X, the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Air Forces announced that on November 20, they conducted a military demonstration, involving an overflight of a supersonic F/A-18E fighter jet, B-52 strategic bombers and KC-135 support aircraft, in support of Operation Southern Spear. According to media reviews of open-source flight data, the F/A-18E flew from the USS Gerald Ford, which arrived in the Caribbean earlier this week, and RC-185 reconnaissance aircraft additionally joined the overflight.
• An Air Force social media post claimed the military demonstration “showcase[d] our vow to deter illicit drug networks & defend the homeland.”
• Note: The U.S. military had been conducting training missions near Venezuela in the air and at sea over the prior few weeks. The missions began in mid-October and have involved activity from both B-52s and supersonic B-1 heavy bombers.

INTERNATIONAL REACTION (China): November 19 – China condemns U.S. action to “interfere” in Venezuelan “internal affairs”

• At a press briefing in Beijing on November 19, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning stated that “China opposes any moves that violate the premises and principles of the U.N. Charter and other countries’ sovereignty and security.” Mao further criticized what she described as the U.S.’s outside involvement in Venezuela’s domestic politics, stating that China opposed “the interference of external forces in Venezuela’s internal affairs and any pretext.”

November 18 – Trump authorizes additional CIA covert action in Venezuela while reopening backchannel negotiations with Caracas

• As of November 18, Trump had reportedly authorized additional CIA covert action in Venezuela. As the administration’s pressure campaign on the Maduro government intensifies, Trump also reportedly reopened backchannel negotiations with President Maduro that he had cut off in October.
• Note: Trump publicly confirmed an initial presidential finding authorizing CIA covert action against Venezuela on October 15. He has reportedly still not ruled out ground forces entering Venezuelan territory and has not publicly commented on his preferred course of action.

November 18 – Members of the House of Representatives introduce resolution under the War Powers Resolution to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities with DTOs in the Western Hemisphere

• On November 18, House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Gergory Meeks (D-NY) and five other House Democrats introduced a resolution (H.Con.Res.61), pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, directing the President to “remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with any presidentially designated terrorist organization in the Western Hemisphere, unless authorized by a declaration of war or a specific congressional authorization for use of military force against such presidentially designated terrorist organization.” 
• Ranking Member Meeks described the strike campaign as the “worst excesses of the war of drugs and the war on terror.”
• Note: The House resolution comes after two failed similar Senate resolutions. The sponsors are likely to attempt to force a vote on the House Floor in the coming weeks.

November 17 – Trump states that he would be open to strikes in Mexico to “stop drugs”

• On November 17, in an interview in the Oval Office, Trump, when asked if he would launch strikes in Mexico or deploy American troops to the country, stated: “It’s okay with me, whatever we have to do to stop drugs.”
• Trump said he would “probably” go to Congress for approval of military strikes in Mexico, though he did not do so before ordering strikes off the coast of Venezuela.

November 16 – Trump states in interview that the U.S. may enter into discussions with Venezuela

• On November 16, in response to questions by reporters, Trump stated that he would consider entering into discussions with Venezuelan President Maduro, claiming that Venezuela “would like to talk.” Trump stated: “We may be having some discussions with Maduro, and we’ll see how that turns out.”
• Note: On the same day, Secretary of State Rubio said the Department of State would designate the Venezuelan group it has termed “Cartel de los Soles” as a “foreign terrorist organization.” Previously, the White House, in a proclamation on May 15, stated “Maduro leads the regime-sponsored enterprise Cártel de los Soles, which coordinates with and relies on TdA… to carry out its objective of using illegal narcotics as a weapon to ‘flood’ the United States”; the group was also sanctioned by OFAC in July.
• Note: When asked if the Department of State announcement means the U.S. could strike Maduro’s assets in Venezuela, Trump stated: “It allows us to do that, but we haven’t said we’re going to do that.”

TWENTY-FIRST STRIKE: November 15 – 21st strike on a vessel in the eastern Pacific, killing three

• On November 15, Joint Task Force “Southern Spear” conducted a strike on a vessel “operated by a Designated Terrorist Organization” in the eastern Pacific Ocean at the direction of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth.
• U.S. Southern Command stated that “[i]ntelligence confirmed that the vessel was involved in illicit narcotics smuggling, transiting along a known narco-trafficking route, and carrying narcotics.” U.S. Southern Command further stated that “3 male narco-terrorists aboard the vessel were killed.”

INTERNATIONAL REACTION (Mexico): November 13 – Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum announced a U.S.-Mexico agreement for Mexico to interdict alleged drug-running boats

• President Sheinbaum said “There are joint protocols for operations in international waters to prevent the use of bombings against vessels and to ensure compliance with all international treaties. What the [Mexican] Secretary of the Navy proposed was simply that those treaties be respected, and in principle, they agreed. . . . If information comes from U.S. agencies or from Southern Command itself, it will be the Mexican Navy that intercepts those vessels allegedly carrying drugs.”
• Reportedly under the new agreement, Mexico’s Navy will be responsible for intercepting vessels in international waters near the Mexican coastline to prevent further bombings.

November 13 – U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announces Operation Southern Spear

• Secretary of Defense Hegseth specified the operation would be “[l]ed by Joint Task Force Southern Spear and @SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command]” for the purpose of “defend[ing] our Homeland, remov[ing] narco-terrorists from our Hemisphere, and secur[ing] our Homeland from the drugs that are killing our people.”
• The announcement builds on a January 2025 mission under the same name. In that January 28 announcement, U.S. Navy Commander Foster Edwards stated “Southern Spear will operationalize a heterogeneous mix of Robotic and Autonomous Systems (RAS) to support the detection and monitoring of illicit trafficking while learning lessons for other theaters[.]”

November 12 – Trump reportedly receives briefing on potential military operations in Venezuela

• According to CBS, on November 12, Secretary of Defense Hegseth, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine, and other senior military officials conducted a briefing in the White House informing Trump of potential military operations in relation to Venezuela, including the possibility of land strikes.

November 11 –  As U.S. carrier arrives in Latin America, Venezuela mobilizes military

• According to a U.S. Navy press statement, on November 11, the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group entered the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, introducing more than 4,000 U.S. troops and dozens of tactical aircraft into the region. The carrier group’s shift from its prior position in the Mediterranean sea to the Caribbean follows an order from Secretary of Defense Hegseth on October 24 stating the need to “augment existing capabilities to disrupt narcotics trafficking and degrade and dismantle TCOs.” (See October 24 entry.)
• Chief Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell stated in a press statement about the carrier group’s arrival: “These forces will enhance and augment existing capabilities to disrupt narcotics trafficking and degrade and dismantle Transnational Criminal Organizations.”
• Note: On the same day, Venezuela’s Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López reportedly announced a militarization of “ground, aerial, naval, riverine, and missile forces,” putting the “entire country’s military arsenal on full operational readiness.” Padrino López framed the mobilization as a response to the “imperialist threat” posed by U.S. strikes. Venezuela’s military conducted large-scale command, control, and communications exercises between November 11-12, reportedly involving around 200,000 forces.

INTERNATIONAL REACTION (France, European Union): November 11 – French Foreign Minister and EU foreign policy chief question the legality of U.S. strikes in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific under international law 

• On the sidelines of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Ontario, Canada, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said “We have observed with concern the military operations in the Caribbean region, because they violate international law and because France has a presence in this region through its overseas territories, where more than a million of our compatriots reside[.]” 
• EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas reportedly said on the sidelines of the same meeting that the strikes could only be justified as self-defense or by a UN Security Council resolution. Kallas noted in an NBC interview on November 12 that the G7 ministers were discussing changing international law because “the countries are all struggling” with drug gangs in the region.

