Numerous officials in the Trump administration have publicly acknowledged that this named military operation was inherently risky (calling it “very dangerous” and “audacious”). It involved approximately 200 U.S. personnel on the ground in Caracas. There were, as would be expected in an operation of this nature, fire fights between U.S. forces and opposing forces, involving both Venezuelan and Cuban military forces. What’s more, the operation took place in the context of an extensive military build-up in the region, coupled with threats against Maduro to cede power, as well as an ongoing U.S. naval blockade of Venezuelan oil tankers. (The threats and blockade continue today.)

Among the many questions immediately raised by the named Operation Absolute Resolve is: did the president have the authority under U.S. law to undertake this dramatic, forcible military operation without congressional authorization? In the Q&A below, we explain why he did not. The analysis is similar to one that two of us published in 2019, and updated in 2025, regarding the unilateral use of military force against Iran.   

As we explained then, “there are only two sources of authority for the use of force abroad – the Constitution and congressional authorizations for the use of military force (or AUMFs).” There is clearly no statute passed by Congress that could authorize the use of military force against Venezuela, nor is anyone claiming such authorization exists. 

The question, then, is whether the President had authority under Article II of the Constitution to order this operation without Congress’ authorization. We believe the answer is no, based on the nature and location of the operations, the expected (and realized) risk of U.S. casualties, the known risks of escalation, the operation’s purpose of removal of a sitting head of State, the use of lethal force against two States’ security forces, and the context of other military actions (threats of force, naval blockade) before, during, and after the operation took place.

Alongside the lack of congressional authorization, we also note the President’s constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” was also breached because the operation violated the prohibition on the use of force in the U.N. Charter. (See Goodman’s analysis including Congress’ long expressed interest in the President’s complying with such treaties).

1. Did the president need authorization from Congress to use U.S. military force against Venezuela?

Debate on the scope of the president’s authority to use military force without congressional authorization is not new, and interbranch disputes on this question have persisted under recent administrations of both political parties (from Obama to Trump, this includes uses of force or deployments in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Iran). Congress has typically taken a more limited view of the President’s unilateral authority to use military force and has pushed back on presidential claims in many cases (often in bipartisan resolutions, none of which were enacted due to presidential vetoes or failure to garner sufficient votes). Meanwhile, the executive branch’s much broader approach has continued to expand the purported zone of unilateral authority in recent years. As we previously explained:

The executive branch, through consistent historical practice in Republican and Democratic administrations, and as reflected in a series of opinions by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), has taken a relatively expansive view of the president’s Article II authority to initiate the use of force, arguing that it has the ability to do so when: (1) there is an important “national interest” in doing so (Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have explained that this has become a very expansive concept in modern practice; Marty Lederman has suggested the concept should be understood as limited to significant national interests that have historically supported such unilateral actions in the past); and (2) the use of force does not constitute “war” in the constitutional sense.

The latter limitation is because Article I of the Constitution delegates the power to “declare war” to Congress. The executive branch has argued, in essence, that if the expected “nature, scope, and duration” of the military engagement falls below the threshold of “war,” the president may use force without congressional authorization. In the OLC’s view, “military operations will likely rise to the level of a war only when characterized by ‘prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.’” The OLC opined most recently that the limited strikes against Syria by the United States in response to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons did not cross this threshold. Prior OLC opinions reached a similar conclusion with respect to U.S. military strikes in Libya in 2011, and U.S. military activities in Haiti in the 1990s, among others.

[…]

The framers of the Constitution gave the authority to declare war to Congress, as well as the authority to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy, provide for the common defense, regulate detention and seizure of vessels in war, and a host of other powers related to war and foreign affairs, in part to prevent the United States from being drawn into conflict for unpopular purposes or without debate and consideration by the representatives of the people. The Constitution’s design anticipates that Congress would be less inclined to go to war than the executive branch — this is a feature, not a bug. (Of note, it has long been understood that even though Congress has the lion’s share of authority in war-making, the president does have at least some concurrent if not exclusive authority in regard to the conduct of hostilities and to use force to repel a sudden attack on the United States.)

What’s more, even in the OLC’s view, the threshold for “war” in the constitutional sense is more easily met when the use of force at issue is against another nation state (rather than in its territory but with its consent) where there is a high likelihood of escalation.

Applying even the OLC’s expansive view from its recent opinions to Operation Absolute Resolve, the Executive action clearly crosses the threshold for requiring congressional authorization.

Extensive U.S. objectives: As we mentioned in the Iran context, the U.S. objectives for the use of force factor into the analysis. In the Venezuela case, there was a clear objective of removing the sitting head of State from his own territory. This distinguishes the operation from the strikes in Syria or Iran, which did not have regime change objectives (despite, of course, open U.S. hostility toward those regimes). Based on statements made by the President and his cabinet, the Venezuela operations’ objectives appear relatively open-ended, with Congressional leaders expressing concerns about the lack of a defined scope. The President has continued to threaten senior Venezuelan government officials with the use of additional military force if they do not meet U.S. demands.

Risk of escalation: With respect to the risk of escalation, Operation Absolute Resolve involved the use of force against the security forces of two States – Venezuela and Cuba. Both of those states are our geographic neighbors (unlike Libya, Syria, or Iran).   A factor in the OLC’s analysis is whether a military operation would “inflict substantial casualties as a result of the deployment,” and the January 3 operation reportedly resulted in 80 killed in action.

The operation reportedly killed 32 members of Cuban security forces deployed in Venezuela on a military mission. Dozens more Cuban service members are thought to have been injured or suffered severe burns during the U.S. operation, according to the Wall Street Journal reporting. 

The administration was presumably aware Cuba’s security forces would get caught up in the fight. Two Delta Forces had reportedly established “a ‘pattern of life’ on Maduro in advance of the operation, mapping out his location and daily movement.” A CIA team located in Caracas for months was reportedly able “to map out minute details about his routines.” On Jan. 4, Sec. Rubio stated, Maduro’s “entire, like, internal security force, his internal security apparatus is entirely controlled by Cubans. … It was Cubans that guarded Maduro.  He was not guarded by Venezuelan bodyguards. He had Cuban bodyguards.”

