Now, with the likelihood of unrest and government crackdowns continuing, the possibility of a second U.S. attack remains viable. Iran’s people deserve international support as they endure what may prove to be the most brutal suppression in the history of the Islamic Republic. But the quick pivot to considering military force without serious domestic debate in the United States or clarity about what force is meant to achieve, and whether this is the best way to help the Iranian people, is alarming. The President and other senior officials have offered mixed messages on the purpose of military threats, suggesting goals ranging from the protection of protesters, the possibility of regime change, the promotion of freedom and democracy, striking more favorable diplomatic deals, and the need to reassert U.S. credibility. Such varied aims leave the strategic objectives of a potential strike unclear—and raise the risk that military action becomes a substitute for strategy. Moreover, military tools are unlikely to achieve any of these objectives, and may only make the situation worse. 

 Military Force is Unlikely to Advance U.S. Goals in Iran   

The most urgent rationale for using military force is to protect Iranian civilians. Reports on the death toll from the current unrest vary, but even cautious estimates suggest casualties in the thousands. Even with the government imposing a total internet blackout, the reports that have emerged make it clear the leadership sees the current protests as existential and has chosen to use the full force of the state’s security forces against its people. President Trump has repeatedly threatened Iranian leaders if they use force against the protesters, posting early in the crisis that the United States. is “locked and loaded” and would come to the protesters “rescue” if the killing continued. He later told Iranians to “keep protesting” and that “help is on the way.” 

But military strikes are unlikely to prevent Iran’s security forces from killing civilians. Striking the headquarters of the IRGC or other state institutions responsible for the killing may rattle the leadership. But as Israel’s previous killing of top IRGC officials has demonstrated, it is difficult to dismantle an expansive security apparatus through external military intervention alone. Moreover, previous attacks only led to more repression as paranoia about external intelligence infiltration led to mass arrests and executions. In this respect, military strikes can backfire and lead to even more indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians.

What if the objective is more expansive, aiming to not only protect protesters but to topple the regime itself? Trump’s statements moved in this direction as the protests gained momentum, encouraging the Iranian people to “Make Iran Great Again.” Senator Lindsey Graham and other U.S. officials have even been donning ‘Make Iran Great Again’ hats, branding Iran’s uprising as a MAGA movement. Though initially reluctant to meet former Iranian crown prince Reza Pahlavi, who has been actively encouraging protesters to overthrow the regime, senior White House envoy Steve Witkoff reportedly met Pahlavi last weekend. However, Trump has questioned Pahlavi’s support inside the country, suggesting he might be seeking information about potential alternative leaders should the Islamic Republic fall.

But the use of external military force to topple regimes has a poor track record historically. Without armed opposition forces on the ground, airpower alone has rarely succeeded in ousting governments. Peaceful protesters on the streets are not an army. They are not organized to take on the massive security capabilities of the Iranian state. This is not Syria, where an armed opposition had been organizing for years and exercising autonomy in parts of the country during the civil war before the surprising opportunity to advance to Damascus and overthrow Bashar al-Assad. Without defections and other signs of splintering among Iran’s security forces and leadership, regime collapse is unlikely. So far, such fissures have not emerged, even after the significant military setbacks during the Israeli and American attacks in June.

Another goal often linked to overthrowing the regime is the desire to see Iran transition to democratic governance, which is the aspiration for many Iranians inside and outside the country. Trump’s social media postings at times refer to his support for freedom in Iran, but the actions of his second administration suggest little interest in such objectives. The Venezuela model, that some fear may be in store for Iran, demonstrated that the administration was content with a change of leadership, not a change of the regime or its repressive machinery. Even if democracy, human rights and accountability were higher priorities for this administration, research on foreign military interventions suggests they tend to bring more repression and violence than democracy. There is little reason to believe Iran would prove an exception.

