To succeed in geo-economic competition with China, U.S. policy should seek to preserve asymmetric advantages by maintaining China’s reliance on U.S. products and technologies, while controlling access to the essential capabilities that secure America’s national security and economic edge. The challenge currently is that China isn’t playing Trump’s transactional game. While the Trump administration celebrates short-term deals, Beijing is executing a multi-decade strategy to dominate the semiconductor supply chain from raw materials to finished chips. Tufts University Professor Chris Miller has estimated that China has invested the equivalent of the entire U.S. CHIPS Act virtually every year since Xi made domestic semiconductor manufacturing a priority in 2014. The CHIPS Act allocated some $52.7 billion ($39 billion for manufacturing grants) for domestic semiconductor manufacturing. It was signed into law by President Joe Biden in 2022 but has been abandoned by the current administration.

When Trump decided to continue the Biden administration’s export controls on advanced chips earlier this year, Xi didn’t blink. Instead, he doubled down on the indigenous innovation programs that have allowed China to achieve breakthroughs that many in the United States thought were only possible in some distant future, such as 7-nanometer chips, considered the “entry point” for competitive AI, and carbon nanotube processors that could leapfrog silicon entirely, outperforming in scale, speed and efficiency.

Worse yet, this strategic drift is coming precisely when the U.S. semiconductor advantage faces threats from multiple directions: China’s accelerating innovation, allies’ frustration with inconsistent U.S. policies, and self-inflicted wounds from using the CHIPS Act as leverage for the government to muscle-in and take a position in private corporations.

The Worst of Both Worlds

The current U.S. government approach to semiconductor export controls embodies the worst of both worlds: undermining American companies’ competitiveness while failing to meaningfully slow China’s progress. Nvidia and AMD face billions in losses from restricted China sales, revenue that funds the research and development needed to keep the United States ahead. Meanwhile, Chinese firms smuggle restricted chips through shell companies, rent computing power from cloud providers, and innovate to get around U.S. restrictions with impressive speed. DeepSeek, a Chinese AI startup, in January 2025 released R1, an open-source research model roughly matching the capabilities of advanced models from OpenAI, Google, Meta, and Anthropic. The breakthrough demonstrated that Chinese companies can achieve efficient AI models, trained on fewer chips than American labs typically use, and demonstrated that hardware constraints can drive software innovation in ways U.S. tech companies have yet to match.

Meanwhile, U.S. policy has devolved into threats to withhold already-promised CHIPS Act grants to American companies, efforts to change deal terms after capital and investments were already committed, and suggestions that the government take an equity stake in companies or convert grants into government ownership. The wildly oscillating approach to export controls creates uncertainty not just for U.S. adversaries, but for American companies, which require predictability to plan and implement multi-billion-dollar, multi-year investments.

The solution requires a more sophisticated approach, exercising the tools the government has at its disposal to both work with and leverage the private sector to assure that the United States will maintain its technological lead for generations yet to come. Trump’s instinct to use semiconductor access as leverage isn’t wrong; it’s that the execution and approach thus far undermine the desired goal. Treating advanced chips as tradeable commodities that the United States can turn on and off based on soybean purchases or other short-term transactions fundamentally misunderstands what’s at stake. These are the chips that power artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and autonomous weapons systems, and it’s not an overstatement that the country that leads the world in AI will also have significant economic, military, and strategic advantages for generations to come.

A More Effective Strategy

A pragmatic, realistic approach would include:

First, control the tools, not just the products. As one analysis put it, “It’s much easier to control the fishing rod than the fish.” Semiconductor manufacturing equipment – the massive chip-making machines from companies like Netherlands-based ASML – represent the real chokepoint. These tools are produced by a handful of firms in countries that are U.S allies; unlike the chips themselves, they are impossible to smuggle; and they’re what China desperately needs to achieve true independence. By contrast, controlling finished chips forces constant policy updates as companies design around each new restriction.

Moreover, constantly shifting rules breed regulatory uncertainty that pushes customers toward Chinese alternatives. Nvidia’s H20 chip was designed specifically to comply with export restrictions, only to then be banned in April 2025, then unbanned months later with a 15 percent revenue-sharing requirement – only to then have the administration just last week lift restrictions on the even more advanced H200. Customers that rely on a predictable supply of chips and are watching this whiplash, many in China, now have every incentive to develop relationships with domestic Chinese suppliers like Huawei, whose supply won’t disappear based on Washington’s latest dealmaking.

The U.S. government needs to focus restrictions on where enforcement works and where partnership is deepest with other nations that share concerns about the malign effect of tech competition with China. Yes, some advanced chips should remain restricted for military applications, but the current approach of banning compliance-engineered chips goes beyond what is needed for security and may be actively counterproductive if the result is to drive Chinese innovation and independent manufacturing capability. U.S. policy should be torqued to restrict where it must but also to let American companies sell more chips where they don’t compromise fundamental advantages.

Second, make export controls a force multiplier, not a substitute, for American competitiveness. The CHIPS Act has spurred investments of tens of billions of dollars in domestic semiconductor capacity — investments that the “adjustments” introduced by the Trump administration threatens to undo. While there are certainly adjustments that can provide additional leverage, Congress and the administration need to refocus on accelerating and expanding investments. U.S. semiconductor companies also need to be able to generate revenues to fund next-generation research and development. That means expanding their access to markets in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Europe to offset losses in China. U.S. companies need economies of scale to compete. While exports to certain markets and countries certainly require additional scrutiny, especially those with deep or longstanding economic ties with China, cutting them off from the world’s largest chip market without providing alternatives is strategic suicide.

Third, recognize that success requires leveraging U.S. alliances fully. The U.S. semiconductor advantage depends entirely on continuing cooperation with technologically advanced and like-minded countries that help support America’s competitive advantage in chips: Dutch lithography (to print the circuit patterns on the silicon at micro/nano scale), Japanese materials, South Korean memory, Taiwanese manufacturing. But the Trump administration’s single-minded pursuit of unilateral control, viewing partnerships as dependency and weakness when in fact they are a strategic asset, has both frustrated allies and left enforcement gaps that China can exploit. The United States benefits from multilateral arrangements with partners to share in the economic pain and required commitment to enforcement as well as to jointly reap the benefits of the strategic upside. The answer isn’t “join us or else.” U.S. economic statecraft and commercial diplomacy should be leveraged to streamline allied export controls, expand their CHIPS Act research access, and jointly develop next-generation technologies, including treaty-level commitments, not just ad hoc coordination shifting with each presidential tweet.

Fourth, accept that some technologies are too foundational for national security to treat them as just another trade variable. The most dangerous signal from the Trump-Xi meeting in Busan was the implication that advanced semiconductor access is negotiable based on agricultural purchases or fentanyl or other matters. While Xi surely suspected it before, he left Busan knowing that security-driven export controls and America’s technological edge are up for negotiation, if the price is right.

Finally, recognize that America’s technological leadership requires protecting the entire innovation ecosystem, not just products. Indeed, America’s advantage has long been in the complete innovation system — universities, capital markets, design tools, equipment expertise, and global talent. Government actions that hollow out or wreck this ecosystem, in whole or in part, create the risk of technological collapse. For the private sector, lost revenues mean cuts in R&D budgets, laying off engineers, and ceding market share to foreign competitors that face fewer restrictions. Export controls should protect core capabilities while enabling companies to maintain the scale and revenues that, in turn, fund continued innovation.

Not Too Late

The Busan meeting bought some temporary calm on rare earths and tariffs. But Xi achieved his objectives: he got semiconductor restrictions on the negotiating table, maintained his option to reimpose rare earth controls in a year, and watched the Trump administration signal that advanced chip access is negotiable rather than strategic — a bet that appears to have now paid off with the H200 decision. Thus far, Xi is thinking in five-year plans while Trump is thinking in tweets.

But it’s not too late. For all its other failings — and they are many — the Trump administration’s new 2025 National Security Strategy is right in maintaining that American leadership in advanced technology lies at the very heart of national security for the 21st century. And nearly at this Trump administration’s one-year mark, it’s likewise clear that if its ambitions for maintaining economic, commercial, and technological advantages are to be fulfilled, it needs to get much smarter about how it seeks to pursue its strategy. That means predictable investments in American research and manufacturing; targeting controls on manufacturing equipment where enforcement works and leverage with allies and partners is greatest; supporting semiconductor ecosystems in friendly nations rather than alienating them through policy chaos; and recognizing that foundational technologies should not be traded away for a hill of soybeans or self-interested revenue-sharing deals.

