Others have already comprehensively analyzed the machinations and outcomes of the annual meeting of Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change/Paris Agreement, or “COP 30,” in Belem. As a long-time climate negotiator, I will focus instead on a few aspects that I found surprising, even though I had anticipated an unusual COP. I conclude with some open questions to watch over on the road to COP 31 and beyond.
The Surprise Theme
One reason COP 30 was likely to be an “unusual COP” was because, before it kicked off in November, it lacked a defined theme or metric for judging its success. Unlike many past COPs where a major decision was to be adopted (a negotiating mandate, a new agreement, significant rules/guidelines), Belem was in need of a clear motif – for Parties and observers to both understand its purpose and measure its outcomes. COP President Brazil and others put forward several possibilities throughout the year, including the Amazon COP, the Forest COP, the Implementation COP, the COP of Truth, and the Adaptation COP. However, the de facto theme – and ultimate metric for success – became one that was rarely mentioned during the year, i.e., making progress on “transitioning away from fossil fuels.”
This phrase had its origins in a decision of the Parties from the 2023 Dubai COP, which engaged in their first assessment of progress (the so-called “global stocktake”) under the Paris Agreement. A carefully worded paragraph called upon the Parties, in line with their respective national circumstances, to contribute to a series of “global efforts” that would help keep a 1.5o C limit on temperature rise within reach. One such global effort, and a key Dubai achievement, was “transitioning away from fossil fuels.”
It was Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva himself who introduced into COP 30 the imperative of developing a “roadmap” to implement this transition, and the idea consumed the Parties, media, and observers. The ensuing debate over whether to include a reference to such a roadmap in the consensus decision pitted supporters (the “coalition of the willing”) against the oil-producing States (the “coalition of the drilling,” so to speak) and became the surprise hottest political issue of the COP. And, despite the fact that it was eminently predictable that the idea would not gain consensus (unless perhaps drafted in a highly nuanced manner, and in the context of the other agreed global efforts, not singled out), it also became the unanticipated metric for success, with much of the COP commentary focused on the failure to agree on such a reference. (Notably, the issue will be taken forward outside the formal process, both by Brazil in its Presidency role and by Colombia/Netherlands at a conference next spring.)
The Surprisingly Weak NDC Response
A second reason for expecting an unusual COP was that the Paris Agreement “issue of the year” was the submission of the Parties’ next set of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) – due last February but mostly straggling in since then – yet the issue was not on the formal agenda, and it was unclear whether the COP would actually address it. It was a main topic of conversation in the run-up to the COP, and it seemed almost impossible to imagine that Belem would not in some way respond to the clear gap between the aggregate NDCs and what is needed to keep a 1.5o C limit within reach. It was the centerpiece of my personal litmus test for a minimally successful COP30.
There were many ways in which the Belem COP could have at least attempted to respond to the NDC gap.
- Ideally, there would have been clear language in a consensus decision acknowledging the gap and converging on a plan, whether substance or procedural (or both) to address it.
- Anticipating a potential lack of consensus at the end of the COP, Brazil could have, for example, prepared a chair’s summary of the NDC-relevant statements at its early Leaders Summit.
- In addition or alternatively, Brazil could have hosted a ministerial-level event focused on the latest NDCs in all their dimensions.
Stunningly, the COP ended with none of the above. While two provisions (¶¶ 41, 42) of the main decision, though tortured, can be read to lightly skim along the surface of the NDC deficit, they are not nearly what should be expected from the primary forum on climate change about the latest NDCs – the backbone of the Paris Agreement. The result clearly placed the interests of the BRICS above those of the progressive and vulnerable Parties. To me, this thin NDC outcome, rather than the absence of an agreed roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels, was the true failure of COP 30, given that consensus agreement on such a roadmap was never realistically in the cards. It may even be that the intense focus on an agreed roadmap took the spotlight off arriving at a serious answer to the NDC gap.
Given the weak response here, it was also somewhat surprising that the main decision’s final package included rather strong outcomes on controversial topics not even mandated to be addressed in Belem, namely in relation to the tripling of adaptation finance and the nexus between climate and trade.
- The “tripling” was heavily nuanced, calling for “efforts,” rather than setting a new goal, and in the context of last year’s agreement in Baku on climate finance, which moved away from the “developed countries only” paradigm. Still, it was a substantial addition to the Paris Agreement’s climate finance architecture.
- The trade outcome was also noteworthy – involving three future dialogues on a topic that has historically been weighted against the developed countries (and even more so since the EU introduced its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism). While the dialogues will involve climate/trade issues generally, rather than the proposed focus on “unilateral” trade measures, it was arguably still a high price to pay for the slim outcome on NDCs.
The Surprise Temperature Goal
Last July, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an Advisory Opinion address the obligations of States with respect to climate change. Among other things, the ICJ opined that the Parties to the Paris Agreement, through their post-Paris decisions, legally changed the temperature goal of the Agreement from the composite goal of “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2o C and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5oC” to the single goal of 1.5o C.
I assumed that proponents of the Advisory Opinion would seek to secure some kind of positive reference to it in one or more COP 30 outcomes – either generic or specific. I equally assumed that there would be certain pushback against such a reference, either on general principle or on the merits of a specific point. (For example, Dan Bodansky and I did not find legally persuasive the Opinion’s reasoning regarding 1.5o C.)
However, I further assumed that the Opinion’s champions would not agree to any references in the outcomes that were inconsistent with the Opinion. I was therefore surprised to see the main decision reaffirming the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal as the original one set forth in Article 2 of the Agreement, which I read as contradicting the ICJ’s conclusion.
The Surprise COP 31 Announcement
The world waited all year to learn who would host COP 31. Bets were initially on Australia, in partnership with the Pacific, and then evolved to includes Australia (still with the Pacific) in some kind of arrangement with Türkiye (such as with the Leaders Summit in Türkiye) or, in the absence of an agreed arrangement, default to the UNFCCC headquarters (Germany) per the rules of procedure.
So, it was a surprise to learn of the innovative partnership ultimately struck between Australia and Türkiye, under which the latter will host the COP and be its President, while the former will have the newly-created position of “President of Negotiations” and the pre-COP will take place in a Pacific island country. Previous COPs have been held in faraway places (the Chile-led COP in Madrid, the Fiji-led COP in Bonn), but there is no precedent for a shared Presidency such as this one. Many details of the COP-sharing arrangement — a bilateral document that appears as nuanced and hard-fought as a consensus COP decision – await further refinement. In any event, advocates of climate action hope that the innovative approach will work to promote, rather than hinder, progress next year.
Some Open Questions…
- Is a weak negotiated outcome on mitigation the new normal or will Türkiye and Australia, aided by the involvement of the Pacific, turn it around next year?
- Recognizing the constraints of the consensus process and without the presence of a pro-climate United States, what will be the relative roles of the formal negotiated outcomes versus informal initiatives, coalitions, and commitments?
- Will the interesting side initiatives emerging from Belem, such as on carbon pricing/markets, gain steam?
- Will opponents of a roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels (and on deforestation) live to regret their opposition, in the sense that they will have less influence over the development of these roadmaps outside the UNFCCC process?
- Will the new dialogues on climate/trade create a space for constructive cross-cutting discussion or devolve into yet more meetings of negotiators with sterile talking points?