In addition, the operation anticipated a second wave of attacks, according to the President. And he has explicitly stated that the second wave could still occur. The President said on Jan. 3, “We’re prepared, we were prepared to do a second wave. … We were out there with an armada like nobody has ever seen before. And we’re prepared, and we were prepared. Frankly, probably thought we were going to have to do it, but we were prepared for a second wave going in.”

As a matter of international law, the “international armed conflict” initiated by Operation Inherent Resolve persists (see #6 in this Expert Q&A). That’s in part because the United States maintains a massive force in the area (“one of the largest naval deployments in modern history,” Sec. Rubio recently stated), and the President continues to threaten to use further military force if Venezuelan authorities do not “cooperate” with U.S. demands. Additionally, the United States maintains enforcement of a military quarantine of sanctioned Venezuelan oil tankers.

[For the law on when a blockade involves an act of war and “aggression” under international law, see Michael Schmitt and Rob McLaughlin, Blockading Venezuela: The International Law Consequences.]

These are all factors that would weigh in the OLC assessment of whether the military action involves “‘prolonged and substantial military engagement”of U.S. forces. It clearly does.

Risks to U.S. personnel: Two of the most expansive executive branch opinions in recent years (Libya and Syria) have justified the President’s ability to engage in military operations without congressional authorization on the basis that the operations involved no U.S. troops on the ground and thus placed no American service members’ lives at risk. 

Operation Absolute Resolve placed a significant number of U.S. forces in harm’s way. According to the President, two service members were wounded and one helicopter was struck. U.S. officials have since acknowledged about half a dozen soldiers were injured in the overall operation (other reports put it at seven). “Even though Venezuelan air defenses were suppressed, the U.S. helicopters came under fire,” the New York Times reported.

Given the nature and scope of the operation, there was of course a risk that casualties could have been more extensive. As President Trump stated in remarks on Jan. 3, “It was an operation against a heavily fortified military fortress in the heart of Caracas.” He later added, “This is a very dangerous attack. This is an attack that could have gone very, very badly.”

Aboard Air Force One, the President also acknowledged his awareness of the “great danger” in advance:

“I knew the possible danger. It was a very dangerous operation. It was amazing that we had a few injured, but all are in good shape right now. But I knew there was great danger. They got off the helicopters, and the helicopters were being shot at. They got on the ground. Amazing, amazing talent and tremendous patriotism, bravery. The bravery was incredible. They got off the helicopter, and the bullets were flying all over the place.”

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated:

“This was an audacious operation. … Failure of one component of this well-oiled machine would have endangered the entire mission and failure is never an option for America’s joint force. Those in the air over Caracas last night were willing to give their lives for those on the ground and in the helicopters.”

“There were multiple self defense engagements as the force began to withdraw out of Venezuela,” the Chairman added.

Paradoxically, Secretary Rubio stated that the “number one reason” for  failure to notify Congress was “operational security.” It “would have put the people who carried this on …  in harm’s way,” the secretary said. He then thanked the press for not reporting about the operation in advance, because “lives could have been lost. American lives.”

2. But wasn’t this a law enforcement action, not a use of military force? Can’t the president order the military to assist with law enforcement operations without congressional approval?

This was a named military operation (“Operation Absolute Resolve”) that also had a law enforcement function. The two are not mutually exclusive. (Secretary of Defense Hegseth described it as a “joint military and law enforcement raid.”)  The President does have some unilateral constitutional authority to defend U.S. nationals in peril, including U.S. law enforcement personnel. 

Of course, any peril U.S. law enforcement officials or U.S. forces may have faced was a direct result of the U.S. operation itself – there was no attack by Venezuelan forces, actual or imminent, on U.S. nationals, armed forces, or other personnel (as opposed to other U.S. operations conducted without congressional authorization that had the goal of protecting U.S. persons or property, rescuing nationals in peril, evacuating U.S. embassies, and the like).   

Moreover, the use of military force here was undeniable and extensive, and is arguably ongoing given the U.S. naval blockade still in effect against Venezuelan oil tankers and continuing threats of further military force against Venezuela’s government. These latter actions are not related to any law enforcement purpose.

3. Does the use of military force need to be consistent with U.S. international legal obligations? 

Yes. This is an important limitation on the use of military force, whether authorized by Congress or not. The United States has ratified the UN Charter (which it also helped to draft and negotiate), making it the “supreme Law of the Land” under the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, Clause 2) of the U.S. Constitution. Thus, whether acting under Article I or Article II authority, the United States must comply with the UN Charter as a domestic law matter (in addition to the importance of meeting its obligations as an international law matter, which is discussed by two of us along with Mike Schmitt here). 

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,” except if authorized by the UN Security Council (clearly not applicable here) or in self-defense as enshrined in Art. 51 of the UN Charter and customary international law. There is no plausible self-defense rationale for Operation Absolute Resolve, and to our knowledge none has been given by the Administration. (It is also important that under international law, even if the United States acts in self-defense, the U.S. response must be necessary and proportionate, though analysis of those requirements is not pertinent where there is no viable underlying self-defense claim).

Finally, as we have previously explained, “the president is charged in Article II of the Constitution to “take care” that the laws are faithfully executed.” This includes the  U.N. Charter obligations described above. 

As supreme Law of the Land, it would require an act of Congress to supersede the UN Charter (the so-called “last in time rule”). In other words, it is Congress’ prerogative. The President  cannot do so alone.

[For more on this issue, see Ryan Goodman, Maduro Capture Operation and the President’s Duty to Faithfully Execute U.N. Charter.]

