Table of Contents

A. History, Sources, and Principles of IHL

B. Triggering the Application of IHL

C. Classification and Status of Persons

D. Conflict Classification

E. Civilian Protection Law

F. Proportionality, Distinction, and other Core IHL Rules

G. Cyber Operations

H. Humanitarian Assistance

I. Compliance

J. War Crimes

A. History, Sources, and Principles of IHL

1. Ryan Goodman, Michael W. Meier and Tess Bridgeman, Expert Guidance: Law of Armed Conflict in the Israel-Hamas War (October 2023)

Discussion prompts:

i. Can you identify the primary sources of IHL and the core set of rules that apply to both international and non-international armed conflicts?

ii. The article highlights several pathways that could cause the Israel-Hamas war to be classified as an international armed conflict. What effect would that have on classification in practice (e.g., the full war-crimes list under the Rome Statute, grave breaches, prisoner of war protections, others)? Which of the pathways raised in the article is the most legally persuasive, in your view? Does it make a difference to your position whether you are providing legal advice to a State government, a human rights advocacy organization, or an international court? How should investigators, journalists, and courts frame their discussion of violations when the classification question isn’t fully resolved?

iii. In dense urban warfare against an organized armed group embedded in civilian areas, does the mainstream IHL approach highlighted in the article give attackers realistic operational space, or is that precisely the restraint IHL is supposed to impose? How should fact-finders separate (a) defenders’ unlawful use of human shields from (b) attackers’ own proportionality and feasible-precautions obligations, especially when both of these kinds of conduct can harm civilians?

2. Just Security, Human Rights, Deprivation of Life and National Security: Q&A with Christof Heyns and Yuval Shany on General Comment 36 (February 2019)

Discussion prompts:

i. General Comment 36 extends the ICCPR’s protection of the right to life to State conduct with a direct and reasonably foreseeable impact outside a State’s borders. Does this broadened standard close accountability gaps — such as those raised by drone strikes, cross-border cyber operations, or transnational surveillance — or does it risk overextending human-rights jurisdiction? What criteria should determine when an effect is “reasonably foreseeable,” and who should decide? How should courts and policymakers draw the line between global human rights obligations and national security imperatives?

ii. The General Comment provides that lethal force consistent with IHL is “in general” not arbitrary under article 6, but leaves room for exceptions. When should article 6 impose stricter limits — for example, requiring capture when feasible, mandating independent investigations, or treating aggression itself as an arbitrary deprivation of life? How should courts reconcile overlapping obligations under IHL, jus ad bellum, and human rights law when those frameworks point in different directions?

3. Sarah Cleveland, The United States and the Torture Convention, Part II: Armed Conflict (November 2014)

Discussion prompts:

i. How should we define “conflict” between CAT and IHL? Does the Obama administration’s “conflict preemption” approach preserve meaningful protections against torture while respecting IHL, or does it risk leaving the CAT’s added safeguards toothless in wartime? What are the best arguments for interpreting IHL versus CAT obligations as controlling, and how would each position shape U.S. and other States’ accountability in practice?

ii. Article 14 of the CAT requires an enforceable right to compensation for torture victims, but the United States argues such remedies are anomalous in armed conflict where IHL envisions State-to-State reparations. Should individual claims for torture be judicially enforceable in wartime, or should remedies remain interstate? What are the legal, institutional, and moral stakes of each approach, and how do evolving practices in European and Inter-American human rights systems challenge the U.S. position? Does it matter if the armed conflict is an internal civil war, a so-called transnational non-international armed conflict, or an international armed conflict?

4. Beth Van Schaack, United States Report to the UN Human Rights Committee: Lex Specialis and Extraterritoriality (October 2013)

Discussion prompts:

i. What might explain the United States’s shift in perspective on the relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law between the Bush and Obama years? What role might the U.N. Human Rights Committee and the United States’ reporting obligations under the ICCPR have played in this shift, if any? Can you think of any other reasons for this change in legal interpretation?

ii. What, if anything, does the U.S. position’s shift from outright separation of humanitarian law and human rights law toward a language of “complementarity” suggest about how States manage legal ambiguity when their practices are under international scrutiny?

B. Triggering the Application of IHL

1. Ryan Goodman, Flip Flops?: The Conflict with Al Qaeda Is (Not) a War (September 2013)

Discussion prompts:

i. What, if anything, does it say about the rules-based international order that legal arguments can and have swung so widely, depending on the policy imperative at stake? What, if anything, does this tell you about international law (positively or negatively), and about the responsibilities of various actors making legal interpretations, particularly (though not only) lawyers of State governments whose interpretations can potentially inform opinio juris and customary law over time? What about civil society?

ii. Taking all of the various “turns” of interpretation together, what is your opinion? As a matter of law, has the United States been engaged in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda? Why or why not? What are the likely positive and negative ramifications of your position?

Note: You may also be interested in Kevin Jon Heller, A Reply to Goodman Re: War/Not War with Al-Qaeda (September 2013)

C. Classification and Status of Persons

1. Jenny Maddocks, Membership in a Non-State Armed Group in the DoD Law of War Manual (February 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. How should “membership” in an organized armed group be defined in IHL? Is a factors-based approach appropriate? If so, are the factors listed in the DoD Law of War Manual the right ones, or are they too closely tied to the particular circumstances of the conflicts in which the United States was engaged when those factors were developed? Does a factors-based approach risk including individuals who are only loosely associated with a non-state armed group, or play no role in its military operations? Is the ICRC’s approach more or less viable as a legal matter? As an operational matter?

2. Ryan Goodman, Al-Qaeda, the Law on Associated Forces and “Belonging to” a Party (did the new UN drones reports get it right?) (October 2013)

Discussion prompts:

i. How do you evaluate “belonging to” as a basis for targeting? In your view, what are the most compelling benefits, and most concerning potential risks, of this approach? More generally, how should international law balance the need for operational clarity with safeguards against perpetual, borderless conflict?

ii. Should legal categories developed for resistance movements in international armed conflict (e.g., the French Resistance) govern twenty-first-century counterterrorism? Why or why not? Are there alternative frameworks that could preserve humanitarian protections without legitimizing indefinite war, in your opinion?

3. Kevin Jon Heller, The Problematic “Belonging To” Analogy: A Response to Goodman (October 2013)

Discussion prompts:

i. Should legal gaps under the law governing non-international armed conflicts, including as it pertains to transnational armed groups, be filled by analogy, or does that raise any particular risks, in your view? Do you have any concerns about the effect on the distinction between IHL and human rights law?

ii. In asymmetric conflicts involving non-state actors, do you think that analogies between international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts must remain symmetrical — or can the realities of terrorism and irregular warfare justify selective extension? What criteria would make such extensions legitimate, in your view? What are the benefits and downsides to such an extension?

D. Conflict Classification

1. Yahli Shereshevsky, Armed Conflict Classification in the ICC Prosecutor’s Request for Arrest Warrants – Between International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law (June 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. Taking together all of the factors raised by the author, are you in favor of adopting a mixed conflict approach, or against? Why? Whichever your view, can you formulate a counterargument supporting the opposite position? If you were advocating to the Prosecutor of the ICC to take a particular approach, what reasoning would you raise, and why?

ii. How would you try to manage the tension that the author raises regarding the differentiation in criminalization under the Rome Statute, between an international armed conflict (IAC) and a non-international armed conflict (NIAC)? For instance, would this inform your approach to classification in certain fora (in which fora and in what ways?), would you advocate for amendments to the Rome Statute, or something else entirely?

E. Civilian Protection Law

1. Michael Schmitt and Marko Milanovic, The International Law Obligation to Investigate the Boat Strikes (December 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. Assume the role of a prosecutor in a hypothetical court with jurisdiction over the United States’ strikes against boats allegedly trafficking drugs from Venezuela. How would you make the case that the United States is under an obligation under international law to conduct an investigation into the strikes? What do you think the strongest and weakest elements of your argument are, and why? What potential consequences would you argue are at stake for the United States? For individual commanders and other officials? For individual armed forces personnel operating under those commanders?

2. Larry Lewis, Israeli Civilian Harm Mitigation in Gaza: Gold Standard or Fool’s Gold? (March 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. What is your assessment of IDF measures to mitigate civilian harm, such as notifications to civilians and “roof knocking”? Are they effective and sufficient, in your view? Why or why not? How do assess the relationship between these measures and the requirements under international humanitarian law regarding protections for civilians?