American technological leadership in the century ahead requires a strategy that is ruthlessly focused, multilaterally coordinated, and strategically disciplined. We know the answer. The question is whether this administration can summon the discipline to execute it.

The post Trump’s Chip Strategy Needs Recalibration appeared first on Just Security.

Far from reclaiming its prerogatives under Article I of the Constitution, the current Congress has displayed a pattern of retreat — reflexively deferential to executive authority, ideologically fractured, and politically paralyzed in the face of an administration intent on remaking America — and American global engagement — in its own image. The administration has every right to do so as long as it operates within the bounds of constitutional law; and Congress has the right and responsibility to assert its own powers in reflection of Americans’ interests. 

The pattern of congressional capitulation, however, is evident across multiple domains: the unchecked use of military force, unilateral economic coercion, the dismantling of development infrastructure, and a breakdown in oversight and advice-and-consent functions. In short, members of the 119th Congress – led by Republicans but with too much acquiescence from Democrats – have demonstrated a troubling trend: an accelerating abdication of their constitutional responsibilities in foreign policy, national security, and international economic affairs. Despite early murmurs about institutional revival, Congress has repeatedly failed to act as a coequal branch, even when faced with decisions involving war, the global economy, and the very infrastructure of U.S. foreign engagement.

The Constitution’s framers vested broad powers in the Congress — the power to declare war, regulate commerce, lay and collect tariffs, set the rules of naturalization, appropriate funds, and oversee the executive. Yet, Congress over the decades has gifted broad authorities to the White House. It’s not that Congress has been outmaneuvered; rather, it has engaged in constitutional quiet quitting, with stakes so immense they are difficult to quantify both for America’s global leadership and for its democracy and the people’s interests at home.

Bombs, Votes, and Silence: Iran and the Use of Force

One of the most stark examples of this abdication of responsibility came in June, when U.S. forces conducted airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. These significant military actions were undertaken with no prior bipartisan consultation with Congress, nor was the executive branch’s authority drawn from any existing statutory grant of power. Instead, the White House asserted inherent powers under the Constitution’s Article II to justify the strikes, a broad interpretation that bypasses congressional war-making authority. 

The legislative response was muted and ultimately ineffective. Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA) introduced a war powers joint resolution requiring congressional authorization for further military action against Iran. However, this measure was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 53-47. The House of Representatives failed even to bring the measure to a vote. This decisive legislative inaction meant that Congress, by failing to assert its constitutional prerogative, effectively post-facto ratified unilateral military action without substantive debate or explicit authorization, solidifying a dangerous precedent for executive war-making.  

Emergency Tariffs and Trade by Fiat

The administration’s unilateral approach has extended to international economic policy, further eroding congressional authority over commerce. In April, Trump issued a proclamation under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), declaring a national economic emergency and imposing sweeping “reciprocal tariffs” on a broad range of imports. These tariffs were set at 10 percent across the board, with rates climbing as high as 50 percent for autos from South Korea, Japan, and the European Union. The use of IEEPA in this manner is legally contentious — the statute was originally intended for sanctions against foreign adversaries or in response to true national security threats, not for broad trade disputes. Yet Congress mounted little effective resistance.

This was followed by an even more brazen invocation of IEEPA in July. The White House announced a new tariff regime targeting Brazilian beef and soy exports, explicitly contingent on the status of former President Jair Bolsonaro’s legal proceedings. The administration justified the move under IEEPA’s emergency powers, citing purported political instability and hostile actions against U.S. companies. Legal scholars immediately questioned the constitutionality of using a national emergency statute for political interference in another country’s domestic judicial process, warning that the action stretches the statute beyond recognition. 

This reliance on national security emergency powers for deeply politicized foreign economic coercion, untethered from established law, precedent, or strategic coherence, proceeds largely unchecked by the legislative branch. This approach undermines international trade norms, risks retaliatory measures from allies, and blurs the lines between national security and political leverage, potentially isolating the United States on the global economic stage.

Reconciliation as Appeasement: The One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB)

Congress’s retreat is also evident in its legislative agenda. In July, Congress passed the “One Big Beautiful Bill” (OBBB), a sweeping reconciliation package (an expedited legislative process that allows certain budget-related bills to bypass the Senate filibuster and pass with a simple majority vote) that, while focused on domestic policy, has profound implications for America’s global engagement. The bill, which is projected to add approximately $3 trillion to the national debt over the coming decade including interest, contained major tax cuts and extensive energy deregulation.

More critically for foreign policy, the bill dramatically scaled back U.S. international engagement on several fronts. It effectively eliminated funding for several key accounts, including significant portions of climate-related development finance, severely curtailing U.S. leadership in global environmental efforts. The measure also substantially reduced global health and food security programs, with some sectors experiencing cuts estimated to be as high as 60 percent. These legislative actions, far from asserting congressional authority over spending, represent a proactive legislative endorsement of a diminished U.S. global footprint—a striking departure from historical norms of congressional engagement in foreign aid and a weakening of humanitarian efforts worldwide.

This legislative retreat is compounded by the executive branch’s aggressive use of impoundment authority. The White House has already effectively rescinded billions in previously appropriated foreign assistance, including funding for lifesaving health and humanitarian assistance, and has stated its intent to reduce the State Department budget for programs that had previously been administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) by some 84 percent — exploiting Congress’s failure to block these actions under the Impoundment Control Act. These moves are not just budgetary but strategic: they signal an American withdrawal from international development, multilateralism, and the soft-power strategy that has made the United States the global leader, leaving vacuums that strategic competitors like China are eager to fill.

And with Congress passing Trump’s $9 billion rescission package on July 18 — targeting roughly $8 billion for foreign assistance programs, even as it preserved $400 million in proposed cuts to PEPFAR — it looks like China will be given the opportunity. First, it  potentially sets up a never-ending cycle of appropriations to reconciliation to rescissions, breaking the appropriations process beyond salvation, where no Congressionally-mandated spending is ever safe, even if signed into law by the president. Perhaps most troubling from the perspective of legislative-executive balance, however, is that the rescissions package Congress passed lacks details about how the cuts will be implemented. That makes it effectively impossible for Congress to carry out its constitutional responsibilities to oversee the power of the purse. 

Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC) made a statement on the floor prior to the vote that “I’m prepared to vote for this rescission package with the hope that I can trust those who are going to make the detailed decisions.” That seems to forget the very fundamentals of James Madison’s arguments for checks and balances laid out in Federalist 51. It was an oversight made all the more glaring by his statement after the vote that  “We have no earthly idea what specific cuts will occur.” 

Confirmation Theater and Oversight Failure

The decline in congressional assertiveness extends to its “advice and consent” and oversight responsibilities. Key national security posts at the State Department and USAID remain either unfilled or held by acting officials lacking substantive foreign policy experience. The Senate’s confirmation process for these critical positions has been marked by a lack of rigor and a breakdown in comity, with the majority ignoring minority holds on nominees (a practice where an individual senator can delay or block committee action on a presidential nominee, often to extract concessions or express opposition) in another sign of institutional decay with likely long-term effects. In some cases, hearings more closely resemble ideological rubber-stamping than robust scrutiny.

Oversight more broadly has withered. Since January, the Republican chairs of both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee have declined to hold substantive public hearings on the most sweeping changes ever to foreign and national security policy, including the Iran strikes, IEEPA tariffs, the dismantlement of USAID and reform of the State Department, impoundment of appropriated funds, or the elements and implications of the  foreign aid rescissions. While some general foreign policy hearings have occurred, the absence of robust public deliberation on these critical, controversial executive actions signals a profound deficit in congressional strategic thinking and its role as a forum for national debate. 

This oversight vacuum means critical foreign policy decisions are made and implemented with minimal public scrutiny or input from diverse expert perspectives, eroding democratic accountability and potentially leading to less effective and less sustainable foreign policy outcomes. Subpoena power has gone unused. Investigations proposed by minority staff have stalled in committee. As of July, there has been no sustained effort to oversee the administration’s fundamental shift in sanctions policy, global health strategy, or arms transfers — or anything else, for that matter. 