4. Hasn’t the President used force to seize a foreign president before without congressional authorization?

Yes, but that does not make it lawful, and there are also meaningful differences here. In 1989, President H.W. Bush ordered a military operation to capture General Manual Noriega, then the military dictator of Panama. Among other stated rationales, President George HW Bush emphasized that a primary purpose of the operation was protection of U.S. nationals following forces under Noriega’s command having “killed an unarmed American serviceman; wounded another; arrested and brutally beat a third American serviceman; and then brutally interrogated his wife, threatening her with sexual abuse.” Secretary of State James A. Baker also stated, “We received an intelligence report that General Noriega was considering launching an urban commando attack on American citizens in a residential neighborhood.” As the War Powers Resolution report to Congress said at the time: “The deployment of U.S. Forces… was necessary to protect American lives in imminent danger…”. While some have criticized these rationales as a pretext for action in Panama, they did not exist at all in Venezuela.  

Operation Absolute Resolve was not intended to rescue or protect U.S. nationals in imminent peril, which was one of the primary stated goals of the Panama operation that removed Noriega from power. It was aimed at removing the Head of State (even if doing so also had a law enforcement purpose of bringing Maduro and his wife to the United States to stand trial on federal drug trafficking and weapons possession charges).  

Panama, on the other hand, was understood by the Executive Branch as “responding in self-defense to an imminent threat to U.S. lives when it took military action in Panama,” according to the Office of Legal Counsel. (The OLC has also emphasized that the action was justified by the United States as a necessary and proportional action in self-defense under the U.N. Charter.)

5. What can Congress do if it disagrees with the president’s decision to use military force unilaterally? 

We described a range of measures Congress can take in our earlier Q&A:

Congress has a number of tools at its disposal to constrain the president’s ability to use force unilaterally. Even in the OLC’s view, the president’s ability to use force without congressional authority can be checked if Congress decides to impose restrictions. While past attorneys general and the OLC have determined the president has the power to use military force abroad to protect important national interests and below the threshold of “war” in the constitutional sense, as discussed above, “[t]his independent authority of the President … exists at least insofar as Congress has not specifically restricted it,” the OLC wrote in 2011.

Among the options available, use of Congress’ “power of the purse” is the most potent and likely the clearest mechanism:

Congress’ appropriations power is one of the most potent tools to restrict presidential action. In 2018, the OLC opined that the significant powers vested in Congress by the Constitution “ensure that the use of force ‘cannot be sustained over time without the acquiescence, indeed the approval, of Congress, for it is Congress that must appropriate the money to fight a war or a police action.’ … These powers further oblige the President to seek congressional approval prior to contemplating military action that would bring the Nation into a war.”

[…]

It is precisely this type of action — the cutting off of funds for specific uses of force, which relies on Congress’ constitutional appropriations power — that would put Congress on its strongest footing to assert authority over the use of force abroad, and would put the president’s authority at what the Supreme Court has described as its “lowest ebb.” The clear intent of this proposed amendment is to prevent the executive branch from drawing the United States into a war without a congressional vote to specifically authorize it, which is particularly important given that senior Trump administration officials are considering justifying a use of force against Iran on purported congressional authorization in the 2001 AUMF.

Finally, an amendment like this could be passed even after an initial use of force, making clear the president does not have authority to continue using force absent congressional authorization.

Congress has all of these options at its disposal today. A bipartisan, privileged measure pursuant to the War Powers Resolution will likely come for a vote as soon as this week.

The post Congress, the President, and the Use of Military Force in Venezuela appeared first on Just Security.

[June 18, 2025 Authors’ Update: With President Donald Trump reportedly considering bringing the United States directly into the armed conflict between Israel and Iran, and in particular offensive strikes against Iran’s nuclear program, it is important to understand the legal framework that governs whether and when a President can use military force overseas under U.S. domestic law (as we noted in 2019, the use of force must also comport with international law, which we do address briefly below). 

As outlined in the Q&A below, there are only two sources of authority for the use of force abroad – the Constitution and congressional authorizations for the use of military force (or AUMFs). As we explained in 2019 and remains true today, there is no existing AUMF that would authorize the President to use force against Iran. Second, under the Executive branch’s own interpretation of Article II of the Constitution, which has become much broader in recent decades and is not necessarily shared by Congress or the courts, the President may use force to protect an important national interest, but only so long as the force used does not amount to war “in the constitutional sense” (which the Constitution delegates Congress alone the power to authorize, along with a host of other war-related powers found in Article I). A number of factors the Executive traditionally considers in this analysis point toward the “war in the constitutional sense” threshold being reached in the current circumstances, including but not limited to the use of force being directed at a large nation state (which has said “[a]ny American intervention would be a recipe for an all-out war in the region”), the exposure of U.S. forces in the region, and the potential that the use of force would not be limited or narrow but could – as some reporting indicates – even point toward an intent to achieve regime change through force or would be perceived by the adversary as such. Indeed, it would be hard to envision what circumstances do not amount to war that Congress must authorize if using military force in Iran in this set of circumstances does not reach that threshold. 

Congress has options as explained below to try to prevent the President from unlawfully using force, including through the appropriations power and the War Powers Resolution of 1973.  Resolutions introduced by Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA) on June 16, by Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) on June 17, and by Representatives Thomas Massie (R-KY) and Ro Khanna (D-CA) on June 17 seek to prevent the President from engaging in hostilities in Iran without Congressional approval.]

What follows is a basic Q&A on the circumstances under which U.S. military operations against Iran would be lawful under U.S. law. The objective is to provide journalists, lawmakers, and other members of the public a legal framework for this important issue. Our analysis is not specific to any particular scenario — such as Iranian forces’ or so-called Iranian proxies’ attacks on commercial ships, U.S. drones, U.S. military vessels, or U.S. personnel — but rather addresses broader questions about the circumstances under which the president has the authority to initiate U.S. military operations against Iran, whether Congress has already authorized the use of force against Iran, how the War Powers Resolution fits into the picture, and what Congress can do if it disagrees with the president’s course of action.

1. Does the president need authorization from Congress to use U.S. military force against Iran?

The president derives authority to use military force overseas from two sources: the Constitution and congressional authorization. At this point, we do not believe that there is any existing congressional authorization to use force against Iran (see Q2 below). In the absence of congressional authorization, the president could only use force against Iran by relying on his authority over foreign relations and as commander-in-chief under Article II of the Constitution.

