In response, Baroness Chapman, a U.K. Minister of State, told the House of Lords that the government’s position “remains that any formal determination as to whether genocide has occurred should be made following a judgment by a competent national or international court” and “that we do not ascribe genocide.” In so doing, Baroness Chapman echoed Under-Secretary Hamish Falconer’s explanation of last year. In a striking contradiction, the government has also sought to deny national courts’ competence on the issue. Regardless, the Commission is right to insist that governments must not wait for judicial determination. The United Kingdom has repeatedly and seemingly deliberately misconstrued its obligation to prevent genocide in Gaza.

Less than a week before the report, Prime Minister Keir Starmer hosted Israel’s President Isaac Herzog, whose infamous remark—“it’s an entire nation out there that is responsible. It’s not true this rhetoric about civilians not aware, not involved”—features prominently in South Africa’s genocide argument before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and has been quoted by the Court itself. (Herzog stated that the Court misrepresented his remarks.) 60 MPs and peers objected to the invitation, invoking the United Kingdom’s. “obligations under the Genocide Convention.” To no avail. 

On Sept. 1, then Foreign Secretary David Lammy wrote a letter to Sarah Champion MP, responding to her questions on the topic. The letter correctly specified the relevant legal test: “The duty to prevent genocide under Article I of the Genocide Convention (1948) arises when the UK learns, or should normally have learned, of the existence of a serious risk of genocide.” 

And yet, immediately thereafter, Lammy reported that the government “has not concluded that Israel is acting with [genocidal] intent.” This formulation avoided concluding that Israel is not acting with genocidal intent, while also sidestepping whether there is a serious risk of that. The government’s more detailed Skeleton Argument from legal proceedings regarding military exports to Israel states that it is “at least tenable” to “conclude that the evidence does not establish that there was a serious risk of genocide,” but offers no support for this claim. 

Crucially, both the Skeleton Argument and the letter erroneously dismiss the relevance of the ICJ repeatedly issuing provisional measures orders in South Africa’s case against Israel under the Genocide Convention. The letter states “the ICJ has neither found that Israel has breached its obligations under the Genocide Convention” (a point that is undisputed) “nor ruled on the plausibility of Israel committing genocide.” It is true that the Court’s determination of “plausibility” is generally understood to relate to Palestinians’ rights under the Convention, not to the claim that Israel is committing genocide, although the Court’s reasoning is not entirely clear on that distinction and the judges may themselves have been divided on the issue (see pp.40-44 here). But why does the government fail to heed what the Court unambiguously has found? After hearing Israel’s strongest arguments, the World Court determined three times that Israel’s conduct in Gaza posed a “real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice” to the rights of Palestinians not to be subject to genocide. These determinations were based largely on Israel’s impediment of humanitarian relief and the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The situation is worse now than it was then.

The Skeleton Argument simply asserts that a “real risk” and a “serious risk” of genocide are not the same, ignoring the ICJ’s emphasis on imminence and irreparability, the repetition of provisional measures, and the obvious gravity of the situation in Gaza. In what sense is the risk identified by the ICJ anything other than serious? Is this the deference owed to a court the UK has supported as the ultimate authority on genocide in litigation relating to Myanmar and Ukraine?

It is worth emphasizing that on every element of genocide other than intent, the case could not be clearer. It is essentially incontestable that Palestinians are a protected group, that the Palestinians of Gaza are a “substantial” part of that group, and that Israel has inflicted destructive conditions of life on Palestinians in Gaza (most obviously, but not exclusively, through the decimation of agricultural areas, livestock, water systems, medical infrastructure, and homes, combined with devastatingly severe restrictions on humanitarian aid, culminating in the recent determination of famine in Gaza City and emergency conditions of food insecurity throughout Gaza). Indeed, UK ministers, including Lammy and Chapman in the letter and remarks cited above, have described the situation in Gaza as “appalling” and “catastrophic,” emphasizing Israel’s responsibility for the “horrors” that are unfolding, including  what Chapman terms a “preventable” “famine.” And yet they invoke uncertainty on genocidal intent to avoid accepting the UK’s preventive duties under the Genocide Convention. 

To be clear, Israel’s conduct is manifestly unlawful, regardless of whether it is animated by the purpose to destroy the Palestinians of Gaza and therefore entails genocide. Critically, to entail genocide that purpose could coexist with others or not be pursued with maximal efficacy. Indeed, an effort at plausible deniability will often mean genocide is implemented with less than maximal efficacy, as exemplified in ICJ precedent by the genocide of Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica. The conduct described above has occurred at scale, over a prolonged period, and has been framed by repeated dehumanizing statements from Israeli officials, including President Herzog and including those that influence state policy, statements that contribute to the evidence South Africa has gathered to show genocidal intent. Any lingering doubt about Israel’s genocidal intent ought to be understood as precisely the kind of uncertainty that remains in any “serious risk” assessment.  

The UN Commission, like Amnesty International, and the Israeli organization B’tselem before, bluntly “concludes that the Israeli authorities and Israeli security forces have the genocidal intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.” Even this latest conclusion from widely respected UN experts seems not to have dissuaded the UK government from its legally illiterate, morally indefensible attempt to deflect an urgent prevention duty to a court determination that is years away. The UK government need not agree with these organizations’ conclusions as to whether genocide is ongoing. However, their conclusions, like the ICJ provisional measures orders, mean the government cannot legally avoid its obligation to take action when there is a serious and real risk genocide may occur. Despite protestations to the contrary, Starmer’s government likely knows a proper interpretation of the law would require a change of policy, but the government misconstrues how its duties under the Genocide Convention apply to Gaza, yet again. 

The post Yet Again: The U.K. Government Mischaracterizes Its Obligation to Prevent Genocide in Gaza appeared first on Just Security.

أعلن جيش الدفاع الإسرائيلي  (IDF)في نهاية الأسبوع المنصرم عن عدد من السياسات المرتبطة بالمساعدات، منها:

• الإسقاطات الجوية (التي تشكّل بحد ذاتها مجرّد إجراء شكلي يصرف الانتباه عن تقديم المساعدات بالحجم المطلوب)،
• مناطق محدودة ستشهد هُدَن وممرات إنسانية (والتي يعترف القائمون عليها صراحة بأنها مناطق محدودة للغاية، ولا ترتقي إلى تلبية احتياجات الإغاثة الضرورية على المستوى المطلوب، بل أن تنفيذها سيؤدي إلى تركيز (حصر) الفلسطينيين في مساحة تشكل نسبة صغيرة غير قابلة للاستدامة من قطاع غزة،
• إعادة إمدادات الكهرباء لأغراض تحلية المياه.

وحتى إذا نظرنا إلى الحالة الإنسانية الطارئة من منظور ضيق، فإن هذه الإجراءات تبقى غير كافية حتى لو افترضنا أنه سيتم تنفيذها بالكامل، كما لا ينبغي لها أن تشتت الانتباه عن الحاجة إلى اتخاذ إجراءاتٍ أكثرَ شمولاً. يشكّلُ إعلان إسرائيل عن هذه الإجراءات، مصحوباً بتنبيه مفاده أنه “لا توجد مجاعة في غزة”، في حد ذاته أمراً يثير الشكوك (أنظر هنا أيضاً). بل أن التقارير الواردة تشير إلى أن مجلس الوزراء الإسرائيلي ينظر بالفعل في تشديد الحصار على مدنٍ معينةٍ في قطاع غزة، ناهيك عن قطع الكهرباء عنه.

لقد ولّى زمن أنصاف الحلول

نقطة اللاعودة

لم تكن الأوضاع في غزة في أي وقت من الأوقات أسوأ مما هي عليه الآن. وقد أفاد تحذير التصنيف المرحلي المتكامل للأمن الغذائي (IPC) الصادر في 29 تموز أنه:

“تشير الأدلة المتزايدة إلى أن المجاعة واسعة الانتشار، وسوء التغذية، والأمراض تؤدي إلى ارتفاع عدد الوفيات المرتبطة بالجوع. كما تشير أحدث البيانات إلى أن عتبة المجاعة فيما يتعلق باستهلاك الغذاء في معظم أنحاء قطاع غزة قد تم تجاوزها، وهو ما ينطبق على سوء التغذية الحاد في مدينة غزة.”

ويأتي هذا التحذير في أعقاب مجموعة من التقارير المأساوية المتزايدة حول الأوضاع في غزة. في 23 تموز، أفادت صحيفة الجارديان بأن أكثر من 35٪ من جميع وفيات المجاعة المسجّلة منذ السابع من أكتوبر 2023 قد وقعت خلال الأيام الثلاثة الماضية فقط. وكان عدد الوفيات بسبب المجاعة قد بلغ حينها 111 شخصاً. وبعد أربعة أيام، أفادت منظمة الصحة العالمية أن 63 من أصل 74 حالة وفاة ناجمة عن سوء التغذية في عام 2025 قد وقعت في شهر تموز وحده (منها 25 طفلاً و38 بالغاً). وفي اليوم التالي، سُجلت 14 حالة وفاة مماثلة خلال 24 ساعة. وإذا أخذنا بعين الاعتبار الآثار المعتادة للحرمان واسع النطاق، فإن هذا يشير إلى عدداً أكبر من الوفيات الناجمة عن الأمراض المعدية، التي غدت أكثر شيوعاً وفتكاً بسبب سوء التغذية ورداءة الصرف الصحي.

ونظراً للظروف الراهنة، بما في ذلك التحديات المعتادة التي تفرضها النزاعات المسلحة على عملية جمع البيانات، فضلاً عن القيود الشديدة المفروضة على الوصول إلى قطاع غزة، فمن المرجّح جداً أن تكون الأرقام المسجلة للوفيات الناجمة عن الصدمات وغير الناجمة عنها أقل بكثير من العدد الفعلي. على أية حال، من الممكن ملاحظة مسار واضح ومروّع عبر مختلف المؤشرات.

في 23 تموز الجاري، أصدرت 115 منظمة إنسانية بياناً مشتركاً وصفت فيه بلوغ “معدلات قياسية” من سوء التغذية الحاد بين الأطفال، وانتشار “الإسهال المائي الحاد”، و”تساقط البالغين في الشوارع جرّاء الجوع والجفاف”. وقد وثّقت وكالة الأمم المتحدة المعنية بالأطفال (UNICEF) عدد الأطفال الذين تم إدخالهم إلى المستشفيات لتلقي الرعاية الطبية بسبب سوء التغذية في الأسبوعين الأولين من شهر تموز، وهو أعلى بكثير من عدد الأطفال الذين تم إدخالهم المستشفيات في شهر حزيران (الذي كان بدوره رقماً قياسياً). وقالت منظمة أطباء بلا حدود (MSF) أن عدد الأشخاص المسجلين لتلقي علاج سوء التغذية في عيادتها بمدينة غزة “تضاعف أربع مرات منذ 18 أيار، بينما تضاعفت معدلات سوء التغذية الحاد بين الأطفال دون سن الخامسة ثلاث مرات في الأسبوعين الماضيين فقط”. ويفيد برنامج الغذاء العالمي بأن “ما يقرب من ثلث الأسر لا تتناول وجبات الطعام لأيام متتالية“.

أجساد الأطفال “تتوقف عن العمل“. أبلغ ناجي القرشلي، طبيب أمراض النساء الولادة في غزة، صحيفة الغارديان أن حوالي “50٪ من مئات النساء الحوامل اللواتي يراهن كل يوم يعانين من سوء التغذية”، مع ارتفاع ملحوظ في حالات الإجهاض، وأن الأطفال يولدون “أقل من الوزن الطبيعي”، كما أنهم”يولدون بشكل متزايد قبل الأوان أو مع تشوهات خلقية“. كما أن نفاذ مخزونات الأغذية العلاجية الضرورية لعلاج المصابين بسوء التغذية الحاد، قد ترك الأطفال الرضع والأطفال الصغار الذين يعانون من سوء التغذية دون أي وسيلة للبقاء على قيد الحياة. كما أفادت الكوادر الطبية بأن نقص الأدوية ووسائل التعقيم يؤدي إلى تفاقم الظروف التي تهدد الحياة، والتي لا يمكنهم علاجها.

لم يستثنَ أحد. وصفت الـ115 منظمة التي أصدرت البيان في 23 تموز بأنها “تشهد زملاءها وشركاءها يذبلون أمام أعينهم”. ويُقال إن الأطباء يعانون من نوبات دوار أثناء قيامهم بجولاتهم الطبية. وقد وصف الصحفيون بالتفصيل تجاربهم في شرب المياه المالحة “فقط للبقاء واقفين”، وفي ومضغ “الأعشاب المجففة أو أوراق الأشجار البرية لإسكات الصراخ الداخلي” الناجم عن الجوع.

وتشير مشاهد الحشود اليائسة للحصول على الطعام، والتقارير عن أشخاص ينبشون القمامة بحثاً عن فتات، والقصص التي تروى عن السرقة والفوضى، إلى الانهيار الاجتماعي الذي يُعد من العلامات الدالة على المراحل الأخيرة للمجاعة. أما من يقاسون هذه المعاناة، فيتحدثون عن شعورهم بالخجل والإذلال ونزع الإنسانية عنهم.

يقوم الوجود الإنساني برمته على تقاسم الطعام. يعود أصل معنى كلمة “رفيق” في اللغة الإنجليزية إلى الشخص الذي يشاركك الخبز، وهو مؤشراً واحداً على عمق هذه الفكرة. فعندما لا يعود بإمكان الناس تقاسم الخبز، بل عوضاً عن ذلك يُجبرون على التقاتل من أجل فتاته، يتعرض المجتمع البشري لخلل عميق يطال قدرته على القيام بوظائفه. وهذا بالتحديد ما نشهده يتكشف في غزة اليوم.

أما التحذير الذي أصدره نظام التصنيف المرحلي المتكامل (IPC) يوم أمس، فلا يُعد إقراراً رسمياً ببلوغ المجاعة المرحلة الخامسة من التصنيف. ويعود السبب في ذلك إلى أنه لا يستند إلى بيانات جديدة، بل إلى توقعات مبنية على بيانات سابقة. يعدّ جمع البيانات في غزة أمراً بالغ الصعوبة بسبب القيود الشديدة المفروضة على الوصول إلى القطاع من جهة، وإلى الظروف الميدانية الخطيرة للغاية من جهة أخرى. كما يعدّ تحليل البيانات أمراً معقداً للغاية بسبب حجم الانهيار الاجتماعي الذي نشهده، إذ يتطلب حساب نسبة الأسر التي تعاني من انعدام الأمن الغذائي، أو نسبة الأطفال الذين يعانون من سوء التغذية، توفر أرقامأ أساسية مرجعية يصعب للغاية حسابها. وقد منعت إسرائيل الصحفيين والعاملين في المجال الإنساني من جمع المعلومات بطريقة ممنهجة. ولكننا، بالرغم من ذلك، يمكننا تشخيص المجاعة استناداً إلى أعراضها الظاهرة، حتى في ظل غياب البيانات على المستوى الذي عادة ما يعتمد عليه تقييم نظام التصنيف المرحلي المتكامل. لذلك، مع الأخذ بالاعتبار جميع العوامل ذات الصلة، فإن المجاعة موجودة في قطاع غزة.   بل إن مجرد شعور نظام IPC بالحاجة إلى إصدار هذا التحذير الصارخ، متجاوزاً بروتوكولاته المعتادة في جمع البيانات وتحليلها، يشير إلى دق ناقوس الخطر الذي أطلقه خبراء الأمن الغذائي.

الالتزامات القانونية الدولية

في مواجهة هذا الواقع، لا ينبغي للقادة أن يطلبوا مشورة قانونية ليروا الحاجة الجليّة إلى التحرك الفوري. فمن الصعب أن يكون الدافع الأخلاقي للتحرك أوضح مما هو الآن. ومع ذلك، هناك التزامات قانونية محددة، بما في ذلك بالنسبة لأولئك الذين قد لا يكونون متورطين بشكل كافٍ في السياسات التي أوجدت هذا الوضع ليتم اعتبارهم متواطئين في إجراءات المحاسبة والمساءلة المستقبلية. ومن الجدير إعادة التأكيد على هذه الالتزامات والتركيز عليها هنا.

كما أوضح كل منا بالتفصيل في مواضع أخرى، فإن إسرائيل، وعلى مدار ما يقارب 22 شهراً، وإن كان ذلك بدرجات متفاوتة من الكثافة ومع هدنٍ متقطعة، قد انتهجت سياسة متنوعة ومتعددة الأوجه لحرمان سكان غزة من الحاجيات الأساسية مثل الغذاء والماء والإمدادات الطبية وإمكانية العيش بكرامة. (انظر الأمثلة هنا، وهنا، وهنا، وهنا).

لطالما شكّلت سياسة الحرمان هذه منذ وقت طويل انتهاكاً واضحاً لحظر القانون الدولي الإنساني لتجويع المدنيين كوسيلة من وسائل الحرب (انظر هنا، وهنا، وهنا، وهنا). وسواء أخذ المرء بالرأي القائل بأن هذا الإجراء طويل الأمد ينطوي أيضاً على نية ارتكاب إبادة جماعية أم لا – وهو ما خلصت إليه يوم الإثنين اثنتان من المنظمات الإسرائيلية المرموقة، بيتسيلم وأطباء من أجل حقوق الانسان، اللتان انضمتا إلى عدد متزايد من الخبراء في استنتاج ذلك على وجه التحديد- يمكن المحاججة بشكل قوي بأن “المخاطر الجدية” أو “الخطر الشديد” بحدوث إبادة جماعية كان كافياً منذ فترة طويلة لتفعيل الالتزامات الوقائية لدول الأطراف الثالثة بموجب اتفاقية منع جريمة الإبادة الجماعية والمعاقبة عليها، كما هو موضحاً أدناه. ومن بين مجموعة من الأدلة الأخرى، فإن هذا ما تؤكده أوامر اتخاذ التدابير المؤقتة الثلاثة التي أصدرتها محكمة العدل الدولية (ICJ) بين كانون ثاني وأيار من عام 2024، والتي استندت جميعها إلى الضرورة الملحّة لمعالجة “خطر حقيقي ووشيك” يهدد حقوق الفلسطينيين بموجب اتفاقية منع جريمة الإبادة الجماعية والمعاقبة عليها. (أنظر إلى دانينباوم وديل)

ولا تزال الأهمية العملية لتلك الأوامر الصادرة عن محكمة العدل الدولية تتردد أصداؤها حتى يومنا هذا. فالمسألة الرئيسية التي تناولتها المحكمة في قراراتها الثلاثة المتعلقة بالتدابير المؤقتة، وجوهر ادعاء جنوب إفريقيا في القضية بشكل عام، هو الفعل الأساسي المتمثل في “إخضاع الجماعة، عمداً، لظروف معيشية يراد بها تدميرها المادي كليًا أو جزئيًا” (المادة الثانية (ج) من اتفاقية منع الإبادة الجماعية والمعاقبة عليها).

وضمن الأمر الثاني الصادر عن محكمة العدل الدولية في 28 آذار 2024، طلبت المحكمة من إسرائيل:

“اتخاذ جميع التدابير اللازمة والفعّالة لضمان، دون تأخير، وبالتعاون الكامل مع الأمم المتحدة، توفير الخدمات الأساسية والمساعدات الإنسانية التي تشتد الحاجة إليها، دون عوائق، وعلى نطاق واسع- بما في ذلك الغذاء والماء والكهرباء والوقود والمأوى والمساعدات الإنسانية، ومتطلبات الملابس والنظافة والصرف الصحي، فضلا عن الإمدادات الطبية والرعاية الطبية للفلسطينيين في جميع أنحاء غزة- بما في ذلك عن طريق زيادة قدرة وعدد نقاط العبور البرية وإبقائها مفتوحة طالما كان ذلك ضرورياً.”

وقد صدر هذا القرار بالإجماع.

وللتوضيح، فإن المحكمة لم تجد أن إسرائيل مسؤولة عن ارتكاب جريمة الإبادة الجماعية. ومع ذلك، أمرت باتخاذ إجراءات يتعين على إسرائيل القيام بها للحفاظ على حقوق الفلسطينيين بموجب اتفاقية منع جريمة الإبادة الجماعية والمعاقبة عليها، في مواجهة “خطر حقيقي ووشيك” بإلحاق ضرر لا يمكن إصلاحه بتلك الحقوق (الفقرتان 26-27). وكما فعلت في أمرها الأول (الفقرتان 80 و86 (4))، صاغت المحكمة هذا الأمر تحديداً كاستجابةً لـ “ظروف المعيشية التي يواجهها الفلسطينيون” في قطاع غزة (الفقرة 45).

وفي أيار عام 2024، أعلنت المحكمة عن تدابيرها المؤقتة الثالثة (والأخيرة حتى الآن)، والتي تتضمن مطالبة إسرائيل بـ”إبقاء معبر رفح مفتوحاً أمام توفير الخدمات الأساسية والمساعدات الإنسانية المطلوبة بشكل عاجل وعلى نطاق واسع ودون عوائق”

يمكن فهم هذه الأوامر على أنها تحدد التزامات المسبقة لإسرائيل على شكل مطالبات لاتخاذ إجراءات ملموسة، بالإضافة إلى كونها توضح الهدف الذي يجب على دول الأطراف الثالثة أن توجه تحركاتها الوقائية تجاهه، وهو ما سنعود لنقاشه أدناه.

وضمن مسارٍ موازٍ، شكّل الحرمان الجماعي والتجويع محور الاهتمام الرئيسي في المحكمة الجنائية الدولية (ICC)، حيث يشكلان أساساً رئيسياً لمذكرات الاعتقال الصادرة بحق رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي بنيامين نتنياهو ووزير الدفاع السابق يوآف غالانت. وقد وجدت الدائرة التمهيدية للمحكمة أسباباً معقولة للاعتقاد بأن نتنياهو وجالانت قد ارتكبا مجموعة من جرائم الحرب والجرائم ضد الإنسانية المتعلقة بالحرمان، بما في ذلك، بشكل أساسي، جريمة الحرب المتمثلة في تجويع المدنيين كأسلوب من أساليب الحرب. ومن الجدير بالذكر أن الدائرة التمهيدية وجدت، وفقاً للبيان الصحفي الصادر عن المحكمة الجنائية الدولية الخاص بالإعلان عن مذكرات التوقيف، أن هناك أسباباً معقولة للاعتقاد بأن نتنياهو وجالانت قد حرما الفلسطينيين في غزة من الغذاء والماء والكهرباء والوقود ومستلزمات طبية محددة، بطريقة “أوجدت أحوالاً معيشية ترمي إلى إهلاك جزء من السكان المدنيين في غزة“.

انتهاكات القانون الدولي هذه لا تقتصر على التزامات إسرائيل القانونية الدولية وحسب، بل يترتب عليها أيضاً تبعات كبيرة على دول الأطراف الثالثة. فبموجب القانون الدولي، تلتزم الدول بـ”ضمان احترام” القانون الدولي الإنساني (بموجب المعاهدات الدولية والقانون الدولي الإنساني العرفي)، وبـ”منع” الإبادة الجماعية (بموجب المادة الأولى من اتفاقية منع جريمة الإبادة الجماعية والمعاقبة عليها). ومن الجدير بالذكر أن محكمة العدل الدولية كانت قد شددت في رأيها الاستشاري عام 2024 على أن “جميع الدول الأطراف في اتفاقية جنيف الرابعة ملزمة… بضمان امتثال إسرائيل للقانون الدولي الإنساني…”. هذه الالتزامات لا تأتي في مرتبة ثانوية أمام الوظيفة، التي غالباً ما يتم التشديد عليها كثير، والمتمثلة في المحاسبة والمساءلة بعد وقوع الانتهاك. وكما جادل أحدنا مع البروفيسورة، جانينا ديل، قبل عام، فإن هذه الالتزامات الوقائية تمثل جوهر الغاية من أطر العمل تلك، ويجب أن توجّه تدخلات الدول في الوقت الفعلي والمناسب، أو لا تفعل على الإطلاق.

هذه الواجبات غير مرهونة بوجود تقييم قضائي كامل ونهائي للمسألة الجاثمة أمامنا، بل إنها تسري استناداً إلى معايير معرفية تستند إلى تقييم الخطر، بدلاً من الاستناد إلى إثباتات نهائية لا تدع مجالاً للشك.

وبشكل ملموس:

• ينشأ الالتزام بضمان احترام القانون الدولي الإنساني عندما يتضح أن هناك انتهاكات يتم ارتكابها، أو عندما توجد “توقعات” بحدوث مثل هذه الانتهاكات “استناداً إلى حقائق أو معرفة بأنماط سابقة”، أو إذا كان هناك “خطر يمكن توقعه بأن هذه الانتهاكات سترتكب”، [تعليق اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر على اتفاقية جنيف الأولى (2016)، الفقرتان 162، 164[.
• ينشأ الالتزام بمنع الإبادة الجماعية بمجرد أن “تعلم الدولة، أو كان ينبغي عليها أن تعلم، بوجود خطر جدّي بارتكاب الإبادة الجماعية”، أو بصيغة أخرى، عندما “تكون مدركة، أو كان ينبغي عليها أن تدرك، الخطر الجدّي بأن أعمال إبادة جماعية ستُرتكب.” [قضية الإبادة الجماعية في البوسنة، محكمة العدل الدولية (2007)، الفقرتان 431-432]

وحتى وفقاً للشروط الخاصة بها، ينبغي أن تفهم هذه الالتزامات باعتبارها تنطبق على إنهاء الانتهاكات الجارية وآثارها بقدر ما تنطبق على منع الانتهاكات المستقبلية المحتملة. وفيما يتعلق بالقواعد الآمرة، مثل الإبادة الجماعية وانتهاكات القواعد الأساسية للقانون الدولي الإنساني (تعليق لجنة القانون الدولي، ص 112-113)، وكذلك بالنسبة للجرائم ضد الإنسانية، في رأينا، يمكن استنتاج هذه الصلة من واجبات الدول بموجب المادة 41 من المواد المتعلقة بمسؤولية الدول عن الأفعال غير المشروعة دولياً، التي تنص على أنه على الدول “التعاون لوضع حد بالوسائل المشروعة لأي خرق جسيم” لهذه القواعد، الامتناع “تقديم المعونة أو المساعدة في الإبقاء على” حالة ناجمة عن مثل هذا الانتهاك. وكما هو موضح أدناه، ينشأ عن هذه الالتزامات القانونية عدداً من الواجبات المحددة والملموسة التي يتعيّن على دول الأطراف الثالثة القيام بها.