3. Eliav Lieblich, On Civilians’ Return to North Gaza: What International Humanitarian Law Requires (February 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. When large-scale civilian evacuations occur in protracted urban conflicts, in your view, does international humanitarian law meaningfully constrain how long displacement can last, or do shifting operational justifications allow states to stretch “temporary” measures far beyond what the law envisioned?

ii. If the October evacuation was framed as a precautionary warning — which civilians were free to heed or ignore — what, if anything, is the legal source for later refusing reentry once large-scale bombardment ends? Does the shift from active hostilities to asserted “operational control” automatically pull the situation into occupation law, with its duty to permit return, or can Israel continue to rely on the original danger assessment months later?

4. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, A Zone of Silence: Obstetric Violence in Gaza and Beyond (February 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. How would you articulate the specific protections that States are legally obligated under international humanitarian law to ensure for pregnant women, women giving birth, mothers with young children, and post-partum women and infants? What are their particular vulnerabilities, and how does the law attempt to protect for them? Are there areas where, in your view, the current legal framework itself falls short (as opposed to poor implementation or enforcement of the current requirements)? What, if anything, would you recommend to more effectively protect this population?

5. Yousuf Syed Khan, The Directive to Evacuate Northern Gaza: Advance Warning or Forced Displacement? (October 2023)

Discussion prompts:

i. Taking all of the criteria set forth in the article together, how do you evaluate whether the IDF has committed forced displacement? What about persecution? Which factors do you find most compelling in your assessment? If you were arguing the case before a tribunal (whether for the prosecution or the defense), how would you craft your argument to make it the most persuasive it can be, and why?

F. Proportionality, Distinction, and other Core IHL Rules

1. Michael Schmitt, Tess Bridgeman and Ryan Goodman, Operation Southern Spear: Why the Crews, Drugs, and Boats are Not Targetable (December 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. Assuming arguendo that the United States has entered into an armed conflict in the context of the strikes on suspected drug boats as it claims, what are the primary reasons that the individuals aboard the boats that were targeted by U.S. strikes were not, in fact, targetable under international law? What about the boats themselves? What about the drugs allegedly onboard the boats? Which of these reasons do you find to be the clearest or most compelling, again assuming IHL applied?

ii. What is your view on whether war-sustaining objects are or ought to be considered targetable under IHL? Why? Pause and consider – is your argument grounded in law, in policy, or both?

2. Alon Sapir, “Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics”: The Legality of Statistical Proportionality (July 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. How does this article inform your understanding of proportionality under IHL, particularly with consideration for how this requirement is implemented in practice? Does it raise any concerns for you that go beyond the specific example center to the article regarding the IDF’s approach to assessing civilian harm? With the article’s analysis in mind, how well do you think the proportionality requirement achieves its purpose(s)? Are there any flaws inherent to the law, in your view, or are proportionality problems primarily those of implementation and/or enforcement?

3. Richard Horowitz, Israel’s Pager Operation: Not an Indiscriminate Attack But a Strategic Success (March 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. With the article’s analysis in mind, make your own assessment of the lawfulness of the Israeli pager operation. Was the operation indiscriminate in your view? Why or why not? Similarly, how do you assess its proportionality? In your opinion, was the incidental loss of civilian life excessive to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated? What is the best evidence to support your position, and what are potential counterarguments?

4. Nicholas Rostow, Revisiting International Law in the Gaza Context (January 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. With particular consideration for the requirements of both of distinction and proportionality under international law, what is your view on whether the targeting of Hamas tunnels is lawful? What is the best evidence to support your position? Now, make the strongest counterarguments you can against your position. How would you answer those counterarguments? Now conduct the same exercise for hospitals, schools, or places of worship. What would need to be true for such civilian objects to become targetable? What kind of evidence would a decision-maker need to have, in your view, before considering such objects repurposed for military use?

5. Eliav Lieblich, Protected Persons and the ‘Geographic Nexus’ Requirement in the DoD Law of War Manual (February 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. What are the implications of attaching a geographic nexus requirement that requires an individual to be either in occupied territory or in the home territory of a party to the conflict to benefit from “protected person” status in the Geneva Conventions? How does this limit important protections under international law, and how does it affect the prospect of criminal accountability? Is it consistent with the structure of the Geneva Conventions? With their object and purpose? What recommendations would you offer to mitigate the potential harms of a geographic nexus requirement if it were to become accepted?

6. Michael W. Meier, The Principles of Proportionality in the DoD Law of War Manual (January 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. With consideration for the views of both the U.S. Department of Defense and the ICRC, which do you think is the better read of the law – that IHL does, or does not, require that military sick and wounded, military medical personnel and facilities, and religious personnel and facilities be incorporated into proportionality analyses? How does the Department of Defense Law of War Manuel’s approach to feasible precautions pertaining to these entities inform your view? What risks are raised by blurring the line between proportionality and feasible precautions?

7. Leonard Rubenstein, Israel’s Rewriting of the Law of War (December 2023)

Discussion Prompts

i. Can you articulate the Israeli legal position regarding proportionality, and what is your view on whether it conflates jus in bello standards with those of jus ad bellum? What do you make of this position normatively? If the international community more broadly were to adopt the described Israeli position, what implications would this have for IHL’s ability to achieve its primary purposes?

ii. What do you make of the author’s analysis regarding Israel’s obligations to hospitals under the duty to minimize harm under Additional Protocol I, including that Israel had an obligation to take feasible steps to “ameliorate the severe health crisis within the hospitals in the lead-up to or execution of the assault”? In your view, does or should the duty to minimize harm include a requirement to address catastrophic hospital conditions caused by raids on hospitals?

8. Amichai Cohen and Yuval Shany, Unpacking Key Assumptions Underlying Legal Analyses of the 2023 Hamas-Israel War (October 2023)

Discussion prompts:

i. What is your assessment as to how the scope and nature of the war aims undertaken by a belligerent should or should not affect legal analyses relating to the means and methods of warfare, distinction, and/or proportionality? In your view, does a more ambitious military campaign necessarily shift proportionality calculations, including because it may expand the scope of what offers a concrete military advantage? Why or why not? What are the relative benefits and costs of this interpretation?

9. Brian Finucane, The Prohibition on Indiscriminate Attacks: The US Position vs. the DoD Law of War Manual (May 2022)

Discussion prompts:

i. What are the various ways in which an attack can be indiscriminate in a manner that is prohibited by law? What are the primary legal bases for the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, including “those which are not directed at a specific military objective,” and to whom are these prohibitions applicable? What risks are raised by the apparent schism in the U.S. Department of Defense’s position on the prohibition of attacks not directed at a specific military objective?

10. Eliav Lieblich, Dispatch from Israel on Human Shields: What I Should’ve Said to a Dad on the Playground (May 2021)

Discussion prompts:

i. How, in your view, should decision-makers approach situations where one party to an armed conflict intentionally puts civilians in harm’s way? What legal and moral imperatives are implicated in this scenario? What responsibilities does the other (responding) party to the conflict have regarding those civilians? What are the costs, legally and morally, of absolving that party from responsibility for their actions vis-à-vis those civilians?

11. Lt. Col. John Cherry, Sqn. Ldr. Kieran Tinkler and Michael Schmitt, Avoiding Collateral Damage on the Battlefield (February 2021)

Discussion prompts:

i. What do you make of the fact that proportionality determinations are made ex ante, as opposed to post factum, and that an assessment of compliance with proportionality generally hews not to the actual collateral damage that took place, but what was expected? Does this inform your view on the effectiveness of IHL? How does the requirement regarding precautions in attack inform your thinking? Evaluate these questions first from the perspective of a legal advisor to a military commanding officer, and then from the perspective of a legal advisor to a civil society humanitarian organization. Does your vantage point change your view of the law?

12. Geoffrey S. Corn, Precautions to Minimize Civilian Harm are a Fundamental Principle of the Law of War (July 2015)

Discussion prompts:

i. When should military decision-makers incorporate consideration for feasible precautions into their decision-making process, and why? What effect does incorporating this consideration at differing junctures in decision-making have on civilian risk mitigation? Do you think that the U.S. approach to precautionary measures adequately enshrines IHL’s fundamental purpose to serve as “effective and rational balance between the need to employ deadly combat power and the obligation to mitigate the risk to civilians produced by that employment”? Why or why not?

G. Cyber Operations

1. Michael Schmitt, The State of Humanitarian Law in Cyber Conflict (January 2015)

Discussion prompts:

i. Should the law evolve so that serious cyber operations (e.g., large-scale disruption of critical infrastructure) by themselves can reach the threshold of an international or non-international armed conflict, or is it better to keep that threshold high to avoid “militarizing” cyberspace? How would or wouldn’t lowering the threshold change the legal status and targetability of State hackers, contractors, and members of organized armed groups who work primarily behind keyboards?

ii. The Tallinn Manual experts treat cyber operations that cause physical damage or loss of functionality as “attacks,” but generally exclude operations that merely alter or destroy civilian data, and proportionality/precautions rules track that boundary. In a world where data loss can cripple hospitals, financial systems, or elections without breaking a single server, should IHL’s concept of “attack” be broadened to cover severe data-only harms, and if so on what criteria (scale, type of data, foreseeability of downstream effects)? If the law does not evolve in that direction, are there other legal regimes (human rights law, domestic criminal law, new treaties) that should fill the protection gap for civilians affected by major but non-physical cyber operations?