INTERNATIONAL REACTION (Colombia): November 11 – Colombia suspends intelligence sharing with United States

• In a post on X, Colombian President Gustavo Petro said: “All levels of law enforcement intelligence are ordered to suspend all communications and other dealings with U.S. security agencies. This measure will remain in effect as long as missile attacks on boats in the Caribbean continue. The fight against drugs must be subordinated to the human rights of the Caribbean people.”
• Colombian Interior Minister Armando Benedetti stated in a post on X on November 13 that Colombia would “continue working as this Government has done against drug trafficking and crime with the United States,” seemingly contradicting President Petro’s earlier statements. The Colombian Defense Minister also clarified on X that Petro gave clear instructions to continue sharing information with “international agencies” to combat drug trafficking.

INTERNATIONAL REACTION (United Kingdom): November 11 – United Kingdom suspends  intelligence sharing with United States on suspected drug trafficking vessels in the Caribbean

• While the United Kingdom has not officially acknowledged this suspension, sources report that it began over a month prior to it being publicly reported. 
• Note: The U.K. has for years provided intelligence to support U.S. Coast Guard drug interdiction efforts, in addition to conducting its own counter-narcotics operations.

TWENTIETH STRIKE: November 10 – Twentieth strike, on a vessel in the Caribbean sea, killing four

• On November 10, Joint Task Force “Southern Spear” conducted a strike on a vessel “operated by a Designated Terrorist Organization” in the Caribbean Sea.
• U.S. Southern Command stated that “[i]ntelligence confirmed that the vessel was involved in illicit narcotics smuggling, transiting along a known narco-trafficking route, and carrying narcotics.” U.S. Southern Command further stated that “4 male narco-terrorists aboard the vessel were killed.”

EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH STRIKES: November 9 – Eighteenth and nineteenth strikes on vessels in the eastern Pacific, killing six

• On November 9, the U.S. military conducted two strikes on vessels “suspected of smuggling drugs” in the eastern Pacific Ocean.
• Secretary of Defense Hegseth announced the strikes in a social media post the following day, stating: “These vessels were known by our intelligence to be associated with illicit narcotics smuggling, were carrying narcotics, and were transiting along a known narco-trafficking transit route in the Eastern Pacific.” He stated: “3 male narco-terrorists were aboard each vessel. All 6 were killed. No U.S. forces were harmed.”

SEVENTEENTH STRIKE: November 6 – Seventeenth strike on a vessel in the Caribbean, killing three

• On November 6, Secretary of Defense Hegseth announced a seventeenth strike on a vessel “operated by a Designated Terrorist Organization[,]” in this instance in the Caribbean. He stated, “The vessel was trafficking narcotics in the Caribbean and was struck in international waters.”
• Hegseth claimed that three “male narco-terrorists” aboard the boat died in the strike. 
• He further warned: “To all narco-terrorists who threaten our homeland: if you want to stay alive, stop trafficking drugs. If you keep trafficking deadly drugs—we will kill you.”

November 5 – Legislation proposed under War Powers Resolution to prohibit war against Venezuela fails 

• A motion to discharge the legislation (S.J. Res. 90) from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, brought by lead sponsor Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA) with the support of 17 co-sponsors, failed 49-51. All Democratic senators voted to discharge the legislation, joined by Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) and bill co-sponsor Senator Rand Paul (R-KY).
• If passed, the legislation would have directed “the President to terminate the use of United States Armed Forces for hostilities within or against Venezuela, unless explicitly authorized by a declaration of war or specific authorization for use of military force.” Co-sponsoring Senator Adam Schiff (D-CA) differentiated the resolution from the prior resolution brought on October 8 to end authorization for sea-based strikes, stating during the Senate floor hearing: “[W]hile we remain concerned about those ongoing strikes… [t]his resolution is tailor-written to stop one thing: a war with the nation of Venezuela.”

November 5 – Secretaries of State and Defense conduct a classified briefing with Senate and House lawmakers on legal justification for strikes

• The Trump administration invited around a dozen lawmakers, including the chairs of the intelligence and armed services committees in both chambers, to the briefing discussing orders and legal justifications behind prior strikes.
• Administration officials reportedly acknowledged that they do not know the individual identities of each person on board a vessel before a strike but claimed that they target vessels based on intelligence that the vessel is linked to a specific cartel or criminal organization.
• Attending Senators and Representatives were reportedly told during the classified session that the “execute order” issued by the President and the OLC opinion justifying strikes on vessels did not extend to strikes within the land territory of Venezuela. However, the OLC opinion reportedly includes a list of 24 different cartels and criminal organizations based around Latin America it claims the administration is authorized to target. Furthermore, an unnamed U.S. official stated that the Trump administration is seeking a separate legal opinion from the Justice Department that would justify launching strikes against land targets without Congress authorizing the use of military force.

SIXTEENTH STRIKE: November 4 – Sixteenth strike on a vessel in the eastern Pacific, killing two

• On November 4, Secretary of Defense Hegseth announced a sixteenth strike on a vessel “operated by a Designated Terrorist Organization (DTO),” in this instance in the eastern Pacific. He stated, “Intelligence confirmed that the vessel was involved in illicit narcotics smuggling, transiting along a known narco-trafficking route, and carrying narcotics.”
• Hegseth claimed that two “male narco-terrorists” aboard the boat died in the strike.

November 2 – Trump states he doubts the United States will go to war with Venezuela

• In a televised interview with 60 Minutes, Trump responded to a question regarding whether the United States was going to war with Venezuela saying “I doubt it. I don’t think so.” He later declined to discuss whether he would consider potential land strikes in Venezuela.
• When asked whether the attacks were about “stopping narcotics” or “getting rid of President Maduro,” Trump responded: “This is about many things. This is a country that allowed their prisons to be emptied into our country.”

November 1 – Trump administration reportedly claims the War Powers Resolution’s 60 day termination clock does not apply

• In a briefing held between October 27-31, the official heading DOJ OLC, T. Elliot Gaiser, reportedly stated that the strikes do not rise to the level of “hostilities” that would trigger the War Powers Resolution’s (WPR) 60-day termination clock (which was set to expire on Nov. 3). An unnamed senior administration official reportedly stated that the strikes did not fall within the scope of the term “hostilities” as they were largely conducted by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and thus did not “endanger American personnel.”
• Note: This interpretation of “hostilities” is similar to that relied on in some past executive branch practice under the WPR, though neither Congress nor the courts have accepted such a narrow interpretation of the term, which is not defined in the WPR itself.

FIFTEENTH STRIKE: November 1 – Fifteenth strike on a vessel in the Caribbean, killing at least three

• Secretary of Defense Hegseth announced in a post on X a strike on a “narco-trafficking vessel operated by a Designated Terrorist Organization (DTO) in the Caribbean,” accompanied by a 17-second video of the strike. He wrote: “This vessel—like EVERY OTHER—was known by our intelligence to be involved in illicit narcotics smuggling, was transiting along a known narco-trafficking route, and carrying narcotics.” The strike killed at least three on board the vessel.

INTERNATIONAL REACTION (United Nations): October 31 – UN High Commissioner for Human Rights says the United States “must halt” strikes on alleged drug boats to prevent “extrajudicial killing”

• The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, called for an investigation into the strikes through a spokesperson’s statement in a regular briefing. He stated: “[C]ountering the serious issue of illicit trafficking of drugs across international borders is – as has long been agreed among States – a law-enforcement matter, governed by the careful limits on lethal force set out in international human rights law.”

October 31 – Senate Armed Services Committee leadership states that the DOD has refused to share information about and legal justification for strikes with Congress upon request

• Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS) and Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI) publicly shared two letters that they sent to Secretary of Defense Hegseth in prior weeks requesting, on September 23, a copy of the president’s orders to carry out the military strikes, and on October 6, the Department of Justice’s legal justification for the attacks and a “complete list” of designated terrorist organizations and drug trafficking organizations “with whom the president has determined the United States is in a noninternational armed conflict and against whom lethal military force may be used.” In a public statement, they claimed that the “documents had not been submitted” to this date.
• Note: On the same day, when asked by reporters on Air Force One if reports that he was considering strikes within Venezuela were true, Trump said: “No.”