التصنيف المرحلي المتكامل للأمن الغذائي (IPC) وظروف الحياة في غزة

استندت محكمة العدل الدولية، في أوامرها بشأن التدابير المؤقتة، من جملة أمور أخرى، إلى البيانات والتحليلات التي قدّمها نظام التصنيف المرحلي المتكامل للأمن الغذائي (IPC). وعلى الرغم من أن قرارات مذكرات الاعتقال الصادرة عن المحكمة الجنائية الدولية ليست علنية، فمن المرجّح أن المحكمة قد اعتمدت على التصنيف ذاته. وهو ما يعدّ اجراءً مناسباً تماماً، إذ إن الغرض من نظام IPC هو تقديم معلومات دقيقة وفي الوقت المناسب لتمكين الحكومات من منع الأزمات الإنسانية والطوارئ والمجاعات. وقد تم تطويره ليتيح تحديد الاحتياجات الإنسانية بطريقة موحدة وثابتة، دون الحاجة إلى انتظار إجراء تحليل لاحق للأضرار بعد وقوعها.

منذ تشرين ثاني 2023، حذّرت لجنة مراجعة المجاعة (FRC) التابعة للتصنيف المتكامل لمراحل الأمن الغذائي، مراراً من كارثة إنسانية بدأت بالتكشّف في قطاع غزة. وقد كرّرت اللجنة ذلك مجدداً يوم أمس في بيانها الأكثر خطورة حتى الآن.

وبالحديث عن خيبة أمل المتخصصين في العمل في المجال الإنساني، تميل قراءات تقييمات اللجنة إلى التركيز على الثنائية المضللة والمبسطة، مجاعة أم ليست مجاعة، بدلًا من التمعن في الأوصاف اليائسة التي تقدمها اللجنة حول المسار المتسارع نحو المجاعة الجماعية. والسبب الرئيسي في توخي اللجنة الحذر بشأن التصنيف الرسمي للمجاعة يكمن في أن البيانات لم تكن متاحة بما يكفي للإثبات، بيقين تقني، أن عتبات المجاعة المحددة بدقة قد تم تجاوزها رسمياً. ومع ذلك، فقد حذّرت اللجنة، في كل مرة، من أن ظروف الحياة في غزة غير مقبولة، وأن تدهوراً إضافيًا ـ بما في ذلك الوصول إلى مستوى المجاعة ـ متوقعاً في حال عدم حدوث تغييرات كبيرة

ويجب التنويه إلى أن اللجنة، في تقريرها الصادر في أيار 2024، والذي خلص إلى عدم كفاية الأدلة لتأكيد وقوع مجاعة، شدّدت على ما يلي:

“يتعيّن على جميع الجهات المعنية التي تستخدم مؤشر IPC لاتخاذ قرارات رفيعة المستوى أن تدرك أن تأكيد تصنيف المجاعة من عدمه لا يغيّر بأي حال من الأحوال من حقيقة أن معاناة بشرية شديدة ومستمرة تقع حالياً بلا أدنى شك في قطاع غزة، ولا يغيّر بأي حال من الأحوال من الضرورة الإنسانية الملحّة لمعالجة معاناة المدنيين من خلال تمكين الوصول الإنساني الكامل والآمن والمستدام وبدون عوائق إلى داخل قطاع غزة وفي جميع أنحائه، بما في ذلك من خلال وقف الأعمال العدائية. لا ينبغي على أي طرف انتظار صدور تصنيف رسمي لحالة المجاعة قبل أن يتصرف وفقًا لذلك.”

ويُظهر نمط استجابات إسرائيل لتلك التحذيرات أنها لم تكن معنية بمستوى المعاناة البشرية في غزة، بل أن تركيزها قد انصبَّ على إدارة البيانات على نحو يضمن لها عدم مواجهة وصمة التسبب بالمجاعة، أو العواقب السياسية المحتملة لذلك. وفي هذا الصدد تحديداً، يكون الهدف من نظام IPC – وهو تمكين الحكومات من منع الأزمات الإنسانية، بما في ذلك المجاعات – قد قوَّض في حالة غزة.

المجاعة ليست تصنيفاً قانونياً، ولا هي المحفز الأخلاقي المناسب للتحرك. على النقيض من ذلك، فإن المعلومات والتحليلات التي وفّرها نظام IPC كانت، على الدوام، وثيقة الصلة بمسألة ما إذا كان هنالك ظروف معيشية مدمّرة للحياة في غزة، أو ما إذا كان يُتوقع بشكل موثوق أن توجد في المستقبل القريب. وهذا بدوره مهم لإبلاغ وتوجيه الدول بالإجراءات التي يتعين عليهم اتخاذها للوفاء بواجباتها في منع وإنهاء انتهاكات القانون الدولي الإنساني والإبادة الجماعية.

إلحاح الضرورة اليوم

تقلّبت سياسة إسرائيل على مر الزمان. وسط فترات طويلة من الحرمان الشديد وغير القانوني برأينا، كانت هناك تحسينات قصيرة الأمد على مستوى الإغاثة خلال الفترة الممتدة بين آذار ونيسان من العام الماضي (خاصة بعد أمر محكمة العدل الدولية في آذار، والتي تزامنت مع ضغوط من قبل الإدارة الأمريكية التي كانت مطالبة بالمصادقة على أن إسرائيل لا تعرقل وصول المساعدات الإنسانية، بغية استمرار إمدادات الأسلحة الأمريكية)، وتكرّر هذا التحسن (على نحوٍ واعدٍ أكثر)، خلال وقف إطلاق النار في كانون الثاني وشباط من هذا العام.

على أية حال، تلك اللحظات القصيرة من الهدوء لم تكن كافية سوى لإبطاء السير نحو المجاعة مؤقتاً (وتجنب تصنيف IPC للمجاعة)، دون أن توقفه. وقد تسارع هذا المسار خلال الأشهر الأخيرة.

ومنذ 2 آذار حتى 19 أيار، فرضت إسرائيل حصاراً شاملاً على قطاع غزة ومنعت وصول المساعدات الإنسانية إليه. وقد برّرت إسرائيل ذلك بأن السكان قد تلقوا ما يكفي من المساعدات الإنسانية، وبأن حركة حماس تقوم بالاستيلاء على المساعدات. إلا أن هذه الحجج كانت غير معقولة وضعيفة، كما أنها ازدادت هشاشة بعد نشر نتائج التحقيقات في حوادث نهب وسرقة المساعدات. وبإجبار السكان على استنفاذ مخزوناتهم من الغذاء، أرست هذه السياسة الأساس لما يحدث اليوم في القطاع.

وتحت الضغط السياسي، بدأت إسرائيل بالسماح بدخول القليل من المساعدات في أواخر أيار. وفي الوقت ذاته، تحوّلت إلى نموذج جديد لتوزيع المساعدات تم فيه تهميش المنظمات الإنسانية المحايدة والأمم المتحدة، لصالح وكالة توزيع جديدة وغير شفافة مدعومة من الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل تُدعى “مؤسسة غزة الإنسانية” (GHF). ولاقت المؤسسة ذات الطابع العسكري، والتي تعتمد على متعاقدين من القطاع الخاص، منذ البداية، إدانات واسعة من قبل خبراء في المجال الإنساني، حيث استقال الرئيس التنفيذي للمؤسسة جيك وود بعد أسابيع من توليه منصبه قائلاً إنه “من غير الممكن تنفيذ هذا المخطط مع الالتزام الصارم بالمبادئ الإنسانية المتمثلة في الإنسانية والحياد النزاهة والاستقلالية“.

وقد جاءت نتائج هذا النظام كارثية على الفلسطينيين، فإلى جانب فشلها في إيصال الحد الأدنى من الإغاثة والدعم الإنساني، وتوزيع طرود غذائية تفتقر إلى التوازن الغذائي، وتركيز المساعدات في أربعة مواقع فقط (بدلاً من نحو 400 سابقًا)، جَلَب إطار العمل الذي تنشط ضمنه مؤسسة GHF بُعداً جديداً من الرعب.

تصف مؤسسة غزة الإنسانية (GHF) مواقعها بأنها “نقاط توزيع آمنة”، ولكن بالنسبة للعديد من الأشخاص الذين قُتلوا أو أُصيبوا أثناء محاولتهم الحصول على المساعدات في تلك المواقع، فإنها أبعد ما تكون عن الأمان. وقد وثّقت منظمة “Forensic Architecture” بدقة كيفية عمل هذه المواقع، حيث تقع في مناطق عسكرية نائية ويصعب الوصول إليها. وفي الأسابيع الستة الأولى من تشغيلها، كانت تُفتح في المتوسط لمدة 23 دقيقة يوميًا فقط، ويتم الإعلان عن أوقات عملها قبل الموعد بوقت قصير – وفي بعض الأحيان لا تُفتح هذه المراكز رغم الإعلان عن ذلك. لذلك، اضطر الناس إلى التنافس على كمية طعام غير كافية، وتعرض المدنيون الذين يطلبون المساعدة لهجمات شبه يومية أسفرت عن عدد كبير من الضحايا، بما في ذلك في الـ “اليوم المخصص للنساء” الذي كان من المفترض أن يخفف من وطأة هذه الآثار. ووصف موظف سابق في مؤسسة غزة الإنسانية ما يحدث في مراكز توزيع المساعدات بأنها “جرائم حرب”. وتصف روايات العاملين في المؤسسة تزاحم الشبان ذوي البنية الجسدية القوية على طرود الطعام، التي عادة ما يفتحونها لأخذ محتوايتها الأكثر قيمة، يليهم بعض الفتية الصغار والبالغين الضعفاء الذين يلتقطون ما تبقى من طعام قبل أن يتم تفريقهم من قبل المتعاقدين الموظفين في المؤسسة عبر إطلاق قنابل الصوت.

في تعليقها المرفق مع آخر تحذير صادر عن IPC، كتبت لجنة مراجعة المجاعة ما يلي:

يُظهر تحليلنا للطرود الغذائية التي توفرها مؤسسة غزة الإنسانية أن خطة توزيعها ستؤدي إلى مجاعة جماعية، حتى لو لم تكن مصحوبة بمستويات العنف المروعة التي تم الإبلاغ عنها. وتدل حقيقة استمرار الناس في المخاطرة بالتعرض لإطلاق النار أو الإصابة جرّاء التدافع والازدحام في مواقع التوزيع، على مستوى الجوع الجديد الذي يعاني منه السكان.

في حزيران، أشار رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي السابق نفتالي بينيت إلى مقطع فيديو يظهر رجالاً مسلحين فوق شاحنة مساعدات باعتباره دليلاً على سرقة حماس للمساعدات. إلا أن المنظمة غير الربحية المسؤولة عن الشحنة قد فنّدت مزاعمه. كما تابع فريق “Forensic Architecture” الواقعة، وتبيّن أن الحقيقة هي أن مجموعة محلية نسّقت مع الأمم المتحدة لحماية الشاحنات من اللصوص، وأن الحرّاس الذين ظهروا في الفيديو تابعون لها. كما تظهر اللقطات أن المساعدات قد وصلت إلى وجهتها بأمان، أي إلى مستودع برنامج الغذاء العالمي، كما تظهر أيضاً أنه تم توزيع المواد الغذائية بأمان. ولكن إسرائيل قامت بإغلاق الطرق أمام المساعدات استناداً إلى هذه الادّعاءات المغلوطة.

وتتجلى الآثار المباشرة لكل ذلك فيما سبق وصفه أعلاه: ارتفاع أعداد الوفيات بسبب المجاعة، وتفاقم مستويات سوء التغذية، وزيادة القابلية للإصابة بالأمراض.

أفاد برنامج الغذاء العالمي في حزيران أن:

“معظم الأسر قالت أنها تعيش على وجبة هزيلة واحدة في اليوم – تتكون من حساء خفيف، والعدس أو الأرز مع الملح، والمعكرونة، أو علب الفاصولياء أو البازلاء، والبقوليات المسلوقة. وقالت ثلث هذه الأسر إنها تمضي أياماً كاملة دون أن تتناول أي طعام أو تكتفي بقطعة خبز واحدة مع الدُقَّة (وهي خليط من الأعشاب يُؤكل مع الزيت في العادة). ويشرب الكثيرون الماء لتهدئة شعورهم بالجوع، وهي استراتيجية تكيُّف يشيع استخدامها في أوساطهم. فكما قال أحد الآباء: “[عندما يستيقظ أطفالي ليلًا وهم جوعى،] أقول لهم أن يشربوا ماء ويغلقوا أعينكم. هذا يحطمني. وأنا أفعل الشيء نفسه – أشرب الماء وأدعو الله أن يطلع الصباح.” وغالباً ما يقلل البالغون من كمية طعامهم من أجل توفير الطعام للأطفال وكبار السن والمرضى. ويعتمد الأشخاص الذين لا دخل لهم أو لا يملكون القدرة الجسدية على الحصول على كميات ضئيلة من الطعام الأساسي الذي يقترضونه من الأقارب والجيران. ويُضطر نحو 15 في المائة من السكان إلى البحث عن الطعام في القمامة أو تحت الأنقاض.”

وفي تعليقها على تقييم انعدام الأمن الغذائي التصنيف المرحلي المتكامل لمراحل الأمن الغذائي (IPC) في شهر أيار، تنبأت لجنة مراجعة المجاعة أنه في ظل “أسوأ سيناريو واقعي”، مع استمرار العمليات العسكرية الإسرائيلية ومحدودية المساعدات الإنسانية، فإن:

“الغالبية العظمى من سكان قطاع غزة لن تتمكن من الوصول إلى الغذاء أو الماء أو المأوى أو الدواء. وسيؤدي ذلك إلى تفاقم الاضطرابات المدنية والمنافسة على الموارد نادرة الوجود، مما سيؤدي إلى تآكل ما تبقى من آليات الدعم المجتمعي… وسيتجاوز انعدام الأمن الغذائي وسوء التغذية الحاد والوفيات عتبات التصنيف الخامس للمجاعة بحسب تصنيف نظام (IPC).

وعلى الرغم من زيادة تدفق المواد الغذائية الأساسية إلى قطاع غزة منذ شهر أيار، يؤكد مؤشر IPC أن “السيناريو الأسوأ” يحدث بالفعل. ويتجلى ذلك بوضوح في التقارير المتزايدة يومياً عن حالات سوء التغذية الحاد والوفاة بسبب الجوع. وبهذا، يصبح تحقيق الاستقرار والتعافي من هذه الحالة أكثر صعوبة مع مرور كل يوم. يؤثر سوء التغذية على جميع أعضاء الجسم، كما أنه يؤثر على الأفراد على مستوى الخلايا. ولا تقتصر إعادة التغذية على مجرد الوصول إلى التغذية والحصول عليها، إذ يتطلب التعافي المحتمل الحصول على أغذية جاهزة ومخصصة لهذا الغرض، بالإضافة إلى الرعاية الطبية المكثفة في المستشفيات للأشخاص الذين يعانون من سوء التغذية الحاد. المخاطر المحدقة متعددة، والآثار الناجمة دائمة، والتعافي معقد من الناحية الطبية. وتتوقع الكوادر الطبية بالفعل أن معدل الوفيات في “آب سيكون أعلى بكثير لأن الكثير من الأطفال قد تجاوزوا بالفعل نقطة اللاعودة حيث تدهورت حالتهم الجسدية لدرجة أن إعادة تغذيتهم قد تؤدي بذاتها إلى الوفاة”.

وعلى الرغم من أنها تتصدر عناوين الأخبار، إلا أن الجوانب البيولوجية التي يتم التركيز عليها لا تعكس سوى جزءاً مما يحدث للفلسطينيين في غزة. ومن الأهمية بمكان، لفهم طبيعة المجاعة الجماعية وإجرامية التسبب فيها، تقدير أبعادها المجتمعية. تؤدي المجاعة الجماعية بانهيار سبل العيش والمجتمعات والأسر. حيث يُجبر الآباء على اتخاذ قرارات مصيرية، كأن يختاروا بين نقل طفل يعاني من سوء تغذية حاد إلى المستشفى، وترك بقية الأطفال الجياع في رعاية الأقارب أو الجيران، أو قضاء كل ساعة في البحث عن الطعام للأسرة بأكملها. وإذا فقدوا واحداً أو أكثر من أطفالهم، فإن الصدمة الناجمة عن اتخاذ هذا الاختيار المستحيل سترافقهم للأبد. أما “الموت الاجتماعي” فيتجلى في انهيار القيم الأساسية للتكافل والتبادل، وفي مشاعر الخزي والإذلال والانحطاط. حيث يُدفع الناس إلى منافسة محمومة على الطعام، وهي التجربة التي من الممكن تعني لمن يعيشها فقداناً عميقاً للكرامة الإنسانية. بالإضافة إلى أن تغير ملامح أجساد هؤلاء الذين يتضورون جوعاً قد يشعرهم بأن حالتهم الجسدية تعتبر شكلاً من أشكال نزع الإنسانية عنهم.

لا يقتصر التأثير على الحاضر فحسب، بل أن الضرر الناجم عن سوء التغذية في مرحلة الطفولة المبكرة وعلى الأجنّة يخلّف أضراراً تدوم مدى الحياة. فالأطفال الذين يعانون من سوء التغذية الحاد في مرحلة حساسة من مراحل نموهم قد يتعرضون لأضرار لا يمكن إصلاحها على مستوى قدراتهم الجسدية والذهنية. بل إن هذا الضرر قد ينتقل إلى الجيل التالي.

وفي الربط بين هذه الآثار ومفهوم “الظروف المدمّرة للحياة”، كان رافائيل ليمكين (المحامي الذي صاغ مصطلح “الإبادة الجماعية” وكان له دور محوري في صياغة اتفاقية منع الإبادة) متيقظاً للأبعاد الاجتماعية للإبادة. ففي محاضرته عام 1953 عن مجاعة هولودومور في أوكرانيا، وصف المجاعة كسلاح استُخدم ضد الشعب الأوكراني كمجتمع، بهدف تدمير “روحهم الوطنية”. ويتماشى هذا مع أبحاث في الأنثروبولوجيا الاجتماعية ودراسات الذاكرة التي تؤكد على تجربة المجاعة باعتبارها فقداناً لنمط وسبل الحياة، وقطعاً لأواصر المجتمع، وتجريدأ من الكرامة والهوية الجمعية والاستقلالية.

واجبات دول الأطراف الثالثة

ما الذي يتعين على الدول فعله في مواجهة هذا المشهد؟

ستشمل الإجابة ذكراً لمجموعة من الإجراءات والتدابيرر على أصعدة عدّة، أكثرها وضوحاً، أن الدول التي ساهمت بشكل هام عن علم (أو، وفقاً لتفسير قانوني بديل، عن قصد) في الانتهاكات القائمة ـ وبالتالي تتحمل درجة معينة مسؤولية التواطؤ ـ يجب أن توقف هذه المساهمات على الفور. (ILC، ARSIWA، المادة 16(أ)، المادة 30، والتعليق ص 66 (الفقرة 5)، ص 88، 115 (الفقرة 11)؛ الإبادة الجماعية في البوسنة، محكمة العدل الدولية (2007)، الفقرات 420-21). وعلى نفس القدر من الأهمية، خصوصاً بالنظر إلى مدة وقوع الضرر في سياق المجاعة الجماعية، يجب على هذه الدول المتواطئة أن تفي بالتزاماتها بجبر الأضرار التي ساهمت في التسبب فيها (ILC، ARSIWA، المادة 31).

وعلى نحو أعمّ، فإن جميع الدول ملزمة بواجبات ضمان احترام القانون الدولي الإنساني، ومنع الإبادة الجماعية، والتعاون لوضع حد للانتهاكات التي تُرتكب. وحيثما كان خطر وقوع انتهاكات قائماً (كما هو الحال هنا بالتأكيد)، يجب على الدول أن “تبذل كل ما في وسعها بشكل معقول لمنع انتهاكات [القانون الدولي الإنساني] المستمرة ووضع حد لها. كما ” يتعيّن عليها” استخدام جميع الوسائل المتاحة لها بشكل معقول” لمنع الإبادة الجماعية أو وضع حد لها. (تعليق اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر 2016، الفقرة 154؛ الإبادة الجماعية في البوسنة، محكمة العدل الدولية (2007)، الفقرة 430).

يُثير هذا الأمر سؤالين؛ أولهما: كيف يمكن تصوّر المسار المؤدي إلى وضع حدّ للانتهاكات الجارية في غزة. وثانيهما: ما طبيعة المساهمة التي يتعيّن على أي دولة بعينها تقديمها لتحقيق ذلك الهدف.

وكما تمت الإشارة سابقاً، على الرغم من أن أوامر محكمة العدل الدولية ملزمة بشكل مباشر لإسرائيل فقط، إلا أن الأوامر التي صدرت العام الماضي توفّر توجيهاً عملياً للإجابة على السؤال الأول، الذي كان من الممكن الإجابة عليه على الأقل في منتصف عام 2024. إن فشل إسرائيل الواضح في الامتثال لأوامر المحكمة كان العامل الأهم في تدهور ظروف الحياة في غزة، وفي احتمال حدوث تدهور حاد في الوضع اليوم. ومن حيث المبدأ، فإن أهمية تلك الأوامر أصبحت أكثر إلحاحاً.

ومع ذلك، في ظل زخم الانزلاق نحو المجاعة الجماعية، أصبحت، بشكل واضح، التدابير التي طلبتها محكمة العدل الدولية قبل عام من الآن غير كافية. فهناك شعور بأن هذا الانزلاق يغيّب التمييز القانوني التقليدي بين الوقاية وجبر الضرر. ولا يمكن حصر الانتهاكات الجارية في إطار زمني واضح، إذ أن بعض الذين هم على قيد الحياة اليوم قد تجاوزوا نقطة اللاعودة، بينما يحتاج آخرون من بين الجياع إلى ما هو أكثر بكثير من التغذية – فهم بحاجة إلى عملية إعادة تغذية دقيقة تحت إشراف طبي حثيث. وقد يحتاج آخرون إلى دعم طبي طويل الأمد بسبب آثار سوء التغذية الحاد على الوظائف الإدراكية والجهاز العصبي المركزي. ونظراً لأن الآثار الجسدية والنفسية والاجتماعية للمجاعة ستستمر في المستقبل، وهنا يمكن القول بقوة إن العمل على الوقاية والتعاون لوضع حد للانتهاكات الجسيمة للقواعد الآمرة للقانون الدولي (jus cogens  )، يجب أن يتبع ذلك.

ووفقاً لهذا المنطق، لا يعد اكتفاء دول الأطراف الثالثة بمحاولة التأثير على إسرائيل لفتح البوابات والسماح بوصول المساعدات الإنسانية دون قيود إيفاءً بواجباتها الوقائية (على الرغم من أنها يجب أن تفعل ذلك)، بل يتعيّن عليها أيضاً أن تستخدم نفوذها لتحقيق هدفٍ أكثر شمولاً – هدف يتطلب من إسرائيل تسهيل وضمان التعافي الشامل للفلسطينيين في غزة من حافة الدمار الجسدي والاجتماعي.

ينطوي تنبيه IPC على وجود حاجة ملحّة للحصول على معلومات أفضل، مما يعني رفع القيود الصارمة المفروضة على الوصول إلى سكان غزة الذين يعيشون تحت وطأة المعاناة. فمن أجل الاستجابة بشكل مناسب وفعال لتنفيذ مجموعة الإجراءات المصيرية الموضحة أدناه، يحتاج العاملون في المجال الإنساني والدول التي تدعمهم دبلوماسياً ومادياً إلى معلومات كافية لتحديد الاحتياجات الأكثر إلحاحاً. هناك أيضاً ضرورة عامة لتحديد حجم الأزمة بشكل كامل باستخدام بيانات شاملة، وذلك من أجل تحديد ما إذا كانت الأزمة تمثل مجاعة من الدرجة الخامسة وفقاً لمؤشر IPC، وتقييم مسار الطوارئ الإنسانية وماهية الاستجابات اللازمة. وهذا يتطلب جمع البيانات الإنسانية وإتاحة التغطية للصحفيين الدوليين دون عوائق، إلا أن كلا الأمرين يخضعان حالياً لقيودٍ صارمة.

فعلياً، لا يحتاج الذين يعانون من سوء التغذية في غزة إلى الغذاء فحسب، وإنما إلى التوازن غذائي، وتوسيع مراكز التغذية المكثفة والعلاجية للأطفال الذين يعانون من سوء التغذية الحاد، وإعادة إحياء النظم الغذائية. كما لا يحتاج الفلسطينيون في غزة إلى الإغاثة الطبية فحسب؛ بل يحتاجون إلى مؤسسات رعاية طبية دائمة ومستقرة يمكن أن تشكّل العمود الفقري للتعافي المستدام، وإعادة التأهيل، والبقاء الفردي والجماعي في السنوات القادمة. ولا يمكن اعتبار هذه الأهداف طوباوية وغير واقعية، بل هي تشكّل الحد الأدنى الضروري إن أردنا ألا تعود الظروف المدمرة للحياة، بعد فترة هدوء قصيرة، بشكل أكثر فتكاً في كل مرة تُغلق فيها المعابر.