H. Humanitarian Assistance

1. Tom Dannenbaum and Alex de Waal, Time Has Run Out: Mass Starvation in Gaza and the Global Imperative (July 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. What are the primary legal obligations that are implicated in a State’s decision to restrict essential necessities to a civilian population? Are those obligations sufficient, in your view? If not, how would you seek to change the legal obligations pertaining to this issue? Because starvation causes long-term and irreversible harm, what does it mean in practice for States to “do everything reasonably in their power” to stop it? Beyond opening aid routes, what kinds of sustained actions should States view as legally required to protect civilians over time?

ii. The authors posit that “leaders ought not require legal advice to see the obvious need to act . . .[t]he moral imperative could hardly be clearer.” What do you make of the nexus between law and morality that is raised by starvation and/or famine? Does the law as it is currently conceived of provide an adequate framework to address this issue? Why or why not?

2. Bailey Ulbricht and Allen Weiner, Humanitarian Notification in Gaza is Broken: How to Document and Respond When Things Go Wrong (July 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. In your opinion, is the humanitarian notification system an effective tool for upholding certain elements of IHL (such as the protections for humanitarians), or has its implementation in conflicts like Gaza undermined the protections it was designed to ensure?

ii. What do you make of the authors’ recommendations for addressing the gaps in the current humanitarian notification framework? What, if anything, would you include in your own recommendations if you were in a position to redesign the notification framework?

3. Rosa-Lena Lauterbach, The Law of Relief Action – Is Israel Required to Allow Fuel into Gaza? (January 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. What resources do you think qualify as “a necessary item in terms of relief action for the sustenance or survival of the civilian population,” and why? Food and medicine are generally more clearly established under sources such as Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, but what about resources such as electricity, cars, shoes, soap, and phones? With consideration for the author’s analysis regarding fuel, what kind of “case-by-case” factors would indicate that these or other related items constitute a necessary or essential element of humanitarian assistance under international law?

ii. With the article’s analysis regarding the parameters for humanitarian assistance in mind, what do you make of international humanitarian law’s balance between humanity and military necessity? Does the law strike the right balance? Why or why not? If you were negotiating to amend either the Geneva Conventions or the Additional Protocols (or perhaps negotiating a new, superseding treaty), what changes would you make to the current framework, and why?

4. Caroline D. Krass, Department of Defense Issues Update to DoD Law of War Manual on the Presumption of Civilian Status and Feasible Precautions to Verify Military Objectives (July 2023)

Discussion prompts:

i. The updated Department of Defense Law of War Manual added a new section regarding the obligation to take feasible precautions, while affirming that “the law of war does not prevent commanders and other personnel from making timely decisions and acting at the speed of relevance, including in high-intensity conflicts, based on their good faith assessments of the information available at the time.” How do you evaluate the relationship between the obligation to take feasible precautions, on the one hand, and the need for timely decision-making by commanders and other personnel, on the other? How well do you think IHL has struck the balance between humanity and military necessity in this context?

5. Rebecca Barber, The UN Has Options Beyond the Security Council for Cross-Border Aid to Syria (June 2021)

Discussion prompts:

i. What are the primary parameters for providing humanitarian assistance without host State consent? How do (or should) those parameters apply in the context of Syria at the time that the article was written, particularly in light of diversified territorial control? What do you make of the United Nations Office of the Legal Affairs opinion finding that the United Nations could not legally provide assistance in opposition-held areas without Syrian government consent? If you were to take a counterposition to that opinion, what would the best arguments be, and why?

I. Compliance

1. Tal Gross and LCDR Christopher Hart, From Ukraine to Gaza: IHL Compliance as a Tool for Preventing Moral Injury (August, 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. Does the article’s analysis regarding moral injury and its intersection with IHL compliance inform or change how you conceive of IHL as a body of law? Why or why not? Does the consideration of moral injury, including as a form of force protection, have anything to say about the balance between humanity and military necessity under international humanitarian law?

2. Cordula Droege, War and What We Make of the Law (July 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. Taking all of the article’s analysis together, do you think that IHL rules are themselves inadequate, or are core failures tied to problematic interpretations of law or insufficient enforcement? The article asserts that “there is a difference between the law assuming a degree of violence and the law enabling it.” How do you assess IHL in that balance?

ii. The author distinguishes between outright non-compliance with IHL and interpretations that skirt the law’s limits. Do you think interpretations that push the envelope, tilting the balance towards military necessity and away from humanity, are undermining the core protective purpose of IHL? Are such interpretations eroding the law, or making it more likely that States still seek to abide by it by making compliance easier? What would it mean for IHL as a body of law if States are abiding by a watered down set of rules that risks further weakening over time?

Note: You may also wish to listen to the author’s podcast elaborating on these issues, available here.

3. Janina Dill, Law and Survival in Israel and Palestine (October 2023)

Discussion prompts:

i. What does the author’s data regarding public support for compliance with international law regarding the treatment of civilians reveal about the international rules based order, in your view? With this information in mind, make an argument for the value and relevance of international law. Now, make the opposite argument. What, if anything, does this tell you about how lawyers should approach giving legal advice regarding international humanitarian law?

ii. How do you respond to the Alexander Hamilton quote that “when the life of a nation is threatened ‘no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed’”? Do you agree or disagree? Why? Do you think international law can ever “fall short”? In what ways? What do you make of the author’s argument that international law is more likely to be effective in reducing moral wrongdoing than moral arguments themselves?

4. Jelena Pejic, Expert Q&A on IHL Compliance in Russia’s War in Ukraine (April 2023)

Discussion prompts:

i. The author raises a fundamental question: “[W]hy compliance with IHL by all States and other actors is not better on the ground and how to improve it,” during an armed conflict (rather than following one, in a courtroom). What is your answer to that question? What are the primary causal factors leading to incomplete compliance with IHL, in your view, and what would need to be done to improve compliance? Are there changes to be made to the law itself, structural reform of certain institutions, or something else? Is this an issue that can be overcome, in your opinion?

J. War Crimes

1. Nema Milaninia, Time to Revisit the ICC’s Position on Head-of-State Immunity? (March 2025); and Todd Buchwald and Charlie Trumbull, Does the Int’l Criminal Court Impose Too Low a Standard of Proof to Arrest a Head of State? (December 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. What do you make of the gap between claimed authority and enforceability of the ICC in the context of head of State immunity? Is it possible to recalibrate the ICC in a manner that addresses this gap effectively? Why or why not? What reforms would you recommend, and why? What are the limitations your recommendations might face, and how might you overcome them?

ii. With the authors’ analysis in mind, what is your opinion on whether the Court should reverse the Bashir precedent? Why? Make the argument in favor of reversal. Now, make the counterargument in support of maintaining the Bashir decision.

2. Dan Plesch and Steve Kostas, The Lost Archive: France’s Highest Court Should Follow WWII-Era Rejection of Head of State Immunity (July 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. What do you make of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and its approach to head of State immunity? Do you agree with the Commission’s assessment that the imperative of accountability for certain international crimes overrides traditional immunity frameworks? Does it matter to your view which international crimes are at play – for instance, should only the most serious crimes overcome head of State immunity? How do you think domestic courts like the Cour de Cassation in France should take into account the “extensive, coordinated state practice during the formative period of international law explicitly rejecting head of state immunity for international crimes”?

3. Rebecca Ingber, Mapping State Reactions to the ICC Arrest Warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant (March 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. What do you make of the various State reactions to the ICC’s decision to issue arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant? As applicable to their circumstances, how do States seem to have attempted to handle the tension between support for customary international law that does enshrine head of State immunity in international tribunals, and treaty obligations under the Rome Statute to comply with ICC warrants? What makes it difficult to infer a position on these issues from the various statements made (or not made) by States, in your view?

ii. What are some of your most significant takeaways from the mapping exercise regarding State reactions, and what import it may have for both customary international law and the ICC?