This moment of profound change could be an opportunity for Congress to restore a bipartisan equilibrium on foreign policy. Privately, most Republicans agree that DOGE went too far, cutting programs that protect Americans from diseases that have no borders and halting sales from Americans farmers to feed people in need. There is now a space to come together on shared foreign assistance and policy priorities defined by a more strategic but still compassionate foreign policy that positions the United States to compete with near-peer rivals. 

Once again, it rests with Congress to take up the authorities granted and to recognize that the greatest risk to the United States isn’t the election success of the other party, but the failure of Congress to use its authority, thereby unbalancing the branches and jeopardizing American democracy. In a world in which the outcomes of decisions can often fall victim to external forces, the integrity of the process by which decisions are made can confer value. That was much of the logic for the powers that the founders, in their wisdom, vested in Congress for the conduct of foreign policy. For all the rhetorical veneration of the founders that congressional Republicans claim, it seems to be a veneration in theory, unsullied by any willingness to put the wisdom to work in practice.

The Constitution’s Article I in Abeyance

Not all members have gone along quietly. The White House had to walk back its proposal to slash PEPFAR by some $400 million in its rescission package, restoring the funds under bipartisan Senate pressure. Representative Sara Jacobs (D-CA) has led efforts to restore funding for humanitarian assistance and to bolster congressional oversight of emergency powers. But these efforts are often late, isolated, and easily overrun by a partisan leadership intent on avoiding conflict with the president.

Why this moment of retreat? The reasons are not mysterious: political self-preservation in a hyper-partisan landscape; Republican leadership loyalty to the executive; institutional atrophy in key committees; and a deeper drift, among many members, over strategic foreign policy engagement in a period when many Americans have turned inward. Add to that a polarized electorate and the result is a Congress that treats its Article I responsibilities for national security as optional.

The Constitution gives Congress ample tools: the power of the purse, the War Powers Resolution, the confirmation process, and oversight authority. But tools unused are tools lost. And when it comes to foreign policy, Congress is increasingly not an adversary of executive aggrandizement — it is its accomplice. That is not just a danger to the constitutional order. It is a risk to American interests, credibility, and values in the world.

What’s playing out is not just a matter of political dysfunction. It reflects a deeper decay of democratic institutions — the slow erosion of norms, checks, and collective responsibility that sustain a functioning republic. When a legislature gives up its seat at the table on matters of war, peace, and global engagement, it changes the very nature of American governance. What was meant to be shared — and contested — power becomes centralized discretion, and, with it, the health of the democratic system itself and the ability to meet citizens’ needs begins to deteriorate.

Congress can still reclaim its role. The tools remain available: reform emergency authorities, reassert control over war powers and foreign assistance, tie confirmations to clear oversight expectations, and reopen the hearing rooms to serious inquiry. These are not revolutionary steps — they are merely reminders of how the system is supposed to work. But they will require a willingness by Congress to reassert itself before the opportunity to do so slips away for good.

The post Congress Shrinking from the World: the Constitution’s Article I in the Shadow of Trump 2.0 appeared first on Just Security.

Most recently, for example, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), run by Russell Vought, the architect of Project 2025, has proposed gutting funding for a range of war crimes accountability efforts in countries such as Colombia, Ukraine, Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, and Myanmar (Burma). And this comes on the heels of Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s winding down of the department’s Office of Global Criminal Justice and Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. While Rubio unveiled the department reorganization as a “proposal” in April and notified Congress formally on May 29, some staff have already been laid off or accepted the administration’s Jan. 28 “Fork in the Road” offer to all federal employees to resign and get paid through Sept. 30. The OMB memo about the war crimes accountability cuts sets a date of July 11 to submit arguments for retaining them.  

These cuts move the United States in exactly the opposite direction of its own interests. Funding and programs that support the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of atrocity crimes — from Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine to Assad’s persecution of Christians and other minorities in Syria to the abuses of Myanmar’s brutal military regime — are among the most cost-effective tools available for advancing American power, interests, and influence abroad. Eliminating them is not only legally questionable and diplomatically and morally short-sighted, but also strategically self-defeating.

Let’s be clear: accountability for mass atrocities directly targets regimes and criminal networks that threaten U.S. national security interests. These grave human rights violations destabilize regions, fuel violent extremism, and undermine international norms. U.S. support for the documentation of atrocities and related accountability efforts exert pressure on malign actors in ways that sanctions or military tools simply cannot. These initiatives uncover the truth, support and elevate victims and survivors in recovery efforts, and reinforce the rule of law as a key pillar of global security. Many of them are run by U.S., international, or local nonprofit organizations and are in support of legitimate local government authorities, such as Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office.

Tangible, Strategic Return on Investment

Advancing accountability is not some misguided, feel-good exercise in global liberalism. It is a smart, scalable instrument to confront terrorists, disrupt transnational criminal networks, and deter rogue regimes grounded in the values that have long-elevated America’s global standing because they are embraced by publics the world over, even if resisted by some of their corrupt leaders. And these initiatives have been undertaken in forums the United States helped build, many of which are now also facing serious funding cuts. These efforts send a clear message: those who commit or enable mass atrocities cannot operate with impunity – there will be consequences, however long they might take in systems designed to ensure true justice.

At a fraction of the cost of military intervention, these tools yield a tangible and strategic return on investment. They sharpen the contrast between the United States and its authoritarian competitors, reinforce cooperation with those allies deeply invested in justice, and encourage cost-sharing in pursuit of shared security goals. Just as importantly, however, they offer a platform that amplifies American leadership without putting boots on the ground. 

To put it in perspective, the FY2025 U.S. defense budget stands at approximately $893 billion. In stark contrast, the total U.S. investment in global criminal justice, support for international tribunals, human rights documentation and advocacy, and atrocity prevention through both the State Department and the now-shuttered U.S. Agency for International Development is typically $145 million at most, accounting for less than 0.02 percent of defense spending. Simply put, one week of military operations in a medium-scale conflict like Afghanistan or Iraq, which cost as much as $1.5 to $2 billion at peak, exceeds the entire annual budget for human rights, atrocity prevention, and accountability programming. These have repeatedly proven to be some of the most cost-effective security tools the United States has, and yet the Trump administration is proposing to just throw them away.

There are countless examples of the impact of these initiatives over the years. For instance, in Colombia, U.S. funding and technical assistance to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) have contributed to more than 230 former Ejército Nacional de Colombia (National Army of Colombia) and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) members and their collaborators admitting responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity during Colombia’s internal armed conflict to date. In Cambodia, U.S. support for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) helped secure the convictions of Kaing Guek Eav (Duch) in 2010 for crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea in 2018 for genocide, crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, all of which was accomplished without the need for U.S. troop deployments. In another case with U.S. backing, the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s successful prosecution of former Liberian President Charles Taylor helped dismantle networks that fueled conflict through the blood diamond trade, reduced the risk of West Africa becoming a haven for terrorism and transnational crime, and reinforced U.S. influence in the region. And of course, U.S. support for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) helped secure the convictions of Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić for genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws or customs of war (including unlawful attacks on civilians and hostage-taking) committed during the Bosnian War of the 1990s, alongside the convictions of more than 90 other military and political leaders.

In the United States, courts have expanded accountability for atrocity crimes by prosecuting individuals who committed war crimes abroad and later sought refuge in the United States. For example, Mohammed Jabbateh, a high-ranking commander in the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), was convicted in Pennsylvania in October 2017. More recently, Michael Sang Correa, a Gambian death squad member, was convicted in Colorado in April 2025. These cases demonstrate how accountability for atrocity crimes advances justice while strengthening immigration enforcement and national security at little cost and without the need for U.S. combat operations. 

Contradicting Stated Priorities

For a Trump administration that all too often reflexively rejects policies and programs simply because its predecessors supported them, what is even more troubling is that these cuts contradict its own stated priorities for a “safer, stronger, and more prosperous” America.

Safer? Atrocity crimes aren’t someone else’s problem – they’re often a root cause of regional collapse, refugee flows, and ungoverned spaces that fuel instability. Refugees from Venezuela, Haiti, Syria, Myanmar, Afghanistan, the Sahel, Sudan, and beyond are fleeing brutal, systematic violence, not hypothetical conflict – much of which U.S.-backed investigators are helping to expose. Accountability is how the United States holds regimes responsible for the chaos they create – chaos that too often reaches U.S. borders.