There is considerable debate on the scope of the president’s authority to use military force in the absence of congressional authorization. The executive branch, through consistent historical practice in Republican and Democratic administrations, and as reflected in a series of opinions by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), has taken a relatively broad view of the president’s Article II authority to initiate the use of force, arguing that it has the ability to do so when: (1) there is an important “national interest” in doing so (Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have explained that this has become a very expansive concept in modern practice; Marty Lederman has suggested the concept should be understood as limited to significant national interests that have historically supported such unilateral actions in the past); and (2) the use of force does not constitute “war” in the constitutional sense.

The latter limitation is because Article I of the Constitution delegates the power to “declare war” to Congress. The executive branch has argued, in essence, that if the expected “nature, scope, and duration” of the military engagement falls below the threshold of “war,” the president may use force without congressional authorization. In the OLC’s view, “military operations will likely rise to the level of a war only when characterized by ‘prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.’” The OLC opined most recently that the limited strikes against Syria by the United States in response to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons did not cross this threshold. Prior OLC opinions reached a similar conclusion with respect to U.S. military strikes in Libya in 2011, and U.S. military activities in Haiti in the 1990s, among others.

In the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (WPR), Congress imposed important limitations on the president’s ability to conduct military operations in the absence of explicit congressional authorization. Indeed, Congress does not necessarily view its own authority so narrowly or the president’s so expansively as described in the OLC opinions noted above. The WPR explicitly states the view of Congress that the president’s constitutional authority to introduce U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities, or situations where involvement in hostilities is imminent, may be exercised “only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.” Moreover, as explained below, the WPR requires the relevant military operations (“hostilities”) to be terminated after a defined period of time unless they have been authorized by Congress.

The framers of the Constitution gave the authority to declare war to Congress, as well as the authority to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy, provide for the common defense, regulate detention and seizure of vessels in war, and a host of other powers related to war and foreign affairs, in part to prevent the United States from being drawn into conflict for unpopular purposes or without debate and consideration by the representatives of the people. The Constitution’s design anticipates that Congress would be less inclined to go to war than the executive branch — this is a feature, not a bug. (Of note, it has long been understood that even though Congress has the lion’s share of authority in war-making, the president does have at least some concurrent if not exclusive authority in regard to the conduct of hostilities and to use force to repel a sudden attack on the United States.)

What’s more, even in the OLC’s view, the threshold for “war” in the constitutional sense is more easily met when the use of force at issue is against another nation state (rather than in its territory but with its consent) where there is a high likelihood of escalation. Although Iran is not a nuclear power, which would necessarily affect that calculus, its capacity as a nation-state with a strong military, including its cyber and ballistic missile capabilities, are relevant factors in this analysis, as is the extent of U.S. exposure given its significant footprint in the region where Iranian military forces (and their proxies) are present and active. The scope of U.S. objectives for the use of force will also affect the analysis, especially if those objectives are likely to require sustained operations or engender use of force in response by Iran. Those factors may distinguish this case from the U.S. strikes against Syria, for example.

Finally, another important limitation is that the president’s use of force — whether based on congressional authorization or not — must comply with international law. The president is charged in Article II of the Constitution to “take care” that the laws are faithfully executed. This includes our international legal obligations, including the U.N. Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force except in certain limited circumstances, such as self-defense. Also, under international law, even if the United States acts in self-defense, the U.S. response must be necessary and proportionate.

2. Does the president have authorization from Congress to strike Iran? Specifically, would the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) authorize a strike against Iran?

There is no existing congressional authorization for the use of force against Iran. While some in the Trump administration, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have made arguments attempting to link Iran and al-Qaeda — in what may be an effort to lay the groundwork for invoking the 2001 AUMF, which was passed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, as authorization to use force against Iran — that argument is thoroughly unconvincing.

The 2001 AUMF authorizes the president to use:

“necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”

This has long been understood to refer to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, who harbored al-Qaeda in Afghanistan at the time of the 9/11 attacks, and also has been interpreted by all three branches of government to apply to “associated forces” of those two armed groups based on the principle of co-belligerency in armed conflict.

As we have previously written: “The 2001 AUMF does not authorize the use of force against Iran. Iran was not implicated in the 9/11 attacks, Iranian forces are not al Qaeda or the Taliban, or their associated forces, nor are they a ‘successor’ to any of those forces.”

Many have suggested that Pompeo and other officials may be laying the groundwork for an argument that the 2001 AUMF authorizes military operations against Iran because Iran is “harboring” some members of al-Qaeda. As a factual matter, we are not aware of any credible information that Iran is “harboring” al-Qaeda as a group, or allowing al-Qaeda to plot attacks from Iran. As a legal matter, the AUMF has never been construed to authorize military attacks against a foreign nation based on the fact that some al Qaeda members may be located in or transit that country, even if that is the case with Iran. In addition, the AUMF’s use of the past tense — “harbored” — suggests that it was intended to refer to those who were responsible for providing safe haven for, and otherwise assisting, those who attacked the United States on Sept. 11, 2001. In the 20 years since the 9/11 attacks, there has not been any suggestion that the 2001 AUMF could be interpreted to authorize force against a present-day “harborer.” (Again, there is no known evidence to suggest that is what Iran is doing with al-Qaeda.)

The 2001 AUMF authorizes force only if it is consistent with international law, as the Supreme Court explained in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. Even if the 2001 AUMF were somehow thought to apply to Iran — which it does not — the executive branch would be able to use force against Iran only if necessary and proportionate to the specific threat from al-Qaeda.

In a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on June 19, Rep. Deutch (D-Fl.) asked State Department Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, whether he believes “the administration could launch an attack against Iran under the 2001 AUMF?” His response, “this is something which the office of the Legal Adviser can give you an opinion on, if you’d like to submit it,” provides an appropriate next step for Congress to engage with the administration on this issue.

Finally, it bears noting that there is no viable argument that another AUMF still on the books — the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002” (2002 AUMF) — authorizes force against Iran. It allows the president to use force that is “necessary and appropriate” to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq;” and “enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iraq.” Those are plainly not relevant to the situation with Iran today.