4. Tom Dannenbaum, Nuts & Bolts of the International Criminal Court Arrest Warrants in the ‘Situation in Palestine’ (November 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. The warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant emphasize starvation, murder, and persecution but (for now) omit extermination and notes that additional crimes may be charged as evidence develops. How should the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC decide when the evidentiary record is strong enough to include the gravest charges, especially for ongoing deprivation-based crimes? Should international criminal law prioritize early, maximal signaling about the nature of the criminal project, or a narrower, more cautiously framed charge sheet that can be safely sustained at confirmation and trial? For whichever position you take, articulate the basis of your view, and the potential downsides of that position.

ii. States Parties now have clear duties to arrest and surrender Netanyahu and Gallant and to cooperate with ICC investigations, while non-parties like the United States still face “ensure respect” obligations under IHL and the Genocide Convention. When these legal duties collide with strategic alliances, domestic politics, and fears of reciprocity, how should we assess the legitimacy of States’ decisions to comply or not comply? What mechanisms — domestic courts, opposition litigation, export controls, or diplomatic efforts — are most likely to shape how governments actually respond to these warrants, in your view?

5. Yussef Al Tamimi, Dutch Appeals Court, Finding Clear Risk of IHL Violations, Orders Government to Halt Military Deliveries to Israel (February 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. The Dutch appeals court treats “clear risk” of grave IHL violations as not requiring prior judicial confirmation and relies heavily on NGO and U.N. reporting to conclude that standard is met. How demanding should the “clear risk” threshold be in export-control cases, and whose fact-finding (government, courts, U.N. actors, NGOs) should carry the most weight? Should national courts be willing to second-guess executive claims that the evidence is uncertain or incomplete, or should they defer more when the assessment involves complex battlefield judgment? Why?

ii. The court holds that once a clear risk of grave IHL violations exists, mandatory export-control norms and the Common Article 1 “ensure respect” duty must trump foreign-policy concerns, including alliance management with the U.S. and Israel and concerns about factory closure or futility if the United States can still supply parts. Is this a desirable model for how courts should police the boundary between hard legal obligations and diplomatic/strategic considerations? Why or why not? How should other F-35 partner States think about their own obligations when their exports are only one link in a broader supply chain, and when cutting off transfers might reduce their political “influence” over how force is used?

The post International Humanitarian Law: Syllabus Supplements appeared first on Just Security.

Table of Contents

A. The Contours of Jus ad Bellum Self-Defense

B. Non-State Actors and Imminence

C. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect

D. Jus ad Bellum Proportionality

E. “Unable or Unwilling” Theory of Self Defense

F. Self-defense vs. Reprisal/Retaliation

G. Threat of Force

H. Russia-Ukraine

I. U.S. Lethal Strikes on Suspected Drug Traffickers

J. Cyber Operations

A. The Contours of Jus ad Bellum Self-Defense

1. Brianna Rosen, Tess Bridgeman, and Nima Gerami, The Day After U.S. Strikes on Iran’s Nuclear Program: A Policy and Legal Assessment (June 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. In your view, did the June 21 strikes on Iran’s Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan nuclear sites meet the international law requirements of imminence, necessity, and proportionality, or do they constitute preventive force prohibited by the United Nations Charter and customary international law? How should decision-makers distinguish legitimate self-defense from prevention when dealing with nuclear latency and ambiguous intelligence? Why would having a weapons capability, but not a specific intention to use it, be insufficient to justify an invocation of self-defense?

ii. Do such attacks deter future nuclear proliferation or undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by discouraging cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and normalizing force against nuclear infrastructure? If you were advising Congress or the National Security Council, what mix of legal authorization to use force, diplomatic engagement, and verification mechanisms would you recommend to best balance deterrence, escalation control, and the integrity of the global nonproliferation regime?

2. Adil Haque, Indefensible: Israel’s Unlawful Attack on Iran (June 2025); and Amichai Cohen and Yuval Shany, A New War or a New Stage in an Ongoing War – Observations on June 13 Israeli Attack against Iran (June 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. What evidence should States invoke to demonstrate an “imminent armed attack” that meets the threshold to invoke article 51 self-defense measures under the United Nations Charter? In the specific context of the June 2025 Israeli strikes on Iran, what specific factors would need to be present for those strikes to be permissible under international law?

ii. Can you articulate the difference between an “armed attack” and an “armed conflict” under international law? What would it mean if the type of use of force in self-defense that Israel engaged in targeting Iran’s nuclear program were permissible at any point during an ongoing armed conflict, regardless of the imminence of an armed attack stemming from the nuclear program? What are the tradeoffs of the approach articulated by the author, such as to utilize lulls in fighting to settle disputes and/or invite the U.N. Security Council to take measures to maintain international peace and security?

iii. What do you make of the “ongoing armed conflict framework” and its application to the June 2025 Israeli attack on Iran? Do you think Israeli government lawyers were more likely to have made a preemptive strike argument with reference to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, or an “ongoing armed conflict” argument? Based on an application of both the law and the facts of this particular context, which do you think would be the stronger argument for those lawyers to make on behalf of their government? Why? What if the argument were “ongoing armed attack” instead?

3. Oona Hathaway, How the Expansion of “Self Defense” Has Undermined Constraints on the Use of Force (September 2023)

Discussion prompts:

i. What are the primary self-defense theories identified by the author, and how have they contributed to an expansionist approach to self-defense under international law? Evaluate the “preemptive self-defense” framework set forth by the United States. Consider, too, the Bethlehem Principles, regarding self-defense against armed attacks by non-State actors. What are the strongest arguments in support of, and against, these positions?

4. Mehrnusch Anssari and Benjamin Nußberger, Compilation of States’ Reactions to U.S. and Iranian Uses of Force in Iraq in January 2020 (January 2020)

Discussion prompts:

i. If international law speaks through States, what do you think we should make of strategic silence in this case? When might a State choose to refrain from taking a public position, and why? Does this communicate anything significant about international law and how it is formed, in your view?

ii. What do you make of the authors’ questions regarding how to assess the legal relevance of certain statements, particularly those that avoid explicit reference to the law, that are ambiguous as to their support for an action, or that express understanding for another State’s actions without invoking legal language? In your view, with particular consideration for the formation of customary international law, what must a State’s official statement do (or not do) in order to constitute a clear legal position?

B. Non-State Actors and Imminence

1. Adil Ahmad Haque, Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors: All Over the Map (March 2021)

Discussion prompts:

i. If Article 51 permits self-defense against only State armed attacks, what — if anything — could legitimately extend the doctrine to non-State actors without territorial State consent? Evaluate three candidates: (a) the unwilling or unable doctrine as a customary rule; (b) an imminence-anchored first-strike theory with strict sunset/verification; and (c) a narrow “quasi-State” exception for entities like ISIL. For each, specify any administrable elements (attribution/threshold of violence, evidentiary standards, geographic limits, temporal limits, reporting to the Security Council) that would prevent a slide beyond imminence and guard against potential abuse.

ii. The article identifies the United States as a potential outlier on four axes (imminence, continuation of force post-attack, origin-of-attack requirement, and breadth of “armed attack”). Choose one axis and make an argument for either convergence (tightening U.S. practice to the Netherlands/UK model), or principled divergence. What concrete rule text would you write (e.g., an updated Article 51 letter template or coalition rules of engagement) to lock in your choice? How would your approach handle: (1) clear cessation vs. “temporary lull”; (2) host-State consent refusals; and (3) documentation burdens to satisfy skeptical third States?

C. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect

1. Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg, Rebecca Ingber, Priya Pillai and Elvina Pothelet, UPDATE: Mapping States’ Reactions to the Syria Strikes of April 2018 (May 2018)

Discussion prompts:

i. When States politically support another State’s strike but avoid overtly declaring it lawful, should political statements of support constitute evidence of opinio juris in the context of the formation of customary international law — or should they have no bearing on customary interpretation of the legal norm? What indicators best distinguish a political statement from a legal statement?

2. Jack Goldsmith and Oona Hathaway, Bad Legal Arguments for the Syria Strikes (April 2018)

Discussion prompts:

i. In your opinion, are there any circumstances in which States should be allowed to use force to enforce international prohibitions like the chemical weapons ban, even without consent or United Nations Security Council authorization? Which kinds of international prohibitions, if any, should be subject to such unilateral enforcement, and which shouldn’t? Why? What would be the basis for such action under international law? What do you see as the potential benefits and potential costs of the “illegal but legitimate” argument put forward by France?

3. Just Security, What Do Top Legal Experts Say About the Syria Strikes? (April 2017)

Discussion prompts:

i. If the United Nations Charter’s black-letter rules render the Syria strike unlawful, should the United States nonetheless advance a narrow humanitarian-intervention theory — or embrace an “illegal but legitimate” posture? Compare the systemic costs/benefits of each path: precedent-setting, reciprocity risks, coalition politics, and effects on future crises (chemical weapons, mass atrocities). Are there any guardrails (criteria, process, reporting) that would make any humanitarian intervention theory minimally acceptable?