Another argument for military force is that it can advance diplomacy, forcing Iran’s leaders to accept terms they previously refused, such as the permanent suspension of uranium enrichment within the country, which has proven a major sticking point in nuclear negotiations. However, the use of military force in June did not move the Iranians to more accommodating positions. Instead of returning to the negotiating table, Iran’s leaders focused on restoring military capabilities, particularly missile capacity, to deter future attacks and make such attacks more costly for the United States and Israel. And in the aftermath of such unprecedented bloodshed in Iran, the political appetite for a deal in Washington is likely diminished. Military escalation tends to disrupt diplomatic processes, not encourage them, as evidenced when the June attacks derailed the Omani-mediated nuclear talks after five rounds of meetings.  

Finally, what if the objective is a show of force to maintain credibility, allowing Trump to claim he acted on his threats without risking prolonged military engagement. Trump prefers military operations that are decisive and short, and that do not require ground troops that could risk quagmires like Afghanistan and Iraq. But just because military operations may be conceived as limited does not mean that they are without risks. Iran has already threatened to retaliate against U.S. bases in neighboring countries if attacked. There are also secondary impacts, including the prospect that even limited strikes lead to unanticipated escalation, spilling over the borders to neighboring states and destabilizing global oil markets. Such concerns, which are not hypothetical as we saw during the June war, explain why regional states, particularly in the Gulf, lobbied Trump to refrain from an attack. 

A Smarter Way to Stand with Iranians

While it is still unclear what the administration is trying to achieve in Iran, military strikes are unlikely to advance any conceivable U.S. objective. The most immediate priority should be to help the Iranian people, and there are more effective and less dangerous ways to do so than resorting to force. 

One way to support Iranian protesters is to improve their ability to communicate with each other and the outside world during internet shutdowns and ensure that reliable information about the protests is available. Internet censorship circumvention tools like Starlink satellite terminals are already being utilized to send videos and images of the protests out of the country, and SpaceX has allowed for free access during this emergency. But relying only on private sector companies and the discretion of its leadership can be risky, and should not replace funding for governmental and nongovernmental organizations working in the internet freedom area, funding that the Trump administration has cut and is under pressure to restore. Funding for NGOs that help investigate and expose AI manipulated media that can be used by the Iranian government and other external actors to distort the nature of the unrest is also critical to document crimes and allow for accountability in the future. 

Another useful step to help Iranians who may be facing increased dangers within the country would be to reverse the current visa restrictions on Iranians who are seeking asylum in the United States and halt deportation flights of Iranians already in the country. The Trump administration sent two planeloads of Iranians seeking refuge in the United States back to Iran before the current protests, Iranians who were sure to face persecution upon their return. Future deportation flights at this perilous time in Iran would be particularly callous.

Finally, this is a moment for a global response, not unilateral military action. The U.S. government should be activating mechanisms like the United Nations, the Human Rights Council, and trans-Atlantic forums to hold those responsible for the killing to account. This is particularly difficult as the administration has withdrawn the United States from dozens of international organizations that press for accountability and rule of law across the world, not to mention the dismantling of U.S. agencies and nongovernmental organizations focused on supporting civil society and democratic governance. 

Ultimately, if the aim is to help the Iranian people, the best approach is to empower them to do it on their own without the complications and dangers of external military intervention. This is an Iranian uprising, and it is up to the people of Iran to decide their own future.

The post Military Force Will Not Help the People of Iran appeared first on Just Security.

Iran has failed to effectively deter or defend itself against these massive attacks that have shown Israeli intelligence capable of penetrating deep inside the country. But Tehran has nonetheless managed to launch a series of direct and deadly missile attacks on central and northern Israel. Various reports suggest Iran is eager to return to the negotiating table and that President Donald Trump is seeking a meeting between his Iran envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, but the Iranians are sending mixed messages about their willingness to return to negotiations as long as the Israeli attacks continue.

Meanwhile, there are growing calls from Israeli officials and some of Trump’s closest political allies for the U.S. military to join the fight. Trump signed the G-7 summit statement calling for de-escalation after initial resistance, but left the summit early, with his own statements that also sent mixed signals about future U.S. military involvement.