ويختلف ما تعنيه الاستجابة من دولة إلى أخرى تبعاً لاختلاف شكل وقدرات كل دولة على التأثر في الأفعال التي تقوم بها إسرائيل (الإبادة الجماعية في البوسنة، محكمة العدل الدولية (2007)، الفقرة 430). وفيما يتعلق بواجبات ضمان احترام القانون الدولي الإنساني ومنع الإبادة الجماعية ووضع حد للانتهاكات، “تظل الدول حرة من حيث المبدأ في الاختيار بين مختلف التدابير الممكنة” (اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر، تعليق 2016، الفقرة 165؛ وكذلك لجنة القانون الدولي، ARSIWA، تعليق ص 114 (الفقرة 3)). ومع ذلك، كلما ازدادت “جسامة الانتهاك” تزداد أيضاً شدة الالتزام بمنعه، مما يضيّق نطاق السلطة التقديرية للدولة فيما يتعلق بما قد ينطوي عليه ذلك. (اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر، تعليق 2016، الفقرة 165). وهنا، تتجلى هذه الخطورة في الأزمة الحادة الراهنة، وفي الأضرار المستقبلية متعددة الأبعاد التي بدأت بالفعل بالتبلور.

وفي بيانٍ نادرٍ من نوعه في ممارسات اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر (ICRC)، أصرّت رئيسة المنظمة، ميريانا سبولجاريتش، مؤخراً على أن الدول “يجب أن تفعل المزيد”، محذرة من أن “كل تردد سياسي” في وضع حد فوري وحاسم للممارسة “المشينة” المتمثلة في “الحرمان الشديد” والهجمات العشوائية في غزة “سيُحكم عليه إلى الأبد باعتباره فشلاً جماعياً في صون الإنسانية في الحرب”. وفي سياق مماثل، حث المفوض السامي للأمم المتحدة لحقوق الإنسان، فولكر تورك، الحكومات على ممارسة “كل أشكال الضغوط الممكنة على الحكومة الإسرائيلية لإنهاء المذبحة في غزة – بشكل دائم”. بل إنه ذهب إلى حد القول أن “الدول التي لا تستخدم نفوذها” في هذا السياق “قد تكون متواطئة في جرائم دولية.”

يجب على كل دولة أن تحدد بنفسها الوسائل التي يمكنها استخدامها. ومن الواضح أن وقت الإدلاء ببيانات قوية أو دعوة إسرائيل لــ“الوفاء بتعهداتها” قد انتهى. وبالمثل، يجب على الدول أن توقف على الفور أي مساهمات أو تشجيع للكارثة المستمرة في غزة، بما في ذلك نقل الأسلحة (تعليق اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر 2016، الفقرة 162) والإمدادات ذات الاستخدام المزدوج. كما ينبغي استخدام أشكال أخرى من الضغط، مثل تعليق اتفاقية الشراكة مع الاتحاد الأوروبي، بهدف حث إسرائيل على السماح بالاستجابة الشاملة للأزمة. كما ينبغي على الدول أن تتحرك لتقويض المناخ المتنامي للإفلات من العقاب في هذا السياق، وإنهاء المراوغة العلنية بشأن ما إذا كانت ستنفذ أوامر الاعتقال مثل تلك الصادرة عن المحكمة الجنائية الدولية، والرد بشكل جماعي على أولئك الذين لا يلتزمون بهذا الواجب، ورفض منح إذن الطيران للأفراد المطلوبين، والتحرك بسرعة لتفعيل قانون الحظر الأوروبي لحماية مسؤولي المحكمة الجنائية الدولية وغيرهم من العقوبات الأمريكية التي تستهدف عمل المحكمة في الوضع الفلسطيني.

لطالما كانت التحذيرات من الجوع الجماعي، بوصفه معاناة إنسانية لا تُحتمل وجريمة في حد ذاتها، متواصلة وموثوقة وتزداد إلحاحاً. ويعدّ الإخفاق في الاستجابة لهذه التحذيرات، في الحد الأدنى، تخلياً مُخزياً عن القيم الإنسانية. أما أولئك المتورطون أو المتواطئون في جرائم التجويع في غزة، فلا بد أن يواجهوا تبعات قانونية قادمة.

أما لهؤلاء الذين يناقشون سبل الاستجابة المناسبة، فهذه ليست اللحظة المناسبة للمراوغة، أو الأعمال الرمزية من قبيل الإسقاطات الجوية؛ بل أن الوقت قد حان لاتخاذ إجراءات إنسانية شاملة ومستدامة ومنسقة. كما يتعيّن على الدول حول العالم أن تتحرك دون تأخير بناءً على هذا الواجب الملحّ.

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צבא ההגנה לישראל (צה”ל)) הכריז על מספר מהלכים הקשורים לסיוע הומניטרי בסוף השבוע האחרון:

• הצנחות סיוע מהאוויר (שמהוות הסחת דעת קוסמטית מהסיוע בקנה המידה הנדרש);
• קביעת אזורים מוגבלים שבהם יהיו הפסקות אש הומניטריות ומסדרונות גישה (שהיקפם “המינימלי”, כפי שהוצהר, אינו עולה בקנה אחד עם סיוע בקנה המידה הנדרש, ויישומו יקדם את ריכוז הפלסטינים בחלק קטן שאינו בר-קיימא בעזה); ו-
• הספקת חשמל מחודשת להתפלת מי ים.

גם לפי תפיסה צרה של מצב החירום ההומניטרי הקיים, צעדים אלה אינם מספיקים, אפילו בהנחה שייושמו באופן מלא. אסור שצעדים אלה יסיחו את הדעת מהצורך בפעולה מקיפה יותר. העובדה שההכרזה הישראלית על צעדים אלה הגיעה עם ההסתייגות ש”אין רעב בעזה” היא כשלעצמה פוגעת באמינותם של הצעדים (ראו גם כאן). כבר עכשיו, דווח כי הקבינט הישראלי שוקל להחמיר את המצור על ערים מסוימות בעזה ולנתק את החשמל לרצועה.

הזמן לצעדים חלקיים חלף.

נקודת מפנה

המצב בעזה מעולם לא היה גרוע יותר. ההתראה  מטעם ה-IPC מה- 29 ביולי קובעת:

“ראיות הולכות ומצטברות מראות כי רעב (starvation) נרחב, תת תזונה ומחלות גורמים לעלייה במקרי המוות הקשורים לרעב. נתונים עדכניים מצביעים על כך שסף הרעב (famine) נחצה ביחס לצריכת מזון ברוב רצועת עזה, וביחס לתת תזונה אקוטית בעיר עזה”.

ב-23 ביולי, דיווח הגרדיאן כי למעלה מ-35% מכלל מקרי המוות מרעב שתועדו מאז 7.10.2023 התרחשו בשלושת הימים הקודמים. סך כל מקרי המוות עמד על 111 באותה עת. ארבעה ימים לאחר מכן, ארגון הבריאות העולמי דיווח כי 63 מתוך 74 מקרי המוות הקשורים לתת-תזונה בשנת2025  התרחשו ביולי (כולל 25 ילדים ו-38 מבוגרים). למחרת נרשמו 14 מקרי מוות כאלה  במהלך 24 שעות. בהנחה כי מתקיימת ההשפעה הרגילה של מחסור המוני, הדבר מרמז כי קיים מספר גבוה עוד יותר של מקרי מוות ממחלות זיהומיות, שהופכות נפוצות יותר וקטלניות יותר עקב תת-תזונה ותברואה לקויה.

בהתחשב בנסיבות, לרבות אתגרי איסוף הנתונים הרגילים הקיימים באזורי סכסוך, כמו גם הגישה המוגבלת מאוד לעזה, המספרים שתועדו גם עבור מקרי מוות כתוצאה מטראומה וגם עבור מקרי מוות שאינם כתוצאה מטראומה הם כמעט בוודאות משקפים ספירת חסר משמעותית. מכל מקום, ניתן להבחין במגמה ברורה ומצמררת בכל המדדים.

ב-23 ביולי, 115 ארגונים הומניטריים פרסמו הצהרה בה תיארו “שיעורי שיא” של תת תזונה אקוטית בקרב ילדים, את ההתפשטות המוגברת של “שלשול מימי אקוטי”, וכן תיארו מבוגרים “המתמוטטים ברחובות מרעב והתייבשות”. יוניצ”ף תיעד את מספר הילדים שאושפזו לטיפול רפואי עקב תת תזונה בשבועיים הראשונים של יולי, שהיה גבוה בהרבה ממספר הילדים שאושפזו ביוני (שהיה בעצמו מספר שיא). ארגון רופאים ללא גבולות מדווח שבמרפאה שלו בעיר עזה “מספר האנשים הרשומים לטיפול בתת תזונה גדל פי ארבעה מאז ה- 18 במאי, בעוד ששיעורי תת התזונה החמורה בקרב ילדים מתחת לגיל חמש שולשו בשבועיים האחרונים בלבד.” תוכנית המזון העולמית מדווחת כי “כמעט שליש מהמשפחות מפספסות ארוחות במשך ימים שלמים”.

גופם של ילדים פשוט ” נכבה.” נאג’י אל-קורשאלי, רופא מיילד-גניקולוג מעזה, אמר לגארדיאן ש-“כ-50% ממאות הנשים ההרות שראה מדי יום סובלות מתת תזונה”, כי מספר ההפלות גדל באופן משמעותי, כי תינוקות שנולדו סובלים “מתת משקל משמעותי”, וכי “יותר ויותר נולדים פגים או עם עיוותים”. התרוקנות המלאי של המזונות הטיפוליים החיוניים לטיפול באלו הסובלים מתת תזונה חמורה, הותירה תינוקות ופעוטות הסובלים מתת תזונה ללא דרך לשרוד. אנשי רפואה תיארו מחסור בתרופות ובתברואה המוביל לעלייה במצבים מסכני חיים, שהם אינם יכולים לטפל בהם.

המצב לא פוסח על איש. 115 הארגונים שפרסמו את ההצהרה ב-23 ביולי תיארו כיצד “הם עדים לכך שעמיתיהם ושותפיהם מתפוגגים לנגד עיניהם.” נאמר כי רופאים סובלים מסחרחורות בזמן שהם בסבבי טיפול. עיתונאים פירטו  כיצד שתו מי מלח “רק כדי להישאר עומדים” וכיצד לעסו “עשבי תיבול יבשים או עלים כדי להשתיק את הצרחה שבפנים”.

סצנות של המוני אנשים נואשים למזון, דיווחים על אנשים שמחפשים שאריות בזבל, וסיפורים על גניבה וכאוס, מצביעים כולם על קריסה חברתית שהינה סימפטומטית לשלבים הסופיים של רעב. האנשים שחווים זאת מדברים על בושה, השפלה, ותחושות של דה-הומניזציה.

הקיום האנושי מבוסס על שיתוף במזון. כאשר אנשים אינם יכולים עוד לחלוק לחם, אלא נאלצים להילחם זה בזה על שאריות, יכולתה של החברה האנושית לתפקד נפגעת קשות. זה מה שאנו עדים להתרחשותו בעזה כיום.

אכן, התראת ה-IPC אחרונה אינה כוללת קביעה רשמית כי בעזה קיים רעב בשלב 5 על פי דירוג ה-IPC  (famine). הסיבה לכך היא שההתראה אינה מבוססת על נתונים חדשים, אלא על תחזית על בסיס נתונים קודמים. איסוף נתונים בעזה קשה ביותר עקב גישה מוגבלת מאוד ותנאים מסוכנים באופן קיצוני. פרשנות הנתונים מסובכת מאוד עקב מידת ההתפרקות החברתית שאנו עדים לה, משום שחישוב שיעור משקי הבית הסובלים מחוסר ביטחון תזונתי, או אחוז הילדים הסובלים מתת תזונה, דורש נתוני בסיס שקשה ביותר לחשבם. ישראל מונעת מעיתונאים ועובדי סיוע לאסוף מידע באופן שיטתי. ועדיין, אנו בכל זאת יכולים לאבחן “רעב” (famine) על סמך התסמינים הנראים לעין, גם בהיעדר רמת הנתונים שעליה מסתמכת בדרך כלל הערכת ה-IPC.  בכל המובנים הרלוונטיים, רעב מסוג famine קיים בעזה. עצם העובדה שמנגנון ה-IPC מצא לנכון לפרסם אזהרה כה חמורה, תוך קיצור הפרוטוקולים הרגילים שלו  ביחס לאיסוף וניתוח נתונים, מעידה על הבהילות שחשים מומחי הביטחון התזונתי לגבי המצב.

חובות משפטיות בינלאומיות

לנוכח מציאות זו, מנהיגים לא נדרשים להזדקק לייעוץ משפטי כדי לראות את הצורך הברור לפעול מיידית. אף הציווי המוסרי אינו יכול להיות ברור יותר.

אף על פי כן, ישנן חובות משפטיות קונקרטיות, החלות גם על אלו שאינם מעורבים ביצירת המצב הזה – או לפחות לא ברמה שעשויה להיחשב כסיוע לפשע בהליכים בינלאומיים עתידיים. ראוי להדגיש ולהתמקד כאן דווקא בחובות אלו.

כפי שכל אחד מאיתנו פירט בהרחבה במקומות אחרים, במשך כמעט עשרים ושניים חודשים – אם כי בדרגות שונות של עוצמה ובהפסקות מדי פעם – ישראל נקטה במדיניות רב-מימדית ומגוונת של מניעת אספקה חיונית מאוכלוסיית עזה, כגון מזון, מים, אספקה רפואית, ומניעת והאפשרות לחיים בכבוד (ראו למשל כאן , כאן, כאן, וכאן).

מדיניות המניעה הזו מפרה זה מכבר את האיסור על הרעבת אזרחים (starvation) כשיטת לוחמה על פי המשפט ההומניטרי הבינלאומי (ראו כאן , כאן , כאן וכאן). בין אם סבורים שפעולה ממושכת זו מונעת באופן משמעותי גם מכוונת השמדה כחלק מפשע רצח העם ובין אם לאו – ויש לציין בהקשר זה כי לאחרונה, שני ארגונים ישראליים מכובדים מאוד, בצלם ורופאים לזכויות אדם, הצטרפו למספר הולך וגדל של מומחים שסבורים שזה אכן המצב – ניתן לטעון בבירור כי לכל הפחות “הסיכון החמור” או “הסכנה החמורה” לקיומו של רצח עם, מספיקים כדי להפעיל את חובות המניעה של מדינות שלישיות מכוח האמנה למניעת רצח עם, כפי שיפורט להלן. בין היתר, זוהי משמעות מרכזית של החלטות בית הדין הבינלאומי לצדק (ICJ), שהוציא שלוש פעמים צווים זמניים בעניין זה בין ינואר למאי 2024. כל אחד מהצווים הללו מבוסס על החובה הדחופה להתייחס ל”סיכון הממשי והמיידי” לזכויות הפלסטינים במסגרת אמנת רצח העם (ראו דננבאום ודיל).

הרלוונטיות המעשית של צווים אלו מהדהדת עד היום. חששו המרכזי של בית המשפט במסגרת שלושת החלטותיו עד כה, והלוז של ההאשמה של דרום אפריקה במסגרת התיק בכללותו, טמונים באקט של “יצירה מכוונת של תנאי חיים שמטרתם להביא להשמדה הפיזית של הקבוצה, כולה או חלקה (אמנת רצח העם, סעיף 2(ג)).

בצו השני של בית המשפט מיום 28.3.2024, בית המשפט חייב את ישראל לנקוט:

[ב]כל האמצעים הדרושים והיעילים כדי להבטיח, ללא דיחוי, בשיתוף פעולה מלא עם האומות המאוחדות, אספקה בלתי מעוכבת ובקנה מידה גדול ועל ידי כל הנוגעים בדבר, של שירותים בסיסיים וסיוע הומניטרי שהינם נחוצים בדחיפות, לרבות מזון, מים, חשמל, דלק, מחסה, ביגוד, צרכי היגיינה ותברואה, כמו גם אספקה רפואית וטיפול רפואי לפלסטינים ברחבי עזה, לרבות על ידי הגדלת הקיבולת ומספר נקודות המעבר היבשתיות והשארתן פתוחות כל עוד יש צורך.

סעיף זה התקבל פה אחד.

למען הסר ספק, בית המשפט לא קבע כי ישראל אחראית לביצוע פשע רצח העם. עם זאת, הוא הורה על פעולות שישראל נדרשת לנקוט כדי לשמר את זכויותיהם של הפלסטינים במסגרת אמנת רצח העם, וזאת לנוכח “סיכון ממשי ומיידי” לפגיעה בלתי הפיכה בזכויות אלו (פסקאות 26-27). כפי שעשה בהחלטתו הראשונה (פסקאות 80, 86(4)) בית המשפט ניסח צו זה במפורש כתגובה ל”תנאי החיים העומדים בפני הפלסטינים” בעזה (פסקה 45).

במאי 2024, בית המשפט קבע צווים בפעם השלישית (והאחרונה עד כה), שכללו דרישה שישראל “תשמור על מעבר רפיח פתוח לאספקה בלתי מוגבלת בקנה מידה גדול של שירותים בסיסיים וסיוע הומניטרי נחוצים בדחיפות”.

ניתן להבין צווים אלה כנותנים תוכן ספציפי לחובותיה הקיימות של ישראל, ואשר הופכים אותן לדרישות פעולה קונקרטיות, אשר בכוחן להבהיר גם למדינות שלישיות כיצד להכווין את פעולות המנע שלהן עצמן (דננבאום ודיל). על נקודה זו נעמוד בהמשך.

במקביל, מחסור המוני והרעבה הם מוקד עניין עיקרי של בית הדין הפלילי הבינלאומי (ICC), שם הם מהווים בסיס מרכזי לצווי המעצר שהוצאו נגד ראש ממשלת ישראל בנימין נתניהו, ושר הביטחון לשעבר יואב גלנט. ערכאת קדם המשפט של בית הדין מצאה כי קיימת עילה סבירה להאמין שנתניהו וגלנט ביצעו מגוון פשעי מלחמה הקשורים ליצירת מחסור, וכן ופשעים נגד האנושות, כאשר במרכז עומד פשע המלחמה של הרעבת אזרחים כשיטת לוחמה. ראוי לציין, כי על פי ההודעה לעיתונות של בית הדין שהכריזה על הצווים, הערכאה מצאה כי קיימות עילות סבירות להאמין שנתניהו וגלנט מנעו מפלסטינים בעזה מזון, מים, חשמל, דלק ואספקה רפואית ספציפית באופן ש”יצר תנאי חיים שנועדו להביא להשמדתה של חלק מהאוכלוסייה האזרחית בעזה”.

הפרות אלה של המשפט הבינלאומי אינן רלוונטיות רק לחובות המשפטיות הבינלאומיות של ישראל; אלא שיש להן השלכות משמעותיות גם כלפי מדינות שלישיות. על פי המשפט הבינלאומי, למדינות יש חובה “להבטיח את כיבודו” של המשפט ההומניטרי הבינלאומי (הן על פי הדין ההסכמי והן על פי הדין המינהגי), וכן “למנוע” רצח עם (תחת סעיף 1 לאמנת רצח העם). ראוי לציין כי בחוות דעתו המייעצת משנת 2024 הדגיש ה-ICJ כי “לכל המדינות החברות באמנת ג’נבה הרביעית יש את החובה … להבטיח את ציותה של ישראל למשפט ההומניטארי הבינלאומי.” חובות אלו אינן משניות לפונקציה המשפטית של הטלת אחריות לאחר מעשה. כפי שטען אחד מאיתנו לפני כשנה במאמר יחד עם פרופ’ יאנינה דיל, חובות המניעה הפרואקטיביות הללו נוגעות למטרות הליבה של המסגרות המשפטיות האלו, וכדי שיהיה בהן טעם הן חייבות להנחות את פעולות המדינות בזמן אמת.

קיומן של חובות אלה אינו תלוי בקביעה מלאה וסופית של בית משפט. הן פועלות על פי ספים אפיסטמיים המתמקדים בסיכון, ולא דורשות הוכחה מעבר לספק סביר.

באופן קונקרטי:

• החובה להבטיח את כיבוד המשפט הבינלאומי ההומניטרי נכנסת לפעולה ברגע שמתברר כי מתבצעות הפרות של המשפט הבינלאומי ההומניטרי, כי קיימת “ציפייה” להפרות כאלה “בהתבסס על עובדות או ידע על דפוסי עבר,” או כי קיים “סיכון צפוי שהן יבוצעו” (הקומנטר של הצלב האדום לאמנת ג’נבה הראשונה (2016), סעיפים 162, 164).
• החובה למנוע רצח עם חלה ברגע שמדינה “יודעת, או שהייתה צריכה לדעת במצב נורמלי על קיומו של סיכון חמור שיבוצע רצח עם;” או “מודעת, או שבדרך כלל הייתה צריכה להיות מודעת, לסכנה חמורה שיבוצעו מעשי רצח עם” (רצח עם בבוסניה בית המשפט הבינלאומי לצדק (ICJ) (2007), פסקאות 431-432).

על פי תנאיהן של חובות אלו עצמן, יש להבין אותן כחלות באותה מידה על הבאתן לסיום של הפרות נמשכות והשפעתן, כמו גם על מניעת הפרות עתידיות. עבור נורמות עליונות של המשפט הבינלאומי (peremptory norms) כגון האיסור על רצח עם והפרות של הכללים הבסיסיים של המשפט ההומניטרי (קומנטר הועדה למשפט בינלאומי של האו”ם, עמ’ 112-113) כמו גם, לדעתנו, פשעים נגד האנושות, ניתן להסיק על כך מחובתן של מדינות על פי סעיף 41 לכללי אחריות המדינה “לשתף פעולה כדי להביא לסיום, באמצעים חוקיים, כל הפרה חמורה” של כללים אלה ולסרב “להגיש עזרה או סיוע בשימור” מצב שנוצר עקב הפרה כזו. כפי שיפורט להלן, חובות משפטיות אלו מולידות מספר חובות ספציפיות וקונקרטיות שמדינות שלישיות חייבות לקיים.

ה-IPC ותנאי החיים בעזה

במתן הצווים הזמניים שלו, הסתמך ה-ICJ בין היתר על הנתונים והניתוחים שסופקו על ידי ה-IPC. למרות שהחלטות של ה-ICC בדבר צווי המעצר אינן פומביות, סביר להניח שבית הדין הפלילי עשה את אותו הדבר. זה בהחלט ראוי. מטרת ה-IPC היא לספק מידע מדויק ומעודכן שיאפשר לממשלות למנוע משברים הומניטריים, מצבי חירום ורעב. המנגנון פותח כך שניתן יהיה לקבוע את הצורך ההומניטרי באופן סטנדרטי ועקבי, מבלי להמתין לניתוח לאחר מעשה של הנזק שנגרם.

מאז אוקטובר 2023, ועדת סקירת הרעב (FRC) של ה-IPC הזהירה שוב ושוב על קטסטרופה הומניטרית מתפתחת  בעזה. ב-29 ביולי, היא עשתה זאת שוב, במסגרת ההצהרה החמורה ביותר שלה עד כה.

באופן שמתסכל אנשי המקצוע ההומניטריים למשך זמן רב, יש נטייה, כאשר קוראים את הערכות הוועדה, להתמקד בהבחנה הבינארית הפשוטה והמטעה בין רעב (famine) לבין היעדרו, ולא בתיאורים הנואשים של הוועדה של המסלול המתפתח לעבר רעב המוני. הסיבה העיקרית לזהירותה של הוועדה בנקודה זו היא שלא היו נתונים נגישים כדי להוכיח בוודאות מספקת שספי הרעב (במובן של famine) הספציפיים והטכניים ביותר נחצו רשמית. ובכל זאת, ה-FRC הזהירה בכל פעם כי תנאי החיים בעזה בלתי מתקבלים על הדעת וכי צפויה הידרדרות נוספת (כולל למצב של famine), בהיעדר שינויים משמעותיים.

ראוי לציין, שבדו”ח שלה ממאי 2024 שקבע כי אין ראיות מספיקות כדי לקבוע ממצא סביר של famine, הוועדה הדגישה:

כל בעלי העניין המשתמשים ב-IPC לקבלת החלטות ברמה גבוהה חייבים להבין כי אישור סיווג רעב (famine) אינו משנה בשום אופן את העובדה שאין כל ספק שסבל אנושי קיצוני מתרחש כעת ברצועת עזה, ואינו משנה בשום אופן את הציווי ההומניטרי הדחוף לטפל בסבל האזרחי הזה על ידי מתן אפשרות לגישה הומניטרית מלאה, בטוחה, בלתי מוגבלת ומתמשכת לתוך רצועת עזה וברחביה, לרבות באמצעות הפסקת פעולות האיבה. אין להמתין עד שיתקבל סיווג רעב (famine) לתקופה הנוכחית כדי לפעול בהתאם.

דפוס תגובותיה של ישראל לאזהרות אלו מצביע על כך שהיא לא התמקדה ברמת הסבל האנושי בעזה, אלא בניהול הנתונים כדי להבטיח שלא תתמודד עם הסטיגמה או עם ההשלכות הפוליטיות הפוטנציאליות הקשורות בקביעה כי גרמה לרעב במובן של famine. בהקשר ספציפי זה, מטרת ה-IPC לאפשר לממשלות למנוע משברים הומניטריים, כולל רעב (famine) – בולבלה בעזה.

רעב במובן של famine אינו קטגוריה משפטית, וגם לא הזרז המוסרי המתאים לפעולה. לעומת זאת, המידע והניתוחים שסופקו על ידי ה-IPC היו רלוונטיים מאוד לשאלות האם קיימים תנאי חיים הרסניים בעזה, או שקיים חשש אמין שאלה צפויים להתקיים שם בעתיד הקרוב. דבר זה, בתורו, חשוב כדי לקבוע אילו פעולות יש לנקוט כדי לקיים את חובותיהן של מדינות למנוע ולהביא לסיום הפרות של המשפט הבינלאומי ההומניטרי ולמנוע רצח עם.

דחיפות החובה לפעול כיום

מדיניותה של ישראל השתנתה לאורך זמן. בתוך תקופות ממושכות של מניעה חמורה, אשר לדעתנו הייתה בלתי חוקית בבירור, חלו שיפורים קצרי מועד בגישה לסיוע הומניטרי במהלך מרץ-אפריל של השנה שעברה (במיוחד בעקבות צו ה-ICJ של חודש מרץ,  אשר התקבל במקביל ללחץ מצד הממשל האמריקאי שדרש מישראל להראות שאינה חוסמת סיוע הומניטרי על מנת שאספקת הנשק האמריקאית תימשך), ושוב (באופן המבטיח ביותר) במהלך הפסקת האש בינואר ופברואר של השנה.