4. David Kaye, Harold Koh’s Case for Humanitarian Intervention (October 2013)

Discussion prompts:

i. When fundamental human rights aims collide with the United Nations Charter’s allocation of authority for the use of force (for instance under Art. 2(4), Ch. VII, the Security Council veto), which should control as a matter of law? As a matter of morality? How does fidelity to law enhance or erode the morality of a use of force decision in this context? If you privilege human rights protection, what is a principled reading that keeps the prohibition of the use of force intact without turning it into a policy balancing test? An exception that swallows the rule or is ripe for abuse?

ii. The article indicates that Kosovo provides little legal support for humanitarian intervention because States — especially the U.S. — framed their justification in policy terms and many States rejected the operation’s legality. How should lawyers advise decision-makers when the policy equities (chemical-weapons norms, atrocity prevention, or similar) are strong, but legality is weak? Should governments ever embrace “illegal but legitimate,” or does this risk eroding the value of law and its power to constrain State action across the board? Given the formation of custom requires State practice and opinio juris, what specific State behavior or statements would be required to move humanitarian intervention from a contested policy to lawful norm?

5. Harold Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part II: International Law and the Way Forward) (October 2013)

Discussion prompts:

i. Koh advocates moving from an “illegal but tolerated” paradigm for humanitarian intervention, to a framework where such intervention is narrowly lawful in extreme cases. His framework relies on an Article 2(4) affirmative defense grounded in United Nations Charter purposes, an exhaustion of Security Council remedies, and strict proportionality. Does formalizing that exception reduce abuse — because it sets conditions for intervening — or increase abuse, by giving powerful States a ready-made script for unauthorized force?

ii. Would you recommend any additional elements, such as some combination of United Nations General Assembly action (for example, “Uniting for Peace”), regional-organization participation, independent findings on the underlying atrocities, or something else?

6. Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Global Legal Norms (October 2013)

Discussion prompts:

i. The article describes a practical space in which humanitarian intervention without United Nations Security Council authorization is still legally prohibited but sometimes tolerated (“illegal but not unprecedented”). In your opinion, does this kind of constructive ambiguity actually protect the Charter’s baseline while allowing rescue in extreme cases, or does it reward powerful States for selective illegality and potentially make it harder to condemn pretextual interventions? Or do you evaluate this paradigm differently than either of these potential views?

ii. If threats of force for humanitarian purposes already receive a de facto “pass,” does this signal that opinio juris is shifting toward a narrow humanitarian exception — or does it instead show that States prefer to manage these cases politically, outside the strict contours of law, precisely to avoid creating doctrine? What would be lost (or gained) by codifying Koh’s “ambulance driver” style exception as compared to keeping the current, practice-driven model?

D. Jus ad Bellum Proportionality

1. Charlie Trumbull, Assessing Jus Ad Bellum Proportionality: A Factored Approach (July 2024); and Adil Ahmad Haque, Enough: Self-Defense and Proportionality in the Israel-Hamas Conflict (November 2023)

Discussion prompts:

i. What is the relationship between proportionality under IHL and proportionality with respect to jus ad bellum claims of self-defense?

ii. If proportionality in jus ad bellum requires weighing anticipated civilian harm against the strategic aims of self-defense when force is used, how does or doesn’t this blur the line between jus ad bellum and jus in bello? If it does blur the line in your view, does such a blur create a more coherent legal framework or, conversely, risk undermining core protections in each body of law? How so?

2. Charles Kels, The Problem of Proportionality: A Response to Adil Haque (November 2023)

Discussion prompts:

i. With consideration for the article’s analysis in mind, what, in your view, is the relationship between what is “ethical and wise” and what is legal in international humanitarian law and jus ad bellum? What should it be?

ii. If Kels is right that “self-defense proportionality is about the strategic scope of the military response” rather than the civilian harm it generates, what does that imply, in your view, for the ability of international law to constrain large-scale defensive wars, from a practical perspective?

3. Adil Ahmad Haque, Proportionality in Self-Defense: A Brief Reply (November 2023)

Discussion prompts:

i. Why might the law use a different assessment for proportionality with respect to jus in bello, as opposed to self-defense? Do you think this distinction in law has value, or do you take issue with this distinction? Why or why not?

ii. What are the different sources of State practice cited in the article, and which is most compelling to you as evidence of customary law? What makes that State practice particularly compelling or less so, in your view?

E. “Unable or Unwilling” Theory of Self Defense

1. Adil Ahmad Haque, Self-Defense Against Self-Defense, In Syria and Beyond (May 2018)

Discussion Prompts:

i. How do you view the concept that there can be “no self-defense against self-defense”? In your opinion, is this a necessary legal principle, or can you articulate a coherent legal order where both an intervening State and the territorial State simultaneously claim self-defense without contradiction? In the Syria tangle identified in the article (U.S. SDF Syria Russia), who, if anyone, do you think forfeits or overrides their self-defense rights, and on what theory (waiver, wrongdoing, lesser-evil, something else)?

ii. If you had to choose one of the three paths for potentially improving the doctrine identified in the article (implicit consent, broader forfeiture via support/omission, and a genuinely impartial “lesser evil” proportionality test), or design a fourth, what do you think a politically realistic and normatively defensible revision of the doctrine would look like, and what costs might it impose on weaker territorial States? How would your preferred approach handle a hypothetical case in which a near-peer power invoked “unwilling or unable” against the United States (e.g., claiming a right to strike a non-State group on U.S. soil over the United States’ objection)?

2. Tess Bridgman, When Does the Legal Basis for U.S. Forces in Syria Expire? (March 2018)

Discussion Prompts:

i. How often must States invoking the unable or unwilling doctrine re-evaluate conditions underlying their claim of lawfully using force within a non-consenting State? In practice, what concrete indicators or “tripwires” would you use to decide that Syria is no longer unable or unwilling — change in territorial control, ISIL’s operational capacity, a competent leader’s offer of consent, or something else? And if the United States doesn’t periodically re-evaluate but rather treats initial necessity as a blank check, does that undermine the doctrine itself, or expose particular uses of it as unlawful extensions?

ii. As a matter of law, where would you draw the line between (a) legitimately staying in Syria until attacks from ISIL in/through Syrian territory are no longer ongoing or imminent, and (b) an overbroad mission that effectively licenses semi-permanent occupation? How do concepts like Luban & Blum’s “morally legitimate bearable risk” inform your thinking about when the United States must accept some residual risk of ISIL resurgence rather than continuing to shift that risk onto Syrian territory and sovereignty?

3. Fionnuala Ni Aolain, International Law a la Carte: Brian Egan’s Jus ad Bellum Doctrine (April 2016)

Discussion prompts:

i. Does the U.S. reliance on “unwilling nor unable” as a basis for self-defense in certain circumstances make future armed conflicts more likely? In what ways? Can you make legal arguments both for and against the validity of such a basis for self-defense? What are the relative weaknesses and strengths of each argument? If you were an attorney advising a policy-maker in a government other than the United States, how would you advise that policy-maker regarding legally-available bases for self-defense?

4. Marty Lederman, President Obama’s Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding and Limiting the Use of Military Force (December 2016)

Discussion prompts:

i. How does international law generally formulate the options available to States who have suffered an armed attack from a non-State actor, in situations where the host State is neither complicit in nor responsible for the non-State actor’s armed attack? Can you briefly summarize the preconditions for use of force in this context and how this relates to the “unwilling or unable” doctrine, as articulated in the article?

F. Self-defense vs. Reprisal/Retaliation

1. Eliav Lieblich, Q&A with Eliav Lieblich on Iran-Israel Hostilities (April 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. How, in practice, should international law draw the line between genuinely preventive self-defense after a pattern of attacks and post-hoc punishment, especially when both sides raise the issue of “restoring deterrence”? If you were drafting reforms to the jus ad bellum standard, what indicators (timing, rhetoric, evidence of future threats, prior exchanges) would you use to decide when a strike is still defensive and when it has slid into an unlawful reprisal? In your view, what are the benefits and potential costs of developing specific criteria along these lines?

ii. In your opinion, should IHL attach to each discrete Iran–Israel exchange to maximize protection and clarify war-crimes liability, or would that potentially risk normalizing and routinizing uses of force that are shaky under jus ad bellum? How would you design a conflict-classification approach that accounts for proxy warfare, long pauses between strikes, and overlapping IHL/IHRL obligations without either under- or over-extending the “armed conflict” frame?