October 30 – Classified House briefing on the U.S. military’s strikes against alleged drug-trafficking boats in the Caribbean and in the East Pacific

• Representatives Jason Crow (D-CO) and Mike Turner (R-OH) both expressed frustration at the lack of information provided at a bipartisan House classified briefing on the U.S. military’s strikes against alleged drug-trafficking boats in the Caribbean and in the East Pacific. Reportedly, the Department of Defense lawyers who were set to explain the legal rationale the administration is using to strike the vessels were not present. Turner, who chairs the committee, told press: “Yesterday, there were not very good answers as to what is the standard, what is occurring with the designation of cartels as terrorist organizations…”
• Note: Reportedly, a classified briefing was held the prior day that excluded Democratic members of the committee. Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), the senior Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, reportedly said the administration “ignores checks and balances” by picking and choosing which elected officials have access to legal justifications.
• Note: White House spokesperson Anna Kelly said the Department of Defense has held nine “bipartisan” briefings on the boat strikes. She claimed DOD “individually works through requests” from lawmakers.

October 29 – Senate Democrats send a letter to AG Bondi requesting legal justifications for strikes

• Ten Democratic senators on the Senate Judiciary Committee signed a letter to Attorney General Pam Bondi asking for “any and all legal opinions assessing the legality of military actions ordered by the President” that have resulted in a current total of 61 deaths in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean.
• In the letter, the senators state “it appears the strikes may violate”:
  1. 18 U.S.C. § 1111, which makes it a felony to commit murder within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US (including the high seas)
  2. EO 12333 § 2.11 (US Intelligence Activities), which prohibits persons employed by or acting on behalf of the USG from engaging in assassination
  3. 10 U.S. Code § 918 – Art. 118 (UCMJ). Murder, which prohibits premeditated and unlawful killing of a human being
  4. Binding peremptory norms of customary international law and treaties to which the United States is a party, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 6 and UNHRC General comment No. 36 on article 6.
  5. The Geneva Conventions
• The letter requests that Attorney General Bondi schedule a briefing, classified or unclassified, for the Committee by November 3, 2025 on the legal analysis of these strikes. It also requests the AG answer a set of six listed questions by November 7, 2025.

FOURTEENTH STRIKE: October 29 – Fourteenth strike in the Eastern Pacific, killing four

• Secretary of Defense Hegseth announced on X that DOD carried out a strike on a vessel operated by “Designated Terrorist Organizations (DTO) trafficking narcotics in the Eastern Pacific.”
• The strike killed four people, bringing the publicly reported death toll to 61 since the strikes began in September.

ELEVENTH, TWELFTH, AND THIRTEENTH STRIKES: October 27 – Eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth strikes in the Eastern Pacific, killing fourteen and initially leaving one survivor

• Secretary of Defense Hegseth announced on X that DOD carried out three separate strikes on four vessels “operated by Designated Terrorist Organizations (DTO) trafficking narcotics in the Eastern Pacific.” Reportedly, eight were killed in the first strike, four in the second strike, and three in the third strike, totaling fourteen killed in the three strikes, with one reported survivor.
• Note: SOUTHCOM reportedly initiated Search and Rescue (SAR) standard protocols for the lone survivor. Mexico SAR authorities accepted the case and assumed responsibility for coordinating the rescue. On Oct. 31, the Mexican Navy reportedly planned to call off search efforts for the individual, who is now presumed dead.

October 26 – Senator Lindsay Graham states that Trump may intend to conduct land strikes in Venezuela  

• Senator Graham stated in an interview with CBS’s Margaret Brennan on “Face the Nation”: “President Trump told me yesterday that he plans to brief members of Congress when he gets back from Asia about future potential military operations against Venezuela and Colombia… So there will be a congressional briefing about a potential expanding from the sea to the land.”
• Note: Senators Rand Paul and James Lankford (R-OK) have both argued against the (thus far, sea-based) strikes. Lankford said that he would be “apoplectic” if former President Joe Biden had done the same thing. Senator Paul said on “Fox News Sunday,” “So far, they have alleged that these people are drug dealers. No one’s said their name, no one’s said what evidence, no one’s said whether they’re armed, and we’ve had no evidence presented … So at this point, I would call them extrajudicial killings.”

October 26 – U.S. warship docks in Trinidad and Tobago

• The USS Gravely, a guided missile destroyer, docked in Port-of-Spain, the capital of Trinidad and Tobago, for joint exercises with the island nation’s military forces.
• Protestors gathered outside the US Embassy after the warship docked in the island country, which borders Venezuela’s coast.

October 24 – DOD moves carrier strike group into the Caribbean Sea

• Secretary of Defense Hegseth ordered the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group to move from the Mediterranean Sea to the Caribbean to “augment existing capabilities to disrupt narcotics trafficking and degrade and dismantle TCOs.”
• Note: Maduro accused the United States of “fabricating a new external war” following the announcement.

TENTH STRIKE: October 24 – Tenth strike on a vessel in the Caribbean Sea, killing six

• Secretary of Defense Hegseth announced on X that the United States carried out another strike on a vessel allegedly “operated by Tren de Aragua (TdA), a Designated Terrorist Organization (DTO), trafficking narcotics in the Caribbean Sea,” killing six people. Hegseth claimed it was the first attack to occur at night.

October 23 – Trump says he will not seek Congressional approval to carry out strikes

• Trump told the press at the White House, “I don’t think we’re going to necessarily ask for a declaration of war. I think we are going to kill people that are bringing drugs into our country, OK? We are going to kill them, you know? They are going to be, like, dead.” He suggested that he may inform Congress about future strikes, including on land, but without seeking congressional approval.
• Note: US officials told the press that two Air Force B-1 bombers from Texas flew near Venezuela in international airspace in an attempt to pressure Maduro to step down. When asked about the flights, Trump said, “No, it’s not accurate,” he said. “No, it’s false.”

NINTH STRIKE: October 22 – Ninth strike on a vessel, killing three; second strike in the eastern Pacific Ocean

• Hours after Secretary of Defense Hegseth announced the first strike, U.S. Special Operations forces carried out a second strike on a vessel in the eastern Pacific Ocean, killing three people aboard and bringing the total death toll from strikes since early September to 37. Hegseth said in a post on X that the vessel was “operated by a Designated Terrorist Organization (DTO)” and was “known by our intelligence to be involved in illicit narcotics smuggling, was transiting along a known narco-trafficking transit route, and carrying narcotics.”
• Note: While speaking to press reporters at the White House ahead of a meeting with NATO Secretary Mark Rutte, Trump suggested that he would soon order strikes against land targets, saying, “We will hit them very hard when they come in by land […] They haven’t experienced that yet, but now we are totally prepared to do that.” He added that his administration would “probably go back to Congress and explain exactly what we are doing” before launching those strikes, but insisted that he did not need their permission to act. “Something very serious is going to happen, the equivalent of what’s happening by sea,” Trump said.

EIGHTH  STRIKE: October 21 – Eighth strike on a vessel, killing two; for the first time, in the eastern Pacific Ocean

• U.S. Special Operations Forces carried out a strike on a vessel for the first time in the eastern Pacific Ocean in international waters, killing two on the boat.
• Secretary of Defense Hegseth posted the video of the strike on X, saying that intelligence indicated the vessel was involved in drug smuggling and had narcotics onboard. (“Yesterday, at the direction of President Trump, the Department of War conducted a lethal kinetic strike on a vessel being operated by a Designated Terrorist Organization and conducting narco-trafficking in the Eastern Pacific”). Hegseth likened cartels to Al Qaeda, saying, “Just as Al Qaeda waged war on our homeland, these cartels are waging war on our border and our people.”

INTERNATIONAL REACTION (United Nations): October 21 – Three United Nations experts issue a joint letter denouncing U.S. targeting of vessels off the coast of Venezuela, describing it as a breach of the UN Charter

• The experts included George Katrougalos, independent expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order; Ben Saul, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; and Morris Tidball-Binz, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.
• The experts claimed the strikes, if made in order to impose regime change, are in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. They additionally stated: “The long history of external interventions in Latin America must not be repeated.”