3. What steps can Congress take if it disagrees with the president’s decision to use military force? More specifically, what steps can Congress take in advance to prevent actions by the president? And, what steps would Congress be able to take after the president uses force against Iran if lawmakers are opposed?

Congress has a number of tools at its disposal to constrain the president’s ability to use force unilaterally. Even in the OLC’s view, the president’s ability to use force without congressional authority can be checked if Congress decides to impose restrictions. While past attorneys general and the OLC have determined the president has the power to use military force abroad to protect important national interests and below the threshold of “war” in the constitutional sense, as discussed above, “[t]his independent authority of the President … exists at least insofar as Congress has not specifically restricted it,” the OLC wrote in 2011.

Congress’ appropriations power is one of the most potent tools to restrict presidential action. In 2018, the OLC opined that the significant powers vested in Congress by the Constitution “ensure that the use of force ‘cannot be sustained over time without the acquiescence, indeed the approval, of Congress, for it is Congress that must appropriate the money to fight a war or a police action.’ … These powers further oblige the President to seek congressional approval prior to contemplating military action that would bring the Nation into a war.”

Notably, an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (FY20 NDAA), which was debated last week in the House Armed Services Committee, would have prohibited the use of federal funds to use military force in or against Iran absent Congress declaring war or enacting specific statutory authorization, with the exception of a “national emergency … created by an attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”

While the amendment was withdrawn after lengthy discussion, Rep. Adam Smith, the Democratic chairman of the committee, has committed to “a vote on a similar proposal when the FY20 NDAA comes to the floor of the House of Representatives.” (The amendment was offered by Reps. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), Anthony Brown (D-Md.), John Garamendi (D-Calif.), and Seth Moulton (D-Mass.).

It is precisely this type of action — the cutting off of funds for specific uses of force, which relies on Congress’ constitutional appropriations power — that would put Congress on its strongest footing to assert authority over the use of force abroad, and would put the president’s authority at what the Supreme Court has described as its “lowest ebb.” The clear intent of this proposed amendment is to prevent the executive branch from drawing the United States into a war without a congressional vote to specifically authorize it, which is particularly important given that senior Trump administration officials are considering justifying a use of force against Iran on purported congressional authorization in the 2001 AUMF.

Finally, an amendment like this could be passed even after an initial use of force, making clear the president does not have authority to continue using force absent congressional authorization.

4. Does the War Powers Resolution authorize the president to use force? What does the War Powers Resolution require the president to do before taking military action? What does it allow Congress to do after the president uses force abroad without authorization?

The War Powers Resolution (WPR) does not authorize the president to use force. It is a common misperception to think otherwise. The law’s stated purpose is “to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution… and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances…” And as noted above, it takes a limited view of the president’s authority to introduce U.S. Armed Forces into such situations in the absence of congressional authorization or an attack on the United States.

Before the president involves U.S. forces in hostilities abroad (or circumstances where hostilities are likely), the WPR requires the president to “consult with Congress.” The WPR also requires the president to report to Congress within 48 hours whenever certain conditions are met that could lead to the United States getting drawn into a war that Congress hasn’t authorized. Those conditions are when U.S. Armed Forces are introduced: (1) into hostilities (or where involvement in hostilities is “clearly indicated by the circumstances”); (2) into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation while equipped for combat (except for routine deployments for “supply, replacement, repair, or training” of U.S. forces); or (3) in “numbers which substantially enlarge” U.S. forces equipped for combat already in a foreign nation.  

Finally, the heart of the WPR is its termination provision, which is intended to provide a mechanism to ensure the president does not continue to involve U.S. forces in hostilities without specific congressional authorization. Under the WPR, the president must “terminate any use” of U.S. Armed Forces that were introduced into hostilities (or where involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances) 60 days after the required notification unless Congress has specifically authorized that use of U.S. Armed Forces by statute, passed a law extending the 60-day period, or has been “physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States.” 

The Executive Branch has not adopted a consistent view on the constitutionality of the WPR’s termination provision.  President Nixon’s veto statement concluded that much of the WPR, including the 60-day clock, was unconstitutional, and OLC made a passing suggestion to the same effect in John Yoo’s subsequently repudiated 2001 memo on the AUMF. On the other hand, OLC concluded in 1980 that Congress may “as a general constitutional matter” place time limits on the use of armed forces without express Congressional authorization, and this position was reaffirmed by the Obama Administration.

There is significant debate, to say the least, regarding what constitutes “hostilities” for the purposes of the War Powers Resolution. Both the Obama and Trump administrations, for example, took the position that providing aerial refueling and intelligence support to the Saudi-led coalition in the conflict in Yemen did not constitute introducing U.S. forces into “hostilities.” Moreover, recent experience has shown that unless Congress has sufficient votes to override a presidential veto of a resolution requiring termination of the use of U.S. Armed Forces, it may be unable to stop military engagement abroad once it has begun using the mechanism of the WPR alone, so long as the president believes that the military engagement in question does not constitute “hostilities.”

This is all the more reason why cutting off funds for the use of military force against Iran, in the absence of congressional authorization or an armed attack by Iran on the United States or its armed forces, would be a more effective tool to curtail the ability of the executive branch to draw the United States into a war that Congress has not authorized.

The post Top Experts’ Backgrounder: Military Action Against Iran and US Domestic Law appeared first on Just Security.

U.S. export controls – normally a sleepy and technical aspect of the U.S. national security regulatory architecture – have been thrust into the spotlight this year. Far-reaching export controls have been arguably the most meaningful and punishing aspect of the Biden administration’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as they have cut off many shipments of even low-level U.S. technologies to Russia by companies in the United States and abroad. The Oct. 7 BIS Rule cements export controls as a key tool that the Biden administration will use to address its national security and foreign policy concerns with China.

The BIS Rule explains that the new restrictions result from “extensive United States government consideration” of the impact of advanced computing semiconductors, computers using such semiconductors, and semiconductor-manufacturing equipment on “enabling military modernization, including the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and human rights abuses.” Accordingly, the BIS Rule establishes five new categories of export controls targeted explicitly at hindering China’s ability to produce and use advanced semiconductors.