Stronger? Want to induce behavior change from a regime? These programs are powerful tools of leverage that offer options for negotiation, without entangling the United States in large-scale commitments or military action. Cutting them erodes U.S. bargaining power. It’s the kind of asymmetrical, low-risk advantage that any savvy, deal-making administration should want to preserve.

More prosperous? China, Russia, and Iran seek to upend an international order that is consonant with U.S. economic strength and global prosperity with one that favors their own interests. They thrive in a world where there are no consequences for State-sponsored violence against civilians. By contrast, U.S. support for atrocity crime documentation and prosecution bolsters legal norms, strengthens allied resolve, and promotes a stable, rules-based system that has enabled American businesses to thrive globally. Eliminating these programs creates a global leadership vacuum, hands a win to U.S. adversaries, and abandons key allies – and all without receiving anything in return. 

In Ukraine, where Russia is already scrambling to whitewash its atrocities from Bucha to Mariupol, cutting funds for groups helping to document international crimes weakens the growing case for prosecution just as momentum builds. It also signals to Ukraine and European allies that the U.S. is stepping out as they are stepping up to do more for their own defense, rather than recommitting to the partnership in return.

Similarly, in the Indo-Pacific, members of Myanmar’s military regime continue to carry out brutal atrocities against civilians, including ethnic-affiliated organizations and pro-democracy forces. Meanwhile, Beijing provides diplomatic cover for the regime, while actively undermining ASEAN-led peace efforts. Pulling U.S. funding from accountability programs in the region cedes strategic ground to China and signals that our talk of competition in the Indo-Pacific is just that: talk. Slashing these programs forecloses future options and weakens the U.S. position, all for savings that are negligible in the context of the broader U.S. budget.

U.S. and International Legal Imperatives

Finally, supporting accountability for atrocities is not only sound strategy, but also a legal imperative. The United States is a party to the Genocide Convention, all four Geneva Conventions, and the Convention Against Torture, each of which carries a clear obligation to prevent and punish atrocity crimes. These commitments have been codified into U.S. law through bipartisan legislation such as the Proxmire Act, the War Crimes Act, the Torture Act, the Torture Victim Protection Act, the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act, and the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, all of which passed with overwhelming support. 

Under the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act, the United States is also prohibited from funding governments that engage in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights unless extraordinary conditions are met. Likewise, the Leahy Laws restrict U.S. military assistance to foreign security forces credibly implicated in gross violations of human rights. Together, these laws equip U.S. policymakers to demand justice, deter future atrocities, and safeguard taxpayer dollars. Eliminating accountability programming not only dismantles this vital legal and policy framework but also cripples one of America’s most effective tools for promoting its values and securing its interests at home and abroad.

As State and OMB make final budget decisions, there may still be a narrow window to reverse course through internal appeals – Reuters reports that State Department bureaus have until the close of business on July 11 to submit their justifications for retaining war crimes and accountability programs. It’s particularly poignant that the date happens to mark the 30th anniversary of the Bosnian War’s Srebrenica Genocide. Whether or not that window is used, the broader case remains: accountability efforts are not a luxury, a liberal pet project, or a misguided moral crusade out of step with a Trumpian view of foreign policy. They are a core, albeit underappreciated, instrument of U.S. national power. 

The second Trump administration has a chance to prove that “peace through strength” is more than a slogan. Strength includes the ability to hold others accountable. Peace requires consequences for those who commit the most serious international crimes. And American leadership – real leadership – means standing for something, even as it fiercely pursues its own interests.

Accountability for atrocity crimes delivers on both strategy and justice. Cutting it now means surrendering powerful tools of U.S. foreign policy and national security – at exactly the moment that the United States and the world need them the most.

The post Trump Administration’s Proposed Cuts to Accountability for Mass Atrocities Undermine Its Own Strategic Goals appeared first on Just Security.

Chinese leaders are intensifying their efforts to shape Burma’s post-conflict landscape. Their approach is classic: arms and intelligence for the military (known as the Tatmadaw), quiet relationships with insurgent groups, investments through the Belt and Road Initiative, and diplomatic maneuvering designed to ensure that, no matter who comes out on top within Burma (also known as Myanmar), China will come out on top in its geopolitical battle, too.

By contrast, the United States, which just a decade ago was leading international efforts to forge a new future for Burma, is now felt most by its absence and risks losing any potential role in helping shape or support Burma’s future. With that, the United States will be further marginalized in its role as the “partner of choice” in Southeast Asia.

Critical for U.S. Security

That would be a generational mistake. Burma may seem far away to the average American, but it’s crucial for U.S. national security in the Indo-Pacific. 

First, there is the imperative of access to Burma’s mineral riches, which in turn is intertwined with geopolitical influence, as the United States seeks to loosen China’s tightening grip on the region – and beyond. Northern Burma, especially Kachin and Shan States, are rich in rare earths and critical minerals vital to the future of the global economy. Control over these resources has already made parts of the country a playground for Chinese shadow companies and illicit mining cartels, with devastating ecological and human costs. A federal, democratic, fully functioning Burma/Myanmar could align with Western supply chain standards and offer an alternative to China’s monopoly in critical minerals. But that window is narrow and closing fast.

The second way Burma is pivotal for the United States is infrastructure, trade, and economic connectivity. Burma is a keystone in mainland Southeast Asia. It borders India, China, Bangladesh, Laos, and Thailand. A more stable, pro-democratic Myanmar could become a connective hub between South and Southeast Asia, offering counterbalance to Beijing’s corridors of influence. China understands this, given memories of the strategic role played by the battle over Burma in World War II and the critical supply lines kept open for allied U.S. and Chinese forces against the Japanese by pilots flying “The Hump” (the Himalayas); it’s one of the reasons Chinese pipelines today cut through Burmese territory to the Bay of Bengal. If the United States wants to sustain influence with ASEAN and in the Indo-Pacific, Myanmar must be part of the equation.

Third, the significance of Burma/Myanmar is about the architecture of norms and values. This is where some of the 21st century’s core ideological contests are playing out: between democratic aspiration and authoritarian repression, between ethnonationalist fragmentation and civic inclusion, between genocide and accountability. Today’s battle for Burma is not only territorial. It is moral. And it matters what the United States does — or does not do — when those who have resisted tyranny emerge – undoubtedly with their hands still tied by the difficulties of reconstruction, but raised in hope for a full recovery for their country.

Policy Options

Washington has policy options — if it’s willing to engage. 

First, with success on the battlefield, the Trump administration has a significant opportunity to upgrade the political recognition of ethnic armed organizations and the National Unity Government (NUG), the exiled and representative government formed after the coup. This does not necessarily mean formal diplomatic recognition today, but simply enhanced engagement: intelligence sharing, technical support, participation in regional dialogues, and material aid and governance support to areas the resistance governs, including helping the ethnic armed groups build an inclusive federal future for Burma from the ground up. 

Second, Washington can take a lead in building a regional coalition to monitor and support post-conflict stabilization in liberated zones. This should be done through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or an ad hoc regional mechanism if needed, along with Japan, the Quad (an informal security and economic alliance between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India), and the European Union. Such a platform could help coordinate humanitarian aid, mediate ethnic political transitions, and offer developmental incentives. 

And while Washington has a critical catalytic role to play, the burden of such an effort, in keeping with the Trump administration’s broader approach to foreign policy, can be carried by those closest to the conflict and with the most at stake in regional stability. ASEAN has sought to mediate the conflict in the past, with limited success given ASEAN’s sometimes paralyzing approach to consensus and non-interference. But the stakes at play in Burma – for ASEAN and for the wider region – bring into sharp relief ASEAN’s need to consider how it will remain “central” if it is unable to forge coherence on such a critical issue.

Third, it’s time for Washington to get serious about economic leverage. Target Chinese-linked illicit mining and timber networks with secondary sanctions, particularly those that finance malign militia groups. Additional economic pressure is likewise crucial to rein in cyberscam centers and the associated human trafficking for labor to work in them – even China is interested in fighting that scourge.Meanwhile, the United States, along with ASEAN and other regional partners, can prepare a roadmap of development assistance and investment for a future democratic Burma/Myanmar that can deliver the good governance and environmental accountability that its people want and that will strengthen its potential as a pivotal partner for the United States in the region.