INTERNATIONAL REACTION (Colombia): October 19 – Colombian President Petro accuses the United States of murdering a Colombian fisherman in one of its strikes, Trump cuts off aid payments

• In a post on X, Colombian President Gustavo Petro accused the United States of killing a Colombian fisherman in a mid-September strike on a vessel in the Caribbean Sea. Petro said the US had “committed murder” and “violated [Colombia’s] sovereignty in territorial waters.”
• Trump responded by saying he would halt aid payments to Colombia and impose new tariffs on the country’s goods. He called Petro an “illegal drug dealer” and accused him of failing to curb the production of illegal drugs in Colombia.
• Petro’s statement followed remarks by him earlier in the month accusing the United States of striking a boat and killing Colombian citizens aboard.

October 18 – Administration repatriates two survivors of the October 16 strike to their respective countries of nationality, Colombia and Ecuador

• The Department of Defense reportedly transferred legal custody of the detainees to the State Department for repatriation.
• On October 20, two prosecutors in Ecuador decided against charging one of two survivors of an October 16 vessel strike, saying there was no evidence the man had committed a crime in Venezuelan territory.

SEVENTH STRIKE: October 17 – Seventh strike on boat “linked to Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional,” a Colombian guerrilla group, killing three

• Secretary of Defense Hegseth stated that the U.S. military “struck another alleged drug-carrying vessel on Friday, killing three people.” In a post on X, he stated that Friday’s strike targeted a boat linked to Ejército de Liberación Nacional, a Colombian guerrilla group that has been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the Trump administration, and alleged the boat “was traveling along a known narco-trafficking route, and was transporting substantial amounts of narcotics.”

October 16 – Senators Kaine, Paul, and Schiff introduce new resolution to prevent strikes on suspected drug trafficking vessels without Congressional approval

• Senators Tim Kaine, Rand Paul, and Adam Schiff introduced a new resolution to require a full briefing to Congress and a congressional vote prior to engaging in “hostilities within or against Venezuela.”
• Note: A previous resolution failed to reach a Senate Floor vote on Oct. 8.

SIXTH STRIKE: October 16 – Sixth strike on boat near Venezuela, killing two and leaving two survivors

• The U.S. Navy carried out a strike against a semi-submersible vessel suspected of smuggling drugs in the Caribbean Sea. Two men aboard were killed, and two survivors were found in the water following the strike.
• The U.S. Navy held the two survivors on a warship in international waters until transferring them (see further developments on Oct. 18).

October 15 – Venezuela sends letter to UN Security Council requesting an “investigation” of US strikes

• On October 16, Venezuela’s U.N. Ambassador Samuel Moncada sent a letter to the 15-person UN Security Council accusing the U.S. of striking “civilian vessels transiting international waters” and asking the Council to “investigate” the strikes to “determine their illegal nature.” The letter further requested that the Council issue a statement “reaffirming the principle of unrestricted respect for the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of states.”

October 15 – Trump confirms he authorized CIA covert action against Venezuela

• In an Oval Office press conference, Trump confirmed earlier news reports citing unnamed U.S. officials that he had authorized CIA covert action against Venezuela, stating that he had made the authorization because Venezuela had “emptied their prisons into the United States of America.” The CIA declined to comment.
• In the same press conference, Trump claimed that the administration is “looking at land now, because we’ve got the sea very well under control,” hinting at potential land operations in Venezuelan territory.

FIFTH STRIKE: October 14 – Fifth strike on boat near Venezuela, killing six

• Trump, in a post on Truth Social, said intelligence confirmed the vessel was “trafficking narcotics” and was “associated with illicit narcoterrorist networks.” He posted a 30-second video of the strike. The video was reposted by the Instagram account of the Department of Defense, and by Secretary of Defense Hegseth on X.

INTERNATIONAL REACTION (Canada): October 10 – Canada clarifies its ongoing participation in Operation Caribbe is “separate and distinct” from U.S. boat strikes in the Caribbean

• A Canadian Department of National Defence spokesperson stated “It is important to note that Canadian Armed Forces activities under Operation Caribbe, conducted in co-ordination with the United States Coast Guard, are separate and distinct from the activities you describe involving other branches of the United States military[.]”
• Operation Caribbe is Canada’s contribution to the multinational anti-drug trafficking effort, Campaign Martillo.

October 10 – US Mission to UN representative states that strikes are part of a “non-international armed conflict” at a UN Security Council briefing

• A representative of the United States Mission to the United Nations, John Kelley, stated at the UN Security Council briefing on the strikes on Venezuela: “President Trump has determined the United States is in a non-international armed conflict and has directed the Department of War to conduct operations against them pursuant to the law of armed conflict and consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter.”
• Mr. Kelley also stated, “President Trump determined these cartels are non-state armed groups, designated them as terrorist organizations, and determined that their actions constitute an armed attack against the United States.” He stated that the Trump administration “does not recognize Nicolás Maduro or his cronies as the government of Venezuela.

October 8 – Proposed legislation to prevent strikes against suspected drug traffickers without congressional authorization fails vote to be brought to Senate floor

• The vote to bring the legislation proposed by Senators Schiff and Kaine, joined by co-sponsor Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), to the floor for a full vote failed 48-51, “largely along party lines.” Republican Senators Paul and Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) voted in favor of the resolution, while Democratic Senator John Fetterman (D-PA) voted against it.
• The measure, brought under the War Powers Resolution, would have barred Trump from using military force against designated terrorist organizations, “states in which those entities operate,” or non-state organizations “engaged in the promotion, trafficking, and distribution of illegal drugs” without authorization from Congress.

October 6 – Commander in charge of SOUTHCOM Admiral Alvin Holsey offers his resignation

• Secretary of Defense Hegseth had reportedly criticized Adm. Holsey for not moving “quickly or aggressively enough to combat drug trafficking in the Caribbean.” According to CNN, “SOUTHCOM was concerned about the operations not being lawful.”
• According to CNN, “[t]he tensions came to a head during a meeting between Hegseth, Holsey and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine on October 6 at the Pentagon” and “Holsey offered to resign during the meeting … but the idea was tabled and his departure was not announced until over a week later.”
• Note: On October 16, Adm. Holsey announced on X his retirement from the Navy, effective December 12, 2025, just one year into his tenure.

October 6 – Senate Armed Services Committee Chair and Ranking Member send a letter to Secretary of Defense requesting a copy of DOJ opinions on legality of strikes

• Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS) and Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI) sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Hegseth, following the October 1 classified Armed Services Committee meeting, requesting (1) any written opinion issued by the DOJ OLC “opining on the domestic or international legal basis for these operations and strikes;” (2) a list of designated terrorist organizations and drug trafficking organizations with whom the President has determined the U.S. is in a non-international armed conflict; and (3) orders by Trump to conduct previous strikes.
• Their letter followed a previous letter from the Senators to Secretary of Defense Hegseth on September 23 that requested a copy of orders by Trump or Hegseth to conduct strikes, citing their legislative authority under Section 1067 of the 2025 NDAA.
• Note: The letter was privately sent but revealed publicly by the senators on October 23, following additional strikes. (See October 31 entry for more details.)

UNCONFIRMED ADDITIONAL STRIKE: October 4 – Trump statement on unconfirmed additional strike

• On October 5, Trump spoke at a celebration of the 250th anniversary of the U.S. Navy aboard the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush. He implied there was an additional strike the prior evening, October 4, stating: “Every one of those boats is responsible for the death of 25,000 American people and the destruction of families. So when you think of it that way, what we’re doing is actually an act of kindness. But we did another one last night. Now we just can’t find any.” Such a strike is otherwise unconfirmed, and it is possible that this statement was in error or intended to reference the Oct. 3 strike.