עם זאת, אותם רגעים קצרים של הפוגה יחסית שימשו רק כדי להאט זמנית את הצעידה לעבר רעב (וכדי ולמנוע קביעת famine על ידי ה-IPC) לא כדי לסיים אותה. בחודשים האחרונים, תהליך זה הואץ.

בין ה-2 במרץ ל-19 במאי הטילה ישראל מצור מוחלט, ולא אפשרה כלל גישה הומניטרית לעזה, וטענה להגנתה כי האוכלוסייה קיבלה סיוע מספק במהלך הפסקת האש וכי חמאס הסיט את הסיוע. אפילו באותה תקופה, אלו היו טיעונים בלתי סבירים. כשפורסמו ממצאי החקירות על מקרי ביזה וגניבה של סיוע, טענות אלו רק הוחלשו. בכך שאילצה את האוכלוסייה לרוקן את מלאי המזון,  הניחה המדיניות הזו את היסודות למה שקורה כיום.

תחת לחץ פוליטי, ישראל החלה לאפשר זרם קטן של סיוע בסוף מאי. במקביל, היא עברה למודל חלוקת סיוע חדש שבו ארגונים הומניטריים בלתי תלויים והאו”ם נדחקו לשוליים, בעוד שסוכנות חלוקה חדשה ועמומה הנתמכת על ידי ארה”ב וישראל – בשם הקרן ההומניטרית לעזה (GHF) – לקחה את ההובלה. מההתחלה, הקרן הצבאית והתלויה בקבלנים פרטיים ספגה גינויים נרחבים על ידי מומחים לעניינים הומניטאריים, כאשר מנכ”ל הקרן ג’ייק ווד התפטר תוך שבועות מתחילת תפקידו בטענה כי “לא ניתן ליישם תוכנית זו תוך עמידה קפדנית על עקרונות הומניטריים של אנושיות, ניטרליות, אובייקטיביות ועצמאות”.

המערכת הייתה הרת אסון עבור הפלסטינים. בעוד שלא סיפקה שום דבר שמתקרב לרמת הסיוע או התמיכה ההומניטרית הנדרשת, חילקה חבילות המורכבות מסחורות חסרות איזון תזונתי, וריכזה את חלוקת הסיוע בארבעה מוקדים בלבד (ירידה מכארבע מאות מוקדים קודם לכן), מסגרת הפעולה של ה-GHF גם הכניסה מימד חדש של אימה.

הקרן מתארת את אתריה כ “אתרי חלוקה מאובטחים”. אבל עבור האנשים הרבים שנהרגו או נפצעו בעת שביקשו סיוע באתרים אלה, הם הכל חוץ מבטוחים. תיעוד מפורט של קבוצתForensic Architecture  מראה כיצד הם מתפקדים. הם ממוקמים באזורים צבאיים, מרוחקים וקשים לגישה. בששת השבועות הראשונים לפעילותם, האתרים היו פתוחים בממוצע  23 דקות בלבד בכל יום, כאשר שעות הפתיחה פורסמו רק זמן קצר מראש – ובמקרים מסוימים, לא נפתחו כלל למרות שהוכרזה שעת פתיחה. לפיכך, אנשים נאלצו להתחרות על מזון לא מספק, והתרחשו התקפות המוניות כמעט מדי יום על אזרחים המבקשים סיוע, כולל ביום “לנשים בלבד” שאמור היה למתן את ההשפעות הללו. עובד לשעבר של הקרן תיאר “פשעי מלחמה” בתחנות שלה. עדויות של הצוות מתארות כיצד ארגזי המזון נשטפים על ידי הגברים הצעירים החזקים ביותר, שנושאים כמה שיותר קופסאות, לעתים קרובות פותחים אותן כדי לקחת את הפריטים היקרים יותר, ואחריהם מגיעים נערים צעירים יותר, כמה נשים ומבוגרים חזקים פחות, שמחפשים בין הפריטים הנטושים עד שהם מפוזרים על ידי קבלני הקרן שיורים רימוני הלם עליהם.

בהערתה המצורפת להתראה האחרונה של ה-IPC, כותבת ועדת סקירת הרעב:

הניתוח שלנו של חבילות המזון שסופקו על ידי ה-GHF מראה שתוכנית החלוקה שלהם הייתה מובילה לרעב המוני, גם אם היא הייתה מסוגלת לתפקד ללא רמות האלימות המחרידות שדווחו. העובדה שאנשים ממשיכים להסתכן בירי או ברמיסה באתרי החלוקה מעידה על רמת הרעב (hunger) הנואשת ביותר שחווה האוכלוסייה.

ביוני, ראש ממשלת ישראל לשעבר, נפתלי בנט, הצביע על סרטון של גברים חמושים על גבי משאית סיוע כראיה לגניבות סיוע מצד חמאס. העמותה שארגנה את המשלוח ערערה על טענתו, וארגון Forensic Architecture  עקב אחר האירוע. הסיפור האמיתי היה שארגון קהילתי יצר קשר עם האו”ם כדי להגן על כלי רכב מפני שודדים, ואלו היו השומרים מטעמם שצולמו בסרטון. המשך רצף האירוע מראה את כלי הרכב מגיעים בבטחה ליעדם (מחסן של תוכנית המזון העולמית), ואת המזון מחולק בבטחה. אך על סמך הטענה השקרית הזו, ישראל סגרה את מסלול החלוקה הזה.

ההשפעות המיידיות באות לידי ביטוי במגמות שתוארו לעיל: עלייה בתמותה מרעב, עלייה מהירה ברמות תת-תזונה, ורגישות מוגברת למחלות.

ביוני, דיווחה תוכנית המזון העולמית כך:

רוב המשפחות דיווחו על כך שהן שורדות מארוחה דלה אחת ביום – ציר דליל, עדשים או אורז עם מלח, מקרוני, קופסאות שימורים של שעועית או אפונה וקטניות מבושלות. שליש אמרו שהן עוברות ימים שלמים בלי לאכול או מסתמכות על חתיכת לחם אחת ודוקה (תערובת עשבי תיבול, שבדרך כלל נאכלת עם שמן זית). רבים שותים מים כדי להרגיע את ייסורי הרעב, אסטרטגיית התמודדות שדווחה באופן נרחב. כפי ששיתף אחד ההורים: “[כשהילדים שלי מתעוררים בלילה רעבים] אני אומר להם לשתות מים ולעצום את העיניים. זה שובר אותי. אני עושה את אותו הדבר – לשתות מים ולהתפלל לבוקר.” מבוגרים מפחיתים באופן שגרתי את צריכת המזון שלהם כדי לתעדף ילדים, קשישים וחולים. אלו שאין להם הכנסה או [שאינם] כשירים גופנית מסתמכים על כמויות קטנות של מזון בסיסי שהושאל מקרובי משפחה ומשכנים. כ-15% פונים לחיפוש מזון באשפה או בהריסות.

בדברי ההסבר שלה על הערכת חוסר הביטחון התזונתי של ה-IPC במאי, חזתה ועדת סקירת הרעב כי ב”תרחיש הגרוע ביותר הסביר” של סיוע מוגבל ופעולה צבאית ישראלית מתמשכת המצב יהיה כדלהלן:

לרוב המכריע של תושבי רצועת עזה לא תהיה גישה למזון, מים, מחסה ותרופות. מצב זה יחריף את אי-השקט האזרחי והתחרות על משאבים נדירים שנותרו, וישחק עוד יותר את מנגנוני ההתמודדות והתמיכה הקהילתיים המוגבלים שנותרו … [ו] חוסר ביטחון תזונתי, תת תזונה חריפה ותמותה יעברו את ספי שלב 5 (famine) של ה-IPC.

[1] הארת מערכת: בעוד שבאנגלית קיימת הבחנה ברורה בין מונחים כגון famine, starvation ו-hunger , בעברית כולם מתורגמים ל”רעב”. מבחינה משפטית, “רעב” או “הרעבה” לא בהכרח דורשים famine, שהינו מונח מעולם מדעי הבריאות שמשמעותו הפורמלית צרה. בתרגום זה, הוספנו בסוגריים את המונח הספציפי המצוי במקור ככל שהדבר נדרש.

Time Has Run Out: Mass Starvation in Gaza and the Global Imperative by Just Security on Scribd

The post הזמן אזל: הרעבה המונית בעזה וחובתו של העולם appeared first on Just Security.

The moral obligation is palpable. The legal obligation is also clear. Pursuant to the duties to ensure respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) and to act if there is at least “a serious risk” that genocide is being, or will be, committed (on which we elaborate our views below), and given the gravity and urgency of the moment, no lawful measure can be eschewed in the effort to induce Israel to allow Gaza to be flooded with humanitarian assistance, to restore essential services, and to provide the conditions for the sustained, long-term recovery needs of Palestinians in Gaza in a context in which immediate humanitarian provision is necessary but will not be sufficient for survival.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced a number of aid-related policies last weekend:

• air drops (themselves a cosmetic distraction from aid at the necessary scale),
• limited areas in which there will be humanitarian pauses and corridors (the self-avowedly “minimal” scope of which are incompatible with aid at the necessary scale and the implementation of which will advance the concentration of Palestinians into an unsustainably small proportion of Gaza), and
• renewed electricity provision for desalination

Even on a narrow view of the humanitarian emergency, these measures are insufficient, even assuming full implementation. They must not distract from the need for more comprehensive action. That the Israeli announcement of these measures came with the caveat that “there is no starvation in Gaza” is itself discrediting (see also here). Already, Israel’s cabinet is reportedly considering a tightened siege on certain cities in Gaza and cutting off electricity to the Strip.

The time for half-measures has passed.

A Tipping Point

The situation in Gaza has never been worse. The July 29 Alert from the IPC reads:

Mounting evidence shows that widespread starvation, malnutrition, and disease are driving a rise in hunger-related deaths. Latest data indicates that Famine thresholds have been reached for food consumption in most of the Gaza Strip and for acute malnutrition in Gaza City.

The warning follows a period of increasingly dire accounts of conditions in Gaza. On July 23, the Guardian reported that over 35% of all recorded starvation deaths since October 7^th 2023 had occurred in the previous three days. The total was 111 at the time. Four days later, the World Health Organization relayed that 63 of the 74 malnutrition-related deaths in 2025 occurred in July (including 25 children and 38 adults). The next day, 14 such deaths were registered in 24 hours. Assuming the ordinary impact of mass deprivation, this would imply an even higher number of fatalities from infectious diseases made more common and more lethal by malnutrition and poor sanitation.

Given the circumstances, including the usual challenges posed to data collection by armed conflict settings as well as severely restricted access to Gaza, recorded numbers for both trauma and non-trauma deaths are almost certainly a massive undercount. However, a clear and chilling trajectory is discernible across indicators.

On the 23^rd of the month, 115 humanitarian organizations issued a statement in which they described “record rates” of acute malnutrition among children, the increased spread of “acute watery diarrhoea,” and adults “collapsing on the streets from hunger & dehydration.” UNICEF has documented the number of children admitted for medical care for malnutrition in the first two weeks of July tracking far higher than the number admitted in June (which was itself a record). Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) says that in its Gaza City clinic, “the number of people enrolled for malnutrition treatment has quadrupled since 18 May, while rates of severe malnutrition in children under five have tripled in the last two weeks alone.” The World Food Programme reports that “almost a third of families miss meals for days at a time.”

Children’s bodies are “shutting down.” Naji al-Qurashali, an obstetrician-gynecologist in Gaza, told the Guardian that around “50% of the hundreds of pregnant women he saw each day were suffering from malnutrition,” with miscarriages increasing significantly and babies carried to term “significantly underweight” and “increasingly born prematurely or with disfigurements.” The exhaustion of therapeutic foods that are essential for treating those suffering from severe malnutrition has left malnourished babies and toddlers with no way to survive. Medical professionals have described a lack of medication and sanitation leading to a rise in life-threatening conditions that they cannot treat.

No one is spared. The 115 organizations that issued the July 23 statement described “witnessing their own colleagues and partners waste away before their eyes.” Doctors are said to be suffering dizzy spells while making rounds. Journalists have detailed their experiences drinking salt water “just to remain standing” and chewing “dried herbs or wild leaves to quiet the screaming inside.”

Scenes of crowds of people desperate for food, reports of people scavenging in garbage for scraps, and stories of theft and chaos all point to the social collapse that is symptomatic of the final stages of famine. The people enduring this speak of their shame, humiliation, and feelings of dehumanization.

Human existence is based upon sharing food. The etymology of the word “companion”—someone with whom one shares bread — is just one indicator of how deep this goes. When people can no longer share bread but must instead fight one another for scraps, human society is severely impacted in its ability to function. This is what we see unfolding in Gaza today.

The IPC Alert issued yesterday is not a formal determination of IPC phase 5 Famine. The reason for that is that it is not based upon new data, but on a projection from prior data. Data gathering in Gaza is extraordinarily difficult due to severely restricted access and viscerally dangerous conditions. Data interpretation is highly complicated by the degree of social breakdown we are witnessing, because calculating the proportion of households that are food insecure, or the percentage of children who are malnourished, requires baseline figures that are extremely hard to calculate. Israel has prevented journalists and aid workers from collecting systematic information. But we can nonetheless diagnose “famine” based on the visible symptoms, even in the absence of the level of data upon which an IPC assessment ordinarily relies. In all relevant respects, it is present in Gaza. The very fact that the IPC felt it necessary to issue such a stark warning, short-circuiting its normal protocols for data gathering and analysis, indicates the food insecurity experts’ alarm.

International Legal Obligations

Faced with this reality, leaders ought not require legal advice to see the obvious need to act now. The moral imperative could hardly be clearer.

Nonetheless, there are concrete legal obligations, including for those who might not be sufficiently entangled in the policies that created this situation to be held complicit in future accountability proceedings. It is worth reiterating and focusing on those obligations here.

As each of us has detailed at length elsewhere, for almost twenty-two months, albeit with varying degrees of intensity and occasional pauses, Israel has pursued a multifaceted and varied policy of depriving the population of Gaza of essentials, such as food, water, medical provisions, and the possibility of a dignified life. (E.g. here, here, here, and here).

The policy of deprivation has long been in clear violation of the IHL prohibition of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare (see here, here, here, and here). Whether or not one takes the view that this prolonged action is also discernibly infused with genocidal intent — notably, on Monday, two highly respected Israeli organizations, B’Tselem and Physicians for Human Rights – Israel joined a growing number of experts in inferring precisely that — an overwhelming case can be made that the “serious risk” or “serious danger” of genocide has long been sufficient to trigger third states’ preventive obligations under the Genocide Convention, as elaborated below. Among other evidence, this is a key implication of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) thrice issuing provisional measures orders between January and May of 2024, each predicated on the urgent imperative to address a “real and imminent risk” to Palestinians rights under the Genocide Convention (see Dannenbaum & Dill).

The practical relevance of those ICJ orders reverberates through to the present. The Court’s key concern across the three provisional measures decisions, and the crux of South Africa’s allegation in the case as a whole, is the underlying act of “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” (Genocide Convention, article II(c)).

In the ICJ’s second order (March 28, 2024), the Court required Israel to take:

all necessary and effective measures to ensure, without delay, in full co-operation with the United Nations, the unhindered provision at scale by all concerned of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance, including food, water, electricity, fuel, shelter, clothing, hygiene and sanitation requirements, as well as medical supplies and medical care to Palestinians throughout Gaza, including by increasing the capacity and number of land crossing points and maintaining them open for as long as necessary.

This provision was unanimous.

To be clear, the Court did not find Israel responsible for committing the crime of genocide. However, it instructed actions that Israel was required to take to preserve the rights of Palestinians under the Genocide Convention in the face of a “real and imminent risk” of irreparable prejudice to those rights (paras. 26-27). As it had in its first order (paras. 80, 86(4), the Court framed this imperative specifically in terms of responding to the “conditions of life faced by Palestinians” in Gaza (para. 45).

In May of 2024, the Court indicated its third (and, thus far, final) provisional measures, which included a requirement that Israel “maintain open the Rafah crossing for unhindered provision at scale of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance.”

These orders may be understood as specifying Israel’s pre-existing obligations into concrete action-guiding demands and illuminating the goal to which third States must direct their preventive action (Dannenbaum & Dill), a point to which we turn below.

In a parallel process, mass deprivation and starvation have also been the primary focus at the International Criminal Court (ICC), where they form a central basis for the arrest warrants issued for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant. The Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe that Netanyahu and Gallant perpetrated a range of deprivation-related war crimes and crimes against humanity, including, centrally, the war crime of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. Notably, per the ICC’s press release announcing the warrants, the Chamber found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Netanyahu and Gallant deprived Palestinians in Gaza of food, water, electricity, fuel, and specific medical supplies in a way that “created conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of the civilian population in Gaza.”

These violations of international law are not relevant only to Israel’s international legal obligations; they have significant implications for third-party States as well. Under international law, States have an obligation to “ensure respect” for IHL (under both treaty and customary IHL) and to “prevent” genocide (under article I of the Genocide Convention). Notably, in its 2024 Advisory Opinion, the ICJ emphasized that “all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention have the obligation. . .to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law. . .” These obligations are not secondary to the oft-emphasized function of ex-poste accountability. As one of us argued together with Professor Janina Dill a year ago, these proactive obligations go to the core purposes of these frameworks, which must guide State action in real time, or not at all.

These duties are not contingent on a full and final evaluation by a court. They operate pursuant to epistemic thresholds focused on risk, rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Concretely:

• The duty to ensure respect for IHL is implicated once it becomes clear that IHL violations are being committed, that there is an “expectation” of such violations “based on facts or knowledge of past patterns,” or that there is a “foreseeable risk they will be committed,” [ICRC Geneva Convention I Commentary (2016) paras. 162, 164].
• The duty to prevent genocide attaches as soon as a State “learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed,” or, in a related formulation, is “aware, or should normally have been aware, of the serious danger that acts of genocide would be committed.” [Bosnian Genocide, ICJ (2007), paras. 431-432]

Even on their own terms, these obligations must be understood to apply as much to terminating ongoing violations and their impacts as to preventing prospective violations.  For peremptory norms, such as genocide and violations of the basic rules of IHL (ILC Commentary, pp.112-113), as well as crimes against humanity in our view, that connection can be discerned from States’ duty under article 41 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts to “cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach” of such rules and to decline to “render aid or assistance in maintaining” a situation created by such a violation. As elaborated below, these legal obligations give rise to a number of specific, concrete duties that third-party States must take.

The IPC and Conditions of Life in Gaza

In its provisional measures orders, the ICJ drew upon, inter alia, the data and analysis provided by the IPC. Although the arrest warrant decisions are not public, it is likely that the ICC did the same. This is entirely appropriate. The IPC’s purpose is to provide timely and accurate information to enable governments to prevent humanitarian crisis, emergency and famine. It was developed so that determinations of humanitarian need could be made in a standardized and consistent manner, without having to wait for a post mortem analysis of the damage done.

Since October 2023, the Famine Review Committee (FRC) of the IPC has warned repeatedly of humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Gaza. Yesterday, it did so once again, in its most dire statement yet.

To the enduring frustration of the humanitarian professionals, there is a tendency in reading the committee’s assessments to focus on the simple and misleading binary of famine versus not-famine, rather than the committee’s desperate descriptions of the unfolding trajectory towards mass starvation. The key reason for the committee’s caution on the former point is that data have not been accessible to demonstrate with sufficient certitude that the specific, highly technical famine thresholds have been formally breached. And yet, each time the FRC has warned that the conditions of life in Gaza are unacceptable and that further deterioration (including into famine) was to be expected, absent significant changes.

Notably, in its May 2024 report that concluded that there was insufficient evidence to make a plausible finding of famine, the committee stressed:

all stakeholders who use the IPC for high-level decision-making must understand that whether a Famine classification is confirmed does not in any manner change the fact that extreme human suffering is without a doubt currently ongoing in the Gaza Strip and does not in any manner change the immediate humanitarian imperative to address this civilian suffering by enabling complete, safe, unhindered, and sustained humanitarian access into and throughout the Gaza Strip, including through ceasing hostilities. All actors should not wait until a Famine classification for the current period is made to act accordingly.

The pattern of Israel’s responses to these warnings suggests that it has been concerned not with the level of human suffering in Gaza, but with managing datapoints to ensure that it does not face the stigma or potential political consequences associated with having caused famine. In that specific respect, the purpose of the IPC – to enable governments to prevent humanitarian crises including famine – has been confounded in Gaza.

Famine is neither a legal category, nor the appropriate moral catalyst for action. In contrast, the information and analysis provided by the IPC have, throughout, been highly germane to the questions of whether destructive conditions of life exist in Gaza, or are credibly forecast to exist there in the near future. That, in turn, is important to informing what actions need to be undertaken to fulfil States’ duties to prevent and terminate violations of IHL and genocide.

The Urgency of the Imperative Today

Israel’s policy has oscillated over time. Amidst sustained periods of severe and, in our view, plainly unlawful deprivation, there were short-lived improvements in humanitarian access during the March-April period of last year (particularly following the March ICJ order, which coincided with pressure from the U.S. Administration that was required to certify that Israel was not obstructing humanitarian aid, in order for U.S. weapons supplies to continue), and again (in the most promising episode) during the ceasefire in January and February of this year.

However, those brief moments of relative respite served only to temporarily slow the march towards famine (and avert a famine determination by the IPC), not to end it. In recent months, that process has been accelerating.

From March 2 to May 19, Israel imposed a total siege, allowing no humanitarian access at all into Gaza, claiming in its defense that the population was adequately supplied from the deliveries during the ceasefire and that Hamas was diverting aid. Even at the time, these were implausible arguments. As the findings of investigations into incidents of aid looting and theft have been made public, these claims have only weakened. In forcing the population to exhaust food stocks, the policy laid the foundation for what is happening today.

Under political pressure, Israel began to allow a trickle of aid in in late May. At the same time, it pivoted to a new aid distribution model in which impartial humanitarian organizations and the United Nations were sidelined, while a new and opaque U.S.- and Israel-backed distribution agency—termed the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF)—took the lead. From the beginning, the militarized and private-contractor-dependent Foundation was widely condemned by humanitarian experts, with GHF chief executive Jake Wood quitting within weeks of starting on the grounds that it was “not possible to implement this plan while also strictly adhering to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.”

The system has been disastrous for Palestinians. While failing to deliver anything like the required level of aid or humanitarian support, distributing packages composed of goods that lack nutritional balance, and concentrating aid distribution in just four locations (down from approximately four hundred), the GHF framework has also ushered in a new dimension of horror.

The GHF describes its locations as “secure distribution sites.” But for the many people who have been killed or injured while seeking aid at these sites, they are anything but safe. Detailed documentation by the group Forensic Architecture shows how they function. They are situated in military zones, remote and hard to access. In their first six weeks of operation, they were open for an average of just 23 minutes each day, with opening times advertised only shortly beforehand — and on some occasions, not opening at all despite announcing an opening time. People were therefore forced to compete for inadequate food, and near-daily mass-casualty attacks on civilians seeking aid, including on the “women only” day that was supposed to mitigate these effects. A former GHF employee has described “war crimes” at its stations. Accounts of staff describe how the food boxes are swarmed by the strongest young men who carry off as many boxes as they can, often opening them to take the more valuable items, who are followed by younger boys and some women and less fit adults, who pick through the abandoned items until they are dispersed by the GHF contractors firing stun grenades.

In its comment appended to the latest IPC Alert, the Famine Review Committee writes:

Our analysis of the food packages supplied by the GHF shows that their distribution plan would lead to mass starvation, even if it was able to function without the appalling levels of violence that have been reported. The fact that people continue to risk being shot or caught in stampedes at distribution sites indicates the extremely desperate level of hunger that the population is experiencing.

In June, former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett pointed to a video of armed men atop an aid truck as evidence for Hamas theft. The nonprofit group that organized the shipment challenged his claim, and Forensic Architecture tracked that incident. The true story is that a community group liaised with the UN to protect vehicles from bandits, and it was their guards that were pictured in the video. The sequence shows the vehicles safely reaching their destination, a World Food Program warehouse, and the food being safely distributed. But on the basis of the false claim, Israel shut down the route.

The immediate impacts are manifest in the trends described above: rising starvation mortality, rapidly increasing levels of malnutrition, and increased susceptibility to disease.

In June, the World Food Programme reported:

Most families reported surviving on one meagre meal a day – thin broths, lentils or rice with salt, macaroni, cans of beans or peas, and boiled legumes. One-third said they go entire days without eating or rely on a single piece of bread and duqqa (a blend of herbs, usually eaten with olive oil). Many drink water to calm hunger pangs, a coping strategy widely reported. As one parent shared: “[When my children wake up at night hungry] I tell them drink water and close your eyes. It breaks me. I do the same – drink water and pray for morning.” Adults routinely reduce their food intake to prioritize children, the elderly, and the ill. Those without income or able-bodied rely on small quantities of borrowed basic food from relatives and neighbours. Around 15 per cent resort to scavenging for food in the garbage or rubble.

In its comment on the IPC food insecurity assessment in May, the Famine Review Committee forecast that under a “reasonable worst case scenario” of limited aid and ongoing Israeli military action:

The vast majority of people in the Gaza Strip would not have access to food, water, shelter, and medicine. This would exacerbate civil unrest and competition over remaining scarce resources, further eroding whatever limited community coping and support mechanisms remain … [and] food insecurity, acute malnutrition and mortality would surpass the IPC Phase 5 (Famine) thresholds.