First, the rule establishes new export controls for China and certain already-embargoed jurisdictions (e.g., Iran) on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, items that could assist in the development of such equipment, high-performance integrated circuits (“chips”), computers containing such chips, and associated software and technology. While certain highly advanced manufacturing equipment, chips, and computers already had been subject to controls for China and numerous other destinations, the new rule effectively lowers the threshold expressly for exports to China.

Second, the rule establishes new requirements for a broad range of additional exports under the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) when the exporter has knowledge (including “reason to know”) that the exports will be used in certain advanced computers, or in developing or producing certain semiconductor chips, in China.

Third, the rule establishes a new licensing requirement for exports of many items destined for Chinese semiconductor-manufacturing facilities making chips meeting specified performance or engineering criteria.

Fourth, the rule expands the jurisdictional scope of the EAR through new “foreign produced direct product rules” targeting exports of foreign-made goods to China. In particular, the rule creates a licensing requirement for certain advanced computing items produced entirely outside the United States when those products are made from certain U.S. products or technologies and destined for China.  The rule also creates a licensing requirement for a broader set of foreign-produced products and technologies when destined for any of 28 Chinese entities on the “Entity List,” a restricted party list maintained by BIS that imposes additional licensing requirements on shipments to listed parties.

Fifth, the rule restricts the ability of U.S. persons (including U.S. citizens and green card holders) to provide any “support” for the development or production of chips at certain semiconductor-manufacturing facilities in China without a license – regardless of whether the “support” includes the export of any products or technologies. This fifth category is hardly an export control at all, but it builds upon existing (and little-used) authority in the EAR to regulate certain U.S. person activity that is completely disconnected from export controls. Media reports suggest that this fifth category already has resulted in significant changes to semiconductor-manufacturing and research-and-development operations in China, with many manufacturers removing Americans from key positions.

According to U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, these new export controls are only one element of the U.S. strategy to counter China by “maintain[ing] as large of a lead as possible” over China in technologies such as advanced logic and memory chips. Other elements of this strategy include a recent Executive Order issued by President Joe Biden, directing the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) to consider (among other things) whether a foreign investment in the United States under review by CFIUS will “impact U.S. technological leadership.” In addition, Sullivan indicated that new regulations for U.S. government review of outbound investments in sensitive technologies are under development within the administration. The Biden administration is also reportedly considering China-focused export controls in the areas of artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

While the BIS Rule will undoubtedly have a significant short-term impact on technology-related trade with China, its longer-term impact hinges in significant part on whether U.S. allies will follow the BIS Rule with their own parallel restrictions. Export controls traditionally have been most effective (and least prejudicial to U.S. industry) when they are coordinated across different countries’ export-control regimes through a multilateral regime like the Wassenaar Arrangement (a multilateral export-control regime covering conventional weapons and certain dual-use goods and technologies) or in direct coordination with key jurisdictions like the European Union or the U.K. Unlike the case with the restrictions on exports to Russia, the U.S. announced the Oct. 7 BIS Rule on its own. No corresponding sanctions or export-controls announcements were made by the EU, U.K., Canada, or U.S. allies in Asia or elsewhere. It is highly likely that such discussions are ongoing, particularly with allies with their own innate advanced semiconductor-manufacturing capabilities who could otherwise potentially step in and fill any gaps created by the Oct. 7 BIS Rule. The Biden administration’s export controls “diplomacy” will be critical in the coming weeks and months if it desires the broadest impact for the BIS Rule.

IMAGE: Employees make chips at a factory of Jiejie Semiconductor Company in Nantong, in eastern China’s Jiangsu province on March 17, 2021. (Photo by STR/AFP via Getty Images)

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On February 13, 2019, the State Department provided a summary of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s recent phone call with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, which stated that “Secretary Pompeo reiterated the U.S. determination to hold Russia accountable for its use of a chemical weapon in Salisbury, UK through sanctions as required by the CBW Act.” The sanctions Secretary Pompeo referenced are the second round of sanctions slated to be imposed on Russia under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) for that country’s use of a nerve agent against a former Russian spy and his daughter in the United Kingdom. The decision to impose the second round of CBW Act sanctions was announced in November of last year, but there has largely been radio silence from the administration over the past few months with respect to a timetable for imposition or the type of sanctions to be imposed. While the summary of Secretary Pompeo’s call did not provide any additional detail on those questions, it is notable as it indicates that despite the months of delay the administration is still expressing an intent to move ahead with the sanctions.

The CBW Act requires the imposition of sanctions following a determination by the President (delegated to the Secretary of State) of the use of chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law or in lethal form against one’s own nationals. On August 8, 2018 the State Department announced that it had made a determination against Russia and that it would be imposing sanctions on Russia under the CBW Act.

The CBW Act contemplates two rounds of sanctions. The first round of sanctions, which in this case went into effect on August 27, 2018, were relatively minor, as is intended under the Act. The Trump Administration then had three months to either (1) provide a certification to Congress that Russia was no longer using chemical or biological weapons, had provided reasonable assurances against the future use of such weapons, and permitted on-site inspections or other reliable means to verify compliance or (2) impose a second round of sanctions.

On November 6, 2018, the State Department informed Congress that it was unable to provide the above certification and would be proceeding with a second round of sanctions. The second round of CBW Act sanctions are more significant — they require the Executive Branch to select three sanctions from a menu of six options, including:

• US opposition to all multilateral development bank assistance;
• a prohibition on any US bank making a loan or providing credit to the Government of the Russian Federation except for the purposes of purchasing food or other agricultural commodities or products;
• a ban on exports to Russia of all goods and technology (excluding food and other agricultural commodities and products);
• a ban on imports into the US of articles that are the “growth, product, or manufacture of” Russia, which “may include petroleum or any petroleum product;”
• a suspension or downgrading of diplomatic relations between the countries; and
• a suspension of the authority for “foreign air carriers owned or controlled by” Russia to “engage in foreign air transportation to or from the United States.”