Bipartisan Letter

Congressional interest in Burma remains high, with Representatives Gregory Meeks (D-NY) and Bill Huizenga (R-MI) recently leading a bipartisan letter urging an additional appropriation of $121 million to support Burma and the goals of the BURMA Act, which was passed by Congress in 2022 with the aim of isolating the junta, bolstering pro-democracy stakeholders, expanding U.S. humanitarian assistance and supporting Burmese refugees. 

Of course, there is no guarantee of success. The previous opening in Burma that the international community tried to nurture a decade ago for the fledgling democratically oriented government of Aung San Suu Kyi fell short, resulting in genocide against the Rohingya people and ending with a coup. Myanmar’s political history is littered with false dawns. The ethnic armed organizations are not a monolith. The Tatmadaw may yet retrench. 

But the strategic terrain is shifting, and China knows it and is prepared to take advantage of the swing. Chinese envoys are busy from Lashio, the site of a major rebel victory last year, to the second-largest city of Mandalay, engaging with all comers, from ethnic opposition groups to the military, and brokering ceasefires and buying loyalty. Meanwhile, Washington is perceived as indifferent and  abandoning its partners. The Trump administration, for example, went so far as to fire staff of the DOGE-targeted U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as they were on the ground responding to the devastating earthquake that struck in April. 

Moments of possibility in geopolitics are fleeting. Burma’s civil war is entering a new phase. Whether its next chapter is shaped by repression, chaos, or pluralistic stability depends not only on the Burmese people, but on the choices great powers make in the coming months. And that means the choices the United States makes are crucial on whether – and how — to support the people of Burma to build a better future for themselves and their nation. Any support will be doubly difficult with the demise of USAID, but it’s crucial for U.S. national security interests, if nothing else, to find a way. 

Washington must decide: will it watch history unfold to its detriment, or help write history in its favor and to the benefit of both Burma and the United States?

The post Why the Trump Administration Should Engage on Burma Now – and How appeared first on Just Security.

Debates over how to structure and optimize the State Department, and U.S. foreign assistance programs in particular, are nothing new. But important questions remain about these proposals—including how they may interact with Congressional prerogatives; their implications for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy amidst compounding global crises; and, ultimately, whether these changes may herald a more streamlined and effective bureaucracy or undermine U.S. diplomatic power.

On May 14, 2025, the Reiss Center on Law and Security and Just Security convened an expert panel to consider these vitally important developments and to unpack what’s happening, what’s at stake, and what lies ahead. 

Show Notes: 

• Dani Schulkin, Tess Bridgeman, and Andrew Miller’s “What Just Happened: The Trump Administration’s Reorganization of the State Department – and How We Got Here” 
• Ambassador Daniel Fried’s “The US Government’s Self-Harm in Killing RFE/RL” and “Is the U.S. Abandoning the Fight Against Foreign Information Operations?” 
• Hon. Dafna Rand’s “Stopped Security Assistant: From Counter-Narcotics to Combating Human Trafficking Programs”  
• Michael Schiffer’s “Secretary of State Rubio’s Reorganization Plan Could Offer a Chance to Rescue U.S. Foreign Assistance — If He’s Smart About It” 
• Music: “Broken” by David Bullard from Uppbeat: https://uppbeat.io/t/david-bullard/broken (License code: OSC7K3LCPSGXISVI)

The post The Just Security Podcast: What’s Next for U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Assistance? appeared first on Just Security.

Still, in the rubble lies a critical opportunity: to repurpose, rebuild, and refocus U.S. foreign assistance as an instrument not just of valuable goodwill, but of 21st-century national security. The United States cannot afford to squander it.

To be clear, there’s nothing inherently wrong with reassessing U.S. foreign assistance institutions. Every administration since the end of the Cold War has tried to improve the alignment of the “three Ds” — diplomacy, development, and defense. And as strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China sharpens, better integrating these instruments of power is not optional. It’s imperative.

But the Trump administration has thus far approached the task more like a demolition crew than a design firm. Just weeks ago, a leaked memo from the White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) suggested cutting the State Department budget in half and gutting USAID to fewer than 300 staff, with only trade, commerce, energy, and humanitarian assistance surviving the purge. And the Department of State is already acting on decisions made without real analysis. Yet, as messy and backwards as this process has been, there’s still time to ask the right questions –and maybe even get some of the right answers.

First, what’s the theory of the case? USAID is gone. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), established in 2004 by President George W. Bush, is on the chopping block. Now, Rubio has proposed a State Department reorganization plan that includes a 15 percent cut in domestic staff,  reduces the number of bureaus and offices from 734 to 602 (including scaling back or eliminating a slate of human-rights focused offices, with the latest plan looking to have the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor radically downsized, with what’s left of it integrated with regional bureaus), and transfers 137 offices to other locations within the department.

Yet, other than the simple repetition that the intent is to assure the State Department is aligned with the president’s foreign policy priorities, the administration has yet to explain what national interests or values are being served by this reorganization and budget proposal. Is it a budget exercise, a power grab, or a strategic pivot?

If the goal is an “America First” realignment, where’s the evidence that dismantling development capabilities – the type of foreign aid hardest hit, even more than humanitarian aid and security assistance — enhances American leadership or counters China’s growing influence? The proposed reorganization also needs to come to terms with the reality that, at the end of the day, it has always been the case that the United States provides foreign assistance in service of its interests and values and to meet national security goals. That is the “why.” Development assistance, humanitarian assistance, global health and so forth are the “how.” If the rationale for “why” is still there, an approach that eviscerates the “how” runs the risk of disaster. Foreign assistance comprises less than 1 percent of the federal budget. Any savings must be weighed against the strategic return on investments in fragile States, global health, and climate resilience. The United States still needs a clear articulation of the Trump vision for foreign affairs and foreign assistance operations — or lack thereof — if it is to build anything fit for purpose.

Second, what capabilities should be preserved? Some of the proposed consolidation in Rubio’s State reorganization plan may make sense — no one who has worked at or with State will question the need to address bureau overlaps, eliminate redundancies and turf wars between offices, and streamline the policy approval process. But any merger must protect technical depth and the capacity needed to further U.S. foreign policy goals around the world. That’s a key lesson from the U.K.’s merger of its USAID counterpart, the Department for International Development (DFID), with its Foreign Office to create the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), which left that government struggling to maintain development expertise and country credibility, at strategic cost. Canada and Australia also faced similar learning curves. Their experiences teach that diplomacy and development are distinct skill sets — and that integration without intent can erode both. USAID’s humanitarian and health bureaus, for example, cannot simply be grafted onto another structure. The expertise and capability is not plug-and-play.

One important element of Rubio’s State reorganization proposal that merits additional scrutiny as the department moves to implementation is that it makes the regional bureaus the nexus of foreign assistance programming, supported with some functional capabilities. This appears to be similar to a model pursued by Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in its 2013 integration with Australia’s AusAID. While not without its challenges and bumps, the Australian experience provides guarded reason for optimism that it is an approach that can be successful in closely aligning interagency development tools — if, as DFAT learned, State is mindful of the need to preserve and enhance organizational capacities, both for personnel and for funding and programs. Australia’s experience also suggests that maintaining development capabilities is important to ensure that a new approach centered on regional bureaus includes the development professionals and the tools needed for success. Examples of critical development capabilities include but are not limited to the Transaction Advisory Fund (TAF), which provides financing for projects in strategic sectors, and other programs funded via the bilateral Economic Support Fund,  which can cover everything from protecting human rights to anticorruption efforts to strengthening civil society to addressing human trafficking.

More critically, gutting USAID’s development arms while preserving only humanitarian functions risks ignoring the root causes of instability — weak governance, climate shocks, and unresolved conflict. Such neglect ensures that tomorrow’s crises are worse than today’s, and that an America less prepared to face them will be less safe. Without clarity on what capabilities are essential to furthering U.S. foreign policy, development, and national security interests, it is challenging to work through the final phase of the reorganization to ensure that those capabilities survive intact.