FOURTH STRIKE: October 3 – Fourth strike on boat near Venezuela, killing four

• In a social media post, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth accused the four men killed in the strike of smuggling narcotics, without offering evidence. He asserted that the men were “affiliated with a Designated Terrorist Organization” – likely referring to one of the cartels or gangs that have been designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the Department of State during this administration, but without specifying which organization.
• Hegseth said the attack took place “just off the coast of Venezuela” but in international waters and did not identify the nationalities of the dead.

October 2 – Trump declares existence of armed conflict in confidential notice to Congress

• A notice provided under Section 1230 of the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA (50 U.S.C. § 1543a) states that Trump has decided that the United States is engaged in a “non-international armed conflict” (NIAC) with drug cartels he has labeled terrorist organizations and that suspected smugglers for such groups are “unlawful combatants.” The notice was sent to several congressional committees and obtained by The New York Times.
• The notice specifically referenced the Sept. 15 strike, stating that the targeted “vessel was assessed by the U.S. intelligence community to be affiliated with a designated terrorist organization.”
• Note: The notice to Congress, which was labeled as controlled but unclassified information, for the first time portrays the U.S. military’s attacks on boats to be part of a NIAC (an international law term that refers to an armed conflict with one or more non-state actors). Specifically, it says that Trump has “determined” that cartels engaged in smuggling drugs are “nonstate armed groups” whose actions “constitute an armed attack against the United States.”

October 1 – Closed Senate Armed Services Committee meeting

• In a closed-door Senate Armed Services Committee meeting, senators from both sides of the aisle questioned the Department of Defense’s legal justification for striking alleged drug smuggling boats in the Caribbean and, according to anonymous sources, “urged officials to devise a stronger legal case.”
• During the meeting, Department of Defense general counsel Earl Matthews repeatedly argued that Trump’s designation of some Latin American drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations “granted the Department of Defense unilateral authority to use military force.” Matthews reportedly also declined to provide a written justification for the strikes.

September 23 – Senate Armed Services Committee Chair and Ranking Member send a letter to Secretary of Defense requesting a copy of President or Secretary of Defense’s order to carry out prior strikes

• Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS) and Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI) sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Hegseth requesting a copy of orders by Trump or Hegseth to conduct strikes, citing their legislative authority under Section 1067 of the 2025 NDAA.
• Note: The letter was privately sent but revealed publicly by the senators on October 23, following additional strikes. (See October 31 entry for more details.)

September 23 – House Democrats introduce a resolution under the War Powers Resolution to prevent strikes against suspected drug traffickers or against Venezuela without congressional approval

• Representatives Ilhan Omar (D-MN), Greg Casar (D-TX), and Jesús Garcia (D-IL) sponsored the resolution (H. Con. Res. 51). The resolution was referred shortly thereafter to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

THIRD STRIKE: September 19 – Third strike against a vessel claimed to be “smuggling drugs,” killing three

• Trump in a social media post said the strike killed three and was carried out against a vessel “affiliated with a Designated Terrorist Organization conducting narcotrafficking in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility.” He did not provide further information about the location of the strike, the identity of the organization, or the individuals “affiliated” with it.

September 18 – Senators introduce a resolution under the War Powers Resolution to prevent strikes on suspected drug trafficking vessels without Congressional approval

• Senators Adam Schiff (D-CA) and Tim Kaine (D-VA) introduced the resolution (S.J. Res. 83), which was initially referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The resolution claimed Congress had “received insufficient information about the vessels, their threat level or the legal basis for using force against them.”
• In a statement on the same day, Senator Kaine claimed, “President Trump has no legal authority to launch strikes or use military force in the Caribbean or elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. The administration has refused to provide Congress with basic information about the multiple strike[sic] it has carried out, including who was killed, why it was necessary to put servicemembers’ lives at risk, and why a standard interdiction operation wasn’t conducted.”
• At the same time, it was reported that draft legislation to provide the Trump administration with “sweeping power to wage war against drug cartels [Trump] deems to be ‘terrorists’” was circulating within Congress.
• See Oct. 8 entry for vote count

SECOND STRIKE: September 15 – Second strike against a vessel, killing three

• Trump said in a Truth Social post announcing the strike that it “occurred while these confirmed narcoterrorists from Venezuela were in International Waters transporting illegal narcotics (A DEADLY WEAPON POISONING AMERICANS!) headed to the U.S.” He added, “These extremely violent drug trafficking cartels POSE A THREAT to U.S. National Security, Foreign Policy, and vital U.S. Interests.”

September 4 – First strike 48-hour report under the War Powers Resolution

• Trump provided Congress with a report describing the Sept. 2 strike on “a vessel… that was assessed to be affiliated with a designated terrorist organization and to be engaged in illicit drug trafficking activities,” but without identifying the organization or the specific activities.
• The report stated: “It is not possible at this time to know the full scope and duration of military operations that will be necessary. United States forces remain postured to carry out further military operations.”
• The report states, “I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148).”
• Note: As discussed on the Just Security podcast, the report likely triggered the War Powers Resolution’s termination provision, which requires U.S. forces to be removed from hostilities or imminent hostilities within 60 days unless Congress authorizes the activity.

FIRST STRIKE: September 2 – First strike against a vessel off the coast of Venezuela, killing 11, including an alleged double-tap killing of two survivors

• Trump said the United States had carried out a strike in the southern Caribbean against a vessel containing “positively identified Tren de Aragua Narcoterrorists in the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of responsibility.”
• The president said in a social media post that 11 people were killed and posted a short video clip of a small vessel appearing to explode in flames. “The strike occurred while the terrorists were at sea in International waters transporting illegal narcotics, heading to the United States,” Trump said on Truth Social. “No U.S. Forces were harmed in this strike. Please let this serve as notice to anybody even thinking about bringing drugs into the United States of America.”

August – U.S. Southern Command senior military lawyer reportedly raised legal concerns before the strikes commenced 

• According to an NBC report published November 19, a senior Judge Advocate General (JAG) at U.S. Southern Command expressed concern in August – prior to the first strike – that strikes against people on boats in the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean, whom administration officials call “narco-terrorists,” could amount to extrajudicial killings and expose service members involved in the operations to legal liability. However, his opinion was overruled, reportedly by lawyers within the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).
• In response to news reports in November, Chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell issued a statement saying: “The War Department categorically denies that any Pentagon lawyers, including SOUTHCOM lawyers, with knowledge of these operations have raised concerns to any attorneys in the chain of command regarding the legality of the strikes conducted thus far because they are aware we are on firm legal ground. Our current operations in the Caribbean are lawful under both U.S. and international law, with all actions in complete compliance with the law of armed conflict.”

July – President Donald Trump reportedly directs DOD to use military force against Latin American “terrorists”

• In late July, Trump reportedly signed a still-secret order directing the Department of Defense (DOD) to start using military force against Latin American criminal groups that his administration has labeled terrorists.
• Note: Subsequent reporting has indicated that official DOJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) guidance to DOD, at least initially drafted and rendered in July, purported to provide legal justification for the strikes. OLC’s legal advice was reportedly finalized on September 5, 2025 in a classified memorandum. It includes a “list of [24] cartels [that] goes beyond those the administration has publicly designated as terrorist organizations.”

February 2025 – Deputy Attorney General tells DOJ officials the administration is “just going to sink the boats”

• In February 2025, then-acting Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove reportedly said during a speech at a Department of Justice (DOJ) conference for the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces that the administration was “not going to worry so much about interdictions, we’re just going to sink the boats,” to the shock of several DOJ officials in attendance.

Early 2025 – Top intelligence and national security lawyers express concern about legality of strikes on vessels in the Caribbean 

• According to several former government officials and other anonymous sources, then-acting CIA General Counsel, then-NSC legal advisor Paul Ney, and a then-CIA Americas and Counternarcotics Mission Center lawyer had all reportedly expressed concerns about the legality of lethal strikes on drug trafficking vessels in the early months of 2025. All three were subsequently replaced or reassigned. 

The post Timeline of Boat Strikes and Related Actions appeared first on Just Security.