Notwithstanding the increased flow of basic foodstuffs into the Gaza Strip since May, the IPC confirms that the “worst case scenario” is indeed unfolding. This is most clearly manifest in daily-increasing reports of cases of severe acute malnutrition and starvation deaths. Stabilizing and recovering from this becomes more challenging with every passing day. Malnutrition impacts all organs of the body, affecting individuals at the cellular level. Refeeding is not simply a matter of accessing nutrition. Specialized ready-to-use nutritional foods and intensive hospital care for the severely acutely malnourished are necessary for potential recovery. The risks are manifold, the effects are lasting, and recovery is medically complicated. Already, medical professionals are predicting that mortality in “August is going to be significantly higher because a lot of the children have already passed the point of no return where their physiology has eroded to the point where even refeeding could potentially cause death itself.”

Although they inevitably grab the headlines, the biological aspects of the current trajectory capture only part of what is being done to Palestinians in Gaza. Crucial to understanding the nature of mass starvation, and the criminality of bringing it about, is an appreciation of its societal dimensions. Mass starvation is characterized by the breakdown of livelihoods, communities, and families. Parents are forced to make choices, such as deciding whether to take a severely acutely malnourished child to hospital while leaving other children who are also very hungry in the care of relatives or neighbors, or to spend every hour seeking food for the family as a whole. Should one or more of their children die, the trauma of this impossible choice will be lasting. Social death is manifest in the violation of basic norms of exchange and reciprocity, and by feelings of shame, humiliation, and degradation. People are reduced to intensive competition for food, which can be experienced as a profound loss of human dignity. Those who are starving often have a significantly altered appearance and may experience their condition as dehumanizing.

The impact is not limited to the present. The harm inflicted through early childhood and in utero malnutrition entail lifelong injury. Children exposed to severe malnutrition at a vulnerable stage of development may face irreparable harm in the form of reduced physical and mental capacities. Indeed, that harm may be transmitted to the next generation.

In connecting these effects to the concept of destructive conditions of life, Raphael Lemkin (the lawyer who famously developed the term “genocide” and was instrumental in the development of the Genocide Convention) was attentive to the social dimensions of starvation. In his 1953 lecture on the Holodomor famine in Ukraine, he described starvation as a weapon wielded against the Ukrainian people as a community, designed to destroy their “national spirit.” This chimes with research in social anthropology and memory studies that emphasize the experience of famine as loss of a way of life, rupture of community, or dispossession of collective dignity and autonomy.

Third-Party States’ Duties

Faced with this prospect, what must States do?

The answer will include actions along several dimensions. Most obviously, those States that have knowingly (or, on an alternative legal interpretation, purposefully) made a significant contribution to existing violations — and thus bear some level of existing complicit liability — must cease those contributions immediately. (ILC, ARSIWA, art. 16(a) art. 30, & Commentary pp.66 (para. 5), pp. 88, 115 (para. 11); Bosnian Genocide, ICJ (2007), paras. 420-21). Equally importantly, particularly given duration of the harm in contexts of mass starvation, these complicit States must discharge their reparative obligations with respect to harms to which they made a causal contribution (ILC, ARSIWA, art. 31).

More broadly, all States are bound by the duties to ensure respect for IHL, to prevent genocide, and to cooperate to bring violations to an end. Where the risk or danger of an ongoing violation is sufficient (as it surely is here), they must “do everything reasonably in their power to prevent and bring [ongoing IHL] violations to an end” and must “employ all means reasonably available to them” to prevent genocide or bring it to an end. (ICRC 2016 Commentary, para. 154; Bosnian Genocide, ICJ (2007), para. 430).

This raises two questions. The first is how to conceive of the path to bringing the ongoing violations in Gaza to an end. The second is what kind of contribution any specific State must make to that objective.

As noted above, although directly binding only on Israel, the ICJ’s orders from last year provide concrete guidance in response to the first of these questions, at least as it might have been answered in mid-2024. Israel’s manifest failure to live up to the ICJ’s orders has been the most important factor in the deterioration of conditions of life in Gaza and the prospect of a precipitously worse trajectory today. In principle, then, the order’s import has only intensified.

And yet, under the momentum of the descent into mass starvation, the measures required by the ICJ a year ago are now plainly inadequate. There is a sense in which that momentum blurs the traditional legal distinction between prevention and reparation. The ongoing violation is not neatly time bound. Some who are alive today have passed the point of no return. Others among the starving need far more than nutrition—they need a careful, medically supervised process of refeeding. Still others may need long-term medical support due to the impacts of acute malnutrition on cognitive and central nervous functioning. As the physical, psychological, and societal impacts of starvation reverberate into the future, a strong case can be made that the work of prevention, and of cooperating to bring serious jus cogens violations to an end, must follow.

On that line of reasoning, third-party States cannot satisfy their preventive duties merely by seeking to influence Israel to open the gates and allow unfettered humanitarian access (although that they must do). They must also deploy their leverage towards a more comprehensive objective — one that demands that Israel facilitate and ensure the full-spectrum recovery of Palestinians in Gaza from the brink of physical and social destruction.

Implicit in the IPC Alert is the imperative of better information, which means a release on harsh restrictions to accessing suffering Gazan populations. In order for an appropriate and effective response to implement the variety of crucial actions detailed below, humanitarian workers and States who support them with funds and diplomatic action need sufficient information to identify and locate the most critical needs. There is also a general imperative to establishing, with comprehensive data, the full extent of the crisis so as accurately determine whether it is an IPC-5 Famine, and assess the trajectory of the humanitarian emergency and necessary responses. This requires unhindered humanitarian data gathering and reporting by international journalists, both of which are currently highly restricted.

Concretely, those suffering malnutrition in Gaza do not simply need food; they need nutritional balance, the expansion of intensive and therapeutic feeding centers for acutely malnourished children, and the regeneration of food systems. Palestinians in Gaza do not simply need medical aid; they need permanent and stable institutions of medical care that can provide the backbone of sustainable recovery, rehabilitation, and individual and collective survival in the coming years. These cannot be dismissed as ideal, but unrealistic goals. They are the bare minimum objectives if the destructive conditions of life that are present today are not to briefly abate only return in ever more virulent form every time the crossings are closed.

What it means for any given State to act towards these objectives will vary according to the form and degree of its ability to impact actions by Israel (Bosnian Genocide, ICJ (2007), para 430). In the domain of duties to ensure respect for IHL, prevent genocide, and bring violations to an end, States “remain in principle free to choose between different possible measures” (ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para. 165; similarly ILC, ARSIWA, Commentary p.114 (para. 3)). However, as the “gravity of the breach” rises, the intensity of the obligation to prevent it is also enhanced, arguably narrowing State discretion regarding what that might entail. (ICRC, 2016 Commentary, para. 165). Here, that gravity manifests both in the present acute crisis and in the multifaceted future harm that has already been set in motion.

In a statement striking for its rarity in the practice of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the organization’s president Mirjana Spoljaric recently insisted that States “must do more,” warning that “every political hesitation” in failing to bring the “abhorrent” practice of “extreme deprivation” and indiscriminate attacks in Gaza to an immediate and decisive end “will forever be judged as a collective failure to preserve humanity in war.” In a similar vein, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk urged governments to put “all possible pressure on the Israeli Government to end the carnage in Gaza – permanently.” He even suggested, “[c]ountries that fail to use their leverage” in this context “may be complicit in international crimes.”

Each State must determine for itself what levers it can deploy. Plainly, the time for strongly worded statements or calls for Israel to “deliver on its pledges” is over. Equally, States must immediately cease any contributions to, or encouragement of, the ongoing catastrophe in Gaza, including through the transfer of arms (ICRC 2016 commentary para. 162) and dual-use supplies. Other forms of leverage, such as suspending the EU Association Agreement should also be deployed with a view to inducing Israel to allow the necessary full-spectrum response. And States must act to quash the growing climate of impunity in this context, ending public equivocation regarding whether they would execute arrest warrants such as those issued by the ICC, responding collectively to those that fail to uphold that duty, denying overflight permission to wanted individuals, and moving with urgency to activate the EU Blocking Statute to protect ICC officials and others from U.S. sanctions aimed at the Court’s work in the Palestine situation.

Warnings of mass starvation, as intolerable human suffering and as a crime, have been consistent, reliable, and increasingly urgent. Failing to act on these warnings is, at the very minimum, a shameful abandonment of humanity. For those involved or complicit in starvation crimes in Gaza, legal reckonings must follow.

For those deliberating about the appropriate response, this is not the moment for equivocation. It is not the time for symbolic gestures such as air drops. It is time for comprehensive, full-spectrum, sustainable, and coordinated humanitarian action. States globally must act without delay on that imperative.

The post Time Has Run Out: Mass Starvation in Gaza and the Global Imperative appeared first on Just Security.

In this episode, Just Security Executive Editor and professor at American University Washington College of Law Rebecca Hamilton, and Just Security editorial board member and professor of International Law at the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy Tom Dannenbaum join Just Security co-editor-in-chief Ryan Goodman to break down the Court’s reasoning, the legal standards applied, and the potential ramifications for the ongoing conflict and the future of international justice.

The conversation is also available on Just Security‘s YouTube channel and below.

Show Notes:  

• Tom Dannenbaum’s “Legal Frameworks for Assessing the Use of Starvation in Ukraine” in Just Security
• Olga Butkevych, Rebecca Hamilton, and Gregory Shaffer’s “International Law in the Face of Russia’s Aggression in Ukraine: The View from Lviv” 
• Ryan Goodman and Ambassador (ret) Keith Harper’s “Toward a Better Accounting of the Human Toll in Putin’s War of Aggression” in Just Security 
• The Just Security Podcast: ICC Arrest Warrants for Russian Attacks on Ukraine’s Power Grid with Kateryna Busol, Rebecca Hamilton, and Paras Shah 
• Case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia Judgement (July 9, 2025) 

The post The Just Security Podcast: Unpacking the European Court of Human Rights Decision on Russia’s Violations in Ukraine appeared first on Just Security.

These catastrophic developments have extinguished the glimmer of hope that characterized the first six weeks of the ceasefire, when hostages and detainees were being returned, the fighting had subsided, and Israel was finally facilitating a broad and consistent flow of humanitarian aid. The ceasefire was “allowing nearly everyone in Gaza to receive food parcels,” United Nations Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric told reporters in New York in early March. After months of devastating food insecurity, woefully inadequate access to water, and a decimated medical system, Palestinians in Gaza were beginning to receive urgently needed sustenance, rudimentary means of shelter, and medical treatment. Exemplifying the change, 40-year old Ibrahim Abu Sultan from Gaza’s Jabaliya refugee camp told NPR, “Before the ceasefire, we would eat one meal every two or three days. Now we can at least have a meal a day.”

To be sure, more ominous signs persisted even during those six weeks. Although reduced in scale, Israeli attacks in Gaza continued throughout (and in apparent violation of) the ceasefire. U.S. and Israeli leaders openly discussed patently illegal proposals to push Palestinians out of Gaza. Hamas’s process of returning hostages through degrading public spectacles included outrages upon personal dignity, a violation of international humanitarian law (IHL) and a war crime. The condition of those returned also suggested that additional war crimes had taken place while they were in captivity. Investigations have concluded that Israel’s detention practices have also entailed grave war crimes, and the condition of released Palestinian detainees likewise provided evidence of criminal mistreatment. Moreover, throughout this period, Israel conducted a severe escalation of violence and displacement of Palestinians in the West Bank.

Nonetheless, the ceasefire offered a glimmer of hope where there had been none. Now, that hope is shattered and the fragile trajectory of recovery is in rapid reverse.

In what follows, I focus exclusively on the legal implications of Israel’s renewed policy of deprivation since March 2. In my view, Israel’s decision to cut off Gaza’s civilian population from the external supply of essential goods clearly violates international humanitarian law. It also almost certainly entails the resumption and continuation of crimes charged in the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for Netanyahu, including principally the war crime of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and certain associated crimes against humanity.

Those charges stem primarily from Israel’s impediment of humanitarian relief, beginning with the total siege order of Oct. 9, 2023. Gaza is under siege again, implicating many of the same legal considerations. Nonetheless, it is important to reexamine the situation in light of the current conditions of the civilian population in Gaza, the arguments Israel is making in its defense, and the conflict’s shifting legal context. If anything, the violation has only become starker.

Before the Ceasefire

For 15 months following Hamas’s deadly assault on October 7, 2023, Israel waged a devastating air and ground campaign in Gaza, while severely restricting humanitarian access, particularly to northern Gaza. Israeli forces have destroyed most buildings. Close to the entire population of Gaza has been displaced, in many cases multiple times. At least 48,000 Palestinians are estimated to have been killed and more than 111,000 injured, although both numbers are likely to be significant undercounts. According to expert assessments, Israel pushed Gazans to the brink of famine on several occasions, with the percentage of people suffering emergency or catastrophe levels of food insecurity unprecedented in the two decades in which the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, a tool for tracking potential famine, has been in operation.

Israel’s deprivation of food, water, and essential medical supplies and treatment to Palestinians in Gaza during this period took multiple forms. Israeli airstrikes attacked, killed, or destroyed agricultural land, farm animals, water systems, and humanitarian workers. Desalination plants were rendered inoperable through the denial of fuel and electricity. Medical infrastructure was cut off from power, bombed, and destroyed. And Israel blocked humanitarian aid throughout the 15-month period, albeit with varying levels of intensity and with variation across different areas of Gaza. The impediment to humanitarian access was especially severe in northern Gaza, which suffered extended periods of total or near-total siege.

Making matters worse, the Israeli Knesset adopted legislation on Oct. 28, 2024, banning UNRWA, the U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees, from operating in Israel and forbidding contact between Israeli officials and the agency. UNRWA is widely understood to be the “backbone” of humanitarian delivery in Gaza. Israel’s decision was predicated in part on its earlier allegation that 19 UNRWA staffers (out of a workforce of 13,000 in Gaza) participated in Hamas’s October 7 attacks. Upon being informed of these allegations in January 2024, UNRWA swiftly fired the staff members in question, while the U.N. Secretary-General tasked the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) with investigating the issue. The investigation led to a determination that nine of those accused may have been involved in the October 7 attacks, but the evidence still needed to be authenticated and corroborated. Only one of the original 19 was rehired, on the grounds that OIOS obtained no evidence to support the allegation of their involvement. Less than two months later, the Knesset adopted the UNRWA ban, which entered into effect on January 30. The anticipated impacts are potentially dire.

In a related vein, on March 10, Amichai Chikli, Israel’s minister of diaspora and combating antisemitism, announced, “a new procedure,” that would revoke the license of international humanitarian organizations working with the Palestinian population if they “published statements in support of the prosecution of Israeli citizens at the International Criminal Court.”

Before assessing the situation today, it is also worth noting several international judicial developments. In May 2024, the ICC Prosecutor applied for arrest warrants for Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, as well as three now-deceased Hamas leaders, for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The centerpiece of the case against Netanyahu and Gallant is alleged starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. Warrants for both men were issued in November. The same acts of deprivation are also at the crux of South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). South Africa’s case, brought under the Genocide Convention, has led to three separate provisional measures orders, all of which have direct implications for Israel’s obligations regarding humanitarian access. Separately, the UNRWA ban has prompted the U.N. General Assembly to request an advisory opinion on Obligations of Israel in relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations, and Third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. That process is now underway. Meanwhile, the ICJ’s advisory opinion of July 2024 on Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory has added jurisprudential weight to doctrinal points that are relevant to current assessments of Israeli conduct vis-à-vis Gaza, most notably by affirming that Israel is bound by at least some provisions of the law of belligerent occupation in Gaza.

A Return to Siege

On Jan. 19, the first phase of the ceasefire went into effect. Pursuant to that agreement, Hamas began a phased release of hostages, whose taking and detention has been a war crime from start to finish. Israel, as well as releasing Palestinian prisoners, facilitated large-scale humanitarian access. As I have previously argued, its failure to have done so previously entailed a consistent violation of IHL. The humanitarian crisis in Gaza started to improve.

As the first phase of the ceasefire expired, however, the delivery of desperately needed supplies slowed to a halt. On March 2, Netanyahu announced that Israel would prevent “the entry of goods and supplies into Gaza” in an effort to exercise leverage over Hamas.  Food prices rose sharply in Gaza’s markets and aid organizations moved quickly to ration the stockpiles of aid they had already brought in. A week later, Israel’s Energy Minister Eli Cohen announced, “I have now signed an order to cut off electricity to the Gaza Strip immediately.” The primary target was a water desalination plant, as Cohen himself acknowledged.

In Netanyahu’s announcement of the new siege, he warned, “There will be no free lunch. If Hamas thinks that it will be possible to continue the ceasefire or benefit from the terms of the first stage, without us receiving hostages, it is sorely mistaken.” Humanitarian aid is being impeded and withheld expressly as a bargaining chip.

To justify this stance, Israeli officials have made two claims. First, as they did throughout the 15 months prior to the ceasefire, they allege that Hamas is diverting and hording the aid. In his announcement, Netanyahu argued, “Hamas currently controls all of the supplies and goods that are being sent to the Gaza Strip. It is abusing the Gazan population that is trying to receive the aid, it is shooting at them, and is turning the humanitarian aid into a budget for terrorism directed against us.” Second, Israeli officials have minimized the likely humanitarian impact of their actions. As reported in the Times of Israel, “Israel believes enough aid has entered the enclave in recent weeks to last Gaza for several months.” Simultaneously, the Israeli government is seeking to avoid domestic judicial scrutiny of these claims and their relationship to its legal obligations by arguing that the denial of humanitarian access to Gaza raises considerations that “go beyond and are outside the realm of law.”

Evaluating Israel’s Arguments

On the facts, Israel’s claims are deeply unconvincing.

Humanitarian actors have consistently contradicted Israel’s allegations of massive aid diversion by Hamas. In September, Refugees International published a study, which relied on interviews with a wide range of stakeholders (government officials in Israel and Jordan, humanitarian officials, staff of international NGOs involved in the cross-border aid response, people inside Gaza, and evacuated Palestinians). The study’s authors found “little evidence to support the allegation that Hamas is diverting humanitarian aid at a large scale.” Regarding the more recent situation during the ceasefire, “Multiple humanitarian aid groups operating inside Gaza have said they distribute the aid they receive directly to those in need.”

The separate claim that Palestinians in Gaza are currently adequately supplied due to the expanded humanitarian delivery during the ceasefire is profoundly misleading.

Shortly after the renewed siege was announced, UNICEF reported, “conditions for children remain extremely dire. Seven newborn babies reportedly died from hypothermia over the past week because they lacked access to sufficiently warm clothes and blankets, shelter, or medical care.” After a four-day mission in March to Gaza and the West Bank, Edouard Beigbeder, UNICEF’s regional director for the Middle East and North Africa, noted that “more than 180,000 doses of essential childhood routine vaccines, enough to fully vaccinate and protect 60,000 children under 2 years of age, as well as 20 lifesaving ventilators for neonatal intensive care units” were blocked and waiting for delivery just outside Gaza. With a reduction of 70 percent of desalinated water due to the electricity cutoff, reports already indicate a severe deterioration in access to potable water. U.N. agencies estimate that 1.8 million of Gaza’s 2.1 million residents “urgently need water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance.” Israel’s deprivation of water in Gaza was one of the most devastating aspects of the 15 months prior to the ceasefire. Meanwhile, the World Food Programme reported that “it has no major stockpile of food in Gaza because it focused on distributing all incoming food to hungry people” stating that “existing stocks are enough to keep bakeries and kitchens running for under two weeks.”

More broadly, the current reality is that there is no stable source of sustenance and medical care other than through external humanitarian delivery—the source that Israel has now comprehensively shut down. The total lack of alternatives is even more acute today than it was at the time of the initial siege order in October 2023. Since then, Israel has destroyed the agricultural, medical, residential, and water infrastructure of Gaza. The population is almost entirely displaced and unable to access permanent shelter. To claim that the population is adequately supplied in virtue of aid delivery during six weeks of ceasefire access is to obscure the fact that cutting off aid now entails denying the only sustainable source of sustenance going forward.

Quite apart from these issues, the question of whether there is adequate supply cannot be answered simply by calculating whether the aggregate number of calories that have been allowed in should theoretically be sufficient for the population in question over a defined period of time. This caloric balance sheet approach evaluates humanitarian need in the abstract, divorced from its practical reality. A genuine assessment of adequate supply requires evaluating access and distribution. Immediately upon the announced siege, food prices shot up. They continue to rise. Within days, six out of 25 bakeries supported by the World Food Programme were forced to close. Reports indicate that “at least 80 community kitchens may soon run out of stock.” And this was before Israel launched its massive bombing campaign on March 18 and promised further massive destruction and displacement.

Moreover, the risk of deterioration must be understood in relation to the prior 15 months of deprivation. In an earlier warning, the IPC Famine Review Committee stressed that temporary improvements to food access “should not allow room for complacency” about the risk of famine, particularly given the increased vulnerability associated with prolonged crisis. As Alex de Waal has shown, societies plunged into catastrophic food insecurity suffer significantly elevated mortality and have significantly elevated humanitarian needs for months after humanitarian assistance starts to flow. Data collected by the Global Nutrition Cluster indicated that “since the ceasefire, over 3,000 children and 1,000 pregnant or breastfeeding women have been referred for acute malnutrition treatment.”

Even if all of this were not already clear, Israel’s claims regarding adequate stockpiles and Hamas hording do not stand on their own terms. The renewed siege is explicitly coercive. Netanyahu described it as a response to “Hamas’s rejection of the Witkoff framework” (referring to the Trump administration envoy) and promised “additional consequences” if “Hamas continues to stick to its position.” But if it were true that (i) the existing supply of aid were adequate, and (ii) Hamas were able to divert all existing stocks for its own benefit, there would be no immediate coercive impact on the armed group itself. On the contrary, according to Netanyahu’s own claims, civilian suffering would necessarily be prior to any coercive impact on Hamas. The purported logic of the siege works only if one assumes it will persist through widespread and severe civilian deprivation.

This was all true prior to Israel’s resumption of massive bombing. The latter, to which Netanyahu had already alluded in the siege announcement, has dramatically worsened a dire situation. Taking each of these points in combination, it is simply impossible to credit claims that stockpiles in Gaza on March 2 were such that Israel faced no humanitarian imperative to grant access in the period since.

How the Renewed Siege Violates International Law

The renewed siege is in violation of IHL and it adds further evidence to the central criminal charge against Netanyahu at the ICC.

At the level of IHL, it is now even clearer than it was in October 2023 that Israel bears obligations under the law of belligerent occupation. As I wrote at the time, there was already a strong argument then that, due to its enduring control of Gaza’s borders, Israel retained occupying power status despite its withdrawal from the territory in 2005. In the intervening months, two things have happened. First, key jurisprudence has developed in support of that assessment. Second, Israel’s level of control has escalated, surpassing even a more demanding threshold for the applicability of the law of belligerent occupation.

In July 2024, the ICJ put its jurisprudential weight behind the view that “Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip” in 2005 did “not entirely release it of its obligations under the law of occupation.” The Court explained that Israel’s responsibilities “have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control.” As Judge Sarah Cleveland indicated in her separate opinion, among the “commensurate” obligations that most closely tracked the level of Israel’s “effective control” prior to Oct. 7, 2023 are those related to the provision of food, water, medical provisions, and humanitarian access. This adds significant support to the view that Israel bore the relevant obligations from the start of this iteration of the conflict.

Second, during its ground incursion after Hamas’s October 7 attacks, Israel took full control over certain areas of Gaza and substantially greater control over the remainder, while eliminating Hamas’s system of civilian control. This led nine leading Israeli professors of international law to assess in April 2024 that, at least in northern Gaza, Israel’s level of control “amounts to full belligerent occupation.” Three months later, Marco Longobardo concluded, “After 7th October 2023, there is no doubt that the Gaza Strip is under occupation and that Israel is the occupying power.” The ICJ reasoned that the argument for obligations under the law of belligerent occupation holds “even more so since 7 October 2023.”

Of course, Israel withdrew its ground forces during the ceasefire. However, there is no plausible case to be made that Israel exited in a way that allows any form of autonomous control and governance within Gaza. The comprehensive destruction of all elements of basic infrastructure across Gaza has created a condition of total dependence on what Israel does or does not allow, particularly in relation to what is crossing the borders. Whatever one’s view on whether Israel’s obligations as occupying power lapsed upon its withdrawal in 2005, the recent ceasefire withdrawal had no such implication. In any event, the IDF has already reasserted a high level of control in key areas in the short time since Israel terminated the ceasefire.

As the occupying power, Israel has a primary duty to “ensur[e] the food and medical supplies of the population,” to the fullest extent of the means available to it (Geneva Convention IV, article 55). Moreover, whenever “whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal.” (article 59). Pursuant to the same provision, “All Contracting Parties shall permit the free passage of these consignments and shall guarantee their protection.”

Israel is plainly not acting to the “fullest extent of the means available to it” to ensure food and medical supplies to Palestinians in Gaza. It is blocking the only source of precisely such supplies. Given the currently “inadequate supply” of essentials to at the very least “part of the population” of Gaza (and soon, if not already, its entirety), Israel bears a clear obligation to agree to relief schemes under article 59. To cut off the external supply of essentials in this scenario straightforwardly contravenes international humanitarian law.

Netanyahu’s statement seeks to avoid this implication by arguing that it is Hamas that is “abusing the Gazan population that is trying to receive aid.” To the extent Hamas is looting aid or denying it to civilians, that would entail violations of IHL and war crimes on its part. But it does not change Israel’s obligations to the civilian population. Moreover, pitting Hamas and the population against one another by cutting off the current supply (which humanitarians have affirmed had been reaching civilians in need), directly contradicts Israel’s obligation to “restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety,” per the foundational rule of the law of occupation in article 43 of the Hague Regulations. Even accepting limits on how comprehensively Israel can achieve that restoration under current conditions, one thing that is unambiguously within its power is to refrain from cutting off humanitarian supplies in a way that will manufacture extreme scarcity and generate severe threats to public order and safety.

Defending Israel’s conduct, some have pointed to article 23 of Geneva Convention IV to argue that Israel is not required to “allow the free passage” of essentials if it has “serious reasons for fearing:

(a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination,
(b) that the control may not be effective, or
(c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned consignments for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy or through the release of such material, services or facilities as would otherwise be required for the production of such goods.”