Third, let’s stop pretending this is a game of musical chairs. Human capital matters. You can’t flip a switch to reboot a development program after thousands of layoffs. The entire ecosystem — implementers, experts, and partners — is reeling. Institutional memory is bleeding out. Merging foreign assistance under the State Department without preserving development as a distinct discipline isn’t reform — it’s a retreat. As with the question of capability, a strategic and considered approach to human capital, rather than seemingly random axing on the basis of facetious internet memes criticizing USAID (which I won’t detail here), is essential to ensure that the State Department reorganization and absorption of USAID is effective. This applies at senior levels as well, where it is essential that development and humanitarian assistance programs are in a unit where the leader is sufficiently empowered to represent their interests and perspectives within the department and across the government. It’s far from clear if an unconfirmed office head, even as powerful an office as the Office of Foreign Assistance, can serve in that role when the music stops.

Fourth, culture clashes aren’t bugs — they’re features to manage. USAID’s culture of operational flexibility and field innovation is not an accident; it reflects its mandate and mission. While the State Department’s culture is centered on formal diplomacy, representing U.S. interests, and managing State-to-State relationships, USAID was driven by a practical, mission-focused approach to global development. It emphasized technological expertise, innovation, and partnerships, and focusing on sustainable, measurable results central to sustainable development. Diplomacy demands discretion and central control; development often thrives on public engagement and local empowerment. If the United States doesn’t design for these differences, it will repeat the mistakes of the late 1990s merger of the U.S. Information Agency into the State Department, which has left America less able to contest information warfare or deal with the public diplomacy challenges of the twenty-first century.

Fifth, process matters. Rushing this reorganization to meet an arbitrary deadline of the end of the fiscal year while continuing to bypass congressional consultation and public debate undermines the very principles the United States claims to value. A deliberative, bipartisan approach grounded in real budget planning, statutory structures, and engagement with Congress won’t just yield better policy. It will last longer. A fully considered process in partnership with Congress — one that provides the necessary statutory framework for the new organizational structure — is essential for long-term success.

Rubio now has a chance to steady the wheel. A reorganization done right — rooted in strategy, not spite — can still align U.S. foreign assistance with national security, development effectiveness, and public trust. Done wrong, it will cost the United States influence, waste resources, and deepen the very crises the administration claims it wants to prevent.

There is no way to undo the damage already done to American interests and values by the administration’s process so far, but it’s not irreversible. With clarity of purpose and humility in process, the administration can still build something worthy of America’s values — and its interests.

IMAGE: U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C) shakes hands with Democratic Republic of the Congo Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner (L) as Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe watches during a Declaration of Principles signing ceremony at the State Department on April 25, 2025 in Washington, DC. The U.S.-facilitated agreement promotes ending fighting in the region while bringing economic development between the two nations. (Photo by Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images)

The post Secretary of State Rubio’s Reorganization Plan Could Offer a Chance to Rescue U.S. Foreign Assistance — If He’s Smart About It appeared first on Just Security.

Despite the mistakes the United States has made around the globe over its lifetime – and in part because it often has acknowledged them, even if belatedly — when disaster strikes, the world looks to the United States, not just for its resources but for its leadership. For decades, the United States has been at the forefront of humanitarian response and disaster assistance, recognizing that such efforts are not just acts of generosity but vital tools of diplomacy and national security.

But in the wake of the March 28 earthquake in Burma, the United States has been largely absent, belatedly sending $2 million and a small emergency response team for an assessment. It’s a failure that carries not only profound moral consequences but also strategic costs that may create aftershocks for years to come. To add insult to injury, President Donald Trump, in announcing his tariffs this week, slapped a 44 percent tariff on Burma, deepening its economic and humanitarian crisis.

For decades, the United States has been the “indispensable nation” for the international community in times of crisis — a position that has, in turn, allowed it to both help those in need, living up to the values that have animated the nation since its founding, and also to assure that U.S. interests, along with American values, are well-served. Humanitarian aid was one of the few areas of assistance in which the United States had a comparable advantage vis-a-vis its adversaries.

Yet just 70 days or so into the Trump administration, the U.S. ability to respond — and to lead — is “in shambles,” as former USAID Assistant to the Administrator for Humanitarian Affairs Sarah Charles put it. The U.S. capacity to mobilize resources, coordinate international relief efforts, and set a moral example has saved countless lives in the past, but in Burma this week, that leadership is missing. The earthquake has left thousands dead and many more without shelter, food, or medical care. And all that is playing out in the midst of a civil war. The conditions are so bad that even Myanmar’s military, which long has rejected the international community’s calls to end the war against its own people, is pleading for assistance, though it’s a plea to take with a grain of salt given the reports that the junta continued to bomb its own people even after the earthquake struck until finally matching the unilateral ceasefires of the armed resistance with a temporary truce on April 2.

Scenes of Suffering

Aid workers have described horrific scenes of suffering, yet Washington’s response has been tepid at best. And in one of those twisted ironies of history — the sort that would get you thrown out of a college creative writing class — on the very day that the earthquake devastated Burma, USAID disaster response personnel in the region were receiving notices telling them they were fired.

The moral cost of this inaction is clear. Human suffering on this scale demands a response from those with the means to alleviate it. While local and regional actors have stepped in, their capacity is limited. The United States has the logistical power, financial resources, and diplomatic influence to make a difference. By failing to act, we send a message that American leadership is conditional, selective, and, in this case, absent.

Beyond the immediate humanitarian cost, the absence of U.S. leadership in Burma is a strategic blunder. Disaster response is not just about aid; it’s about influence. In past crises, U.S. humanitarian assistance has not only saved lives but also built goodwill, deepened alliances, and strengthened regional stability. Recall the U.S. response to the tsunami that swept across Indonesia and the Indian Ocean in 2005. In responding — immediately and unconditionally — we did good, and found that in doing good, we did well. The tsunami response turned around negative views of America in that part of the world following the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and opened pathways for diplomatic engagement and partnership that paid dividends for years to come. In other words, it’s a vital tool for our national interests.

China, eager to expand its influence in Southeast Asia, has already moved into Burma to fill the vacuum left by American inaction. Pictures of relief workers in brightly branded “China Search and Rescue” and “China Aid” attire are all across the press (and maybe more importantly, on social media) in Burma and the region. Beijing’s relief efforts are not simply acts of charity; they are strategic investments. By stepping in where the United States is absent, China is positioning itself as the dominant regional power, further entrenching its influence in Burma’s politics, economy, and military affairs.

Washington’s absence also weakens its credibility among allies in the region. Nations such as Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines have long relied on U.S. leadership in times of crisis. If they see America retreating in Burma, where it had been so active in the past to support its nascent democracy before the war, these U.S. allies and partners will question whether they can count on Americans in their own moments of need or on crucial joint strategic issues, including the competition with China that the Trump administration claims is a priority.

Not Too Late

It is not too late for the United States to step up. A robust humanitarian response — led by USAID, in coordination with regional partners such as the Quad (a grouping of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan), or ASEAN (the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations) — would demonstrate that American leadership is not in retreat.

Indeed, the administration’s belated recognition of the imperative to deploy emergency aid, logistical support, and financial resources to ensure that relief reaches those in need can be seen as an acknowledgment that the work of USAID isn’t “waste, fraud, and abuse,” as they’ve too often alleged even as they struggle for evidence, but that it actually serves the national interest. The United States supports people abroad in part so they do not have to be migrants fleeing to U.S. shores in the future. This response should be paired with diplomatic pressure on the Burmese junta to allow full humanitarian access and, ultimately, to end the war and return power to an elected civilian government.

Getting Burma right — both in terms of strategic context and in supporting the people of Burma in building a genuine, inclusive federal democracy — has long been an elusive goal for U.S. policymakers. And it remains a challenge. But there can be no question that the gutting of USAID programs, the lack of a robust response to the earthquake, and now, the imposition of tariffs, is what it looks like to get Burma wrong.

If Washington fails to act, the consequences will be long-lasting. The United States will have ceded both moral authority and strategic influence to adversaries who will not hesitate to use this moment to their advantage. In the end, America’s absence in Burma will not just be remembered as a failure to help those in desperate need; it will be seen as a retreat from the global stage, one that weakens both America’s values and its interests.