Despite this explicit constitutional prohibition, the Trump Organization is selling Trump 2028 merchandise, including a baseball hat that the president featured in the Oval Office while meeting with congressional leaders in September. In recent weeks, Trump and several of his allies have openly suggested that a third term remains possible. Earlier this year, Steve Bannon—the chief executive of Trump’s 2016 campaign and a former White House advisor— told The Economist that Trump is going to “get a third term” and that people “just ought to get accommodated with that.” And at a news conference in the Capitol building, Speaker of the House Mike Johnson claimed that many Americans “lament” the constrictions of the Constitution, and that “the ‘Trump 2028’ cap is one of the most popular that’s ever been produced.” Trump himself admitted that he would “love” to serve a third term as president. In a recent interview, he said, “Based on what I read, I guess I’m not allowed to run,” before equivocating, “So we’ll see what happens.” Although the president and his allies have repeatedly tried to muddy the waters in recent months, the 22nd Amendment and historical record of its ratification are clear.

During the drafting of the Constitution, and over the subsequent years, Americans consistently debated whether and how to limit presidential terms. Many who lived under the thumb of King George III and through the American revolution had strong concerns about the dangers of unconstrained executive power, which, combined with the examples set by George Washington and Thomas Jefferson when each chose to eschew public office after two terms, created a strong norm that led to more than a century of presidents serving no more than two terms. Presidents of various parties observed this tradition, which was also enforced by voters and the political process when necessary through elections. As Thomas Jefferson observed in 1807, without externally imposed limits, the presidency “will in fact become for life, and history shows how easily that degenerates into an inheritance.”

The two term tradition for American presidents, while not unchallenged, remained unbroken until, during a time of major unrest that included the Great Depression and the second World War, the norm failed and President Franklin Roosevelt was elected to not three, but four terms, before dying while in office. In the wake of these events, the country confronted the question of whether it wanted this possibility to recur in the future. Despite the extreme situation that led to the breaking of the norm, the country brought to a close a 150-year debate over presidential term limits by codifying the previously unbroken two-term tradition in the strongest way possible: enshrinement in the Constitution of the United States. The legislative debate regarding what became the 22nd Amendment included not only the U.S. Congress, but also the state legislatures in 41 states, out of 48 at the time, with votes in favor cast by hundreds of legislators of both political parties. All told, the process took nearly four years.

As a review of the debates in state legislatures around the ratification of the 22nd Amendment shows, the officials who made this decision did so with not only awareness and consideration of many arguments we hear in current discourse around presidential term limits, but also with a direct experience of the alternative, in the aftermath of a second World War fought to beat back the tide of authoritarianism. Their decision deserves our continued respect, and the Constitution mandates adherence.

Support for the 22nd Amendment was Bipartisan

While one impetus for considering the 22nd Amendment was President Franklin Roosevelt, a Democrat, breaking the two-term norm, lawmakers from both parties supported the amendment and understood that it would bind presidents of each party equally. In the U.S. Congress, 47 Democratic representatives and 16 Democratic senators joined 238 Republican representatives and 43 Republican senators in supporting the measure.

Likewise in the states, the measure was supported by Democratic and Republican legislators as well as by Democratic and Republican controlled legislatures, and the legislative history confirms that these bodies well understood that it would apply to future presidents of both parties.

In Texas, for example, at the time of ratification the Texas legislature was controlled by Democratic majorities, but the measure approving the proposed amendment enjoyed strong bipartisan support. Republican Representative Edward Dicker, who voted in favor of the amendment, said,

“I’m for it 1,000 per cent. And it is going to be our handicap, because the next President will be a Republican and the 2-term limit will apply to him. But they can count on me to be for it, Republican or Democrat.”

The Joint Resolution to ratify the amendment passed the Texas House on February 20, 1951 by a bipartisan vote of 122 to 22 (with 5 absent), and the measure passed the Texas Senate on February 22, 1951 by a vote of 25 to 4 (with 2 absent).

Nevada was the 36th state to ratify the proposed amendment, officially bringing it across the three-fourths threshold to become part of the Constitution. As the Nevada State Journal reported, the Republican-controlled Nevada Senate gave “lifelong Democrat” Senator John Robbins the privilege of making the motion to ratify the amendment and to consider it as an emergency measure for approval. Senator Robbins said at the time:

“Some have given the measure the stigma of partisan politics. To me there is no such stigma. As a Democrat, active in Nevada Democratic circles for more than 40 years, I’d like to remove that stigma. I consider it a real honor that this Republican controlled Senate has picked me to make the motion to ratify the 22nd Amendment.”

On February 26, 1951, the Nevada Assembly voted to pass the resolution ratifying the 22nd Amendment 29 to 12, including nine Democrats. Later that day, in a bipartisan vote, the Senate ratified the amendment by a margin of 16 to 1.

Following ratification by the requisite 36 states, the editorial page of The Salt Lake Tribune noted that although the amendment arose in response to President Franklin Roosevelt’s reelections, it “received support in both parties [including Utah] and six of the states which ratified [in 1951] had Democratic-controlled legislatures.” The editorial board explained,

“The reason for bipartisan support is not hard to find. The two-term tradition has deep roots in American history and only one president was able to break it. … [The amendment] will end speculation as to whether a president will seek a third term, thus relieving him of the terrific pressure to run again and, by letting party leaders know in advance they must select another man.”

Supporters Understood that the 22nd Amendment Would Limit the Public’s Choice

Like all qualification requirements in the Constitution, such as those setting age and citizenship requirements, the two-term limit operates as a limit on the public’s choice. Opponents of the amendment highlighted this, arguing that limiting public choice was inappropriate.

Pennsylvania Senator Burton Tarr, a Democrat, argued the amendment questioned “whether or not we believe our American form of democracy has been a success.” Senator Tarr argued the amendment suggests “the American people can not be trusted to wholly or wisely decide on the question of their Chief Executive” and claimed “[i]n one hundred and sixty years America has never had a bad president, a president of whom we could say he was dangerous to our form of government.” Senator Bertram Frazier, a Republican, took a different view, stating in support of the amendment: “I do not think it is an attempt to take away from the people the right to act; I think this gives them the right to act.” Ultimately, the Joint Resolution passed the Pennsylvania House on April 15, 1947, by a vote of 162 to 35 with 8 representatives not voting, and passed the Pennsylvania Senate on April 29, 1947, by a vote of 33 to 16.

Legislators elsewhere also rejected this argument, echoing Thomas Jefferson’s concerns about presidencies without limits. In Connecticut, Republican Representative George Ramsey said the amendment was a “forward-looking piece of legislation, aimed at no one.” He warned, “There is no indispensable man, and if that fallacy arises, there is the end of our Republic.” In South Carolina, Senator Edward Williams Cantwell, a Democrat, said of the 22nd Amendment debate, “no man is indispensable.”

Supporters Understood that the 22nd Amendment Would Apply Even in Times of Emergency

The question of whether it is wise to require a change in administration notwithstanding the fact that the country could be in the grips of an emergency at the time was also part of the debate in some states.

In Wisconsin, Republican Senator Ernest Heden, who supported the amendment, noted that an emergency rationale for staying in office could be abused. He said a president might conceivably “build himself up” through broad powers and “create emergencies himself” that would force the people to continue him in office. “There are men in this world who would capitalize on economic conditions and other catastrophes in order to exalt their own power.”

Illinois Senator Roland Libonati, a Democrat, “argued that future emergencies could arise and that the individual voter shouldn’t be restricted in his choice of a President.” These arguments were ultimately rejected by the Illinois legislature, as both chambers approved the Amendment by significant margins.

Pennsylvania Senator Carleton Woodring, a Democrat, argued the amendment was “a shame, … a travesty on our democratic principles, … a bad piece of legislation” because it would prevent future generations from exercising “the democratic right to govern themselves,” particularly in the situation of “great national emergency by reason of war, or by reason of internal strife, for one reason or another, or by reason of great economic difficulties.” As noted above, the Pennsylvania legislature also approved the amendment by significant margins.