For many years both Iran and Israel had reasons to avoid a direct war of this nature, and many in the region and globally sought to prevent it. But those days are over. The war is here, and it is not clear if there is anyone willing or able to stop it.

Israel is Unlikely to Stop

For years, Israeli leaders have focused on the challenge of a nuclear Iran, as well as Iran’s expanding missile capabilities, and support for non-state proxy forces across the region forming the so-called “axis of resistance” against Israel. At various points, particularly in the 2011-2012 period, Israel considered using military force against Iran’s nuclear program. It ultimately decided against such unilateral action because of concerns about alienating Washington as well as a recognition that, on its own, Israel could not fully destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities. For much of the recent decade, Israel has instead fought Iran indirectly and covertly, through a shadow war of sabotage, cyberattacks, and assassinations of nuclear scientists.

The shadow war largely subsided (outside of Syria, where Israel carried out regular airstrikes against Iranian-linked targets) during the short time the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, was in place. But after Trump withdrew from the deal in 2018, Israel’s targeting of Iranian nuclear and military assets resumed and expanded. Israel refrained from publicly acknowledging responsibility for such attacks, providing a cover that helped contain Iranian retaliation. During this time, the Iranians were never eager for a direct conflict with Israel given Israel’s far superior conventional power and its backing from Washington.

The October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks changed Israel’s strategic calculus in transformative ways. The attacks instilled a sense of vulnerability Israel had not experienced since its founding. The military campaign it launched in response quickly extended beyond Gaza, as the country attempted to restore deterrence and degrade the capabilities of its regional adversaries. For Israeli leaders, and not just Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Iran was always the ultimate target given its backing for groups fighting Israel, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to Iraqi Shia militant groups to the Houthis in Yemen.

With Israel’s military successes against Hezbollah last summer, and its degradation of Iranian air defenses in its attack against Iran in October, Israeli confidence in its ability to further degrade Iran’s capabilities without suffering serious retaliation increased substantially. Israeli military and strategic analysts believe Iran’s resilience was overestimated — and Israel’s military capabilities underestimated.

As is now evident to everyone, Israeli planners perceived a unique window of opportunity to strike Iran while it remained vulnerable. Even though Trump stated publicly he didn’t want Israel to strike Iran while negotiations were underway, Israelis likely calculated, correctly as it turns out, that once the strike became a reality no U.S. president would abandon Israel even if the United States would not directly join the attack. Israeli officials reportedly believed they had a green light for a strike from the Trump administration, and Trump himself has since said that he was fully informed ahead of the strike and supported it.

A military strike without full U.S. participation may seem strategically questionable given it is well known that Israel’s military capabilities on their own are unlikely to fully destroy Iran’s widely dispersed and deeply buried nuclear facilities. But from the Israeli perspective, military force is not always about achieving a definitive strategic victory. It’s about using force to manage conflicts. Even slowing down Iran’s nuclear program is a win, no matter how many times they might have to go back and attack again. Such attacks could also destabilize the Iranian government, an added benefit from Israel’s viewpoint if it leads to the collapse of the Islamic Republic. From the Israeli perspective, the military campaign is working, leaving little reason to halt the effort now. Former Israeli officials assess Israeli operations could continue for weeks.

The U.S. Position

Trump and other senior U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that the United States is not involved in the war, but the Iranians view the United States as complicit in the attack. Some Israeli reporting even suggests that Trump and other senior U.S. officials helped Israel deceive the Iranians into believing they were not in harm’s way as long as U.S. talks with Iran were underway to help Israel launch the initial surprise attack. Now that the Trump administration has been unable or unwilling to prevent this Israeli gambit, there is an increased risk that the United States will become further involved in the war. It is widely understood that to definitively set back Iran’s nuclear program through military force, Iran’s deeply buried enrichment facility at Fordo would need to be destroyed, something that only U.S. military capabilities could achieve.