2. Ryan Goodman, Legal Questions (and Some Answers) Concerning the U.S. Military Strike in Syria (March 2021); and Adil Ahmad Haque, Biden’s First Strike and the International Law of Self-Defense (February 2021)

Discussion prompts:

i. Of the analytic tools for assessing the legal justifications offered by the United States for the February strikes in Syria, which do you find the most compelling or unconvincing, and why? If you were a lawyer for the United States, which argument(s) would you gravitate toward, and why? What if you were a lawyer for the United Nations? For the Syrian Arab Republic?

ii. Taking the two articles together, how do you answer the question as to whether international law permits States to take a proportionate military strike against an organized armed group that has subjected the State to a series of armed attacks, and the State has high confidence that such a strike will stop the attacks from continuing? Why? What factors are the most important to your assessment? For instance, how much does frequency of the recurring attacks by the organized armed group matter to your view? What are the strongest counterarguments against your position, and how would you address them?

3. Adil Ahmad Haque, Iran’s Unlawful Reprisal (and Ours) (January 2020)

Discussion prompts:

i. How do you understand the immediacy standard highlighted in the article, both normatively and practically in a world of long-range strikes, dispersed decision-making, and complex threat assessments? How, if at all, should the law distinguish between an impermissible “lesson-teaching” reprisal and a delayed but still genuinely protective strike aimed at neutralizing a real risk of future attacks?

ii. In your opinion, should we understand the pattern of reciprocal violations detailed in the article as evidence that the customary law of self-defense is shifting toward a broader deterrence-based model, or as unlawful practice that other States and scholars ought to resist and treat as non-opinio juris? If the U.N. Security Council is structurally unable to act when its permanent members are involved, what realistic alternatives — regional arrangements, General Assembly action, tighter doctrinal rules, or something else — could channel responses away from cycles of unilateral armed reprisals?

4. Geoffrey Corn & Rache VanLandingham, Lawful Self-Defense vs. Revenge Strikes: Scrutinizing Iran and U.S. Uses of Force under International Law (January 2020).

Discussion prompts:

i. As articulated in the article, what is the difference between lawful self-defense versus retaliation following an armed attack that is not permitted by international law? And, what are the lawfully-permitted options for a State to seek recourse, after a threat has been terminated?

ii. What kinds of evidence do you think would be necessary to establish that a State’s attack was necessary to prevent the imminent use of force by another State, and how might a State substantiate that? Can you think of reasons why a State would withhold its proof that its attack was justified under international law? How could a State balance the call to be forthcoming with evidence to support their legal right to exercise self-defense in a particular instance, and protecting sensitive intelligence or national security equities that might be impacted by such disclosure? If you were legal counsel to a State, how would you advise that the State balance these potentially competing interests?

G. Threat of Force

1. Michael Schmitt, U.S. Saber Rattling and Venezuela: Lawful Show of Force or Unlawful Threat of Force? (November 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. What is the difference between a “show of force” and an unlawful “threat” of force under international law? What import does each designation have from a legal perspective? What would escalate a show of force into a threat, and what factors must be met in order for a threat to be unlawful? With these factors in mind, how do you evaluate the United States’ actions in relation to Venezuela as described in the article? Do they rise to the level of an unlawful threat of force in violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter?

H. Russia-Ukraine

1. Chris O’Meara, Ukraine’s Incursion into Kursk Oblast: A Lawful Case of Defensive Invasion? (August 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. How do you evaluate whether Ukraine’s advances into Russian territory in response to Russia’s war of aggression were lawful under international law? Do you agree that the nature and scale of Russian aggression against Ukraine (and Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory) indicates that Ukrainian incursions into Russian territory meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality under the law governing the right to self-defense? If so, are there any potential slippery-slope consequences of such a position? Conversely, if not, what are the potential consequences of restricting States from making counter-incursions in a context like this? For either position, what incentives (positive or negative) might such an interpretation of the legal framework raise?

i. What are the strategic and political risks for Ukraine if its incursion is viewed as unlawful by the international community? Can you think of any additional factors to complement (or counter) those raised by the author?

2. Dor Hai, A Reply to Chris O’Meara: Necessity and Proportionality in International Law on the Use of Force (August 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. In your view, why might it be important to distinguish between necessity and proportionality in assessing self-defense under international law? What, if any, are the risks of inadvertently eliding these two concepts?

ii. Consider the two approaches to assessing proportionality raised by the author in this article: the view that self-defense must not be “excessive” when measured against the legitimate defensive purposes (and therefore only permits the halting and repelling of the aggressor’s attacks), and Hai’s articulation that to be proportional, a State’s self-defense should be limited to measures that are proportional to the anticipated value or benefit of repelling the armed attack in question, and other imminent armed attacks. Which of these approaches aligns more closely with your own views, and why? Are there any potential problems or risks with either of these approaches?

I. U.S. Lethal Strikes on Suspected Drug Traffickers

1. Michael Schmitt, Attacking Drug Cartels in the Territory of Another State (October 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. What do you make of the debate regarding whether a State may exercise the right of self-defense by conducting operations into another State that is “unwilling or unable” to put an end to activities related to an armed attack against the first State? How would you argue in favor of the position that international law permits the right to self-defense to be exercised in such a manner? How would you argue against it?

2. Michael Schmitt, Striking Drug Cartels Under the Jus ad Bellum and Law of Armed Conflict (September 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. What is the prevailing view of conduct that qualifies as an “armed attack” as that term is understood in international law?

ii. How do you evaluate the legal position a few States have taken that views non-destructive or injurious cyber operations as a use of force potentially rising to the level of an armed attack? Do you agree with States that take this legal position? If you were legal counsel for these States, what arguments might you make to support this position, including (but not limited to) the causal relationship between the cyber operation and the harm caused? If you were arguing against this position, what arguments would you make? What are the potential consequences of a more expansive position regarding what types of actions constitute an armed attack? In your opinion, can this position be distinguished from cartel or criminal gang activities like shipment and sale of illicit drugs?

iii. If you were legal counsel to a State, what position would you take in the debate surrounding the applicability of the right of self-defense to actions by non-State actors like drug cartels, and why? Conversely, if you were an ICJ judge, which arguments for or against such applicability would you find most compelling, and why?

J. Cyber Operations

1. Michael Schmitt, Russia’s SolarWinds Operation and International Law (December 2020)

Discussion prompts:

i. What is your view as to whether a cyber operation that is not destructive nor injurious in its effects constitutes a use of force? Is it important whether there is a permanent loss of functionality of the targeted infrastructure or system(s)? What kinds of harm would need to have been committed to reach the use of force threshold, in your view? If the operation creates a vulnerability that allows a State to access another State’s system and cause damage, but no damage has yet occurred, what is your view on whether the latter State ought to be able to act preventatively to prevent such damage from potentially occurring?

ii. If the operation were to be physical instead of cyber in nature, i.e. (for the sake of this hypothetical), literally installing a “back door” into the Pentagon so that Russia could steal records if it chose, how would you understand that action under international law? Would this constitute an “armed attack” sufficient to trigger the right to self-defense under the U.N. Charter? How does your answer to this question inform your assessment of whether a cyber operation to gain data access ought to be understood under this legal framework?

2. Ryan Goodman, Cyber Operations and the U.S. Definition of “Armed Attack” (March 2018)

Discussion prompts:

i. With particular consideration for the context of cyber operations, is the U.S. approach more or less compelling than a more conservative approach regarding what constitutes an “armed attack,” in your view? Why? What are the primary benefits, and drawbacks, to the U.S. approach? Can you think of any specific benefits or drawbacks that complement or add to those raised in the article?

3. Sean Watts, International Law and Proposed U.S. Responses to the DNC Hack (October 2016)

Discussion prompts:

i. In your opinion, does it make sense to transpose the standards guiding countermeasures, developed in reference to a kinetic environment, into the cyber realm, or do these standards need to be tailored or updated in some way to specifically account for activity in cyberspace? What are the potential risks of creating two separate legal paradigms for kinetic environments versus cyberspace? Are there any potential risks to attempting to cover both environments with one unified legal framework?

ii. What do you make of Admiral Stavridis’ proposals, in light of the contours of countermeasures set forth by the author of the article? Is there any argument to be made that any of these proposals could be lawfully undertaken?

The post Jus Ad Bellum: Syllabus Supplements appeared first on Just Security.