Supporters Wanted to Prevent a Demagogue from Abusing Presidential Power

Legislators also acknowledged that because presidents in our constitutional system have significant power, they can abuse it to keep themselves in power.

South Carolina Senator John C. Taylor, a former Democratic member of Congress, reportedly “[led the] battle for [the] two-term limit” in South Carolina; Taylor expressed concern that an incumbent president’s control of political party funds would ensure that nominating conventions were “controlled from the top and not from the grass roots.”

Illinois Representative Clinton Searle, a Republican, said in support of the amendment, “The late Franklin D. Roosevelt overrode the unwritten law of our land. We want to reestablish that law so that some future demagog [sic] can’t use burocratic [sic] controls to establish a dictatorship and political dynasty.”

Similarly, Texas Representative Samuel Jackson Isaacks, a Democrat known as dean of the Legislature, said, “The Constitution is written to see to it that our public officers do not have too much power. Any President, by force of patronage, can renominate himself. The President appoints every federal judge, every district attorney, and indirectly every postmaster. They are responsible to him for bread and meat. When a man can renominate himself through patronage, he may also be re-elected through patronage. That’s not democratic. It resembles dictatorship.”

* * *

The day after the 22nd Amendment was ratified in New Hampshire, the Nashua Telegraph noted that even despite the vote along party lines in that state’s legislature,

“Conceivably the Republicans may some day come up with a man with the vote getting appeal of the late President Roosevelt who might want to continue in office indefinitely. This amendment prohibits such ambition as it should. No man should hold office in perpetuity no matter how much he may appeal to the electorate as a candidate. The United States has grown great and strong under many Presidents. There is no reason why this policy should not continue.”

To violate the 22nd Amendment would be to discard the wisdom of those who sought to preserve our democracy against the last rising tide of authoritarianism, and who foresaw the possibility we now find ourselves in. The 22nd Amendment resolves this question definitively. Its prohibition is binding constitutional law borne out of the rigorous ratification process, not a matter of political preference, to be decided in a partisan election.

The post No Indispensable Man: The Democratic Foundation of the 22nd Amendment appeared first on Just Security.

The FY 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, enacted on Dec. 18, takes a significant step towards the full removal of sanctions on Syria by repealing the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (Caesar Act), which provided for mandatory sanctions on those providing certain support to Syria and its government. This marks the latest in a remarkable series of developments following Assad’s sudden downfall and exile to Russia in December 2024. The transitional Syrian government formed after Assad’s ouster has worked to project stability and attract international development and investment funding, reversing years of isolation and the Assad regime’s reliance on Russia for survival. As Syria emerges from sanctions seclusion, numerous challenges remain to outside investment and development in Syria, which the World Bank estimates will cost $216 billion to reconstruct.

Led by transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the new Syrian government has pursued a path towards building international legitimacy and demonstrated its willingness to reconsider Syria’s relationships with regional and global powers to fund its development. This shift was evident on November 10, 2025, when al-Sharaa joined President Trump in the White House for the first-ever meeting hosting a Syrian head of State. This followed an initial meeting with al-Sharaa in Saudi Arabia on May 14, the day after Trump announced he would order the lifting of sanctions on Syria.

The repeal of the Caesar Act presents a key moment to review the U.S. government’s progress towards the goal reflected in Trump’s May 13 announcement and June 30 Executive Order of removing sanctions and other restrictions on Syria to support the new government and efforts to promote a stable, unified, and peaceful Syria. Key issues such as accountability, institutional reforms, and a successful democratic transition are closely interlinked with Syria’s ability to engage in effective reconstruction and economic recovery, and sanctions – or their removal – have the potential to significantly impact Syria’s ability to garner the support necessary for those processes. In this article, we take stock of where things stand along the path of Syria sanctions removal and what restrictions remain to inhibit burgeoning investment and development in post-Assad Syria.

Assad’s Ouster Leads to Reexamination and Removal of Sanctions

U.S. sanctions on Syria started with export controls and foreign assistance restrictions derived from Syria’s designation in 1979 as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) and grew over decades to include an amalgamation of export controls, economic sanctions and terror list designations, and assistance restrictions. They variously aimed to pressure Assad’s regime to either reverse course and end its interference in Lebanon, terrorist support, and human rights abuses or hasten the transition to a new Syrian government. Over 13 years after President Obama sanctioned the government of Syria and called for Bashar al-Assad to step aside, Syrian rebel groups including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ended the Assad family’s 50+-year reign in a matter of roughly 11 days. Following this quick change in government, U.S. policymakers were left with the question of whether and how to dismantle the entrenched Syria sanctions apparatus, which broadly impacted the country and its government, without regard to who held power.

Since becoming transitional president shortly after leading the overthrow of Assad, al-Sharaa has sought to quickly move beyond his militant past and attempted to establish himself as a moderate leader committed to preventing corruption and holding accountable human rights abusers, protecting minorities, and ensuring a stable and secure Syrian government  Significant questions and challenges surrounding al-Sharaa’s goals for his new government remain unresolved as Syria charts its course for the future. Outbreaks of government-affiliated sectarian violence raise concerns about al-Sharaa’s ability to ensure the safety of all Syrians. On the economic front, he has pressed the United States to permanently end its sanctions on Syria, including removing Syria as a State Sponsor of Terror and specific appeals for a permanent repeal of the Caesar Act, to further settle the nerves of potential investors and provide more clarity and stability for Syria.

While barriers to trade remain, repealing the Caesar Act is the latest in a number of significant sanctions relief actions that suggest al-Sharaa’s strategy is working. Since announcing he would roll back Syria sanctions on May 13, Trump has continued to voice his support for Syria and his desire to “give them a chance at greatness.” As detailed below, the U.S. government has already removed many sanctions measures to implement the May 13 announcement, while retaining sanctions on Assad and his supporters and other bad actors related to Syria.

Post-May 13 Syria Sanctions Relief

Step 1: Temporary Sanctions Relief

On May 23, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the State Department took the first significant steps towards sanctions relief by issuing OFAC General License 25 and a 180-day waiver of sanctions under the Caesar Act. These actions broadly authorized transactions with the new transitional Syrian government, al-Sharaa (under his nom de guerre, Abu Muhammad Al-Jawlani) and transitional Interior Minister Khattab, and certain sanctioned entities. The Caesar Act waiver also temporarily removed the risk of sanctions designation under the Act. Absent a waiver or suspension, the Caesar Act provided for mandatory secondary sanctions on non-U.S. persons that engage in various significant transactions involving Syria, such as support to the Syrian government, Syria’s petroleum industry, or engineering services to the Syrian government.

Before its repeal, two distinct methods allowed the U.S. Secretary of State to temporarily halt application of the Caesar Act: a waiver under Section 7432 of the Act, or suspension via Section 7431 of the Act. Waiving sanctions under the Act required the Secretary to certify that such a waiver was in the national security interests of the United States. Suspension, however, required a more fact-based certification that seven enumerated conditions had been met, including with respect to the government of Syria’s actions related to destruction of chemical and biological weapons, the return of displaced Syrians, and accountability for the Assad regime. The statute limited both waiver and suspension to 180 days, renewable.

Step 2: Executive Order Roadmap

On June 30, President Trump issued Executive Order 14312, “Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions.” This order laid out the following steps towards sanctions relief and reframing:

• Permanently Removing Syria Sanctions: The Executive Order terminated the national emergency with respect to Syria and revoked previous Executive Orders establishing the Syrian sanctions regime (EOs 13338, 13399, 13460, 13572, 13573 and 13582). This led to the removal of 518 individuals and entities associated with Syria from OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List).

• Expanding Assad-related Sanctions: It further amended EO 13894 to expand sanctions authorities to “ensure meaningful accountability” for former Assad officials and their supporters, providing sanctions authorities to designate, e.g., those who threaten Syrian peace, security and stability, commit human rights abuses, trade illicitly in captagon, or are responsible for missing persons in Syria during the Assad era. OFAC designated 139 persons under these expanded authorities, as well as other relevant authorities, in conjunction with the Executive Order.