In this case, rather than immediately imposing the second round of sanctions, a State Department spokesperson stated “[t]he process takes time and we want to get sanctions right” and that the State Department did not believe there was a statutory deadline for the sanctions imposition. The State Department has not explained their legal justification, but it appears to stem from language in the CBW Act requiring the second round of sanctions to be imposed “after consultation with the Congress” without indicating a specific timetable in which such consultations must be completed.

In the meantime there have been no updates from the administration on a timetable for implementation, which of the six menu options will be selected, or whether any waivers of the sanctions will be exercised.  The summary of Secretary Pompeo’s call appears to reaffirm the State Department’s previous decision to proceed with second round CBW Act sanctions, but, for now at least, the waiting continues.

Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

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Against this backdrop, on January 31, the Senate passed a resolution introduced by Senate Majority Leader McConnell and supported by most Republicans and some Democrats (the so-called “McConnell amendment”) urging the Administration to exercise caution before withdrawing from Syria and Afghanistan. The resolution, which the Washington Post characterized as a “striking reprimand” of President Trump’s withdrawal decisions, may seem at first blush like an uncontroversial expression of the need for caution. It “acknowledges” that U.S. and coalition partners “have made significant progress in the campaign against al Qaeda and [ISIS]” and “recognizes that diplomatic efforts to secure peaceful, negotiated solutions to the conflicts in Syria and Afghanistan are necessary to long-term stability and counterterrorism efforts,” but also “warns” against “a precipitous withdrawal.”

The McConnell amendment, however, does not merely caution against a hasty retreat from ISIS and Al Qa’ida. Its repeated references to Iran’s role in Syria and Afghanistan could be read to suggest that countering Iranian influence is already a component of the U.S. military missions in the region and should be an objective for a continued U.S. military mission in Syria and Afghanistan going forward – and it may lead some to argue that Congress’ existing force authorizations would provide a legal basis for those actions.

Specifically, the amendment “expresses concern that Iran has supported the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hizballah and the Assad regime in Syria, and has sought to frustrate diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts in these two countries.” It “recognizes the positive role the United States and its partners have played in Syria and Afghanistan” in, among other things, “countering Iranian aggression.” It “warns that a precipitous withdrawal” could “create vacuums that could be filled by Iran or Russia.” And it “calls upon the Administration to pursue a strategy that sets the conditions for the long-term defeat of al Qaeda and ISIS, as well as the protection of regional partners and allies, while ensuring that Iran cannot dominate the region or threaten Israel.”

What’s the big deal, some might ask? None of these statements, on their own, go so far as to endorse U.S. military operations in opposition to Iran, much less purport to authorize the use of military force against Iran. And this is merely a non-binding “sense of the Senate” resolution. But there are two independent reasons to be wary of the amendment – first, by implicitly endorsing a conditions-based withdrawal rather than expeditious removal of U.S. forces, it seems to embrace the continuation of what is already the longest war in U.S. history, rather than simply rebuking the President for the chaotic decision-making process and abrupt nature of his decision to withdraw. Second, its call for “ensuring that Iran cannot dominate the region or threaten Israel” to be a component of U.S. strategy in the region alongside “long-term defeat of al Qaeda and ISIS” arguably creates dangerous ambiguity as to whether confronting Iran should be considered part of the U.S. military mission authorized by Congress.

While 23 Senate Democrats voted against the amendment, Senator Murphy (D.-Conn.) was the most forceful in expressing concern that it provides a quasi-legal justification to those in the Administration who would like to change the U.S. mission in Syria and Afghanistan to a “counter-Iran” mission (or add such a mission) without Congressional authorization. In the words of Senator Murphy, “the language of this bill suggests that our mission inside Syria is not just to fight ISIS. The language of this bill suggests that our troops are in Syria to fight Iran as well.” He concluded that a vote in support of the McConnell amendment would “potentially put some imprimatur of congressional support for a bigger conflagration with Iran that some in the administration may be trying to achieve.”

For Sen. Murphy, the importance of Congressional authorization for expanded military operations is not a new issue. He was critical of the last Administration as well for using the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) as U.S. domestic legal justification for the U.S. military presence in Iraq and Syria.  The 2001 AUMF, which remains operative law today for U.S military operations in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, authorizes the use of military force against “those nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons….”  The Bush and Obama Administrations took the legal position, endorsed by Congress, that the 2001 AUMF authorized the use of military force against Al Qa’ida, the Taliban and their “associated forces” (in essence, forces that had joined the fight with Al Qa’ida and the Taliban against the United States and its allies).

In 2014 the Obama Administration went a step further, taking the position that the 2001 AUMF also served as legal authorization for military operations against ISIS as the successor to Al Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), which had been an “associated force” of Al Qa’ida and had carried out substantial military activities against U.S. personnel in Iraq. Although ISIS severed its ties with Al Qa’ida, the Obama Administration took the position that the 2001 AUMF continued to authorize military activities against ISIS as the successor to AQI, because ISIS continued to operate in Iraq, including attacking U.S. personnel there. While U.S. operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria have been broadly supported by Congress, reliance on the 2001 AUMF as a domestic legal justification was seen as a stretch by Senator Murphy and a number of his colleagues, but Congress and the Obama Administration were unable to come to agreement on an alternative AUMF that would replace the 2001 AUMF.

The McConnell amendment could be seen as a shift away from nascent bipartisan efforts in the last Congress to replace or update the 18-year old 2001 AUMF, instead endorsing a continuation of the conflict under that same authorization. For Senator Murphy, the McConnell amendment represents not just Congress losing the opportunity to return to a debate on an AUMF, but simultaneously endorsing mission creep toward countering Iran: “I wish this wasn’t the way in which we were exercising our constitutional prerogative on foreign policy,” Sen. Murphy said, and “I am deeply worried, deeply worried about the language in this amendment that empowers those in the administration who are jonesing for a fight with Iran.”