Nonetheless, Trump continued to claim he wants peace and for Iran to return to the negotiating table. On Monday, he sent mixed signals: “I think Iran basically is at the negotiating table where they want to make a deal, and as soon as I leave here, we’re going to be doing something,” Trump told reporters in Canada. Hours later, he posted on Truth Social, “Everyone should immediately evacuate Tehran!” He did not say why. He has also said that there cannot be peace if Iran has nuclear weapons.

Trump’s aspirations for diplomacy are seemingly based on the notion that Iran will be forced to capitulate at the negotiating table because of Israel’s overwhelming military pressure. But it is difficult to see diplomacy succeeding soon in the aftermath of such a destructive war. Israel not only killed Iran’s top military leadership, including the current head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, but also reportedly the Supreme Leader’s adviser overseeing nuclear diplomacy efforts. The next round of talks was cancelled after Israel’s attack began. Trump’s initial inflammatory statements after the strikes, threatening that Iran needs to accept a deal or “nothing will be left” were not conducive to encouraging diplomacy.

Trump may also be misreading Iran. The Iranian regime was unlikely to capitulate to maximalist demands like abandoning all domestic nuclear enrichment even before these attacks. It would be less likely to do so now when it has little reason to trust that a new deal on less favorable terms will guarantee its survival. This calculation is even more likely now given the widening scope of Israeli military actions. The Iranians may opt for a strategy of resistance in a bid for survival in the midst of what many expect to be a prolonged conflict. Iran’s foreign minister said Iran would continue retaliating as long as Israeli attacks continue and is demanding a ceasefire before the resumption of talks. Trump would have to exert considerable pressure on Israel to halt its attacks at a time when Israel feels it has the upper hand. There has been little evidence to date that Trump has been willing to do so in any meaningful way like threatening arms shipments.

Absent a return to diplomacy that could stave off further Israeli strikes, U.S. choices are now realistically to commit U.S. troops and resources and join the attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, stay out of an offensive operation but continue to help defend Israel against Iranian missile strikes, or actively work to contain this war even without the prospects for an imminent nuclear deal. Based on Trump’s approach to Israel to date, as evidenced in Gaza, he is more likely to let Israel’s campaign run its course, with all the costs that could entail, including the possibility the United States could get involved more deeply than Trump might have wanted.

Indeed, despite Trump’s persistent insistence that he doesn’t want the United States involved in Middle East wars, it is not difficult to contemplate scenarios where the United States nonetheless gets further embroiled in this war beyond its current efforts to defend Israel from Iran’s missile strikes (President Joe Biden also helped defend Israel from Iranian missile and drone launches in April and October of 2024). Trump has already threatened to retaliate against Iran “at levels never seen before” if Iran attacks U.S. targets. But if Israeli attacks and Iranian retaliation continues, it will be difficult to ensure Americans are not caught in the crossfire, even if unintended.

With over half a million Americans living in Israel, Iran’s increasingly indiscriminate retaliatory strikes could lead to American casualties. A resumption of Iraqi militia attacks on U.S. forces is also possible, though Iran is likely to be cautious about such direct attacks, or other provocative moves like closing the Straits of Hormuz or attacking U.S. bases in the Gulf, as the United States weighs military options. Still, militia forces, particularly the Houthis in Yemen, are not always aligned with Tehran, and continued strikes against Israeli interests as the Gaza war continues alongside the Israel-Iran war could lead to American casualties. American deaths could be the red line that ultimately pushes Trump to join Israel’s war on Iran.

If Not the United States, Who?

If the Trump administration is unwilling or unable to contain and ultimately end this war, who could step in and play that role? Trump has talked about Russia mediating, which has good ties with both Iran and Israel. Russia is unlikely to want to see the collapse of the Islamic Republic. But the swift demise of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria was a clear demonstration that even after years of defending Assad, Russia was unable to save it. Instead, Russia prioritized its war against Ukraine. And since Russia supplied significant military capacity to Iran, which the Israelis are currently trying to destroy, it’s unlikely the Israelis would view Russia as looking out for their interests. European states such as France have already rejected the idea of Russian mediation. In many ways, a protracted conflict that bogs down the United States and Europe is not the worst scenario for Russia as it continues its fight in Ukraine.