• Providing for Export Control and Assistance Relief: The Executive Order also waived statutory provisions under section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 (Syria Accountability Act) and section 307(d)(1)(B) of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) that had underpinned prohibitions on virtually all exports to Syria, restricted U.S. foreign assistance, denied U.S. government credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance, and restricted U.S. banks from making loans or providing credit to the Syrian government.

• Secondary Sanctions Relief: The Executive Order also directed the U.S. Secretary of State to evaluate whether the criteria in the Caesar Act had been met to justify suspension of the Act’s mandatory sanctions.

• Counterterrorism Review and UN Engagement: Last, the Executive Order required the U.S. Secretary of State to take “all appropriate action” related to the terror designations applied to the new Syrian government and its members – including HTS’s designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, Syria’s inclusion on the SST list, and al-Sharaa’s designation as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). It also directed the U.S. Secretary of State to support a stable Syria at the U.N. and “explore” U.N. sanctions relief to Syria.

Evaluating the EO’s Effect – What Remains to Deliver on President Trump’s Promise?

Following issuance of the roadmap for sanctions removal in EO 14312, the U.S. Departments of State, the Treasury, and Commerce have continued along the path to remove sanctions on Syria. Additional steps, however, remain before the U.S. sanctions and export control apparatus applicable to Syria is fully dismantled. Below, we review actions taken in furtherance of the measures described in EO 14312 and remaining steps along the path to fully removing sanctions and restrictive export controls from Syria.

Sanctions Regulatory Changes: On August 26, OFAC removed the Syrian Sanctions Regulations from the Code of Federal Regulations. On September 25, OFAC also renamed the “Syria Related Sanctions Regulations” as the “Promoting Accountability for Assad and Regional Stabilization Sanctions Regulations” to reflect the expanded scope of the underlying national emergency. The removal of all Syria-focused sanctions regulations has the effect of underscoring that U.S. sanctions do not target Syria but rather target destabilizing actors in the region.

Initial Export Control Relief: On September 2, empowered by EO 14312’s waivers of the Syria Accountability Act and CBW Act, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule to allow greater trade with Syria, while maintaining restrictions relevant to malign or destabilizing actors.

This rule added a Syria-specific license exception, License Exception Syria Peace and Prosperity (SPP), which authorizes the export of “EAR99” items to Syria. EAR99 refers to low-technology consumer goods items that are not identified on the Commerce Control List and are therefore subject to the lowest level of U.S. export controls. It also expanded several other license exceptions to allow for specified exports to Syria without requiring an export license. These expanded exceptions apply to certain consumer communications devices; aircraft, vessels, and spacecraft; temporary imports, exports, and transfers; servicing and replacing parts and equipment; exports related to the U.S. government and its allies; technology and software; and baggage. Additionally, BIS now applies a presumption of approval for license applications to Syria that support economic and business development. These license exceptions represent an incremental step towards allowing exports for daily living, international travel, and global business operations to Syria, removing some of the export control impediments that stymied the early response to the Syrian earthquake in 2023.

Of note, however, Syria remains subject to significant export controls resulting from its designation in Country Group E of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”), which applies to terrorist list countries. This country group designation means that items subject to even the lowest levels of control require a license or license exception for export to Syria, and U.S. export control jurisdiction extends to items that contain as little as 10% U.S. content.

Counterterrorism Relief: Effective July 8, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio delisted HTS as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), citing the group’s announced dissolution “and the Syrian government’s commitment to combat terrorism in all its forms.” This meant the removal of criminal risk under the Material Support Statute associated with knowingly providing material support or resources to the group, although the group remains designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under EO 13224, as amended. Then, on November 6, with the support of the United States, the U.N. Security Council voted to remove U.N. terror sanctions from Al-Sharaa and transitional Interior Minister Khattab. One day later, on November 7, the United States itself removed the designations of al-Sharaa and Khattab as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, meaning they are no longer individually subject to U.S. sanctions.

Caesar Act Suspension: In conjunction with al-Sharaa’s November 10 White House visit, Rubio also announced the suspension of the Caesar Act for the maximum 180-day period. While Rubio had previously issued a Caesar Act waiver, suspension required his certification to Congress that Syria is meeting the conditions set out in the Act. This suspension had the effect of replacing the soon expiring waiver to remove the risk of sanctions designation for those engaging with the transitional government of Syria to support investment or development in Syria for the next 180 days.

Caesar Act’s Repeal: Prior to its repeal, the Caesar Act only allowed for suspension or waivers in 180-day increments. As a result, even when the Secretary of State acted to waive and later suspend the Act, its specter continued to stymie investment in Syria as investors remained reticent to invest in the face of sanctions uncertainty. On Dec. 18 Congress removed this impediment to long-term investment in Syria by fully repealing the Caesar Act in section 8369 of the FY 2026 NDAA, entitled “Repeal of Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019.” This section also requires the President to report to Congress every 180 days for four years and certify to that Syria’s government is: (1) taking action against ISIS and other terrorist groups; (2) taking steps to remove foreign fighters from Syrian government; (3) upholding religious and ethnic minority rights; (4) not taking unilateral, unprovoked military action against its neighbors, including Israel; (5) taking steps to implement the March 10, 2025, agreement between the Government of Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces; (6) taking steps to effectively combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (7) actively prosecuting those that have committed serious abuses of internationally recognized human rights since December 8, 2024; and (8) taking verifiable steps to combat the illicit production and proliferation of narcotics, including Captagon. If these conditions are not met for two consecutive reporting periods, section 8369 provides that the President “may consider whether to impose targeted sanctions on individuals under existing authorities,” but critically for attracting investment into Syria, the NDAA includes no mandatory sanctions or snapback provision that would reimpose Caesar Act sanctions.

Looking Ahead: Post-Caesar Repeal

The repeal of the Caesar Act sets the stage for next steps along the path of sanctions removal. The key players in this next phase are the Secretary of State and BIS.

Syria State Sponsor of Terrorism Removal:  Syria was designated on the initial State Sponsor of Terrorism list in 1979, during the reign of Hafez al-Assad, and remains listed today despite the U.S. government’s steps to dismantle the Syria sanctions regime and the direction in EO 14312 to review Syria’s SST designation. As such, significant export controls still apply to Syria due to SST-related restrictions imposed under section 1754(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (relating primarily to export control requirements), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (related to munitions items), and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (related to assistance). Until it is delisted, Syria is denied immunity by virtue of the SST-designation under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) if sued in U.S. court. Under the terrorism exception to the FSIA, if Syria is eventually delisted, any U.S. victims of Syrian terrorism will have six months from the time of delisting to make claims for damages incurred during the period Syria was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.

Export Controls: Delisting Syria as a State Sponsor of Terrorism would also remove the legal underpinnings requiring stringent export controls on Syria. If the Department of State delists Syria, the ball will be in BIS’s court to update the EAR to account for Syria’s new status. Looking to the regulatory change BIS made following Sudan’s SST removal as an example, this will include the removal of Syria from EAR Country Group E:1 and a change to the de minimis threshold for U.S. export control jurisdiction from 10% to 25%, meaning that fewer items destined to Syria will be subject to U.S. export control. It will also make Syria eligible for additional license exceptions under the EAR and remove it from the most stringent, anti-terrorism-related controls. Once implemented, these changes should make it easier for developers and investors in Syria to obtain parts and machinery necessary for reconstruction and development, and they will remove barriers to consumer imports and business operations that support the country’s economic recovery. None of these changes will occur, however, until (1) Syria is removed as an SST; and(2) BIS publishes a rule change to amend the EAR.

Syria has a long road ahead towards reconstruction, development, justice, and accountability. As the country rebuilds and emerges from years of isolation, it requires international funding, technical assistance, and support. Removing Assad era barriers to engagement with the international community is a critical step along this path.

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