Table of Contents

I. Executive, Congressional, and State Authorities

II. Admission to the United States

III. Non-Citizens in the United States

IV. Birthright Citizenship

V. Detention and Removal

A. Use of Military in Internal Immigration Enforcement

B. Use of Military in Border Enforcement

C. Detention

D. Deportation

1. Non-Refoulement

2. Punishment and Constitutional Limits

E. Special case study: Alien Enemies Act

I. Executive, Congressional, and State Authorities

Camille J. Mackler, Immigration Policy Before and After 9/11: From the INS to DHS – Where Did We Go Wrong? (September 2021)

Discussion prompts:

i. This article raises a number of continuingly relevant changes that were made to U.S. immigration policy following 9/11. What implications did those changes have for subsequent policy-making related to immigration, including recent policy changes?

ii. Which, if any, additional reforms to DHS and its authorities would you recommend, beyond those offered by the author of this article? Do you identify any limitations or challenges raised by the reforms suggested by the author? How might you overcome them?

Ryan Goodman, Understanding DHS’s and ICE’s New Powers in Comparative Perspective (July 2025) (Note: The full podcast by David Aaron and Steven Cash, highlighted in this article, may be found here)

Discussion prompts:

i. Why might intentional inefficiencies in the DHS infrastructure be a positive? Conversely, what costs might this pose? To whom?

ii. How do you evaluate the pros and cons of having only certain components of ICE engage in regular law enforcement activity? Are there benefits to limiting the law enforcement authorities of these entities? What are potential downsides?

Andy Wright and Tara Ganapathy, Three Thorny Issues to Watch in Congressional Investigations (August 2025) (Read the immigration section, specifically)

Discussion prompts:

I. In light of the complex public-private nature of congressional offices, should DHS be able to access congressional offices without a warrant or consent by the relevant member of Congress, when carrying out activities otherwise within their authority? What are the best arguments for and against this degree of access?

ii. In the context of DHS denial of access to ICE field offices by members of Congress, how do you view the current balance between congressional oversight and the executive’s legitimate interest in minimizing operational disruption and executing its policies? What are the most effective arguments that DHS can restrict congressional access to ICE field offices, and what are the most effective arguments that it cannot?

Nikhel Sus, Why Trump v. Anderson Undermines State Efforts to Hijack Immigration Enforcement (May 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. Are there any arguments that States should have the ability to direct immigration enforcement within their territory? What would need to be true for States to have a cognizable authority to do so? What might be the risks, and potential benefits, of this level of State authority pertaining to immigration (especially any issues that are additional to those covered in the article)?

Lucas Guttentag, The President and Immigration Law: The Danger and Promise of Presidential Power (October 2020); Nicholas Espíritu, The President and Immigration Law Series: Executive Power Beyond Enforcement (October 2020)

Discussion prompts:

i. These pieces from 2020 raise a number of separation of powers issues that may remain relevant today. How do you evaluate the balance of congressional, executive, and judicial authorities in the current U.S. immigration framework, in light of some of these enduring considerations? Is reform needed? If so, what changes would you make, and what effect would you anticipate those changes to have? What are the potential drawbacks or limitations to those changes?

II. Admission to the United States

Bill Frelick, The Racial Twist in Trump’s Cutoff of Refugee Admissions (February 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. Should executive powers regarding refugee admissions be reformed? How much discretion should the executive have when determining which populations to prioritize for resettlement? Are there any downsides to a legislatively prescriptive framework? Of the reforms you’ve identified, which would you prioritize, and why? How feasible do you evaluate those reforms to be?

Rebecca Hamilton and Jon Temin, Visa Revocations Disregard South Sudan War Risks, Overlook U.S. Communities’ Embrace of Refugees (April 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. Should there be any limitations to the Secretary of State’s authority to revoke visas, and/or any additional oversight over this authority? Which limitations and/or oversight would you recommend, and by which entities or institutions? Are there any legitimate reasons why the Secretary of State should have discretionary authority over visa revocation?

Chris Purdy, US is Finally Aiding Stranded Afghan Allies, But Congress Needs to Step Up (August 2024); Susan Akram, Abandoning Afghan Allies: The Latest Chapter in Shameful History of US in Afghanistan (August 2021)

Discussion prompts:

i. Although the landscape regarding Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) has altered considerably since these articles were published, challenges with SIV processing have been consistent since the initiation of the program and are likely to persist under future administrations. What are the relative values and challenges to codifying executive decisions regarding SIVs via legislation, as Chris Purdy suggests Congress ought to have done in 2024? In light of the problems identified by the authors of these two articles, what reforms to the program writ large would you recommend Congress consider, to address the systemic challenges faced by applicants?

Adam Keith, Shaming without Naming: The Limits of Anonymous U.S. Visa Sanctions for Accountability (January 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. Do you agree that Congress should legislate an exception that permits the State Department to publicize individuals that have been subjected to a 3(C) visa denial? Can you think of any arguments as to why the State Department should not have the discretion to make such disclosures? What, if any, are the benefits to non-disclosure? Could there be any privacy interests at play, for instance?

Priya Morley, AI at the Border: Racialized Impacts and Implications (June 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. What are the benefits and costs of utilizing AI (or other technology) in border enforcement activities? Recognizing that technological development and its proliferation throughout various government functions is highly likely to persist, are there ways to realize the benefits while minimizing the costs? What preconditions would be necessary for that to be true? Are there any technologies that should be outright banned from use in immigration enforcement?

III. Non-Citizens in the United States

Nancy Morawetz, The Immigration Registration Trap Goes Live (April 16, 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. How does the interim final rule (IFR) requiring non-citizens to register with the government potentially impact U.S. citizens, even though it appears facially to focus on non-citizens?

ii. Do you agree with the author that DHS’s argument that it is implementing the 1940 statutory provision regarding registration is weak, and that notice and comment rulemaking ought to be required? What are the benefits or potential drawbacks of ensuring a notice and comment period takes place?

Ahilan Arulanantham and Adam Cox, Explainer on First Amendment and Due Process Issues in Deportation of Pro-Palestinian Student Activist(s) (March 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. In the context of Nationality Act (INA) section 237(a)(4)(C), how should concepts like “potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences” and “compelling United States foreign policy interest” be understood? Should there be any limitations on how those concepts can be interpreted and applied? If so, how should those limitations be established, and by whom? The judiciary, via review of the “void for vagueness” problems raised by this section of the statute? Congress, via legislation to amend the INA? The executive itself, via internal statutory interpretation or policy guidance? What are the pros and cons to these various approaches?

Edgar Chen, With New “Alien Land Laws” Asian Immigrants Are Once Again Targeted by Real Estate Bans (May 2023)

Discussion prompts:

i. So-called “alien land laws” continue to raise thorny issues in the context of immigration. How would you balance the policy concerns referenced in the article, with the risk of constitutional violations and potential discriminatory enforcement? What other methods might be used to address these purported national security or other concerns? How does this article inform your thinking on the relationship between immigration and national security?

IV. Birthright Citizenship

Ilya Somin, Birthright Citizenship and Undocumented Immigrants (November 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. What do you make of the various arguments for and against considering the children of undocumented immigrants as “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States? Are there any arguments for or against this that were not addressed in the article?

Edgar Chen and Chris M. Kwok, The Trump Administration’s 14th Amendment Retcon: ‘Wong Kim Ark’ Does Not Limit Birthright Citizenship (March 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. What strikes you as the strongest argument that United States v. Wong Kim Ark does not limit birthright citizenship in the manner claimed by the Trump administration? Are there any weaknesses to this argument? Are there any potential arguments in addition to those offered in the article?

ii. What do you make of the concept of “allegiance” in the context of U.S. citizenship? Setting aside which markers ought to demonstrate “sufficient” allegiance to the United States, is this an appropriate analytical lens for consideration of who ought to be eligible for citizenship at all, and if so, under what circumstances?

John Mikhail, Birthright Citizenship and DOJ’s Misuse of History in Its Appellate Briefs (April 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. Utilizing the same historical sources cited in DOJ’s appellate brief, what are the core arguments in opposition to the Executive Order limiting birthright citizenship? Are there any arguments you can identify that the authors did not include in their article?

ii. Is it possible to square the concept of “primary allegiance” that DOJ references in its brief with the fact that the United States recognizes dual citizenship? If you were arguing on behalf of the government, how would you define what constitutes “primary” allegiance? Now, take the position of opposing counsel. What are the problems with, and consequences of, the arguments that you advanced on behalf of the government?

Kristin A. Collins, Gerald Neuman & Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Another Reason Trump’s Birthright Citizenship Order is Unlawful (May 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. Are there any readily-available counterarguments to the birthright citizenship statute argument detailed by the authors of this article? What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of the arguments that it violates the Constitution, versus that it violates the birthright citizenship statute? Why do you think that the statutory argument has received less attention?