The marker Sen. Murphy put down in his opposition to the McConnell amendment that neither the 2001 AUMF, nor the McConnell amendment, nor anything else, serves as Congressional authorization for military operations against Iran, is an important one. Specifically, he noted that “there is absolutely no congressional authorization for U.S forces to be in Syria to counter Iran or to fight Iran or to try to be a bulwark against Iranian aggression. No matter what kind of hoops you jump through to try to contort the 2001 AUMF to cover ISIS, you cannot get it to cover Iran.”

We agree. The 2001 AUMF does not authorize the use of force against Iran. Iran was not implicated in the 9/11 attacks, Iranian forces are not al Qa’ida or the Taliban or their associated forces, nor are they a “successor” to any of those forces. We also share Senator Murphy’s concern that the Executive Branch may be tempted to point to statements by Congress such as the McConnell amendment as support for expanding or redirecting the U.S. military’s mission in Syria and Afghanistan – even though the amendment is clearly not an authorization for use of military force under the War Powers Resolution.

To date, there is no concrete indication of a changed mission for the U.S. military in Syria, Afghanistan or elsewhere. In response to comments made by President Trump that the U.S. military should “watch” Iran from Iraq, General Votel, Commander of the US Central Command, testified on February 5 that the U.S. military remains focused on its counter ISIS mission there. His exchange with Senator Tim Kaine, in particular, was reassuring in that it underscored that the President’s remarks about monitoring Iran were unfounded. But there is a risk that statements from Congress that could be cited as favoring an expanded mission may well be used as such by the Executive Branch. Given reports that the Trump administration has long been considering “whether to make confronting Iran an explicit new goal” for U.S. forces in Syria and more recent bellicose rhetoric that could be seen as laying the groundwork for opposing Iran militarily, Senator Murphy is right to raise a warning flag.

IMAGE: Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R_KY is trailed by reporters after speaking on the floor of the U.S. Senate on January 22, 2019 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images)

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The subject of the speech is not surprising, of course, in light of the Trump administration’s very public and aggressive approach towards Iran, including its re-imposition of unilateral economic sanctions earlier this month. But the use of the phrase “threat to international peace and security” is quite deliberate and should be monitored carefully. Hook’s speech tomorrow follows on remarks he made at the Hudson Institute in September, when he characterized missiles, fired into Saudi Arabia by the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels in Yemen, as a “threat to international peace and security.”

Why do these words matter? Under the United Nations Charter, the U.N. Security Council is charged with determining the existence of any threat to international peace and security, and it can decide to impose measures under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (including economic sanctions and the use of military force) to “maintain or restore international peace and security.” The U.N. Security Council sanctions on Iran that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, more commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, were predicated on the Security Council’s finding that the proliferation risks presented by Iran’s nuclear program represented a threat to international peace and security. The words in the State Department’s press release today fall short of a statement that the Iranian regime itself poses a threat to international peace and security. However, they are part of a clear push by the United States to convince the international community that the “threat to international peace and security” posed by Iran goes well beyond Iran’s nuclear program and merits additional collective action.

These are the types of arguments that are made when trying to build support in the Security Council to address a threat. To date, the Trump administration has not built this support. These arguments are also made by states considering unilateral action under the theory and rhetorical (if not legal) justification that the Security Council has failed to address such a threat. So, should we assume that this rhetoric from the Trump administration is a precursor to additional unilateral action by the United States, perhaps even military action, to address what it perceives as an international threat from Iran? Not at this point – but these words do matter, and it is important to follow this rhetoric carefully.

Let’s see what Hook’s speech tomorrow includes.

Image: Brian Hook speaks to the media about Iran at the State Department on June 2, 2018. Photo by Mark Wilson/Getty Images

The post Them’s Fightin’ Words? State Dept. Ramps Up Iran Rhetoric appeared first on Just Security.

Brian Egan joined Steptoe & Johnson LLP as a partner in May 2017 following a highly distinguished career in public service. He served as Legal Adviser to the State Department from February 2016 to January 2017, and he served as Deputy Counsel and Deputy Assistant to the President, as well as Legal Adviser to the National Security Council from 2013 to 2016. Prior to that, from 2012 to 2013, he served at the Treasury Department as Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement and Intelligence, managing lawyers who counseled the Department on administering economic sanctions, anti-terrorism financing, and anti-money laundering regimes. Egan also served as Deputy Legal Adviser to the National Security Staff from 2009 to 2011, and as an Attorney-Adviser at the State Department from 2005 to 2009.

Laura Rozen (@lrozen) has served since 2012 as Al Monitor’s diplomatic correspondent, covering Washington, foreign policy, and Middle East affairs. In that role, she has provided comprehensive news coverage of major developments in U.S. foreign policy events, such as her coverage on Al-Monitor’s Back Channel blog of the diplomatic negotiations leading up to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement between Iran and six world powers in July 2015. She also provided in-depth coverage of the 2017 diplomatic rift between Qatar and the Saudi Arabia-led coalition of Persian Gulf states. In addition, she covered the flare-up of tensions between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine, leading to Russia’s expulsion from the G8 in March 2014.

From March 2011 to April 2012, Rozen wrote for The Envoy blog at Yahoo! News, covering diplomatic affairs. From 2009 to 2011, she served as a foreign policy reporter at Politico, reporting on foreign policy decision-making and thinking within the White House, State Department, Congress, and in the think tank community. Up to 2009, she authored a web column called The Cable at Foreign Policy, which many regarded as a daily must-read within the Washington foreign policy community. Prior to joining Foreign Policy, Rozen reported for The Washington Monthly, The American Prospect, and Mother Jones, and authored work appearing in the Los Angeles Times, National Journal, Boston Globe, The Forward, the Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, USA Today, Slate, and Salon. She also authored the afterward to Fair Game, the memoir of former CIA officer Valerie Plame Wilson. From 1997 to 2001, Rozen reported from Turkey and the Balkans as a freelance journalist, and spent two years prior to that reporting from Russia.

Brian and Laura will naturally expand our deep expertise in covering the most important topics in national security. We couldn’t be more thrilled to welcome them on board, and for the wealth of analysis and insights that they will bring to Just Security!

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