This argument distorts the legal reality. The caveats listed in that section of article 23 apply explicitly and exclusively to the humanitarian access “obligation …. indicated in the preceding paragraph” of article 23, which is not specific to belligerent occupation. In other words, they codify not general authorizations to limit aid, but specific caveats to the specific obligations defined in article 23. By its own terms, article 23 of the Fourth Convention does not authorize what articles 55 and 59 prohibit. That is to say, in occupied territory, the requirements to grant access and ensure food and medical supply hold without modification according to the enumerated caveats in article 23.

But the point is not limited to belligerent occupation or the internal structure of Geneva Convention IV. International humanitarian law did not stop developing in 1949. Significant additional obligations have subsequently taken hold. And just as the caveats internal to article 23 do not authorize the violation of other articles of Convention IV, they are equally unable to authorize the violation of rules of IHL external to the Fourth Convention.

Today, even if it were not bound by the obligations of an occupying power, Israel would still be bound by (a) the customary prohibition of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and (b) the customary requirements (i) not to arbitrarily deny consent to humanitarian access and (ii) to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel to which it consents in that regard. Indeed, Israel’s own High Court of Justice recognized the customary relevance of these obligations to its control over the supply of essentials into Gaza as far back as 2008 (Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed 2008). Israeli litigation regarding the application of these rules to the current situation in Gaza is ongoing.

None of these rules is subject to the caveats in article 23 of Geneva Convention IV, which, again, apply only to the requirements of that specific provision. Notably, even States such as the United Kingdom and Germany, both of which have been largely supportive of Israel, have expressed “deep concern at the Government of Israel’s announcement on 2 March to halt all entry of goods and supplies into Gaza” and have called on “the Government of Israel to abide by its international obligations to ensure full, rapid, safe and unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance to the population in Gaza.” With a blanket prohibition of access to a population in need, there can be little doubt that Israel is failing that duty.

The prohibition of starvation of civilians is particularly significant, as it underpins the central war crime with which Netanyahu is charged at the ICC. Based on information released by the ICC, the arrest warrant for Netanyahu is predicated primarily on his impediment of relief supplies, per the terms of article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the ICC Statute. At the ICC, criminal liability attaches when a perpetrator (i) deprives civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, (ii) with the intent to starve civilians as a method of warfare.

There is no question that this latest iteration of the siege involves the deliberate deprivation of objects indispensable to survival. Food is the quintessential object indispensable to survival and is legally cognizable as such even assuming the fact of existing (and here depleting) alternative stocks. Essential medicines also clearly qualify.

Electricity can be more complicated. In this case, however, the Israeli government was clear that the denied electricity “was used for a desalination and wastewater treatment facility.” Although Israel’s energy minister argued that “this will force them to use their fuel stocks,” this rationale concedes that the electricity was not serving a military use. Rather, it was supporting the functioning of what is unambiguously an object indispensable to survival (a water desalination plant) and it was cut off with that in mind. As noted in a recent U.N. update on the humanitarian situation in Gaza, “Without electricity, the plant can only provide about 2,500 cubic metres of water per day and the amount of drinking water available in southern Gaza will be substantially reduced, affecting approximately 600,000 people.” In issuing arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber emphasized that “cutting off electricity … had a severe impact on the availability of water in Gaza and the ability of hospitals to provide medical care” and was one of the practices that “created conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of the civilian population in Gaza, which resulted in the death of civilians, including children due to malnutrition and dehydration.” These findings led it to include electricity denial as a component of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and the crime against humanity of murder.

As in earlier iterations, the current deprivation of humanitarian aid and electricity is clearly directed at a civilian population. The presence of combatants in Gaza does not change the civilian character of the population as a whole, given that the latter is overwhelmingly comprised of civilians (e.g. Protocol I, article 50(3); ICTY Prosecutor v. Karadžić Trial Judgment 2016). To cut off the supply of essentials, such as food, medical supplies, or the electricity necessary for desalination to Gaza as a whole is to deprive a civilian population of objects indispensable to survival. Here, the rules relating to starvation must be understood in light of the “basic rule” of IHL, pursuant to which parties to the conflict must, in all military operations, distinguish between the civilian population and combatants (Protocol I, article 48).

The remaining question relates to criminal intent. I have outlined the range of arguments on that point at length in a law review article and in an earlier Just Security essay. As explained in those pieces, and as articulated at the time of the ICC warrant application, a composite analysis of (a) the underlying IHL on starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, codified in article 54 of Additional Protocol I, and (b) “intent,” as defined in article 30 of the ICC Statute, supports the assessment that acting with the intent to starve civilians as a method of warfare includes either of the two following alternatives:

• Engaging in the deliberate deprivation of objects indispensable to survival for the purpose of denying the sustenance value of those objects to civilians or to a civilian population. This form of intent can attach before it is certain that civilians will be reduced to a state of starvation.

or:

• Engaging in the deliberate deprivation of objects indispensable to survival in the knowledge that this deprivation is virtually certain to leave civilians in a state of starvation. This form of intent can attach even if civilian sustenance denial is not the purpose.

Even assuming that current stocks of humanitarian essentials in Gaza preclude finding that the current iteration of the siege is, at this stage, virtually certain to leave civilians in a state of starvation, it is clear that this step has been taken with a view to denying the sustenance value of the blocked objects. As detailed above, both Netanyahu and Cohen, the energy minister, have been unabashed about their hope to coerce. That coercive effect relies upon denying the sustenance value of the things that are being blocked or undermined: humanitarian aid and water desalination. The deprivation of these essentials is directed at a population that is unambiguously civilian. For those reasons, the starvation war crime is again implicated.

Given the widespread nature of these practices, a similar analysis would extend to the crimes against humanity of inhumane acts, persecution, and (where lethality is virtually certain) murder. Each of these is included already in the warrant for Netanyahu.

Efforts to Marginalize Humanitarian Organizations

Israel’s ban on UNRWA and its move to exclude humanitarian actors that have supported legal efforts to hold Israel or its officials accountable may also violate IHL. In considering that question, the ensuing analysis leaves aside questions regarding Israel’s relevant obligations under the UN Charter and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

In general terms, a belligerent is not required to provide access to any one specific humanitarian actor. As long as it is not arbitrarily withholding consent to humanitarian action or impeding delivery, it has a certain level of discretion regarding the specific humanitarian organizations with which it works. There are distinctive constraints relevant to the specific situation of UNRWA, however, that make it harder to reconcile Israel’s ban on engagement with the agency with key obligations of IHL. There are additional concerns relating to restrictions on organizations that have supported ICC investigations of Israeli officials.

In the context of belligerent occupation, preexisting “relief societies shall be permitted to continue their humanitarian activities” as long as they act in accordance with humanitarian principles (art. 63, GC IV). The provision names Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, but the category is expressly not exclusive to them. The ICRC Commentary explains the provision’s reference to “other relief societies” on the grounds that “no method of alleviating suffering must be ignored.”

Could UNRWA qualify? The agency’s work in Gaza clearly preexisted Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the West Bank in 1967, and Israel agreed to its continued operations at the time. There is widespread consensus that UNRWA performs a critical humanitarian relief function, especially in Gaza. And the agency describes the humanitarian principles as being “at the heart of all” of its operations. In 2014, the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions adopted a declaration in which parties supported the activities “of the International Committee of the Red Cross, … of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and of other impartial humanitarian organizations.” Although not specific to article 63, this arguably supports the classification of UNRWA alongside Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in that context. UNRWA had emphasized its commitment to humanitarian principles in a submission to the Conference.

At the same time, UNRWA performs a more diverse array of functions than ordinary humanitarian relief organizations. The agency describes its work in the broader terms of “human development and humanitarian services.” However, in addition to relief societies, article 63 also covers “the activities and personnel of special organizations of a non-military character, which already exist or which may be established, for the purpose of ensuring the living conditions of the civilian population by the maintenance of the essential public utility services, by the distribution of relief and by the organization of rescues.” (art. 63, GC IV). A strong argument could be made that UNRWA fits within this category, at least if the list of functions is not understood to be exhaustive. Moreover, some of UNRWA’s activities that are not enumerated in article 63, such as education, are the subject of other provisions requiring facilitation by the occupying power (art. 50, GC IV). The ICRC Commentary emphasizes that the latter protection applies to “a wide variety of institutions and establishments” for children and “must be respected whatever their status under the law of the country and whether they are privately run or under State control.”

Of course, Israel’s explanation of its withdrawal of consent and prohibition of engagement with the agency implies UNRWA does not operate according to humanitarian principles—a failure that would appear to eliminate the article 63 shield of its continued activities. Claims by Israeli political leaders that UNRWA is fundamentally compromised or complicit in activities hostile to Israel are both longstanding and long contested. Certainly, the allegation regarding specific participants in the October 7 attacks should not itself be taken to vitiate the humanitarian character or impartiality of the agency as a whole, given that UNRWA quickly fired those individuals and launched an internal investigation. The ICJ could play a key role by opining authoritatively on UNRWA’s compliance with humanitarian principles and status under article 63 in its prospective advisory opinion on Israel’s obligations of cooperation with the United Nations.

Strikingly in that respect, UNRWA is widely understood by States and humanitarians to be the backbone of humanitarian action in Gaza. As the ban loomed, UNRWA Commissioner General Philippe Lazzarini told the Security Council, “Since October 2023, we have delivered two-thirds of all food assistance, provided shelter to over a million displaced persons, and vaccinated a quarter of a million children against polio.”

Article 63 aside, in the case of an organization of that scale and with that unique level of situational integration, the general discretion belligerents retain regarding working with specific humanitarian organizations must attend to humanitarian practicalities. Under current circumstances, it is not clear that Israel can discharge either its primary obligations as an occupying power or its obligations to facilitate humanitarian relief without engaging with UNRWA.

Additionally, in its March provisional measures order in the genocide case, the ICJ required Israel to “[t]ake all necessary and effective measures to ensure, without delay, in full co-operation with the United Nations, the unhindered provision at scale by all concerned of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance …” Given UNRWA’s central role in humanitarian response, including as articulated by other U.N. agencies, the UNRWA ban legislation would appear to violate Israel’s obligations under this order.

Finally, with respect to the threat to humanitarian organizations other than UNRWA, their satisfaction of the criteria of independence and impartiality cannot be conditioned on their silence in the face of IHL violations. On the contrary, contributing to the work of the ICC through identifying serious violations of international humanitarian law is fully aligned with the mission of IHL. Arguably, States have an obligation to facilitate—and certainly not to sanction—such engagement as part of their common article 1 and customary duty to ensure respect for IHL. The requirement of impartiality attaches to the delivery of relief. Advocacy pursuant to the standards of international law cannot impugn an organization’s humanitarian status.

Overall, the renewed cut-off of aid and electricity to Gaza and its overt framing as part of a coercive negotiation strategy reflects a profoundly dangerous normalization of the weaponization of aid and the use of civilian populations as bargaining chips. Efforts to marginalize key humanitarian actors are likely to exacerbate an already dire situation. The Israeli government’s willingness to pursue this path indicates Netanyahu’s presumption of impunity despite the ICC warrant for his arrest. ICC States Parties—including those that consider themselves to be leading supporters of the Court—have much to answer for in that regard. It is long past time to state clearly and without equivocation that warrants will be executed. More broadly, states must act now to use all available leverage to demand the restoration of humanitarian access and an immediate cease-fire.

IMAGE: Palestinian children in Beit Lahia, Gaza, on March 17, 2025. (Photo by SAEED JARAS/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images)

The post Gaza and Israel’s Renewed Policy of Deprivation appeared first on Just Security.

Q-1: What happened with the Prosecutor’s request for arrest warrants in the ‘Situation in Palestine’ at the International Criminal Court (ICC)? 

A: Yesterday, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I issued three warrants: one for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, one for former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and one for Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri (commonly known as “Deif”), the leader of Hamas’s military wing. Deif is presumed dead, but, unlike Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, for whom the Prosecutor had also requested warrants, his death has not yet been confirmed.

The warrants were issued under a “secret” classification to protect witnesses and safeguard investigations. However, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued press releases with key information regarding the contents of the warrants for two reasons. 

First, as specified in the press releases, conduct “similar to that addressed” in the warrants “appears to be ongoing.” Hostage-taking and starvation of civilians as a method of warfare are both at least allegedly continuing crimes. Publicizing the existence of warrants for ongoing conduct may be particularly important in concretizing for all individuals not already included in the warrants that they face legal exposure by participating in or contributing to that continuing conduct. Second, the Chamber deemed it to be “in the interest of victims and their families” to be made aware of the existence of the warrants.

Q-2: What are the key allegations in the arrest warrants and for what crimes are Netanyahu and Gallant’s arrests sought? 

A. The information released by the Pre-Trial Chamber includes a summary of the crimes for which the individuals’ arrests are sought. (As identified below, however, there are conspicuous gaps between the Prosecutor’s request and the press release description of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s issuance of warrants.)

Specifically, the arrests of Netanyahu and Gallant are sought for the following crimes.

• As co-perpetrators:
  • The war crime of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare (here through impeding humanitarian relief in violation of international humanitarian law and in a way that intentionally and knowingly deprived the civilian population in Gaza of food, water, medicine, and medical supplies, as well as fuel and electricity, from at least 8 October 2023 to 20 May 2024);
  • The crime against humanity of murder (here through the aforementioned deprivation creating “conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of the civilian population in Gaza, which resulted in the death of civilians, including children due to malnutrition and dehydration”);
  • The crime against humanity of inhumane acts (here in the form of inflicting great suffering through the deprivation of medical supplies and medicines);
  • The crime against humanity of persecution—the discriminatory deprivation (here on national or political grounds) of fundamental rights (here the rights to life and health).

• As civilian superiors, responsible for their subordinates:
  • The war crime of directing attacks at a civilian population.

The key allegation made by the Prosecutor in relation to Netanyahu and Gallant that is not included in the arrest warrant is that of extermination (a crime against humanity). The warrants also appear to omit the Prosecutor’s allegations relating to the war crimes of wilfully killing and wilfully inflicting great suffering or serious injury to body or health, although this may well be an imprecision in the press release. More on these points below.

Deif’s arrest is sought for:

• The war crime of hostage-taking (starting on October 7th, when a “large number of persons” were seized from various locations in Israel, including Kfar Aza, Holit, Nir Oz, Be’eri, Nahal Oz, and the Supernova festival, and continuing into Gaza, where they were detained in secret locations; the press release notes that “a number of hostages” appear still to be held captive);
• In relation to the attacks of October 7th:
  • The war crime of directing attacks at a civilian population (here through attackers firing at people with semi-automatic weapons and/or rocket-propelled grenades, particularly at the site of the Supernova festival and in its vicinity);
  • Murder as a war crime and as a crime against humanity (here through mass killings at or around the communities of Kfar Aza, Holit, Nir Oz, Be’eri, and Nahal Oz, as well as at the Supernova festival);
  • The crime against humanity of extermination (through the same mass killings that underpin the murder allegation, which were found to be coordinated across locations);

• In relation to sexual and gender-based violence inflicted on certain hostages in Gaza (“predominantly women”):
  • Torture and cruel treatment, as war crimes and crimes against humanity;
  • Rape and sexual violence, as war crimes and crimes against humanity;
  • The war crime of outrages upon personal dignity.

In addition to the name and identifying information of each individual and the crimes for which their arrest is sought, each warrant will have included a concise statement of the facts that underpin those criminal allegations (ICC Statute, article 58(3)(c)). On this, the press releases included only limited details. From those details, it is notable that the Pre-Trial Chamber approved warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant in relation to two specific direct attacks on civilian populations, without specifying which attacks those were. The press release associated with the Prosecutor’s request for warrants in May referred to “attacks on civilians, including those queuing for food; obstruction of aid delivery by humanitarian agencies; and attacks on and killing of aid workers, which forced many agencies to cease or limit their operations in Gaza.” However, we do not know which two attacks meeting this description the Chamber found to be supported by sufficient evidence to ground that component of the warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant. Among the most high-profile events that might have been included in this category are the so-called “flour massacre” of Feb. 29, when at least 112 people were killed and 760 injured, and the attack on a World Central Kitchen convoy that killed seven aid workers on April 1. Importantly, the theory of the case here is not that Netanyahu or Gallant ordered these attacks. Rather, it is that they criminally failed “to prevent or repress” the commission of these crimes.

Q-3: What more can you discern about alleged crimes in the ICC Prosecutor’s applications for the arrest of Netanyahu and Gallant that were not included in the arrest warrants?

A: On the exclusion of extermination from the Netanyahu and Gallant warrants, we have only limited information. Extermination is a crime of mass murder. Notably, the Prosecutor’s description of the initial request included murder and extermination in the alternative (listing “extermination and/or murder contrary to articles 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(a)” in relation to Netanyahu and Gallant, in contrast to listing the extermination and murder allegations separately in relation to Sinwar, Deif, and Haniyeh). This hinted even then that the Office of the Prosecutor was aware that the “massiveness” component of extermination could prove to be an evidentiary stumbling block.

This may seem dissonant with the scale of killing in Gaza, but the Prosecutor’s extermination and murder allegations were focused exclusively on “deaths … resulting from or associated with the systematic deprivation of objects indispensable to the survival of Palestinian civilians in Gaza.” Indeed, the Prosecutor noted explicitly at the time of the request that his office was still investigating crimes “in relation to the large-scale bombing that has caused and continues to cause so many civilian deaths, injuries, and suffering in Gaza.” This distinction matters because it can be difficult to prove cause of death via mass deprivation, due to the stretched temporal context and multiple intervening factors between that deprivation and fatality (see, for example, here p.146). That challenge is multiplied when it is necessary to prove death on a massive scale, as is required to establish the crime of extermination. 

On this point, it is worth noting that the Pre-Trial Chamber was presented with evidence up to May 20. As I wrote recently, events since then have likely strengthened the evidence supporting the extermination allegation. The Office of the Prosecutor may well seek to have extermination added to the warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant.

The apparent exclusion from the Netanyahu and Gallant warrants of the war crimes of wilfully killing and inflicting great suffering or serious injury to body or health is harder to explain, not least because the Chamber says nothing at all about this issue in its press release. Their exclusion cannot have been due to insufficient evidence, given that crimes against humanity involving similar conduct (murder and inhumane acts via the infliction of great suffering) were found to be established to the requisite standard. The only additional element of the war crime (as distinct from the related crimes against humanity) would be a nexus to the armed conflict or belligerent occupation, which is clear-cut in this case. Indeed, that nexus is a key element underpinning the allegation of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, which is predicated on many of the same acts. Given this, and recognizing that ICC press releases are generally not written by the judges and are not legal documents, the lack of coverage of these war crimes is most likely an imprecision in the press release, rather than an omission in the underlying arrest warrants.

Q-4: What happens next at the ICC?

A: In terms of next steps at the ICC, three points warrant particular emphasis. First, the Pre-Trial Chamber will determine when to instruct the Registry to prepare and communicate a request for arrest and surrender to relevant states and international organizations. Second, further litigation is likely to occur even in the absence of arrests. This could include prosecutorial requests for amendment to the warrants or prosecutorial appeals regarding crimes excluded from the warrants, as well as challenges to the admissibility of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court by Israel, Netanyahu, Gallant, or (conceivably) Deif, if the latter is in fact alive. Third, the Prosecutor will continue to proceed with gathering evidence and building the case. 

One of the most significant next steps will be for the Pre-Trial Chamber to instruct the Registry to prepare and communicate a request for arrest. This can either be a request for provisional arrest where urgency demands it (ICC Statute, article 92), or a full request for arrest and surrender (article 91). 

In the former case, the request for provisional arrest would include a statement that a full request for surrender of the person sought will follow (article 92(2)(d)). A request for provisional arrest would include information regarding the existence of the warrant, a concise statement of the crimes for which arrest is sought, and identifying information regarding the person sought (article 92(2)) – all information that has already been made public in the press releases. 

In contrast, a request for arrest and surrender would include the full arrest warrant in addition to documents, statements, or information necessary to meet the requirements for the surrender process in the requested state (article 91(2)(b-c)). Although the warrants are currently secret, a sealed warrant can be communicated to a state or international organization for the purposes of its execution. Additionally, the Court may reclassify the warrants whenever the basis for their classification no longer exists. This could occur pursuant to an application by the Prosecutor or on the Court’s own motion (Regulations of the ICC, regulation 23bis(3)). In this case, given the implications for witness safety and investigative integrity, the Court may invite the Prosecution and the Victims and Witnesses Unit to submit observations on the possible unsealing. If not earlier, Pre-Trial Chambers ordinarily decide to make warrants public (with necessary redactions) as soon as the person sought is surrendered to the Court.

Regarding further litigation, there are avenues for the Prosecutor, the individuals whose arrest is sought, and states with jurisdiction–notably Israel–to litigate various aspects relating to the current arrest warrants. In particular, as explained below, the Prosecutor may seek to amend the contents of the warrants or appeal the exclusion of extermination from the warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant. Israel and any of the individuals whose arrest is sought may seek to challenge the admissibility of the relevant case or, it seems from the Pre-Trial Chamber’s analysis, the jurisdiction of the Court (ICC Statute, article 19(2)). It is likely that at least some of those actors will avail themselves of those avenues. 

Regarding admissibility, the most significant test is that of complementarity. A case would be inadmissible if a state of jurisdiction is actively engaged in (or has completed) genuine criminal investigations and, where appropriate, prosecutions in relation to the persons sought by the ICC and regarding substantially the same conduct alleged in the arrest warrants (see Kevin Jon Heller’s excellent overview). As the Prosecutor emphasized yesterday, “In line with the Rome Statute, the door to complementarity continues to remain open. As with all situations, we will continue to actively assess the application of this fundamental principle, which requires genuine domestic investigations and any necessary prosecution of the same individuals for substantially the same conduct.”

On the issue of evidence gathering, it is important to note that the evidentiary threshold that needed to be satisfied for the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue the warrants was that there were “reasonable grounds to believe” the individuals in question committed the crimes in question (ICC Statute, article 58(1)(a)). Following an arrest, in order to have the charges confirmed, the Prosecutor will next have to establish that the allegations are supported by “substantial grounds to believe” that the individuals perpetrated the crimes (article 61(5, 7)). That would set the stage for a trial, where the evidentiary standard would again elevate, this time to “beyond reasonable doubt” (article 66(3)). 

In other words, although we do not know how much evidence the Prosecutor has already collected (and it is notable that he has indicated that his Office proceeds with an arrest warrant request when the evidence gathered is sufficient for a “realistic prospect of conviction”), it is possible that the Prosecutor will want to seek significant additional evidence, including evidence relating to activity since the initial request. Following the issuance of the warrants, the Prosecutor emphasized that his office will “continue to seek cooperation from all stakeholders including the State of Israel and the State of Palestine to ensure my Office fully meets its responsibility pursuant to article 54 of the Rome Statute to investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.”

Q-5: What are the legal implications for ICC State Parties?

A: The most obvious and important implication for States Parties is that when the person sought is found on their territory, they must “comply with requests for arrest and surrender,” pursuant to appropriate procedural safeguards (ICC Statute, article 89(1)). This is a specific manifestation of their general obligation to “cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution” of crimes within its jurisdiction (article 86). This obligation is relatively straightforward in relation to Deif and Gallant. 

Benjamin Netanyahu, on the other hand, is Israel’s sitting head of government. For the duration of his term in office, he is generally shielded from arrest in other states by his immunity ratione personae (also termed a “personal” or “status” immunity). States Parties waive that immunity through their ratification of the Rome Statute (article 27), but Israel is not an ICC State Party. Numerous states declined to arrest former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir during his period as Head of State on the ground that Sudan, as a non-party, had not waived his immunity and he was therefore shielded from arrest in foreign jurisdictions (for Court decisions on these refusals, see here). In so doing, they invoked article 98 of the Statute, which provides, “The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.”

However, following key jurisprudence on status immunities from the International Court of Justice (para. 61) and other courts, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the ICC Appeals Chamber ultimately determined that al-Bashir’s immunity did not apply before the ICC because it is an international court. Moreover, it determined that this meant that such immunities were also inapplicable in shielding heads of state or head of government from arrest by ICC States Parties when the latter are acting pursuant to ICC arrest warrants. 

This is also the basis for the Court’s determination that States Parties have an obligation to arrest Vladimir Putin. Pre-Trial Chamber II recently ruled that Mongolia failed to discharge this obligation during Putin’s visit to the country beginning on September 2nd of this year. In this and other respects, yesterday’s warrants will test the consistency of states on key issues of international criminal law. Some of those who have been most critical of the arrest warrant for Netanyahu celebrated and affirmed the Court’s warrant for Putin. 

In addition to their obligation to arrest and surrender, States Parties also have a broader obligation to cooperate with the Court’s “investigation and prosecution of crimes” within its jurisdiction (ICC Statute, article 86), including through forms of cooperation enumerated in article 93, many of which involve specific investigative and evidence-gathering functions, as well as those relating to the protection of witnesses and victims. Given information regarding certain States Parties’ access to relevant evidence, these obligations are potentially highly significant. 

[Editor’s note: See also, Rebecca Ingber, Mapping State Reactions to the ICC Warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant]

Q-6: What are the practical implications for the defendants? How likely are arrests? Will the living defendants still be able to travel, etc.?

A: Deif is most likely dead, so his warrant is very likely moot. Once the Pre-Trial Chamber receives confirmation of his death, it will terminate proceedings against him. Given the very high likelihood of that outcome, it may be tempting to think that the issuance of an arrest warrant for Deif was simply to provide balance, given that he was the only remaining member of Hamas for whom a warrant had been sought. However, the Court terminates proceedings only upon confirmation of death. Similarly, the Office of the Prosecutor withdrew the requests for warrants for Haniyeh and Sinwar only after it received confirmation of their deaths. There is nothing out of the ordinary about the Court proceeding with the case against Deif under current conditions.