Musk has stated several times that he recognizes that DOGE will make mistakes, and that, when those mistakes are pointed out, DOGE will move fast to correct them. The earthquake in Burma has made clear the cost of DOGE’s error-prone attack on U.S. foreign assistance. The only question now is whether Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Musk and his acolytes will recognize it and correct it. Or whether the costs will continue to compound. The Burma earthquake may be the first disaster that tests the Trump administration’s approach. But it surely won’t be the last.

Editor’s note: This piece is part of the Collection: Just Security’s Coverage of the Trump Administration’s Executive Actions

IMAGE: China’s and Belarus’ rescue teams coordinate at the site of a collapsed building in Mandalay on April 2, 2025, five days after a major earthquake struck central Myanmar. Days after a shallow 7.7-magnitude earthquake that killed more than 2,000 people, many people in Myanmar are still sleeping outdoors, either unable to return to ruined homes or afraid of further aftershocks. (Photo by STR/AFP via Getty Images)

The post America’s Absence in Myanmar’s Early Earthquake Response: A Moral and Strategic Failure appeared first on Just Security.

This insert, published in the Federal Register, represents a  decision that, for the first time since Trump’s 2020 Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization, implements tariff treatment of Hong Kong as indistinguishable from China, disregarding Hong Kong’s status as an autonomous territory.

There is a real discussion to be had about whether “one country, two systems” exists anymore in any meaningful sense – there was and is compelling logic to the 2020 executive order. But this consequential question is not just a matter of economic statecraft or foreign policy, but one of law. Congress must assert its voice, given both its constitutionally enumerated powers to set tariffs and the strong role it has played on Hong Kong policy over the years.

Indeed, we are under no illusion about what China is doing. It is critical to expose and address how Beijing has sought to use Hong Kong’s trade and economic status to game its advantages – to the disadvantage of the United States and others. Chinese companies, for example, have been able to export through Hong Kong to secure lower tariff treatment from the United States and, prior to 2020, were also able to avoid restrictions on dual use items or other sensitive technologies that applied to China. Chinese companies can also tap into the city’s access to global investors, which they cannot do on the mainland due to Beijing’s strict capital controls.

But for the United States to walk away from its commitment to the people of Hong Kong – to forgo any recognition of its innate difference from China and any hope Hong Kong has for a democratic future without even a cursory debate in Congress – is unconscionable.

Bipartisan Support

The United States has sought to support Hong Kong’s autonomy since passing the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act in 1992. The act promotes trade and economic engagement, supports Hong Kong’s government and civil society, and advances educational and cultural exchanges as well as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

Congress passed the act with a clear, bipartisan message – with both the House and Senate approving the measure by voice vote. It stated that the United States must support Hong Kongers to continue to live in freedom and with dignity, and that the United States should “seek to maintain and expand economic and trade relations with Hong Kong” and continue to “treat Hong Kong as a separate territory in economic and trade matters.”

That goal, while laudable, is one that has been receding ever more rapidly over the past decade or so. Beijing has conducted a concerted campaign to return Hong Kong to the fold, erasing its autonomous political and judicial systems and turning it into simply another megacity under Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s authoritarian thumb, just like dozens of other megacities across China.

Xi has asserted a strong hand because he wants the independent, democratic, capitalist essence of Hong Kong to die. Working through its handpicked chief executive, Xi’s regime has jailed the brave voices who dared to speak out – people like student leader Joshua Wong and publisher Jimmy Lai. But Xi also knows that the city is not with him – that Hong Kongers, for the sake of survival, for now, may choose to remain silent, but in their heart of hearts they loath what is happening to their city.

And Beijing’s iron fist has been heavy as a result.

In 2020, in response to large protests in Hong Kong, China’s rubber-stamp legislature introduced draft national security legislation – bypassing elected leaders in Hong Kong – that targeted broadly-defined acts of secession, unspecified “terrorist activities,” and efforts to subvert State power in the city. Beijing deployed its “nuclear option” to silent dissent, effectively reneging on the promise that it made in the Sino-British Joint Declaration – an international treaty signed by former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and China’s then-paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in 1984 – to preserve Hong Kong’s way of life even under Chinese rule.

Beijing’s goals are clear, and the Chinese Communist Party has been relentless in seeking to impose its will on the people of Hong Kong. And, arguably, as Beijing aggressively seeks to erase the lines between the “two systems,” reconsideration of where, how, and whether the United States should continue to treat Hong Kong as different from the rest of China is in order, especially if that treatment creates risk for export controls, investment flows, and critical supply chains.

The Role for Congress

But that’s a debate that needs to happen out in the open and should include congressional engagement, considering how important Congress has been in driving U.S. policy on Hong Kong over the past several decades. Moreover, having hearings and debate on Capitol Hill also means that the voices that Beijing fears most – the dissidents, the brave Hong Kong civil society groups still operating globally – might have a say.

Indeed, the proposed Hong Kong Policy Act of 2024, introduced in December 2024, too late in the last Congress to be passed, recognized that Beijing’s actions are stifling Hong Kong’s political and economic autonomy. The legislation stated that U.S. policy toward Hong Kong “should be updated with a new policy framework that protects United States national security interests and is centered on the people in Hong Kong, including their aspirations, their human rights and well-being, and their desire for autonomy and a democratic system of government in Hong Kong.”

Just as the United States considers how to treat Hong Kong’s trade and economic status in the face of Beijing’s pressure, so too do U.S. lawmakers need to reconsider what the best and most effective policy options are to keep faith with the people of Hong Kong – and their desire for a future characterized by democracy, rule of law, a free press, and a vibrant civil society. It should be a future in which Hong Kong’s unique history, culture, and politics can continue to flourish.

This is an especially critical time for Congress to weigh-in, given the Trump administration’s clear disregard for these once uncontroversial and bipartisan priorities, as evidenced by the dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development, the National Endowment for Democracy and other organizations that have long garnered bipartisan support for their support of human rights globally.

All too often in recent years – even under administrations that expressed a commitment to democracy, rule of law and human rights – the United States has failed to stand by Hong Kong in its moments of need, turned its back on Hong Kong’s democratic voices, and looked the other way as Beijing has sought to crush the spirit of Hong Kongers. While American leaders may ultimately determine that the time has come to treat Hong Kong and China the same for the new tariff designations, the United States should not do so without any attention or consideration, allowing Hong Kong’s democracy to die in silent darkness.

Editor’s note: This piece is part of the Collection: Just Security’s Coverage of the Trump Administration’s Executive Actions

IMAGE: A pro-democracy protester known as “Granny Wong” shouts slogans outside the West Kowloon court in Hong Kong on February 1, 2024. Four Hong Kong men were convicted of rioting on February 1 over the storming and ransacking of the city’s legislature in 2019, part of a pro-democracy movement that posed an unprecedented challenge to the Beijing-backed government. (Photo by PETER PARKS/AFP via Getty Images)

The post Trump’s China Tariff Now Treats Hong Kong the Same as the Mainland, a First in US Policy appeared first on Just Security.

As a former appointee in the Biden administration (in USAID, no less), I take no pride in admitting that President Joe Biden’s decision to block the deal during his final days in office on national security grounds was a problematic one with enormous ramifications for the domestic steel industry, as well as for U.S. allies and adversaries. The move reportedly contradicted the recommendations of some of his Cabinet secretaries, who voiced their support of the acquisition in the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) on fears of alienating Japan, a key ally. Biden apparently stuck with his instincts to support domestically owned production capacity and to heed labor unions that feared job losses with such a deal.

Just as the United States seeks to build strong military-security partnerships to address the global challenges posed by China, it also should encourage allied foreign investments that can strengthen core industrial capacity in the face of economic-security challenges. Just as with Trump’s encouragement of foreign investment for the critical artificial intelligence sector – including Japan’s Softbank in the Stargate initiative to build more AI infrastructure – the new president should seek economic partnerships that benefit domestic steel capacity.

There is perhaps no better way to do so than with Nippon Steel, the fourth-largest steelmaker in the world and the biggest in Japan. Tokyo is one of Washington’s most important – if not the most important – allies in the world today, given the U.S.-China competition. When the late U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield characterized the alliance as the most important bilateral relationship for the United States “bar none” in the early 1980s, the current era of great power strategic competition with China was still off in the distance. But the wisdom of his words — and the need for ever-closer economic partnership between the United States and Japan — is more critical now than ever. The decades ahead will be determined as much by geoeconomic power as geostrategic power, and encouraging Japanese investment and a strong allied partnership of economic statecraft, including in domestic steel production, is an investment not just in U.S. jobs, but in national security. 