As for the Europeans, they are largely taking Israel’s side in this war, despite their growing opposition to Israeli actions in Gaza. In the past, Europe served as an important channel for defusing U.S.-Iranian tensions. But in the aftermath of Iran’s arming Russia with drones to attack Ukrainian cities, not to mention increased targeting of European nationals by the Iranian government in recent years, European hostility toward Iran has grown. In this context it is not surprising that French President Emmanuel Macron vowed to defend Israel and blamed Iran for destabilizing the Middle East. The United Kingdom sent fighter jets to the region as British Prime Minister Keir Starmer refused to rule out defending Israel against Iranian attacks.

In the current fractured geopolitical environment, where the United Nations Security Council is paralyzed by division, the U.N. is also hamstrung. In conflicts like this one, the U.N. tends to condemn continued military escalation and repeatedly calls for de-escalation but with little ability to do much to bring wars to an end. This pattern has played out in Gaza repeatedly. Indeed, today’s wars–from Gaza to Ukraine to Sudan–only underscore how fragile, if not in tatters, the international rules-based order has become.

Against this backdrop, less traditional players may step in to try to contain the conflict, such as regional powers like the Saudis, who have been playing an increasingly active mediating role. The Chinese also have a strong interest in regional stability to protect their energy interests, and have also shown increased interest in mediation as their brokering of the Saudi-Iran agreement to resume diplomatic relations in March 2023 demonstrated. Still, the prospects that the Saudis, other Arab powers, or the Chinese can provide a successful off-ramp to end the Israel-Iran war is a long-shot given current Israeli strategic thinking and continued American backing for what appears to be increasingly maximalist goals, both vis-à-vis Iran but also toward the Palestinians.

What Comes Next

Without an off-ramp, several bad to very bad outcomes are possible. The conflict could spill over to inflame the entire region, just as we saw in the case of the protracted Gaza war—Houthi strikes disrupting global maritime traffic, Iran-backed militias in Iraq resuming attacks on U.S. forces, spikes in oil prices if critical oil routes are shut down or disrupted. If Iranian leaders believe they will continue to face existential attacks regardless of the nature of their retaliation or willingness to return to the negotiating table, there is a high probability they will more actively back signature tactics like terrorism against Israeli and American targets globally, believing that exacting a higher price may at least change the cost calculus for Trump. As many observers have noted, Iran may also resort to exiting the NPT and weaponizing its nuclear program to offset its inability to deter or defend itself from Israeli attacks through conventional means, the very outcome the Israeli strikes were intended to prevent.

But such drastic measures come with costs to Iran and are by no means assured. It is also possible Iran will bide its time and refrain from escalatory responses, either because it is unable do so after Israel’s devastating attacks or because it calculates that restraint may yield other benefits as Iranian leaders fight for their survival—including preserving political and economic lifelines with its Arab neighbors who also would reject a nuclear-armed Iran. Arab states have condemned the Israeli attacks and are resuming calls for a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East, an initiative Iran has supported in the past but which Israel opposes.

Some may hope that the tactical successes of the Israeli attacks will yield strategic wins that were previously unthinkable—like a more moderate and tamed Islamic Republic or its collapse entirely. But like those who thought the Iraq war would reshape the Middle East in positive directions, such wishful thinking can be dangerous, failing to think through far worse outcomes when military campaigns lack a clear strategic endgame or realistic assessments of future political outcomes. Unfortunately, even beyond the already heavy toll this war is taking on both the Iranian and Israeli people, its continuation can lead to much worse.

An off-ramp is desperately needed, but tragically the constellation of forces in Israel, the United States, and indeed worldwide make finding one extremely difficult.

The post Israel and Iran: A War with No Off-Ramp appeared first on Just Security.