If, contrary to expectations, Deif is in fact alive, perhaps the most significant implication is that Palestine, as a State Party to the ICC Statute, would have an obligation to arrest and surrender him to the Court. In the immediate term, of course, the Palestinian Authority has no ability to arrest Deif. However, if Deif is alive, the warrant would add an additional layer of complication to the dynamic between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas in any post-conflict settlement that would involve the Palestinian Authority returning to the Gaza Strip. Given that Hamas members are already limited in their ability to travel, the fact of the ICC warrant is unlikely to change much on that front for Deif.

As an aside: It should also be noted that the Prosecutor stated, back in May when he announced the requests for arrest warrants, “My Office will not hesitate to submit further applications for warrants of arrest.” He might seek, or have already sought, warrants for other individuals, and that process may occur under seal.

For Netanyahu and Gallant the impact is highly significant. The warrants will change how they can engage with the world. The 124 States Parties to the ICC system now have an obligation to arrest each man should he travel to their territory. Many of those parties to the ICC are states with good relations with Israel. In short, the world of both Netanyahu and Gallant has shrunk considerably and their risk of arrest has escalated. 

For the same reason, Vladimir Putin was ultimately unable to travel to the BRICS Summit hosted by South Africa in 2023. The latter is an ICC State Party. In the build-up to the Summit, it was clear that Putin wanted to attend, and it appeared that South Africa did not want to arrest him. As explained by Max du Plessis and Andreas Coutsoudis, 

“In the face of repeated refusals by the South African government openly to accept that it would comply with its obligations to arrest President Putin, in May 2023, the Democratic Alliance (the DA), the official parliamentary opposition, launched an urgent application in the Pretoria High Court (the Putin matter). In that application, the DA sought declaratory and interdictory relief: asking the High Court to confirm South Africa’s obligation to arrest President Putin, and ensuring that the necessary steps were taken to domesticate and execute the ICC arrest warrant.” 

The litigation played a key role in South Africa’s domestication of the warrant. Putin did not travel to the BRICS Summit. 

With one caveat, this change to the capacity of Netanyahu and Gallant to engage with the broader world is essentially permanent and unyielding – there are no statutes of limitations (ICC Statute, article 29) or amnesties for these crimes. Unless they prevail legally before the ICC, Netanyahu and Gallant will live for the rest of their days as international fugitives, with most countries in the world off-limits for them in perpetuity. The one caveat to this is that, pursuant to a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council can defer proceedings at the ICC for one year at a time, with the possibility of renewal (ICC Statute, article 16). Any of the permanent five members could veto such a resolution, which would need to be supported by nine affirmative votes from the fifteen members of the Council.

The warrants also have the potential to provide the focal point for political and legal mobilization in third states, making it harder for some states to sustain military aid to Israel (and Hamas). As part of their general duty to “ensure respect” for international humanitarian law (IHL), states must refrain from military support to other states or groups whenever there is an “expectation” of IHL violations and must act with due diligence to “prevent violations when there is a foreseeable risk that they will be committed” (ICRC Commentary to GC I, paras. 162, 164). States that are party to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)—including, for example, Germany and the United Kingdom—must cease their supply of arms if such support “could facilitate” serious violations of IHL or human rights law and, despite mitigating measures, an “overriding risk” of such violation remains (ATT, article 7). 

With three independent ICC judges having affirmed the ICC prosecutor’s request in relation to multiple serious violations of IHL and crimes against humanity, the basis for both legal and political mobilization against the continued transfer of arms to Israel has obviously been strengthened (see here, pt. II). Additionally, as noted above, the warrants may concretize the duty not to participate or contribute for those individuals currently doing so. That could, at least in theory, limit Prime Minister Netanyahu’s ability to pursue the alleged criminal scheme effectively.

Q-7: Are there any legal implications for the United States given its special signatory status?

A: The United States signed the ICC Statute on Dec. 31, 2000. However it never ratified the ICC Statute. Ordinarily, treaty signatories have an obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 18(a)). That said, on May 6, 2002, the Bush administration “un-signed” the treaty, informing (n.12) the U.N. Secretary-General: “the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000. The United States requests that its intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be reflected in the depositary’s status lists relating to this treaty.” 

This was an effort to invoke the exception regarding the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, namely that that obligation ceases once the state has “made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty” (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 18(a)).

However, regardless of one’s view regarding the implications of the US “un-signing” the ICC Statute, the United States is bound by other rules of international law, the specific application of which is at least informed by this development at the ICC. In particular, the United States is bound by the aforementioned duty to ensure respect for IHL. It is also bound by the duty to “prevent” violations of the Genocide Convention (article I), when it “learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed.” (International Court of Justice, Bosnian Genocide, para. 431). These points are relevant here, because the unanimous issuance of war crimes arrest warrants by three judges of an independent and impartial international court, with recognition that some of those crimes appear to be “ongoing,” is itself indicative of a foreseeable risk of IHL violations. 

Moreover, although genocide is not among the allegations at the ICC, it is notable that, according to the press release, the Pre-Trial Chamber “found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the lack of food, water, electricity and fuel, and specific medical supplies, created conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of the civilian population in Gaza.” This conspicuously tracks one of the underlying acts of genocide (Genocide Convention, article II(c)). Of course, for genocide to be established, this underlying act would need to be combined with genocidal intent. However, that an independent court has determined there to be “reasonable grounds to believe” that the underlying act is occurring must be incorporated into any evaluation of the seriousness of risk that would trigger preventive duties under the Genocide Convention.

Furthermore, the United States is party to the four Geneva Conventions and has codified their grave breaches into its domestic war crimes code. Jurisdiction relating to such offenses attaches whenever an alleged perpetrator is “present in” the United States (18 USC § 2441(b)(2)(B)). Indeed, under Geneva Convention IV (the relevant treaty in this case), the United States would have an obligation to “bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts” or “hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a ‘prima facie ‘ case” (Geneva Convention IV, article 146). As noted above, two of the Prosecutor’s allegations omitted from yesterday’s press release are wilful killing and wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. These are codified as war crimes in 18 USC § 2441(c)(1). Even assuming the United States rejects the full application of Geneva Convention IV to the conflict in Gaza, instead deeming this a non-international armed conflict, the same facts underpin the Prosecutor’s alternative allegations of cruel treatment and murder as serious violations of Common Article 3, which also qualify as war crimes in US law under 18 USC § 2441(d)(B, D). Assuming that the omission of these war crimes from the press release is indeed an imprecision, rather than a substantive omission, the Court’s determination that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Netanyahu and Gallant have perpetrated these war crimes would imply that Netanyahu and Gallant are persons who ought to be brought before U.S. courts to face such allegations, should they enter the United States. The ICC’s determination on this is not binding on the United States, but the underlying IHL obligations are.

Q-8: Is there a path for appealing the warrants? What does that look like and how likely is it to happen? Would the defendants need to appear in person to appeal?

A: The Prosecutor could request the Pre-Trial Chamber to amend the arrest warrants by presenting evidence in relation to allegations not included in the arrest warrants as they currently exist (ICC Statute, article 58(6)). Assuming new evidence has been gathered in the period since the initial warrant request, such an amendment could potentially include extermination (the sole requested crime clearly excluded from the Netanyahu and Gallant warrants). Where there is a legal issue relating to the issuance of the warrant, the Prosecutor could apply for leave to appeal that aspect of the warrant (article 82(1)(d)). This was done previously in relation to the arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir, where the Prosecutor successfully challenged the omission of genocide from the initial warrant on the ground that the Court had used an incorrect evidentiary standard, leading to the issuance of a new warrant including genocide.

The person for whom arrest is sought may challenge the jurisdiction or admissibility of the case against them pursuant to article 19(2)(a). Importantly, such a challenge does not require the presence of the individual. Initially, that challenge would go to the Pre-Trial Chamber. However, it would be subject to appeal (article 82(1)(a)). Saif Gaddafi, for example, has challenged the admissibility of the case against him and taken that challenge to the Appeals Chamber, without ever having appeared in person before the ICC.

Q-9: What does it mean that the Pre-Trial Chamber  said Israel could contest jurisdiction at a later stage? How does that work given the Pre-Trial Chamber suggested it was bound by its earlier ruling on jurisdiction (invoking res judicata)?

A: As I read the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision, the Chamber sought to separate two distinct, albeit interrelated issues here: the source of Israel’s standing and the question of ICC jurisdiction.

The Court invoked res judicata on the question of whether Israel has the specific standing of a “State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required under article 12” (ICC Statute, article 19(2)(c)). If Palestine qualifies as a State Party (as a differently composed Pre-Trial Chamber I found it did in 2021), then Israel’s acceptance of jurisdiction would not be “required” under article 12 in relation to any activity with respect to which Palestine’s acceptance of jurisdiction would be sufficient. 

Of course, as the Court notes, Israel claims that Palestine is not a State Party and insists that the question of whether Israel’s acceptance of jurisdiction is required must itself be subject to litigation. Specifically, Israel argued that it “would be problematic … to deny standing on the basis that a State needs to establish the merits of a jurisdictional challenge as a prerequisite to its standing to make it.” This was the basis for Israel’s claim that it needed only to make a “prima facie tenable” claim on this point to have standing under article 19(2)(c) (para. 14). It is specifically in relation to this claim that the Chamber invoked res judicata. As the Court puts it, “there is a fundamental difference between granting a State standing on the presumptive validity of its claim to have jurisdiction over a situation or a case and granting it standing on the basis of an argument – which was already ruled upon – that a particular State Party does not have jurisdiction.” (para. 15).

The second question, however, is not about whether to grant presumptive validity to Israel’s claim to be a state whose acceptance is necessary for ICC jurisdiction, but about whether the ICC actually has jurisdiction. On that point, the Court holds that Israel has standing based on the distinct ground that it is a “State which has jurisdiction over a case,” per article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (para. 16). The Pre-Trial Chamber’s reasoning appears to be that granting that does not require granting standing on the presumptive invalidity of a prior ruling of the Chamber that continues to govern. Rather, it entails recognizing Israel’s clear standing to litigate under article 19(2)(b) and affirming that jurisdiction is one of the issues that can be litigated in that context, including on appeal. 

The distinction could have been articulated more clearly, particularly since the two questions raise overlapping substantive issues. Nonetheless, ultimately it appears that the Chamber does not consider the question of jurisdiction to be res judicata for the purposes of a challenge under article 19(2)(b), following the issuance of an arrest warrant (para. 18). It is worth noting that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 2021 decision, which recognized the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine, emphasized that “the Chamber’s conclusions pertain to the current stage of the proceedings, namely the initiation of an investigation” and affirmed that if a State or “submits a challenge under article 19(2) of the Statute, the Chamber will be in a position to examine further questions of jurisdiction which may arise at that point in time.” (para. 131) (emphasis added). The one point of uncertainty here is whether the reference to “further” questions limits the grounds on which jurisdiction may be challenged.

Separately, it is worth noting that Israel’s standing to contest jurisdiction under article 19(2)(b) is not straightforward, as one can read the provision to allow challenges based only on admissibility. However, the Pre-Trial Chamber seems to indicate that a party whose standing is predicated on 19(2)(b) can “challenge the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to a particular case.” (2024 decision, para. 18). The reason Israel was not positioned to do that yet is that a “case” exists only “after the relevant Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court and issued a warrant of arrest or a summons to ensure the person’s appearance before the Court.” (para. 17) That has now happened. As such, Israel now has standing under article 19(2)(b) to raise an admissibility challenge “on the ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted” the case, or, as the Pre-Trial Chamber seems to indicate, on questions regarding “the Court’s jurisdiction.”

IMAGE:  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (C) speaks to Defence Minister Yoav Gallant (L) at the opening of the 25th Parliament session in Jerusalem on October 28, 2024.  (Photo by DEBBIE HILL/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)

The post Nuts & Bolts of the International Criminal Court Arrest Warrants in the ‘Situation in Palestine’ appeared first on Just Security.

Immediate action, within days not weeks, is required from all actors who are directly taking part in the conflict, or have influence on its conduct, to avert and alleviate this catastrophic situation. … If no effective action is taken by stakeholders with influence, the scale of this looming catastrophe is likely to dwarf anything we have seen so far in the Gaza Strip since 7 October 2023.

This dire warning reflects a humanitarian consensus. Around the same time, Jan Egeland, Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council relayed, “When I visited Gaza in February, I was shaken by what I witnessed & stories I heard. Returning this week, it is clear that the situation has drastically worsened.” Also this month, a coalition of leading humanitarian NGOs declared, “the humanitarian situation in Gaza has deteriorated to its worst point since the war began in October 2023” and the leaders of 15 United Nations and humanitarian organizations described the situation in North Gaza as “apocalyptic.” On Oct. 26, Joyce Msuya, acting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, warned, “The entire population of North Gaza is at risk of dying.”

People who have spent their lives working in situations of humanitarian crisis are speaking with the greatest possible urgency and clarity about the catastrophic situation in Gaza. And yet, it seems that even these calls will go unheeded. The United States continues to sit on its hands, a year of leverage squandered and a new Trump administration now on the horizon. Germany, Israel’s second-largest military supplier, has also shown itself to be unwilling to take the kind of meaningful action that might help to avert the FRC’s grim forecast. Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor’s request for arrest warrants relating to the conduct underpinning the crisis is approaching six months without answer by the Pre-Trial Chamber.

Particularly in recent weeks, the intensification of the alleged criminal scheme has only strengthened the basis for issuing the warrants. More urgently, the current situation has sharpened third states’ clear obligation to act now, without any further delay, to use legally available means to cause Israel to reverse this disastrous trajectory.

Why Gaza is (Again) on the Brink of Famine

The FRC noted several key factors in the most recent deterioration of the situation in Gaza:

• Israel’s decision to designate the northern Gaza Strip a combat zone and preclude access has eliminated the viability of humanitarian missions to the area.
• Humanitarian access to Gaza as a whole has plummeted.
• Prices for food and other essentials have soared, while the livelihoods necessary to obtain those goods have suffered a “total collapse.”
• Widespread attacks have decimated health, nutrition, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure.

These current conditions follow a year of the destruction of agricultural areas, water systems, and health infrastructure, in addition to prolonged and profound restrictions on humanitarian access.

Throughout, Israeli officials have sought to deny responsibility for the crisis (as well as denying the extent of the crisis). However, humanitarian actors have testified consistently that Israeli impediments and actions have been a critical obstacle to delivering aid to Palestinians (p.19-28).

Moreover, contrary to moments of heightened message discipline, the prior and new Ministers of Defense, the Prime Minister, and the head of Israel’s agency for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) have all spoken openly or deliberated at various moments about the imperative to cut Palestinians in Gaza off from the supply of objects indispensable to their survival. Those perspectives have clear support elsewhere in the government.

Although it has not been linear, the overall trajectory of food, water, and medical deprivation has been devastating. Israel’s severe restrictions on humanitarian access began immediately after Hamas’s October 7 attacks. It took more than 70 days before an Israeli crossing into Gaza was opened. Improvements in humanitarian access in March and April were important (FRC p.9; Refugees International pp.17-18), but they proved to be the exception. The Rafah offensive in early May precipitated a further period of deprivation (Refugees International, pp.19-23).

On the basis of this pattern, the International Court of Justice has on three occasions issued orders (“provisional measures”) in an effort to protect Palestinians’ rights under the Genocide Convention. Israel has clearly violated the orders, including through:

• pushing Gaza to the brink of famine in early 2024 (contrary to para. 86(4) of the first order, see also para. 4 of Judge Nolte’s separate opinion attached to the second order),
• pursuing the Rafah offensive and shutting down the Rafah crossing into Gaza (in breach of para. 57(2)(a, b) of the third order),
• and passing legislation banning the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), the backbone of humanitarian relief operations in the Palestinian territories, (in breach of para. 51(2)(a) of the second order),

The most recent deterioration has been accelerated by intensified impediments to humanitarian access. In mid-October, James Elder, spokesperson for UNICEF, described “probably the worst restrictions we’ve seen on humanitarian aid, ever.” In issuing its current alert, the FRC reported that, according to UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) data, “the number of aid shipments being let into the Gaza Strip (data up to Oct. 27, 2024) is lower now than at any time since October 2023.” As the FRC emphasized, this trend is reflected also in COGAT’s data. Just over a week ago, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated, “At no time in the past 12 months has so little help reached the Gaza Strip as is the case at the moment.”

One month ago, the United States demanded that Israel act to ensure that 350 trucks per day were entering Gaza in order to avert a deeper crisis. However, according to UN figures, the number of humanitarian trucks entering Gaza last month (October) was in single figures on multiple occasions, often below 40, and very rarely over 100. A similar pattern has continued into November. This level of restriction replicates that of late 2023. However, after a year of war, deprivation, and displacement, the pre-existing vulnerability of Palestinians in Gaza is far greater now than it was then. The FRC was careful to emphasize this point when assessing the improved food security data released in June (p.3).

The situation is worst in North Gaza. Whether operations there have formally implemented the so-called “Generals’ Plan” reportedly presented to the Israeli government in October is beside the point. Its key components are manifest in current conduct. The plan, provided to the Associated Press, recommended the use of evacuation orders that would create a zone allowing killing and starvation, on the legally spurious basis that those who remain following the orders could be considered combatants. This proposal was followed by Israel cutting off humanitarian access to North Gaza, engaging in a process of mass evacuation, and expressing an intention not to allow Palestinians to return to their homes there. An estimated 100,000 civilians have been forcibly displaced from northern Gaza—itself implicating war crimes and crimes against humanity (ICC Statute, articles 8(2)(b)(viii), 8(2)(e)(viii), and 7(1)(d)) on forcible population transfer). Meanwhile, “between 75,000 and 95,000 people remain besieged in North Gaza without medical or food supplies.”

All of this is set to be exacerbated by Israel’s UNRWA ban, the implementation of which will deepen the crisis and contribute further to the starvation of Palestinians in Gaza. The agency is recognized to be the “backbone” of humanitarian distribution and provision in Gaza. In March, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was unanimous in requiring that Israel act “in full co-operation with the United Nations” to ensure, without delay, “the unhindered provision at scale by all concerned of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance” in Gaza. No UN actor is more important in that respect than UNRWA.

The Intensification of an Alleged Criminal Strategy

In combination, this marks an intensification of the practice that underpins the ICC Prosecutor’s request for arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. The central crime alleged in those requests is starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. The other war crimes and crimes against humanity detailed in the request relate to the same underlying facts, while focusing on specific components or consequences of the starvation strategy, such as killing, inflicting great suffering, and engaging in the discriminatory violation of fundamental human rights.

Mass deprivation is also at the heart of South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel under the Genocide Convention, there in the form of the underlying act of inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of Palestinians in Gaza. The centrality of that underlying act to the case is reflected in the Court’s provisional measures orders, each of which includes a strong emphasis on humanitarian access.

I have argued previously that the ICC Prosecutor’s requests were well-founded at the time they were announced. Indeed, the evidence of criminality in Israel’s starvation tactics have, in my view, been identifiable for over a year. Instead of replicating prior arguments, three points relating to the situation today are worth emphasizing in relation to the criminal case. First, the viability of contesting criminal intent in relation to the starvation war crime has diminished to the vanishing point. Second, the Generals’ Plan was predicated in part on a legal distortion that must be debunked and rejected forcefully if presented to the ICC. Third, the evidence base for the Prosecutor’s extermination allegation is strengthening.

In my view, the war crime of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare occurs in one of two alternative situations, reflecting the criminal law distinction between direct and oblique intent and the underlying structure of the international humanitarian law (IHL) rules on objects indispensable to civilian survival.

Either:

• The perpetrator(s) engaged in the deliberate deprivation of objects indispensable to survival for the purpose of denying the sustenance value of those objects to civilians or to a civilian population. This form of intent can attach before it is certain that civilians will be reduced to a state of starvation.

Or:

• The perpetrator(s) engaged in the deliberate deprivation of objects indispensable to survival in the knowledge that this deprivation was virtually certain to leave civilians in a state of starvation. This form of intent can attach even if civilian sustenance denial is not the purpose.

Today, there is reason to believe that both of these alternative thresholds are applicable. The Generals’ Plan was an overt proposal to deny sustenance to all who refuse to evacuate North Gaza, where tens of thousands of civilians remain. The conduct that has followed provides a strong indication that at least that component of the plan has been implemented in some form. Meanwhile, the FRC’s warning indicates in the clearest possible terms that continuing this policy entails the virtual certainty of causing civilian starvation. In short, even if a heightened criminal threshold were applied, such that both purposive denial of sustenance and a virtual certainty of civilian starvation had to coincide (rather than offering alternative bases of criminal liability), the current practice would almost certainly satisfy that elevated requirement.

More generally, and whether or not it has been formally implemented, the Generals’ Plan is predicated on a profound and indefensible legal distortion—namely that civilians can lose their protection by not evacuating an area when ordered to do so. If this is argued at the ICC, it must be rejected without equivocation. Civilians lose their protections as such under IHL only for such time as they directly participate in hostilities. (Additional Protocol I [AP I], article 51(3)) Whether by choice or ability, not leaving one’s home or otherwise evacuating an area is nowhere near the threshold of direct participation in hostilities. In other words, civilians who have remained in the besieged areas of North Gaza are no less civilian for having done so. They must be treated as such, whether in relation to the rules on starvation or those on kinetic attack. In a context of doubt as to their status, individuals must be presumed civilian. (AP I, article 50(1)) With 75,000-90,000 people still in the besieged zone (a number several times higher than plausible estimates of Hamas’s entire fighting force across the Strip), the population in that area remains predominantly civilian, and thus civilian at the aggregate level. It cannot lose its status as such in virtue of the presence of a minority of combatants (AP I, article 50(3)). Taking these points together, any military operation that has been directed against that population, including an operation of mass deprivation, is an operation targeted at civilians, regardless of whether the ultimate goal is to starve or kill the combatants within the besieged zone. To invoke evacuation “warnings” to authorize killing or starving those who would otherwise be protected would be to distort a protective feature of law to eviscerate the very framework of protections it is supposed to safeguard. Far from relieving the attacking force of its other obligations, the requirement to issue warnings supplements and augments other obligations under IHL (AP I, article 57, paragraphs (2)(c) and (5)).

One of the crimes against humanity alleged by the Prosecutor is extermination—the crime of mass-killing. The Panel of Experts in International Law that reviewed the Prosecutor’s warrant request noted that the extermination allegation attached to “deaths … resulting from or associated with the systematic deprivation of objects indispensable to the survival of Palestinian civilians in Gaza” (emphasis added), including both “deaths resulting from the use of starvation” and from “attacks on civilians gathering to obtain food and on humanitarian workers.” (paras. 22, 29) The latter entails the more evidentiarily straightforward component of this allegation. In contrast, proving extermination through starvation can be complicated due to the difficulty of establishing cause of death in a temporally stretched and multivariate context (see, for example, here p.146). However, the spate of warnings from humanitarian experts and the urgency of the identified threat in the current moment make it increasingly undeniable that impeding humanitarian aid entails a virtual certainty of lethal consequences. That strengthens the prosecutor’s case in relation to extermination.

There are several reasons for the slow progress at the ICC. In addition to the Court’s decision to allow a significant number of amicus curiae observations on issues of jurisdiction and complementarity, Judge Iulia Motoc was recently replaced by Judge Beti Hohler for medical reasons. Israel is now questioning the latter’s impartiality, which could further delay matters. It is likely that the Chamber will affirm ICC jurisdiction (as did a prior iteration of Pre-Trial Chamber I in 2021) and that it will follow past precedent on complementarity, thus allowing the case to proceed on those fronts. Assuming it does, for the reasons outlined above, the substantive allegations are only strengthening with time.

Time, however, is precisely what is lacking. And in that respect, the criminal process will be of little help. Even if the arrest warrants were issued today, criminal accountability will occur, if at all, on a schedule far removed from the urgency of the moment.

Urgency and Real-Time Legal Response

For that reason, in a recent piece, Janina Dill and I argue against focusing exclusively on criminal and other ex post accountability in assessing Israel’s conduct in Gaza. As we discuss, third states have a responsibility to exercise leverage to ensure respect for IHL in real time. Plainly, if that duty is to mean anything at all, it cannot wait for the final adjudication of the criminal responsibility of Netanyahu and Gallant at the ICC or of Israel’s state responsibility at the ICJ.

It is appropriate, then, that the legal and epistemic thresholds for such action are different from those applicable in the evaluation of ex post criminal accountability. Whereas the latter requires establishing criminal intent and meeting a high evidentiary threshold—namely, proof beyond reasonable doubt (ICC Statute, article 66(3))—states must refrain from supplying arms whenever there is an “expectation” of IHL violation and must act with due diligence to “prevent violations when there is a foreseeable risk that they will be committed” (ICRC Commentary to GC I, paras. 162, 164). The International Court of Justice recently reaffirmed IHL’s third-party requirements in this regard (para. 279). Additionally, those states that are party to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)—including, for example, Germany and the United Kingdom—must cease their supply of arms if such support “could facilitate” serious violations of IHL and, despite mitigating measures, an “overriding risk” of such violation remains (ATT, article 7).

These responsibilities are not limited to war crimes. The ICJ determined in July that the law of belligerent occupation applies to Israel’s operations in Gaza, at least to the extent “commensurate” with its degree of effective control (para. 94). Among the occupation-specific obligations that would appear to be most obviously commensurate with Israel’s control are those related to the delivery of food, water, and medicine to Gaza (Cleveland sep. op., para 24). On that point, the IHL rule (as distinct from the starvation war crime) is that Israel must “to the fullest extent of the means available to it … ensur[e] the food and medical supplies of the population” of Gaza, including by bringing “in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.” (Geneva Convention IV [GC IV], article 55) Moreover, when the occupied population is inadequately supplied notwithstanding those efforts, Israel “shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal.” (GC IV, article 59). For third states determining whether their duty to ensure compliance is implicated, it could hardly be more apparent, given the information summarized above, that there is a clear and overriding risk that Israel is violating and will continue to violate these rules.