Even as the world is increasingly dominated by silicon and artificial intelligence, there are stubborn reminders — from Ukraine to the Taiwan Strait — that history is far from over, and that industrial steel production remains a vital source of national power and a wellspring for American jobs and resilient communities. Yet today the United States produces barely a 10th of the steel production of China.

Chinese dominance in global steel production — driven by state-sponsored enterprises and resulting in overcapacity and depressed prices — exacerbates U.S. national security concerns. Beijing’s use of trade cheats and non-market policies, which are not compliant with the World Trade Organization, prevent U.S. steel producers from competing on a level playing field. China is actively using economic statecraft to erode this vital national security capacity. 

This is exactly the kind of trade imbalance with China that Trump is aiming to address. If not averted soon, it will continue to threaten U.S. plant closures and job losses. The proposed merger between U.S Steel and Nippon Steel offers the right solution.

Starting with the needs of America’s defense industrial base and the production of military materiel (tanks, ship, aircraft), there is no question that U.S. national security requires resilient domestic steel production capacity. But the future of the U.S. steel industry — and that of U.S. national security — isn’t an abstract question. It is a question of seizing the best tangible deal that can safeguard American jobs and communities, as well as fortify national security in the face of increasingly intense competition from China. And this deal, as the CEO of U.S. Steel has said, assures the future of domestic steel production is “mined, melted and made in America.”

The TikTok saga tells us everything we need to know about Trump’s willingness to reopen, reconsider, and renegotiate deals. Given the grave and very real national security concerns, if TikTok gets to enjoy a second chance after a government rejection — and I am not saying it should — and then receives approval from CFIUS later on, it is difficult to argue that Nippon Steel — a company from Japan, a major U.S. ally — should be any different. Even better, Trump does not need to go through the hassle of arranging a new deal here. A good deal for domestic manufacturing and national security is sitting right in front of him; all he needs to do is reverse his predecessor’s decision and approve it.

As a former official in the predecessor administration, I don’t agree with much of what Trump has done in the first days of his term. However, he has an opportunity to bolster the U.S. relationship with one of its most important allies and strengthen its competitive posture in relation to China in one fell swoop. I hope Trump has the courage to swiftly reverse Biden’s decision and position the United States in this critical sector for the challenges of strategic competition in the years ahead. 

IMAGE: Workers leave the U.S. Steel Corp. Granite City Works plant after their shift in Granite City, Illinois, July 1, 2022. (Photo by Whitney Curtis for The Washington Post via Getty Images)

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The “stop-work” order in the directive has carveouts for emergency food aid, as well as military assistance to Israel and Egypt. But everything else has been put on ice. Work to prevent current outbreaks of mpox and Marburg virus from spreading beyond Africa, for example. Drug supplies that are keeping 20 million people living with HIV alive, including more than a half million children. Support for religious minorities in the Middle East and those risking their lives to resist oppressive political regimes in places like Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Burma. Combatting the spread of fentanyl across the western hemisphere. Work to support allies and partners in Asia to build resilience in the face of coercive economic practices by China. And military assistance to allies such as Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Poland, and Ukraine.

The United States funds all of this, and far more, for just 1 cent of every dollar that Americans pay in taxes each year. Halting it, even just temporarily, will have obvious, predictable results: Children will die. Our national security will erode. America’s alliances will suffer. U.S. partners will be at risk. And America’s enemies will rejoice.

In halting foreign assistance spending, the Trump administration has just put America last, while handing a gift to our biggest adversaries, notably China. In fact, Trump may just have conceded great power competition with China before his first week in office was even over – though it is not too late to reverse this spiral.

To be clear, every administration has a right and an obligation to review the money America spends around the world. And, having occupied senior positions in overseeing foreign assistance, I can attest that there are better and more efficient ways to manage and distribute it. A serious review of how the United States conducts foreign assistance and how its institutions are aligned to integrate diplomacy, development, and defense is well in order.

But there are smart ways to conduct reviews and pursue reform — ways that preserve America’s influence and interests — and then there is the catastrophic path that the Trump administration appears to be pursuing now. The relevant section of the State Department directive, states:

Effective immediately, Assistant Secretaries and Senior Bureau Officials shall ensure that, to the maximum extent permitted by law, no new obligations shall be made for foreign assistance until such time as the Secretary shall determine, following a review. For existing foreign assistance awards, contracting officers and grant officers shall immediately issue stop-work orders, consistent with the terms of the relevant award, until such time as the Secretary shall determine, following a review. Decisions whether to continue, modify, or terminate programs will be made following this review.

To be clear, there is no such thing as a temporary pause. When an NGO, a small business, or an American company that receives U.S. government funding to implement U.S. foreign assistance is told to stop work, even for 90 days, that means people are fired, expertise is lost, and programs are shut down with no guarantee they’ll start back up, even if they survive the review. It is difficult to exaggerate the reverberating effects of a stop-work order on the ability of such organizations and their programs to continue to function. We know that already, many development assistance partners and international organizations have begun layoffs — including jobs here in the United States — though at least some have reportedly been told by the Trump administration not to publicly talk about those impacts.

Nor will the suspension itself save U.S. taxpayers money. The U.S. government knows from prior experience that the cost of suspending and restarting programs like these far exceeds the cost of simply pivoting resources to new priorities.

Unless it is reversed, this shocking halt, especially with the ramifications of the stop-work order, may represent an extraordinary setback for the United States.

Why? Because foreign assistance, though charitable, isn’t charity. It’s a strategic investment that safeguards America’s most important interests while reflecting its highest values. It protects the United States from threats abroad before they reach America’s shores, from diseases to fentanyl to terrorism. It helps to combat human trafficking, supports democratic elections, and stems the flow of migration, attacking the root causes that force people to flee. It helps secure critical supply chains and builds markets for U.S. exports while creating jobs at home. And in an era of strategic competition, foreign aid wins influence and allies.

That’s why foreign assistance has long been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, seen by both parties as crucial to securing America’s national interests. Programs like the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe after World War II demonstrated how aid could secure alliances, rebuild shattered countries, and foster free societies and free markets. And prosperity in post-war Europe helped drive America’s own prosperity at home. As Senator Lindsey Graham recently said, when it comes to competing with China in Africa and elsewhere with U.S. foreign aid, “soft power is a critical component of defending America and our values.”

Few understand this better than the PRC. Since its inception in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative has poured more than $1 trillion into infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, bolstering its global influence. For instance, China has financed massive infrastructure projects in Africa, including the construction of railways in Kenya and ports in Djibouti, giving Beijing significant sway over governments there while creating footholds in a region of strategic importance to the United States. The U.S. suspension of foreign aid now threatens to effectively leave the field wide open for China to expand its influence – and, ironically, to paint Beijing as a better and more reliable partner than Washington. 

Russia, too, may seek to exploit the vacuum created by the U.S. retreat from foreign assistance. In Central and Latin America, Russia has funded multi-pronged information-manipulation campaigns meant to sow division and spread anti-U.S. sentiment. In Africa, Russia is shipping arms and wreaking havoc in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic, and has targeted U.S. health initiatives.

And of course, this State Department pause imperils Ukraine. Not only is military assistance threatened, but so too is incredible work the United States has led to safeguard and rebuild Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and agricultural sector after years of Russian attacks.

No matter how the review ends, this suspension of foreign assistance and its stop-work order has already caused lasting damage. And with a decision this reckless, it’s difficult to know whether it was made out of ignorance or intent. But it is not too late for the Trump administration to reverse course — to conduct their review but to lift the stop-work order. Otherwise, the damage of these actions will have generational consequences, both for the communities abroad that the United States is abandoning and for the values and interests of the American people.

Editor’s note: This piece is part of the Collection: Just Security’s Coverage of the Trump Administration’s Executive Actions

IMAGE: Farmers work during a visit to a farm of U.S. officials announcing support for a development plan for small farmers on November 8, 2023 in Quito, Ecuador. (Photo by Franklin Jacome/Agencia Press South/Getty Images)

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