Melissa Stewart, Trump v. CASA and the Risk of Statelessness (July 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. What processes could reasonably be put in place to protect individuals at risk of statelessness? Are there vulnerabilities in leaving any such protections to executive branch policy-making? Should there be legislation to provide some degree of protection, as suggested by the authors? What should such legislation strive to do? Are there any constraints on what can be solved via congressional action, in your view?

ii. What problems are raised by the lack of a clear definition of a “stateless person” in U.S. law?

V. Detention and Removal

A. Use of Military in Internal Immigration Enforcement

William Banks and Mark Nevitt, The Mounting Crisis of Militarizing Immigration Enforcement (June 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. In your view, what are the most compelling problems raised by 287(g) agreements? Are there any reforms that could adequately address those problems? Conversely, are there any advantages or benefits to 287(g) agreements, such that they should be maintained?

ii. How do the recent signings of 287(g) agreements contrast to previous signings under the Bush and Obama administrations? What is the relevance of any significant differences?

Steve Vladeck and Ryan Goodman, Posse Comitatus Act Meets the President’s “Protective Powers”: What’s Next in Newsom v. Trump (June 2025); Elizabeth Goitein, “The Insurrection Act” by Any Other Name: Unpacking Trump’s Memorandum Authorizing Domestic Deployment of the Military (June 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. How are immigration policy disputes being utilized to drive increased militarization of law enforcement activity, or otherwise expand heightened theories of executive authorities in this context? Is there ever a time when it is appropriate to utilize the military for law enforcement purposes? What are the risks in doing so?

Ryan Goodman, David Aaron, Mark Nevitt, What Just Happened Series: Potential U.S. Military Domestic Deployment for Immigration Enforcement – The Just Security Podcast (January 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. How well does the Posse Comitatus Act help us distinguish between law enforcement functions and military functions, and what are its limitations in doing so? What impacts does this have on immigration enforced in the United States, currently and hypothetically?

ii. Does the Insurrection Act have a place in modern immigration enforcement? Should it be amended, and if so, how?

B. Use of Military in Border Enforcement

Mark Nevitt, The New “National Defense Area” at the Southern Border (April 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. Is reforming the National Emergencies Act necessary and, if so, in what ways? For instance, should the ability of the executive branch to bypass congressional approval for certain actions during a national emergency be restricted in some way? Or should the circumstances in which the president declares a national emergency at all be circumscribed? Why might the drafters of the legislation have originally provided for exceptions to congressional approval upon the declaration of a national emergency?

ii. In what ways can we understand the (possibly purposeful) ambiguity of the military purpose doctrine regarding national security, and its concomitant effects on immigration? Should the military purpose doctrine be reimagined? How so?

William Banks, Expert Backgrounder: Federalizing the National Guard and Domestic Use of the Military (February 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. Should Congress establish heightened limitations on presidential discretion in the Insurrection Act? What limitations would you propose, and how effective do you anticipate these limitations would be? What problems might remain, if any, and how might you address those?

C. Detention

Margy O’Herron, Big Budget Act Creates a ‘Deportation Industrial Complex’ That Will be Hard to Dismantle (August 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. If you were to reapportion the budget for immigration-related activities, how would you apportion funds, and for what reasons? Which immigration efforts should receive the most funding, and why? Or, should immigration-related funding be reallocated to another executive branch initiative entirely? What would be the benefits and drawbacks of doing so?

Jonathan Hafetz and Rebecca Ingber, What Just Happened: At Guantanamo’s Migrant Operation Center (February 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. Do individuals held at Guantanamo for immigration enforcement purposes have the same constitutional rights, such as due process, access to counsel, and habeas protections, as those held within continental United States? Should they? What implications does this have for other U.S. legal positions, such as in the DOD law of war detention context where the United States has taken the position that Guantanamo is not the United States and that U.S. law does not apply there?

Just Security, Series: Executive Order 9066 (February 2022)

Discussion prompts:

i. In reflecting on Executive Order 9066 and considering contemporary issues in immigration regulation and enforcement in the United States, what actions would you advocate should be taken now, and by whom, to incorporate the lessons from history into law, policy, and public discourse in a way that meaningfully mitigates the abuse of national security authorities? What lessons from Executive Order 9066 do you think are most at risk of repeating (or already are), and what implications does that have for the current legal infrastructure in which national security authorities are exercised?

D. Deportation

1. Non-Refoulement

Scott Roehm & Rebecca Ingber, In Congress, a Welcome, But Flawed, Step to Stop Trump’s Transfers to Torture (May 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. Why is it important for Congress to be specific about the kind of information it seeks from the State Department regarding El Salvador’s human rights records, U.S. work to promote human rights in that country, and U.S. efforts to remedy rights violations associated with transfers? What would the categories of information detailed by the authors allow Congress to more effectively do?

ii. In addition to (or perhaps instead of) 502B resolutions, are there more systemic approaches to Congressional oversight over U.S. security assistance and the conditions in the countries which receive it that you might recommend? What would those be, and how would they be an improvement over the current 502B framework?

Rebecca Ingber and Scott Roehm, The Trump Administration’s Recent Removals to El Salvador Violate the Prohibition on Transfer to Torture (March 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. Can you make an argument for why it is in the national security interests of the United States to adhere to the law regarding non-refoulement? What core U.S. objectives does compliance with this requirement potentially advance?

ii. Is a violation of non-refoulement ever justified? Why or why not, and under what circumstances?

Oona A. Hathaway, Mark Stevens, and Preston Lim, COVID-19 and International Law: Refugee Law – The Principle of Non-Refoulement (November 2020)

Discussion prompts:

i. Although the overt emergency raised by the COVID-19 has largely passed, questions regarding the limits that public crises can and should be able to place on international legal obligations remain highly relevant. How should governments balance the exigencies of extreme public health or other significant crises, on the one hand, and the requirements of international law that may be in tension with certain efforts to mitigate such a crisis, on the other hand? Should international law account for such circumstances in some way that it currently does not? What would be the risks of doing so?

2. Punishment and Constitutional Limits

Ahilan Arulanantham, Deportation to CECOT: The Constitutional Prohibition on Punishment Without Charge or Trial (April 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. What circumstances of incarceration would not constitute punishment, under current conceptions of the law? Are these circumstances appropriate, or would you argue for a differing approach? If so, why?

ii. Are there circumstances when incarceration without trial is justifiable, in the context of immigration enforcement? Why, or why not? Do the transfers to CECOT constitute such a circumstance?

Frank O. Bowman III, Immigration Is Not an “Invasion” under the Constitution (January 2024)

Discussion prompts:

i. What do you make of the constitutional, caselaw, and non-immigration arguments regarding the use of the word “invasion” in the context of immigration levels? Are there any additional arguments (or counterarguments) that might also be available, in addition to those raised in the article? Are there any limitations to the arguments you identified?

ii. What do you think the greatest risks of framing immigration as an “invasion” are, and why? Is there potential for any unintended consequences?

E. Special case study: Alien Enemies Act

Rebecca Ingber, Judicial Deference and Presidential Power Under the Alien Enemies Act (May 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. Is a finding that the president’s factual determinations are not judicially reviewable supportable under the political question doctrine? Why or why not? What are the risks to this approach, and when (if ever) might there be justification for it?

ii. How has the March 2025 invocation of the AEA differed from prior invocations of the authority? What relevance do any of these differences have, if any, for our understanding of its March 2025 use?

Ryan Goodman, The Absence of “State Secrets” in US-El Salvador Agreement: On Removal and Imprisonment of Non-US Citizens (May 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. The DC Circuit states in the decision in Ellsberg v. Mitchell that “the privilege [of State secrets] may not be used to shield any material not strictly necessary to prevent injury to national security.” If U.S. officials had not shared so much information publicly about the United States-El Salvador arrangement (or the State secrets argument was otherwise stronger), would there be legitimacy to the national security argument in the case of transferring non-U.S. citizens to El Salvador? Why or why not?

Marty Lederman, Remarkable Things in the Government’s Alien Enemies Act Briefs to the Supreme Court (April 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. Does the government’s position regarding habeas petitions in the context of removals made under an invocation of the Alien Enemies act violate the 5th Amendment’s Due Process Clause? How or how not? Are there specific aspects of the government’s arguments regarding habeas petitions that you find more or less problematic than others?

ii. Which of the author’s arguments do you find the most compelling, and why? Can you think of any counterarguments, and any responses to those counterarguments?

Katherine Yon Ebright, The Courts Can Stop Abuse of the Alien Enemies Act – the Political Question Doctrine is No Bar (March 2025)

Discussion prompts:

i. Should there be additional checks on the president’s ability to invoke the Alien Enemies Act? In light of the political question doctrine, is it more appropriate (or potentially more effective) for the judiciary or for Congress to serve as a check? Why, and in what ways might each institution best do so? What are the limitations of either institution’s ability to do so?

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