In a similar vein, whereas the ICJ has determined that genocide can be ascertained (as a matter of state responsibility) only when genocidal intent can be “convincingly” established, such as through a pattern of conduct that “could only point to [its] existence” (ICJ, Bosnian Genocide, para. 373), the duty to prevent genocide attaches whenever a state “learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed.” (ICJ, Bosnian Genocide, para. 431) A strong case can be made that existing ICJ provisional measures orders are themselves indicative of the risk necessary to trigger such preventive action, particularly in relation to Israel’s restrictions on humanitarian access (pp.678-680).

In what might have appeared to be its most significant effort to fulfil its real-time preventive duties, one month ago, the United States expressed “deep concern over the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza” and demanded “urgent and sustained action” to reverse that trajectory through several concrete actions to be achieved within the following 30 days. The prospect of U.S. action on military support appears to have played a key role in precipitating Israel’s expansion of humanitarian access in March and April (pp.17-18). This time, U.S. requirements were more specific and thus, in principle, harder to evade. Included among its numerous concrete demands to Israel were:

• Surging all forms of humanitarian assistance throughout Gaza by enabling a minimum of 350 trucks per day to enter through all four major crossings, while opening a fifth,
• Instituting adequate humanitarian pauses to enable humanitarian activities,
• Rescinding evacuation orders when there is no operational need, and
• Ending the isolation of northern Gaza by reaffirming there will be no forced evacuation of civilians from the north to the south and ensuring continued humanitarian access to the north.

Days after the FRC issued its warning, the 30-day period specified in the United States’ letter expired. As is apparent from the FRC’s clarion call and as observed by a coalition of humanitarian NGOs, Israel clearly failed to comply with these demands. It was not close:

Israel’s actions failed to meet any of the specific criteria set out in the U.S. letter. Israel not only failed to meet the U.S. criteria that would indicate support to the humanitarian response, but concurrently took actions that dramatically worsened the situation on the ground, particularly in Northern Gaza. That situation is in an even more dire state today than a month ago.

To take just one metric, per United Nations assessments, the number of trucks entering Gaza per day was in double digits on almost every day during the 30-day period. On some days, it slipped into single digits. Even according to Israel’s numbers, the threshold of 350 per day was never reached. Northern Gaza remains isolated and besieged.

The duty to ensure respect for IHL does not include providing a 30-day grace period for compliance to those over whom one has influence, particularly in relation to a continuing violation that has been ongoing for months. And yet, even this tepid effort proved to be a false dawn in the application of the American influence that is, in the FRC’s assessment, needed immediately.

Upon the expiration of the 30-day period, State Department deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel stated, “I certainly don’t have a change in U.S. policy to announce today.” Describing the humanitarian situation in Gaza as not “pristine,” Patel noted “some steps being taken” by Israeli authorities, while indicating that there also “need to be some additional steps.” In short, in response to the FRC’s overtly desperate plea to those with “influence” to exercise it now, the United States has decided that now is not the time. It never is. This shocking, and yet infuriatingly familiar, failure caps a year of squandered leverage. The same day, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield addressed the Security Council declaring, “we continue to reiterate there must be no forcible displacement, nor policy of starvation in Gaza, which would have grave implications under U.S. and international law” and insisting that Israel must “immediately surge humanitarian aid to civilians throughout Gaza.” This mirrored almost identical remarks made in mid-October. But the “grave implications” have never materialized.

Israel’s second most important military supplier is Germany. Last week, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated, “Time and again, promises have been made and not kept. As a result of strong insistence by us and on the orders of the International Court of Justice, the Israeli Government wanted ‘to flood Gaza with humanitarian assistance’ in spring. That has to happen, without any excuses. The Israeli Government must be held to this assurance.” But the FRC did not call for strongly worded public declarations. The world’s leading experts on famine have identified an urgent imperative for “immediate action” by those with influence. Nothing short of that will suffice.

The warnings could not be any clearer. It could not be more obvious that those with the capacity to act are abdicating their legal and moral responsibility to do so.

Could Arrest Warrants Make a Difference?

For the reasons noted above, action at the ICC cannot fill the gap left by the inaction of states with influence. However, there is one aspect of the issuance of warrants that should not be overlooked. Criminal exposure does not end with Netanyahu and Gallant. Warrants for either or both of them could have meaningful reverberations for others involved in the actions that underpin the criminal case.

Having emphasized that disobedience should be reserved for “the most extreme and distinct ‘black flag’ cases of a manifestly illegal order,” former deputy head of Israel’s National Security Council, Eran Etzion, commented on October 22:

we have reached this point. Netanyahu and the cabinet passed a decision, which is hidden from the public, to implement the ‘[Generals’] Plan.’ This plan is a war crime … if you are a soldier or an officer, regular, permanent or reserve, it is your duty to refuse to take part in any action that constitutes a war crime. [translated by Google]

Whether or not there was in fact a secret cabinet decision to pursue the Generals’ Plan, Etzion is plainly correct about the criminality of the starvation siege that seems to reflect the implementation of that element of the plan. Of course, the imperative to refuse to participate in the mechanisms of starvation in Gaza predated his statement, and it will have long predated warrants if they are issued. But the fact of the latter may concretize the risk of individual criminal exposure.

Among others, Gallant’s replacement, Israel Katz—who himself appears to be an open advocate of starvation methods—should take note. So, too, should anyone who implements the policy or otherwise makes a substantial contribution through knowingly facilitating it, whether in Israel or beyond.

If the actions of the first Trump administration and campaign statements regarding Israel are a guide, the incoming U.S. administration is likely to do what it can to impede the enforcement of ICC warrants against Israeli officials. However, war crimes and crimes against humanity are not subject to statutes of limitations (ICC Statute, article 29). They are generally thought not to be subject to amnesty. The political likelihood of being shielded in the short-term is no guarantee of perpetual impunity. The mark of international fugitive status will linger. The choice now must be to refuse to contribute to this destructive path.

Editors’ note: For other recent analysis, see Yael Ronen’s In ICJ Advisory Opinion on Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Separate Opinions Obscure Legal Rationale (November 15, 2024)

Image: Children gather for a meal in Al-Bureij refugee camp, central Gaza Strip, on November 10, 2024. (Saeed Jaras/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images)

The post Days, Not Weeks: Gaza, Starvation, and the Imperative to Act Now appeared first on Just Security.

With a commitment to complying with its international obligations, Ukraine can embrace the ICC Statute without caveat or equivocation. The draft provision should be removed before the damage is done.

Why Ukraine is Ratifying the ICC Statute

Ordinarily, ICC jurisdiction applies in one of three circumstances:

1. The crimes were perpetrated in whole or in part on the territory or registered vessels or aircraft of a State Party (article 12(2)(a), ICC Statute) or a state that has otherwise accepted the jurisdiction of the Court (article 12(3)).
2. The crimes were perpetrated by the nationals of a State Party (article 12(2)(b)) or a state that has otherwise accepted the jurisdiction of the Court (article 12(3)).
3. The situation was referred to the Court by the United Nations Security Council (articles 12(2) and 13(b)).

As things stand, neither Ukraine nor Russia is party to the ICC Statute and a Security Council resolution is out of the question due to Russia’s veto authority. However, Ukraine issued ad hoc declarations accepting ICC jurisdiction in 2014 and 2015, with the latter covering “acts committed in the territory of Ukraine since 20 February 2014” for an “indefinite duration.” The 2015 declaration is the basis of all of the ICC’s activity thus far with respect to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, including the issuance of arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and other high-ranking officials.

Although the existing article 12(3) declarations underpin ICC jurisdiction over any war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide committed in Ukraine (in whole or in part) since November 2013 (the jurisdictional start date under the first declaration), Ukraine’s ratification would still be legally significant in relation to the current conflict. Crimes that might be committed by Ukrainian nationals entirely on Russian territory or otherwise outside Ukraine would be implicated by the ratification (article 12(2)(b)), but not by the ad hoc declaration, which is territorially limited to conduct in Ukraine. Notably, in opening the Ukraine investigation, ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan defined the situation as encompassing crimes “committed on any part of the territory of Ukraine by any person.”

Moreover, unlike the ad hoc declarations, ratification would express Ukraine’s comprehensive and permanent commitment to the system of international criminal accountability, while also empowering Ukraine within the ICC system in certain important respects. For example, as a State Party, Ukraine could spearhead an effort to amend the ICC Statute to harmonize the jurisdictional regime applicable to aggression with those applicable to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide (article 121(1), ICC Statute). It could also refer situations (article 14), nominate judges and have its nationals serve as ICC judges (article 36(4)(a-b)), and participate fully in all activities of the ICC Assembly of States Parties (article 112(2)). Affirming its institutional commitment, it would be assessed regular budgetary contributions (articles 115, 117).

Ukraine has faced pressure to ratify the Statute for some time, including from Ukrainian and international civil society and the European Union, to which it has committed to do so (article 8, Association Agreement). The bill sent to the Verkhovna Rada is the first tangible step toward delivery on that promise.

A Plan to Invoke Article 124 of the ICC Statute

Regrettably, however, it includes a mistake that could overwhelm the value of the ratification itself. As drafted, the proposed bill invokes article 124 of the Statute—a peculiar relic of a shabby compromise struck in the final days of the negotiations at Rome. At the time, a handful of powerful states, led by France, objected to their nationals’ exposure to ICC war crimes jurisdiction, threatening not to sign the Statute without some protection in that regard (see Zimmermann’s entry in the Ambos Rome Statute Commentary (p. 2906)). The solution was to include article 124, which provided each state an option upon ratification to:

“declare that, for a period of seven years after the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory.”

This was so obviously contrary to the general spirit of the Rome Statute that even as it was incorporated, the provision was uniquely primed for deletion. The article itself specifies, “The provisions of this article shall be reviewed at the [first] Review Conference.”

They were reviewed and, in 2015, the Assembly of States Parties approved an amendment by consensus that would delete article 124. Because this prospect had been codified in the original Statute, some states argued that the deletion would not require the usual 7/8ths of States Parties to ratify the amendment for it to enter into force. However, this effort failed, so the final deletion now depends on the realization of that 7/8ths of States Parties threshold.

This is a slow process at the best of times, but even slower for a change that has not seemed particularly urgent. Only France and Colombia have ever invoked article 124 (in 2000 and 2002), with France withdrawing its declaration in 2008 and Colombia’s terminating in 2009.

In short, the provision has not been an active barrier to ICC war crimes jurisdiction for 15 years and it has not seemed particularly likely to become one. Twenty-three of the current 124 ICC States Parties have ratified the deletion amendment (notably including article 124’s early champion, France). Although final deletion is still a long way off, among the ratifiers are some of Ukraine’s major supporters, both in its war effort and in its efforts to pursue accountability.

The Legal Implications of Invoking Article 124

For Ukraine to invoke article 124 would not only be an anachronistic regression from its otherwise commendable engagement with international law, it would also contradict its own national interest. The move is unlikely to achieve the dubious objective of shielding Ukrainians from ICC war crimes jurisdiction, and any success it might have in that endeavor would likely come at the far greater cost of giving Russian officials a parallel free pass to commit war crimes in Ukraine without ICC scrutiny—a pass that they currently do not have.

Four key legal points stand out here, the first three of which are also analyzed in a largely complementary way in Kevin Jon Heller’s excellent post over at Opinio Juris.

1. No Retroactive Impact

Through its 2014 and 2015 article 12(3) declarations, Ukraine has already accepted ICC jurisdiction over war crimes committed by its nationals in Ukraine since November 2013. A declaration under article 124 may only apply “for a period of seven years after the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned.” To make such a declaration today would have no impact at all on the prior decade of Ukrainian nationals’ war crimes exposure at the ICC. To the extent this declaration is supposed to shield Ukrainian officials from ICC prosecution for existing or prior conduct, it will not work. At most, it would initiate a period of up to 7 years from the point of ratification during which Ukrainian conduct would have that protection.

2. Dubious Validity or Limited Effect

The fact of this previous decade of exposure is also significant prospectively. Article 124 is an explicitly “transitional” provision. It applies only for the first seven years (at most) of a State Party’s conferral of ICC jurisdiction over war crimes by its nationals or on its territory. Following that transition, the jurisdictional shield terminates.

Ukraine, however, is not in the process of “transitioning” to accepting ICC jurisdiction over its nationals’ war crimes; it has already accepted that jurisdiction on its territory for a decade, without caveat. Recognizing that, the Court could take one of two paths to vitiating, or at least severely limiting, the declaration’s jurisdictional impact:

• First, it could find that Ukraine’s 2015 article 12(3) declaration (through which Ukraine “indefinitely” accepts jurisdiction over war crimes in Ukraine) would apply concurrently with its ratification. Several legal scholars have advanced this position in preliminary reactions to the current bill (see here, here, and here). On this interpretation, the article 124 declaration would still shield war crimes committed entirely outside Ukraine by Ukrainian nationals, but any war crimes committed at least in part in Ukraine would be unshielded, due to the article 12(3) declaration. Heller argues against this approach on the grounds that, given article 12(3)’s purpose—offering a flexible mechanism to exercise jurisdiction based on ad hoc consent—it “seems unlikely” that the intent was for an “open-ended declaration to remain in force forever.” On his view, Ukraine must have a way to terminate its ad hoc acceptance under article 12(3), and Ukraine’s ratification and article 124 declaration could perform something like that function. This strikes me as plausible. However, as things stand, it remains an area of significant legal uncertainty.
• If, in line with Heller, the ICC were to take Ukraine’s ratification to subsume the 12(3) declaration or otherwise entail its temporal conclusion, the Court could nevertheless determine that the fact of the prior article 12(3) declaration precludes an article 124 declaration because the latter would not perform the “transitional” function for which it was created. On this view, the prior article 12(3) declaration would so fundamentally contradict the object and purpose of article 124 as to demand its interpretive exclusion (article 31(1) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).

To be clear, neither of these interpretive paths is guaranteed. The Court might accept the validity of Ukraine’s article 124 declaration, while understanding Ukraine’s ratification to subsume and conclude the jurisdictional implications of its article 12(3) declaration. However, they are both conceivable paths and either would severely limit the legal effect of that declaration. Ukraine risks sacrificing the moral high ground (see below) for little or no benefit.

3. ICC Acceptance of the Declaration may be the Worst-Case Scenario for Ukraine

The Court accepting the validity and jurisdictional impact of the 124 declaration might actually be the worst-case scenario for Ukraine, as it runs the risk of shielding Russian nationals from ICC scrutiny for war crimes on Ukrainian territory.

Article 124 allows for a state to declare that “it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory.” The question is what precisely this means, and specifically how to interpret the use of the term “or.”

On one interpretation, the provision offers Ukraine the opportunity to declare one of three things:

i. that it does not accept ICC war crimes jurisdiction over its nationals, or

ii. that it does not accept ICC war crimes jurisdiction over its territory, or

iii. that it does not accept ICC war crimes jurisdiction over its nationals or its territory.

On the other interpretation it only offers Ukraine the right to declare that it does not accept ICC war crimes jurisdiction “over its nationals or territory,” taken as a non-severable jurisdictional package.

The latter is the more plausible reading. First, it is symmetrical with the Statute’s general jurisdictional regime. By ratifying the Statute, a state accepts ICC jurisdiction over any crimes committed by its nationals or on its territory (article 12(2)(a-b)); by issuing an article 124 declaration, on this interpretation, a state suspends that acceptance—namely the acceptance of jurisdiction over crimes committed by its nationals or on its territory—as applied to war crimes.

Second, the only article 124 declarations issued thus far have taken precisely that form, with both France and Colombia declaring that they do not accept ICC war crimes jurisdiction “when a crime is alleged to have been committed by [French / Colombian] nationals or on [French / Colombian] territory.”

Third, the rule of law would be undermined by a system that would allow states to ground ICC jurisdiction over the war crimes of others on their territory while shielding their own nationals from precisely the jurisdiction they have underpinned. Frankly, it beggars belief that Ukraine would purport to underpin ICC jurisdiction over Russian conduct in Ukraine, while shielding its own troops from precisely the jurisdiction pursuant to which the ICC would act against those Russian officials.

For these reasons, it would not be surprising if the ICC were to determine that the article 124 declaration is only valid if read to entail the scope articulated in the earlier French and Colombian declarations—in other words, if understood to apply equally to Ukrainian and Russian nationals, as long as the latter’s exposure is predicated on Ukraine’s ratification.

This would entail a spectacular own goal. Contrary to everything it has worked for in the domain of international law for the past decade, it would mean Ukraine giving Russian nationals a 7-year war crimes free pass on Ukrainian territory (for ICC purposes)—a free pass they currently do not have. Of course, Ukraine can revoke the article 124 declaration at any time. But the period of impunity would apply to any conduct occurring during the declaration’s efficacy.

Alternatively, assuming new States Parties are allowed to pick and choose whether to decline to accept ICC war crimes jurisdictional on a territorial or nationality basis, the upshot would be that Ukraine has suspended acceptance for its nationals, but not its territory. On that basis, Ukrainian territorial jurisdiction would continue to apply, including to the nationals of states that have not accepted ICC jurisdiction, such as Russia. But if so, why would Ukraine’s territorial jurisdiction not also apply to Ukrainian nationals for precisely the same reason? As Heller elaborates, the ICC generally approaches situations holistically, rejecting states’ attempts to define the boundaries of its investigative work to focus on a specific belligerent party. Moreover, the text of article 124 refers to a state declining to “accept” ICC jurisdiction of certain kinds, not to a state blocking jurisdiction where its acceptance of that kind of jurisdiction is not needed. Concretely, the fact that Ukraine has not accepted nationality-based jurisdiction would, on this reading, be irrelevant to the conduct of Ukrainian nationals in Ukraine because its acceptance of territorial jurisdiction would be sufficient to ground ICC jurisdiction over that conduct.

Of course, as Zimmermann emphasizes (p. 2907), it seems fairly clear from the drafting history of the ICC Statute that states included article 124 so that they could block ICC jurisdiction over their nationals’ war crimes completely, including when ICC jurisdiction would have applied absent their acceptance. That would indicate that Ukraine’s rejection of jurisdiction over its own nationals would protect them from ICC jurisdiction even when they act on the territory of an ICC State Party, including (it might be argued) the territory of Ukraine itself. However, there are two problems with this approach.

First, one might question the interpretive weight of some states’ original intent when it is contradicted not only by the plain text (compare article 31(1) and article 32 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), but also by States Parties’ current consensus opinion that the provision should be deleted. To be clear, the latter consensus plainly does not entail the provision’s deletion—that can only be achieved through the proper amendment procedure. Moreover, in certain instances, the motivation for pursuing a provision’s deletion could be the danger associated with interpretively open text—text which would be no less open for the fact of mobilization toward deletion. However, arguably, States Parties’ consensus approval of deletion does weigh specifically against invoking drafters’ intent (since openly contradicted by the desire of current parties) as the key basis for reading the provision more expansively than the text requires.

Second, the notion that Ukraine’s rejection of jurisdiction over its nationals might protect them against an alternative basis for ICC jurisdiction is particularly weak when that alternative basis is jurisdiction that Ukraine will have specifically accepted and declined to block (namely, territorial jurisdiction). Here, again, it is not plausible that the rule would allow for the basis for Russians’ exposure to ICC war crimes jurisdiction to be the very Ukrainian act pursuant to which Ukrainian nationals that would otherwise fall into precisely the same jurisdictional category are shielded from ICC scrutiny.

In short, even if Ukraine were able to pick and choose which form of jurisdiction to reject, its acceptance of territorial jurisdiction would most plausibly apply equally to Ukrainians acting in Ukraine as to Russians acting in Ukraine. As such, the only effect of its suspension of war crimes jurisdiction over crimes committed by its nationals would be to preclude ICC jurisdiction over Ukrainian nationals acting entirely in Russia (or otherwise outside of Ukraine).

Ultimately, it is not certain how the Court will approach this. It may be that Russians are shielded together with Ukrainians, or it may be that both are exposed to ICC jurisdiction for acts in Ukraine (even as Ukrainian nationals are protected outside Ukraine).

However, in my view, one thing is clear: the reading that is least in keeping with the rule of law, the structure of the ICC’s jurisdictional regime, and the Court’s general approach of treating situations holistically is the reading according to which Ukrainian nationals would be protected from ICC jurisdiction over war crimes on Ukrainian territory, but Russian nationals would not. Based on that analysis, the best case for Ukraine is that the shield is very limited (applicable only to Ukrainian nationals acting outside Ukraine) and the worst case is that it gives Russian nationals a free pass on Ukrainian territory. The former would return little benefit to Ukraine. The latter would be a disaster.

4. War Crimes are War Crimes, With or Without ICC Jurisdiction

Even if the Court were to accept the declaration and its limited scope of application, Ukraine would still have an obligation to investigate and prosecute any war crimes perpetrated by its nationals. That obligation emanates from international humanitarian law and is not contingent on ICC membership (articles 49, 50, 129, 146 of Geneva Conventions I, II, III, IV, respectively; article 85 Additional Protocol I; ICRC Customary IHL Rule 158). Similarly, other states, including Russia, would still have the authority to exercise jurisdiction over any such crimes. In other words, all the declaration would do is block ICC jurisdiction. Given the principle of complementarity, Ukraine can already render cases inadmissible at the ICC by genuinely investigating and, where appropriate, prosecuting those cases domestically (article 17, ICC Statute).

Two possible implications follow. Either Ukraine wants the freedom for its nationals to commit war crimes and for the state to refrain from prosecuting them. Or Ukraine fully intends to prosecute any war crimes by its nationals in this conflict but does not trust the ICC to consider complementarity appropriately or adjudicate war crimes cases fairly in this conflict. Both possibilities communicate entirely the wrong message

Ceding the Moral High Ground

Indeed, these alternative implications of Ukraine’s posture emphasize that the problems with invoking article 124 are not only technical. Quite apart from how the ICC reacts to the declaration, for Ukraine to issue a declaration excluding ICC war crimes jurisdiction over its nationals for seven years would run contrary to all of the genuinely extraordinary work Ukraine has done to leverage international law in this context. In the domain of legitimacy, it would entail a gift to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Together with a group of friendly states (many of which have ratified the ICC Statute amendment deleting article 124), Ukraine has pursued a remarkable array of accountability efforts in relation to Russia’s aggression and the atrocities that have followed. Among others, these have included joining a Joint Investigation Team under Eurojust, working towards the creation of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression (including through the European Union’s establishment of a precursor International Center for the Prosecution of Aggression against Ukraine), and working towards the creation of a Compensation Commission for the distribution of reparations (again, including through the establishment of a precursor institution—the Register of Damage for Ukraine—created, in this instance, by the Council of Europe). The Ukrainian Prosecutor General has cooperated productively with ICC investigators and Ukraine, while opening multiple lines of inquiry domestically.

Each of these laudable efforts is predicated on the principle that Russia and its officials are bound by international law and that it is appropriate and indeed imperative to pursue accountability under international law for their violations, including through the ICC. Ukraine’s determination to pursue each of these efforts (and others), and to rally the support of other states in that endeavor has not only emphasized the intrinsic importance of accountability and reparation. It has also centered international law as the language of legitimacy in this conflict.

In that very vein, per the submitted bill, Ukraine plans to ratify not only the ICC Statute, but also the Kampala amendments relating to the crime of aggression—an important affirmation that coheres with and bolsters its effort to pursue accountability for that crime through a Special Tribunal, given the impossibility of acting through the ICC under current circumstances. The Kampala ratification would not change the situation legally vis-à-vis accountability for Russia’s aggression. Instead, it would affirm Ukraine’s willingness to subject its officials to the rules that it invokes. As such, it would augment its legitimacy in seeking alternative institutional avenues in the pursuit of accountability for Russia’s aggression.

In each of these respects, the article 124 declaration—expressing, at worst, a desire for impunity  in committing war crimes or, at best, a lack of trust in the ICC to fairly adjudicate them—would be a striking step backwards. Extraordinarily, it would support Vladimir Putin in his effort to discredit the ICC and condemn Ukraine’s and its partners’ efforts as tainted by hypocrisy and double standards. A key reason to ratify the Statute rather than relying on the prior article 12(3) declarations is to express Ukraine’s comprehensive commitment to international law and the system of accountability. An article 124 declaration would do precisely the opposite.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the legal impact of the draft provision laying the foundation for Ukraine to make an article 124 declaration is uncertain, likely marginal, and quite possibly counterproductive. Its expressive impact is profoundly contrary to everything Ukraine has worked for in the domain of international accountability. Ukraine is right to embrace ICC jurisdiction; it has no reason to equivocate in doing so. There is still time to reverse this error. The bill should proceed, but it should proceed without this provision.

IMAGE: The flag of Ukraine flies in front of the building of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on August 24, 2023 in Kyiv, Ukraine. (Photo by Andrii Nesterenko/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)

The post Unforced Error: Article 124 and the Regrettable Caveat to Ukraine’s Proposed Ratification of the ICC Statute appeared first on Just Security.

On Monday, May 20, International Criminal Court head Prosecutor Karim Khan announced that he has submitted an application to the Court’s judges to issue arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, and Yoav Gallant, the Minister of Defence of Israel, and three Hamas leaders, including Yahya Sinwar, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The allegations are extensive, as discussed in a lengthy statement released by the Prosecutor, although the application itself is not yet public.

The decision has major implications for the devastating conflict still raging in Gaza; and for how the Court interacts with nations across the world. In Washington, the arrest warrants are certain to threaten recent increased cooperation with the Court, and efforts to prosecute Russian officials for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Ukraine could also be jeopardized.

Joining the show to discuss Khan’s request and its potential consequences are Todd Buchwald, Tom Dannenbaum, and Rebecca Hamilton.

Todd formerly served as Ambassador and Special Coordinator for the State Department’s Office of Global Criminal Justice. Tom is an Associate Professor of International Law at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, where he is also Co-Director of the Center for International Law and Governance. Rebecca is a law professor at American University and an Executive Editor at Just Security.

Listen to the episode by clicking below.

The post The Just Security Podcast: A Request for ICC Arrest Warrants and the Israel-Hamas War appeared first on Just Security.